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SUMMARY 
Little attention is paid to the civil remedies available when infringement of a trade mark 
or the right to goodwill occurs. Yet, for the owners of ~uch rights, these remedies are 
of much greater importance than theoretical considerations regarding the nature of the 
rights or what constitutes their infringement. 
This thesis analyses the civil remedies for trade mark infringement granted by the 
South African Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993. In the South African context, any 
consideration of civil remedies is rendered problematic by the attempted graft of 
English remedies onto a legal system with a different common-law background. 
It is, therefore, essential first to trace the English origin and application of these 
remedies, and then to determine whether each remedy is acceptable in terms of the 
South African common law. This is necessary, as our courts have previously rejected 
or adapted English remedies which were unknown to our common law but which 
Parliament introduced in legislation. 
The remedies of interdict (or injunction) in final and interlocutory form, compensatory 
damages, reasonable royalties, and delivery up are analysed from a substantive law 
and a procedural perspective. The procedural innovation of an inquiry as to damages 
is also considered. 
In respect of each remedy, (1) the English roots and development of the remedy are 
traced; (2) differences of approach in two other Commonwealth jurisdictions, Australia 
and Canada, are highlighted; (3) the development of the South African equivalent is 
detailed; and (4) suggestions for the future implementation of the remedy in South 
Africa are made. 
In the penultimate chapter, our common law and legislation (including the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 ) are measured against the requirements 
of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
Recommendations for the effective utilization of each remedy in South Africa are then 
made. They include suggestions for legislative amendment in respect of delivery up 
and an inquiry as to damages, and the introduction of statutory damages as an further 
civil remedy. 
Key !erms: Intellectual property; civil remedy; trade marks; passing off; interdict; 
injunction; damages; statutory damages; royalty; delivery up; inquiry. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 THE ISSUES DEALT WITH IN THIS THESIS 
When reading textbooks or court decisions on trade marks and passing off, it is 
remarkable how little attention is paid to the remedies available when infringement of 
a trade mark or the right to goodwill takes place. The reason for granting protection to 
trade marks and goodwill is primarily to allow the owner of these rights to enforce them. 
Yet, while volumes are filled with information on the nature of the rights, what they 
encompass, how to record and transfer them, and what constitutes infringement, a 
short chapter in a textbook, or a paragraph in a court decision is the only attention paid 
to the enforcement of such rights. 
This is not a uniquely South African phenomenon. However, in South Africa the 
problem is exacerbated by the graft of English remedies onto a legal system with 
different roots. 
The whole of our law of intellectual property is firmly grounded on English principles 
and concepts. This is not a serious problem as regards substantive statutory rights; 
they are described in our municipal law and their English origin is then irrelevant except 
as a source of reference. The assimilation of English remedies, however, is not as 
simple. Parliament has frequently attempted to incorporate English remedies by mere 
reference in intellectual property legislation. This is found most frequently in copyright 
legislation. Remedies such as conversion and detention, account of profits, and 
exemplary and additional damages have all been named as forms of relief, without any 
explanation of what they comprised or how they were to be applied in a South African 
context. The Trade Marks Act of 1993 is not immune to criticism: it states that remedies 
such as delivery up, inquiries as to damages, and reasonable royalties are available, 
without any explanation of what these statutory innovations mean. When enforcement 
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of these remedies is sought, our courts either hold that they are not available in South 
Africa or reduce them to procedural relief falling within their inherent jurisdiction. 
Not surprisingly, none of the remedies listed above has been consistently granted by 
our courts. Yet all of them have been introduced in an attempt to assist the owners of 
intellectual property rights in their battle against infringers. 
I have tried to place the civil remedies listed in the Trade Marks Act of 1993 in their 
historical context and to determine whether they are appropriate for the South African 
legal system. Each remedy is considered in both a substantive law and a procedural 
context, as both contexts affect the implementation and value of the remedies in the 
different jurisdictions. 
For reasons of space, I have limited this study to those remedies specifically listed in 
the Trade Marks Act of 1993. Although the Act provides that these remedies are 
available only for infringement of registered trade marks, it is generally accepted that 
they are also available when the right to goodwill is infringed. For this reason, the 
remedies are analysed both as regards trade mark infringement and passing off: when 
the remedies do not have identical application, this is indicated. Many of the remedies 
are also available in the event of infringement ofother forms of intellectual property and 
so the discussion and conclusions are also of more general relevance. 
2 METHODOLOGY 
All the remedies enumerated in the Trade Marks Act of 1993 are available in English 
law. While a number of them have always been available in terms of our common law, 
the enormous influence of English precedent and legislation in the field of intellectual 
property has meant that even traditional remedies, such as damages or interdicts, have 
acquired an English flavour when applied in this field. This has led to confusion as to 
the requirements which must be met before such remedies are available to South 
African litigants. Those remedies which are foreign to our common law have frequently 
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been rejected out of hand, merely because they are of English origin, without a 
consideration of whether they can be adapted to meet our common-law requirements. 
It is for this reason that each remedy is first dealt with from an English law perspective. 
The origin and development of the remedy in England is traced, and its current 
application in English trade mark infringement and passing off decisions described. 
The origin and development of the equivalent South African remedy is then discussed, 
followed by a consideration of the application of the remedy in our trade mark law. 
Where a specific remedy is unknown to our common law, I have tried to determine 
whether the remedy can be justified in terms of general legal principles and, if so, how 
it should be implemented in South Africa so as to accord with these principles. 
The application of these remedies in the Commonwealth jurisdictions of Australia and 
Canada is sufficiently similar to the English position to make a full comparison 
unnecessary. However, South Africa's readmission to the Commonwealth on 1 June 
1994 justifies discussion where these jurisdictions have diverged from or adapted the 
English approach. 
Differences between the remedies in the various jurisdictions are then highlighted and 
analysed. 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 1 
concluded in Uruguay in 1993 and signed in Marrakesh in 1994, is the first international 
agreement2 on the minimum enforcement procedures which members must make 
available to the owners of intellectual property rights. As all the countries mentioned 
in the thesis are members of the World Trade Organization, their compliance with the 
provisions of this agreement is considered. 
1 Annexure Ill to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
2 Previous attempts to harmonise national trade mark legislation, such as the EC Directive of 
1988, did not deal with the remedies for infringement. 
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Finally, suggestions are made for the future implementation of each remedy in South 
Africa, taking into account both its application by our courts and its compliance with 
the TRIPS requirements. 
3 SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is primarily a comparison between English and South African law. As stated 
earlier, Australian and Canadian developments are considered when they diverge from 
the English position. A comparison with similar remedies applied in the Continental 
legal systems is futile, as the whole focus of our courts and legislature in the 
intellectual property field has been on English developments. A comparison with the 
American position has not been attempted for the same reason. But where guidance 
on the application of a remedy cannot be found in English law, reference has been 
made to American decisions. 
Questions concerning the nature of the right to be enforced, and proof of infringement, 
have not been considered except when they are relevant to the implementation of a 
particular remedy. They are then discussed in that context only. 
4 STRUCTUREOFTHETHES~ 
The historical development of the remedies available to the owners of trade marks and 
goodwill is described in chapter 2. No attempt is made to give a general history of the 
development of trade mark rights - this would require a separate thesis. 
Coercive relief in the form of final and interlocutory interdicts is considered in chapters 
3 and 4. 
Chapter 5 deals with the compensatory relief of damages and reasonable royalties. As 
these remedies appear inadequate, it is suggested that a further type of damages, 
statutory damages, be introduced. 
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The new procedural relief for obtaining damages by means of an inquiry as to damages 
is dealt with in chapter 6, while chapter 7 considers how the remedy of delivery up 
should be applied in South Africa. 
Finally, the TRIPS requirements are set out in chapter 8 and the compliance of, in 
particular, English and South African legislation with these requirements is assessed. 
Chapter 9 contains brief recommendations for the implementation or amendment of 
statutory civil remedies in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER2 
HISTORICAL SURVEY OF REMEDIES 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the historical development of the civil remedies available when trade 
mark infringement or passing off occurs will be sketched briefly. The emphasis 
throughout will be placed on these remedies, rather than on the development of the 
rights which are protected. When the nature of the right to be protected is relevant to 
a specific remedy, it will be dealt with when the remedy is considered. 
Any consideration of this development requires a study of English, rather than Roman 
and Roman-Dutch, legal history. It is trite to say that South African intellectual property 
law is based on English equivalents; the English influence on this area of law is greater 
than on any other. Until the most recent South African legislation was promulgated, 
trade mark legislation in South Africa was a virtual reprint of equivalent English 
provisions. 
Unfortunately, in this wholesale adoption, English remedies unknown to our common 
law were incorporated in South African legislation. This has resulted in enormous 
confusion as to the application and extent of such remedies. A general survey of how 
trade mark remedies changed as the nature of the rights developed can be made only 
by tracing English history. It is only when specific remedies are discussed later in this 
thesis that it becomes necessary to refer to our common law to determine how these 
remedies apply in South Africa. The focus in this chapter is therefore on English, rather 
than South African, historical developments. 
The historical development of the remedies for trade mark infringement and passing 
off differs substantially from that of the remedies available for other forms of intellectual 
property infringement. Although trade marks have a much older pistory than other forms 
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of intellectual property, statutory protection was granted only at a much later stage. In 
addition, before the current trade mark legislation in England and South Africa, 
legislation never spelt out the remedies available to the proprietor of an infringed mark. 
During the Middle Ages, when markings were controlled by the guilds and their function 
was to control defective workmanship, misuse of these markings carried only penal 
sanctions. As the concept of a trade mark altered and the structure of British courts 
became more formalised, the nature of the action to prevent infringement also changed 
from a criminal to a civil action. At common law, actions were based on deceit and 
damages were the only relief that common-law courts could grant. In equity courts, 
introduced to alleviate the limitations of the common law, actions to prevent trade mark 
misuse came to be based on property rights. Although damages could not be 
recovered, fraud was not an essential element of the action and injunctions could be 
obtained. In addition, the equitable remedies of accounts and delivery up were 
available to successful plaintiffs. 
Unlike other legislation dealing with intellectual property, when statutory protection was 
finally given to trade marks, it did not specify the remedies available to proprietors 
when their trade marks were infringed. But it has always been accepted that all 
common-law and equitable remedies available in respect of the infringement of other 
property rights are available for trade mark infringement and passing off. 1 
2 EARLY HISTORY 
The standard English text on trade marks warns readers that a discussion of the history 
of trade marks prior to 1875 'is a mixture of what actually happened with myth drawn 
from decisions over the years of various courts';2 an earlier edition of the same work 
states bluntly that 'the law on this subject cannot be traced back further than the 
1 Comish (1996) 54; Kerly (1986) 317 and 422. 
2 Kerly (1986) 1 footnote 2. 
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nineteenth century'. 3 While it is correct that formal legislation governing trade marks 
in England did not exist before 1875, a brief survey of the little that is known about the 
precursors to modern trade marks still offers a useful perspective. 
2.1 MARKINGS IN CLASSICAL TIMES 
It is trite that marks have been used since antiquity,4 and it is unnecessary for present 
purposes to speculate on the function of these earliest marks, branded onto cattle or 
found on pottery fragments. Logic seems to indicate that such markings were not all 
intended to fulfil the same purpose and that some marks were indicators of ownership, 
others of the source of goods. Similarly, although it is clear that forms of trade marks 
existed in Greek and Roman times,5 no Roman text deals with any form of legal 
structure or organisation acknowledging or protecting such marks.6 This absence of any 
contemporaneous literature makes a discussion of such marks futile, as it is impossible 
to ascertain with any certainty how they were protected. 
2.2 MEDIEVAL MARKINGS 
In medieval Europe and England, marks were in common use and various types of 
mark could be identified, each performing a different function. Personal marks, such as 
coats of arms and seals, identified individuals, or, as house marks, the family living 
there. 7 
Proprietary marks were used to indicate ownership of goods. Such marks were 
3 Kerly (1923) 2. 
4 See Burrell (1976) 35-36; Diamond (1975) 266-272; Rogers (1910) 29-30. 
5 Diamond (1975) 271; Vukmir (1992) 127-131. 
6 Rogers ( 1910) 32, quoting from Kohler Das Recht des Markenschutzes Wurzburg ( 1884) 41. 
See also Paster (1969) 554-555; Vukmir (1992) 127, 130-131. 
7 Diamond (1975) 272-273. 
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frequently derived from the personal mark of the owner but, in these instances, served 
a different function. These marks were used to identify the goods, tools, and cattle of 
individuals and later, with the growth of trade, were used by merchants to identify their 
ownership of goods in transit. This identification was to identify goods for handlers who 
were illiterate or to enable a merchant to establish ownership in case of loss and 
subsequent salvage of his goods.8 These marks were an important development in the 
evolution of the concept of trade marks, as they were seen as prima facie or even 
conclusive evidence of ownership of the goods on which they appeared. 9 No 
information is available on the remedies for misuse of such marks. 
These marks did not fulfil the functions of a trade mark but were merely indicators of 
ownership. It was only with the introduction of the guilds that the precursor to the 
modern trade mark first made its appearance. 
3 ENGLAND 
3.1 ENGLISH HISTORY BEFORE LEGISLATION 
3.1.1 Guild production marks 
In the fourteenth century, English trade was dominated by the guild system, in which 
groups of artisans in the same trade worked under a strict controlling body. These 
organisations, known as guilds, controlled the various industries of the time and 
supervised manufacturing processes and trade.10 Most guilds were created with the 
approval of the civic authorities and were controlled by them, with occasional friction 
as to the delegation of authority, although some guilds were independent of the local 
8 Melikan (1990) 173. 
9 Paster (1969) 559. Schechter (1925) 26-34 gives many examples of Admiralty Court records and 
argues that the statute of 27 Edward Ill indicates that such marks were accepted as proving 
ownership of the goods concerned (at 34). 
10 Holdsworth (1924) 321-322. 
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authorities. 11 The various guilds usually held a monopoly in respect of their trade in 
their town or area, 12 but were then expected to enforce high standards of production. 
To do so, compulsory marks had to be affixed to every article produced by a guild 
craftsman. Each member had a different mark and the quality of a member's produce 
could be controlled in this way. The purpose of these production marks was both to 
facilitate the tracing of defective wares so as to punish the craftsman concerned, and 
to assist the guild authorities in identifying non-members to prevent them from selling 
their produce within the area of the guild monopoly. 13 So, for the craftsmen concerned, 
these production marks were originally a liability, not an asset. Guild members were 
not encouraged to establish an individual, as opposed to a collective, goodwill. 14 
Misuse of guild marks was subject to severe penalties, imposed by the guild 
organisation or the leet courts of the time.15 Penalties were corporal punishment, 
forfeiture of the offending goods, and fines payable to either the guild or the local or 
state authorities.16 It does not appear that the individual guild member had a civil action 
against someone who misappropriated his mark. This is understandable, as the mark 
was not viewed as having a commercial value for him personally, but rather as falling 
under the control of the guild. On occasion, part of the fine was to be paid to the rightful 
user of the misused mark; but references to this practice are limited to specific types 
of guild mark and are so vague as to be inconclusive. 
In industries dealing with non-perishable commodities capable of transportation, 
however, some marks did acquire a secondary significance as an indication of quality.11 
11 Cunningham (1915) 338 and 341. 
12 Holdsworth (1956) 568. 
13 Schechter (1925) 47. 
14 Idem at 38 and 44. 
15 Cunningham (1915) 222. A leet court was a court in which municipal matters were decided -
each leet comprising what would in modern terminology be understood as a ward: Hudson 
(1892) xxxvii. 
16 Schechter (1925) 51 and 55. 
17 Idem at 63. 
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The cloth trade was one of the first trades where such a development occurred. Wool 
was the major English export in the later Middle Ages, and at an early stage the 
government regulated this industry through guild officials or, as the influence of the 
guilds began to wane, through its own officials. 18 Weavers from less esteemed areas 
began to imitate or forge both the collective marks of the best-known manufacturing 
centres and the marks of individual weavers from those centres. The Privy Council 
made many regulations to prevent such forgeries and maintain the standards of the 
cloth industry.19 Punishment for the misappropriation of marks was imposed by the Star 
Chamber, the administrative court responsible for such commercial matters, and took 
the form of heavy fines and the pillory.20 So in time these marks, which originated as 
guild control marks, came to be viewed as identifying the excellence of a manufacturing 
source and were valued and protected as such. But cloth marks were never viewed as 
assets which could exist independently of the specific craftsman or which could enjoy 
judicial, rather than administrative, protection. 
This realisation finally evolved through the changing perception of cutlers' marks, which 
also started out as guild marks. The cutlery trade, responsible not only for knives but 
all weapons and war material, was arranged in geographic monopolies. Early records 
of the various companies show that some form of ownership was acknowledged, that 
marks could be sold or leased, and that marks were transferable, with a widow enjoying 
the right to a life estate in the mark and being able to claim a reversion of it.21 This right 
was statutorily confirmed in 1801. This Act can be viewed as the first statutory 
acknowledgement of a trade mark as an independent asset of value to its owner. 22 The 
Court of the Cutlers Company was responsible for the protection of cutlers' marks, but 
18 ldemat81. 
19 Idem at 87 and 90-93 details some of these regulations. 
20 Guy (1985) 46 and 58. 
21 Schechter (1925) 121. 
22 41 Geo Ill c 97 (as quoted by Schechter (1925) 121): 'to bequeath his mark, as his other 
personalty, by his will, his widow, thereby not to be thereby prevented from carrying on the trade, 
or selling the right to the mark, for her lifetime, to any other person carrying on the trade'. 
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it appears that, while this court was empowered to impose penalties on offenders,23 a 
civil action by the user of the mark against infringers was not available. 
3.1.2 Post-guild marks 
The strength of the guilds began to decline in the middle of the fifteenth century, as 
inroads were made into their monopolies. They remained a controlling force in respect 
of guild marks until the seventeenth century, as they remained responsible for the 
discipline of their members and the control of the quality of their produce. So the 
protection of marks, whether guild marks or otherwise, was more usually exercised by 
guild and administrative courts, such as the Star Chamber, than by common-law courts. 
3.2 LITIGATION BEFORE LEGISLATION 
3.2.1 Common-law courts 
It is unclear when the protection of marks shifted away from administrative courts to the 
common-law courts.24 Early common-law actions were instituted by purchasers of 
fraudulently marked goods. The action was based on deceit.25 Damages were awarded 
for any loss which the purchaser had suffered. When the owners of marks commenced 
proceedings at common law, they were also obliged to base their action on deceit, as 
the common law had a limited number of forms of action and did not recognise any 
property right to a trade mark. It is commonly accepted that Southern contains the first 
reference to a trade mark in a common-law court. This 1618 case, while not itself 
dealing with trade mark infringment, contains a dictum by the judge referring to an 
Elizabethan action concerning the infringement of a clothier's mark. Various conflicting 
23 Schechter (1925) 118. 
24 See Paster (1969) 563-564. 
25 Kiralfy (1962) 428. 
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reports of this decision exist26 and the reference is generally viewed as being too 
unreliable to afford definite confirmation that civil actions to protect trade marks were 
known before 1600.27 The decision is not helpful for purposes of this investigation, 
primarily because one report states that action was instituted by the trader whose mark 
had been infringed,28 another that the purchaser of the cloth was the plaintiff,29 while the 
remainder are silent on this point. So the basis of the action cannot be determined. 
Despite the vagueness of this reference, this decision was cited in an eighteenth 
century law dictionary as authority for the statement that 'if one man shall use the mark 
of another, to the intent to do him damage, action upon the case lieth'.30 The first 
reported decision which dealt with trade marks as such in a common-law court, 
Singelton,31 was heard in 1783, more than a century later. Here the court held that 'if 
the defendant had sold a medicine of his own under the plaintiff's name or mark, that 
would be a fraud for which an action would lie'.32 The action was dismissed, as no 
evidence was presented that the defendant had sold his preparation as if it were that 
of the plaintiff, and the action could not be maintained on the ground of any property 
right of the plaintiff 'there being no patent, nor any letters of administration'. By 1824, 
it was accepted, without need to cite authority, that an action was maintainable 'against 
another person who adopted the same mark for the purpose of denoting that that his 
goods were manufactured by the plaintiff' .33 A few years later, the concept of a trade 
mark had already developed to the extent that a court would hold that 'the act of the 
26 Southern (Popham) (1659) 143; Southern (Rolle.1) (1676) 5; Southern (Rolle.2) 28; Southern 
(Croke) (1659) 471; Southern (Bridgman) (1659) 125. 
27 Rogers (1910) 40 footnote 30; Schechter (1925) 7-8. 
28 Southern (Popham) (1659) 144. 
29 Southern (Croke) (1659) 471. 
30 Jacob (1772), definition of 'mark to goods'. The citation is given as 2 Cro 471 rather than 3 Cro 
471, but this appears to be a misprint. 
31 Singelton (1783) 293. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Sykes (1824) 541. 
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defendant was a fraud against the plaintiff; and if it occasioned him no specific damage, 
it was still, to a certain extent, an injury to his right' and that the plaintiff was entitled to 
some damages in consequence. 34 At common law, once the existence of an action for 
trade mark infringement had been recognised, it was always instituted as an action for 
deceit, with proof offraud on the defendant's part being an essential requirement. 35 This 
was so despite the fact that it was the purchaser, who was not a party to the action, 
rather than the plaintiff, who had been deceived. 36 
Common-law courts were also able only to award damages, which was frequently not 
the most useful relief for the plaintiff. But despite the unsatisfactory nature of the relief 
available at common law, it was frequently necessary first to establish a legal right at 
common law before an injunction would be granted by a chancery court. 37 After 1862, 
when Sir John Rolt's Act allowed an equity court to determine the validity of a plaintitrs 
title itself, rather than requiring him to prove it at common law before approaching an 
equity court for injunctive relief,38 trade mark actions were more commonly instituted in 
courts of equity.39 
34 Blofeld ( 1833) 411. 
35 See, for example, Crawshay(1842) 385; Edelsten (1863) 199; Leather Cloth (1863) 139. The 
interpretation placed by Ludlow (1877) 13 on Crawshay is that 'the Court held that an intention 
on the defendants' part to deceive buyers, added to a probability that buyers would be deceived, 
was a sufficient ground of action'. 
36 LudlOYJ (1877) 14 argued that the action for trade mark infringement differed from a true action 
based on fraud, as in the former an attempt to deceive could ground the action, while in other 
instances fraud gave no ground of action unless it was successful. 
37 See Rodgers (1846) 325 and Morison (1841) 385. Counsel for the plaintiffs in Morison told the 
court that 'the action was not brought to recover damages, but to contest the right of the 
defendant to injure the plaintiffs by selling an imitation of their medicine as the genuine article' 
(at 391). Nominal damages of one farthing had been awarded. 
38 Section 1 of Sir John Rolt's Act 1862. 
39 See Ludlow (1877) 19 and Adams (1874) 36. 
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3.2.2 Equity courts 
The grant of injunctive relief by chancery courts was not initially a sine qua non. In 
17 42, in the earliest reported trade mark decision in which an injunction was sought, 
the court refused to assist the plaintiff, stating that there was no ground for the grant 
of an injunction.40 The first equity case in which an injunction was granted, in 1816, in 
respect of an infringed trade mark, is unreported, and merely referred to in an early 
nineteenth century textbook on injunctions.41 It concerned a manufacturer of blacking 
who was enjoined from using labels in imitation of those employed by the plaintiff. The 
first reported decision in which an injunction was granted seems to have been that of 
Gout, in 1833.42 But by 1838, a chancery court was prepared to grant an injunction even 
against innocent infringers. It held that as the plaintiffs had proved title to the marks in 
question, they were entitled to the court's assistance to enforce such title.43 By 1856, 
when a plaintiffs right to institute equity proceedings was queried by the defendant, the 
court held: 
'The plaintiff's equity is founded on the jurisdiction of this court to give relief in 
the shape of preventative justice in order to make more effectual a legal right, 
the legal right here being a right to have a particular trade-mark to designate a 
commodity .... [l]t is the right which any person designating his wares or 
commodities by a particular trade-mark, as it is called, has to prevent others 
from selling wares which are not his marked with that trade-mark in order to 
mislead the public and so incidentally to injure the person who is the owner of 
the trade-mark' .44 
40 Blanchard (1742) 485: 'Every particular trader has some particular mark or stamp; but I do not 
know any instance of granting an injunction here, to restrain one trader from using the same 
mark with another; and I think it would be a mischievous consequence to do so.' 
41 Eden (1821) 314 footnote (d). 
42 Gout (1833) 69. 
43 Millington (1838) 352. 
44 Farina (1856) 217. 
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The concept of a trade mark as property right, which could be enforced by injunctive 
relief, was confirmed a few years later in the Leather Cloth (1863) decision. 
3.3 ENGLISH LEGISLATION 
3.3.1 Early legislation 
Before the first legislation dealing specifically with trade marks was passed, some form 
of legal protection was given to specific types of mark. The earliest of these statutes, 
passed in 1581, dealt with waxmaking and trade in honey, and provided for these 
goods to be marked. The penalty for counterfeiting such marks, or using them without 
the consent of the persons whose names they signified, was a fine of five pounds, half 
to go to the Crown and the other half to the person deceived. It is unclear whether this 
person was the rightful user of the mark or a purchaser. If this fine could not be paid, 
the infringer was set on the pillory and subject to three months' imprisonment.45 
Similarly, in 1698 legislation was passed prohibiting the export of empty watchcases 
from England to foreign parts and requiring each watch or case to contain the maker's 
name. The penalty was a heavy fine, to be shared between the Crown and the 
complainant.46 legislation regulating the manufacture of linen in Scotland provided that 
manufacturers could fix some mark to the cloth they wove. On conviction as 
counterfeiter, a penalty of one hundred pounds was due, not to the Crown but for the 
use of the person whose mark had been counterfeited.47 Here we already find that use 
of a trade mark, while not compulsory, was clearly viewed as advantageous; the 
penalty cannot be described as a criminal sanction, as the proceeds went to the owner 
of the infringed mark. 
45 Section Vl(2) of 23 Eliz c 8. This statute is cited as authority by Jacob (1772) for his allegation 
that 'a penalty is inflicted in this case' when stating that 'if a man uses the mark of another, to 
do him damage, an action upon the case lies'. 
46 Section II of 9 & 1 O Wm Ill c 28. 
47 Section XXX of 13 Geo I c 26. 
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3.3.2 Previous trade mark legislation 
The first statute dealing with trade marks, the Merchandise Marks Act, was passed in 
1862. No provision is made for the registration of marks, nor is a trade mark defined. 
The Act contains primarily penal sanctions for the forging and counterfeiting of trade 
marks, but also deals with civil litigation. It provides that in common-law and equity 
suits either court48 may award an injunction, order destruction or disposal of the 
infringing articles, inspect the articles and processes used to commit the infringement, 
and award damages.49 This Act contained the most detailed provisions on the civil 
remedies available to the proprietor of an infringed mark of any English legislation 
before passage of the 1994 Act. 
The first Act containing registration provisions, the Trade Marks Registration Act 1875, 
makes registration a precondition for infringement proceedings, but does not mention 
what relief is available if infringement is proved.50 The 1876 amendment amends 
section 1 of the principal Act to provide that registration is a precondition 'to prevent or 
recover damages for the infringement of any trade-mark'. 51 The same phrase is used 
in the 1883 Act and, in respect of unregistered trade marks, in the 1905 Act. 52 Although 
the 1905 Act makes no mention of the relief available to a registered proprietor, the 
1919 Act provides that 'no injunction, interdict or other relief may be granted in respect 
of part B marks if the use complained of is not calculated to deceive.53 The 1938 Act 
48 It was possible for a common-law court to award an injunction after 1854, in terms of section 79 
of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854. Similarly, section 2 of the Lord Cairns' Act 1858 
permitted a chancery court to award damages if the court had jurisdiction to hear an application 
for an injunction. Both Acts were promulgated to prevent the necessity of instituting more than 
one suit to obtain both remedies. 
49 Sections 21 and 22 of the Merchandise Marks Act 1862. 
50 Section 1 of the Trade-Marks Registration Act 1875. 
51 Section 1 of the Trade-Marks Registration Amendment Act 1876. 
52 Section 77 of the Trade Marks Act 1883, section 42 of the Trade Marks Act 1905. 
53 Section 4 of the Trade Marks Act 1919. 
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contains a similar provision.54 
3.3.3 Current trade mark legislation 
The most recent legislation is the Trade Marks Act 1994, which for the first time since 
1862 details the remedies available to the proprietor of a registered trade mark which 
has been infringed. The White Paper of 1990 which preceded this Act made no 
mention of civil remedies, possibly because a major incentive for the amendment of 
English trade mark legislation was the EC Directive of 1988, which does not deal with 
remedies for infringement. Although this Directive, for the harmonisation of trade mark 
laws of member states, required compliance by 1992, the new English Act was not 
promulgated until 1994. So it is possible that the listing of remedies was introduced to 
accommodate TRIPS, which details the civil remedies which members must make 
available to holders of intellectual property rights. The 1994 Act provides that the relief 
by way of damages, injunctions, accounts or otherwise, available in respect of any 
other property right, is also available for trade mark infringement.55 Provision is also 
made for erasure of the offending mark or destruction of the infringing goods, as well 
as for the delivery up of infringing goods in certain circumstances.56 
4 AUSTRALIA 
Before federation, the various Australian colonies had the power to pass legislation 
governing trade marks. Most enacted legislation was similar to the British Merchandise 
Marks Act 1862 and the subsequent Trade Marks Registration Act 1875. The Trade 
Marks Act 1905 was the first legislation on the topic and was substantially similar to the 
English 1905 Act. This Act was reviewed in 1938 in the Knowles Report, but its 
54 Section 5 of the Trade Marks Act 1938. Neither the Goschen Report of 1934 nor the Mathys 
Report of 1974 considered civil remedies. 
55 Section 14(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). 
56 Sections 15, 16 and 19 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). 
20 Chapter 2: Historical survey of remedies 
suggestions were never implemented due to the outbreak of war. The Dean Report of 
1954 was prepared together with a draft Bill, which was enacted with minor 
amendments the following year. 
This Act57 remained in force until 1996. It provided that the relief a court could grant 
included an injunction and, except in the case of a trade mark registered in part C of 
the register, at the option of the plaintiff, either damages or an account of profits.58 The 
Act also provided that where a defendant was sued for passing off in respect of his use 
of a registered trade mark of which he was the proprietor, being a trade mark which 
was identical or similar to the plaintiff's mark, damages would not be awarded if he 
satisfied the court that he was unaware of the plaintiff's mark.59 The Act contained 
various penal provisions which included fines, imprisonment, and forfeiture.60 Statutory 
provision was not made for civil delivery up, but writers and the courts viewed erasure 
or delivery up as part of the courts' inherent equitable jurisdiction.61 
Following the Recommended Changes Report of 1992, draft trade mark legislation 
was published in 1994. This draft contained fundamental changes, including 
amendments in respect of offences and penalties,62 but nothing new in the field of civil 
remedies.63 
The Trade Marks Act 1995 came into effect at the beginning of 1996. It provides that 
a court may grant an injunction, subject to any condition that the court thinks fit, and, 
57 Trade Marks Act 1955 (Aus). 
58 Section 65 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Aus). Part C marks are certification marks (section 83). 
59 Section 68 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Aus). 
60 Sections 98-107. 
61 See Ricketson (1984) 720; Shanahan (1990) 359. 
62 Recommended Changes Report (1992) 114-116. For a discussion of this report and draft see 
Dwyer (1994) 41. 
63 The Discussion Paper (1991) Vllhich preceded the Report contains no reference to or request for 
comments on civil remedies. 
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at the option of the plaintiff, damages or an account of profits.64 A further provision is 
that a court may not grant damages or an account during a critical period, which is 
defined as a period when a mark is vulnerable to removal for non-use.65 The statutory 
protection which an innocent infringer enjoyed in certain circumstances under section 
98 of the 1955 Act has disappeared. No provision is made for civil or criminal delivery 
up or forfeiture orders, and forfeiture to the state may be ordered only in respect of 
infringing goods imported into Australia.66 
5 CANADA 
The Trade Mark and Design Act 1868 was the first legislation governing trade marks 
passed by the Dominion parliament. Further legislation was passed in 187967 and again 
in 1890.68 The latter Act, after various amendments, was included in the 1927 revision. 
The only provision which this Act made for civil remedies was that registration was a 
prerequisite 'to prevent the infringement' of a trade mark.69 But section 21 of the same 
Act made it an indictable offence for anyone other than the proprietor of a mark to mark 
or sell an article with a registered trade mark, and provided for substantial penalties on 
contravention.10 Of interest is the fact that these fines were to be paid to the proprietor 
of the mark, together with the costs incurred in enforcing and recovering the fine. 11 The 
bulk of this Act, including the provisions referred to above, was repealed by the Unfair 
Competition Act 1932. This Act regulated trade marks but also diverged from equivalent 
legislation in other Commonwealth jurisdictions by attempting to regulate commerce 
64 Section 126 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Aus). 
65 Section 127. 
66 Section 135(1). 
67 Trade Mark and Design Act 1879. 
68 Trade Mark and Design Act 1890. 
69 Section 19(3) of the Trade Mark Act 1927 (Cn). 
70 Section 21(1). 
71 Section 21(2). 
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and competition on fair and ethical bases.72 While the Act, when dealing with remedies 
for infringement, merely provided that registration was necessary to institute 
proceedings to 'prevent the infringement' of a trade mark,73 a further provision, 
authorising delivery up for destruction of infringing labels and dies, stated that a court 
might make such an order 'in addition to any such order as the circumstances may 
require by way of injunction or for the recovery of damages or with respect to the 
disposition of the wares and/or packages improperly marked'.74 No equivalent to the 
penal provisions contained in the previous Act appeared in this Act. The Unfair 
Competition Act was subject to widespread criticism due to unfortunate drafting and 
interpretation by the courts.75 In 1947 a committee was appointed to consider the 
Canadian trade mark system. The Fox Report, with an attached draft Bill, was 
presented in 1953. The report did not consider civil remedies at all; a possible reason 
for this omission was that it was always accepted that the usual common-law remedies 
of injunctions, damages, or accounts, available in respect of passing off, were also 
available in instances of trade mark infringement. 
The Bill, with minor changes, became the Trade Marks Act 1953. As amended, it 
remains the current legislation. Despite many amendments to the Act, including those 
by the Intellectual Property Law Improvement Act 1993 and the recent World Trade 
Organisation Act 1994, the provisions dealing with civil remedies have remained 
unchanged since the original promulgation of the Act. The Act provides for relief 'by 
way of injunction and the recovery of damages or profits' and 'disposition of any 
offending wares, packages, labels and advertising material and of any dies'.76 Relief in 
72 Fox (1956} 22. 
73 Section 4(4} of the Unfair Competition Act 1932 (Cn}. 
74 Section 17. 
75 Fox (1956) 22. 
76 Section 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1953 (Cn}. In the 1970 revision, the Act, as amended, is cited 
as RSC 1970 c T-10 and section 52 is renumbered as section 53. Since the 1985 revision, it is 
cited as RSC 1985, c T-13. The 1985 revision also changed the spelling of the word 'trade mark' 
as previously used to 'trade-mark'. The original spelling is retained unless the Act is quoted. 
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terms of this Act is available not only when trade mark infringement per se occurs. The 
provisions on unfair business practices contained in the Unfair Competition Act were 
reflected in section 7 of the new Act, which contains various prohibitions against unfair 
competition. As a result, the owner of a registered trade mark has more than one 
possible statutory cause of action. As in other jurisdictions, he may sue for actual or 
deemed infringement of the mark.77 In addition, he may sue for depreciation of goodwill 
if his mark is used by another in a manner that is likely to have the effect of 
depreciating the value of the goodwill attached to the mark.78 Finally, he has a statutory 
action for passing off,79 which has the advantage of falling under the jurisdiction of the 
federal court, as is the case with the previous two causes of action, rather than under 
the jurisdiction of the provincial courts, as is the case if a common-law action for 
passing off is instituted. 
6 SOUTH AFRICA 
6.1 COMMON-LAW TRADE MARK PROTECTION 
A restatement of South African history from settlement in 1652 until Union in 1910 is 
unnecessary for present purposes. It is sufficient to state that Jan van Riebeeck 
declared that the law of Holland was adopted as the law of the Cape of Good Hope.80 
Roman-Dutch law remained applicable despite British annexation of the Cape in 1795. 
The Cape was a Dutch colony for a further three years from 1803 to 1806 under the 
Batavian Republic. After 1806, under British rule, Roman-Dutch law remained the 
common law of the Cape, 81 was accepted as common law in the Transvaal, Orange 
77 Sections 19 and 20. 
78 Section 22(1). Section 22(2) provides, ho.Never, that the court may decline to order the recovery 
of damages or profits and may permit the defendant to sell existing wares. 
79 Section 7(b). 
80 Hahlo & Kahn (1973) 572. 
81 Hahlo & Kahn (1960) 17. 
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Free State, and Natal,02 and, in 1910, as the common law of the Union of South Africa. 
The common law is not of major importance in respect of most trade mark issues. 
Our common law is still of great importance when the remedies afforded by South 
African trade mark legislation are considered, as English provisions were duplicated 
in South African legislation. Many remedies unknown in this country were introduced 
in this way. It is then often necessary to refer to the common law to determine whether 
such remedies exist at all in South Africa and, if so, what their ambit and application 
comprise. 
Trade marks were viewed as capable of protection before the adoption of any 
legislation on the issue. But the basis of protection differed according to the jurisdiction 
where the matter was heard. In the Cape Colony, an interdict and damages were 
granted as early as 1863 where the trade mark of a miller was infringed. The action 
was based on English principles. English cases were cited, it was argued that the 
remedy was equitable, not legal - a distinction unknown in Roman-Dutch law - and the 
court found that a fraud had been committed on traders and the public.83 By contrast, 
in the Transvaal the court granted an interdict on the basis that imitation of a label was 
a form of iniuria or infringement of right.84 
6.2 SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION 
6.2.1 Pre-Union legislation 
English trade mark legislation did not extend to Crown possessions.85 Shortly after the 
82 ldemat21. 
83 Mills (1863) 234 . 
. 
84 Rose & Co (1890) 125. 
85 The position was different in other areas of intellectual property: for example, section 8(1) of the 
International Copyright Act 1886 provided that English copyright legislation applied to works first 
produced in a Crown possession. 
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creation of a trade mark register in England,86 the various colonies and republics 
passed their own legislation creating such registers. 
In the Cape Colony, Act 22 of 1877 established a trade mark register. This Act was 
based on the English Act of 1875. Section 1 provided that registration was a 
precondition to 'institute proceedings to prevent or to recover damages' for 
infringement. Subsequent amending legislation in 1891 and 1895 did not alter this 
provision.87 A similar provision existed in the corresponding Natal legislation.88 The first 
Trade Marks Act promulgated in the Transvaal was during its period as a republic and 
derived from Dutch rather than English legislation. It provided for criminal prosecution 
and a civil action for damages.89 Subsequent legislation after annexation followed 
equivalent British wording,00 while, in the Orange Free State, registration was a 
prerequisite 'to take any legal proceedings to prevent or obtain compensation for any 
infringement of any trade mark'. 91 
6.2.2 Union legislation 
The Trade Marks and Copyright Act of 1916 repealed all the above legislation, but 
section 124 retained the wording of colonial legislation when dealing with civil 
remedies for trade mark infringement. 
The Trade Marks Act of 1963 incorporated many of the changes in the English 1938 
Act and included the division of the register into two parts. Registration was essential 
to 'institute any proceedings to prevent, or to recover damages for, the infringement of 
86 Section 1 of the Trade-Marks Registration Act 1875. 
87 Act 27 of 1891 and Act 12 of 1895. 
88 Section 17 of Law 4 of 1885. 
89 Section 14 of Act 6 of 1892. 
90 Section 10 of Transvaal Proc 23of1902. 
91 Section 1 of Chapter CXlll Law Book. 
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a trade mark',92 while the Part B proviso in section 44 stated that 'no interdict or other 
relief shall ... be granted ... '. Neither the Chowles Report of 1961, which preceded this 
Act, nor the Schoeman Report of 1969, which considered the amendments to the Act 
introduced in 1971,93 dealt with civil remedies. 
6.2.3 Current legislation 
The Trade Marks Act of 1993 came into effect on 1 May 1995. For the first time, the 
relief available to the proprietor of a registered mark which has been infringed, is spelt 
out in the Act. It includes interdicts, orders for the removal of the infringing mark from 
material, or, where the mark is inseparable, delivery up. Damages are available to a 
successful plaintiff or, the innovation of a reasonable royalty in lieu of it. The court is 
statutorily empowered to direct that an enquiry be held to determine the amount of 
damages or reasonable royalty.94 These provisions will be discussed in detail when the 
various remedies are considered individually. 
92 Section 43 of the Trade Marks Act of 1963 (SA). 
93 Trade Marks Amendment Act of 1971. 
94 Section 34(3) and (4) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
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CHAPTER3 
FINAL INTERDICTS 
1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Traditionally, interdicts are classified as final or interlocutory, with the duration of the 
order as the distinctive feature. A final interdict is a judgment which has permanent 
effect and so is usually granted after a trial on the merits. An interlocutory interdict is 
a provisional measure taken at an early stage of the proceedings, before the merits 
have been fully canvassed, and is of force for a limited period. 1 
A further distinction is made between prohibitory and mandatory interdicts, where the 
form of order is relevant. A prohibitory interdict requires a party to refrain from 
performing an act, while a mandatory interdict orders him to do something.2 
It is important to remember the completely different origins of the British injunction and 
the South African interdict. Although they are sometimes viewed as substantially similar 
in effect,3 the differing legal bases on which the remedies are founded make it unwise 
to assume that the remedies are identical in the two jurisdictions.4 
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the development of English injunctions and 
South African interdicts, as these developments have influenced the current 
requirements for relief. 
1 Bean (1994) 3; LAWSA Interdicts (1981) 295 and 297. 
2 Bean (1994) 3; LAWSA Interdicts (1981) 294. 
3 Nathan (1939) 1 states that '[t]he remedy by way of interdict corresponds to the remedy by way 
of injunction in English law'. 
4 LAWSA Interdicts (1981) 294 cautions that there are 'some important although discrete 
differences'. 
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The requirements for obtaining relief are then considered. The requirements which 
must be met before a final interdict will be granted are the same for prohibitory and 
mandatory interdicts. However, the requirements for obtaining a final interdict differ 
greatly from those for interlocutory relief. This is so because the merits have been fully 
canvassed before final relief is granted and the order is permanent, while interlocutory 
relief merely maintains the status quo until trial. 
Once the requirements for the grant of final relief have been determined, the procedure 
for obtaining such relief is considered. 
Finally, the distinction between prohibitory and mandatory interdicts will be dealt with 
when the form of order which a final interdict can take is considered. 
2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COERCIVE RELIEF 
2.1 ENGLAND 
2.1.1 Origins of the remedy 
Traditionally, the injunction of English law was seen as an equitable remedy, in contrast 
to the remedy of damages, which was available at common law only. Before the fusion 
of the common-law and equity courts in 1873, injunctions could be granted by courts 
of chancery only. 5 The origin of these courts can be traced back to the thirteenth 
century, when the deficiencies in the common-law courts resulted in petitions for 
redress to the King or his council; these were then referred to the Chancellor for 
attention. 6 The early development of these courts is not of much relevance to this 
5 The power to grant injunctive relief was viewed by some writers as the highest function of the 
equity courts. Blackstone (1829} 442 footnote 14 states: 'a court of law can, in general, only 
redress an injury when or where it has been inflicted, or been actually sustained; but a court of 
equity can step between the blow and its object. A court of law may punish, but rarely restrain; 
but a court of equity may, and often does, both prevent and restrain wrong.' 
6 Halsbury Equity (1976} 807. 
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discussion, as the notion of enforceable individual rights to intellectual property 
emerged only later. 
By the middle of the fourteenth century, the concept of an injunction was already 
established. The first injunctions were granted by equity courts to override common-law 
proceedings or judgments when these were 'made the instrument of oppression'. 7 
These early injunctions could not attack the validity of the common-law legal 
proceedings or judgments, as equity decrees operated in personam and were binding 
only on the parties to the cause.8 So they merely forbade the plaintiff to sue at law or 
enforce a judgment obtained in a common-law court. 9 These orders led to conflict 
between the two courts over the extent of their powers, as common-law judges were 
understandably aggrieved by the assumption by chancery courts of powers to restrain 
their proceedings and judgments. The right of chancery courts to come to the 
assistance of litigants at common law was finally approved by royal decree in 1616, 
after an appeal by the Chancellor to King James I as a result of the refusal by common-
law judges to accept the interference of chancery courts. From then on the 'common' 
injunction to restrain proceedings or judgments at law was routinely granted.1° Fraud, 
which at that time was the only basis on which trade marks could be protected, was 
one of the grounds on which proceedings at common law could be restrained by a 
chancery court. 11 
The other form of injunction which was recognised was the 'special' injunction, 
restraining the performance of a particular act or acts.12 This developed into the modern 
injunction as there was no need for the 'common' injunction after passage of the 
7 Halsbury Equity (1976) 852. 
8 Baker (1990) 121. 
9 Kerly (1890) 89. 
10 Idem at 115. 
11 Idem at 116. 
12 Spry (1990) 318. 
30 Chapter 3: Final interdicts 
Judicature Act in 1873, in which the distinction between the two court systems was 
removed. 13 
By the seventeenth century, it was accepted that, as courts of equity, chancery courts 
could interfere not only when a party had fraudulently obtained a legal advantage 
which a common-law court would uphold, but also when a right was recognised but 
inadequately protected by common law.14 However, nineteenth century writers state 
that special injunctions, although well known, were not frequently used before the 
beginning of that century, and that equity courts would seldom grant an injunction if a 
party had a remedy at common law.15 Interestingly, the Statute of Anne, which granted 
statutory copyright in 1709, is credited with the increased demand for injunctive relief, 
as summary suppression was required against 'offenders who are probably 
impecunious, and whom it would be therefore useless to sue for damages'. 16 
2.1.2 Trade mark injunctions 
The basis on which early equity courts granted injunctions to prevent trade mark 
infringement is difficult to determine. Unlike other forms of intellectual property, trade 
marks were originally not seen as the object of any proprietary right. Also, trade marks 
could not be registered until 1875.17 
At common law, actions for damages when trade mark infringement had occurred, were 
instituted on the basis of fraud, not the protection of property. 
13 Idem at 329. 
14 Kerly (1890) 130. 
15 Idem at 258. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Registration was first possible in terms of section 1 of the Trade-Marks Registration Act 1875. 
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In the earliest chancery decision dealing with trade marks, 18 a trader attempted to 
restrain a competitor from using the same mark on playing cards, by relying on a 
proprietary right granted by Crown charter. The injunction was refused on the basis that 
any charter granted by the Crown was a form of monopoly and as such no longer legal. 
Also, no other proprietary right existed, as a trader could not obtain exclusive property 
in a name. The Chancellor did, however, indicate that if fraud had been committed, the 
position might be different. 19 Although an injunction was granted as early as 1838, 
despite the absence of fraud, the court holding that the plaintiffs had a right to the 
exclusive use of their mark,20 most injunctions of that time were granted on the basis 
of fraud, not of any proprietary right. 21 
However, in 1863 the Lord Chancellor stated, when considering the conflicting views 
on the basis of the legal right which equity protected in instances of trade mark 
infringement: 
'The true principle would seem to be, that the jurisdiction of the Court in the 
protection given to trade marks rests upon property, and that the Court interferes 
by injunction, because that is the only mode by which property of this description 
can be effectually protected.'22 
18 Blanchard (1742) 484. 
19 At 485. 
20 Millington (1838) 352. 
21 Knott (1836) 219: 'It is not to be said that the Plaintiffs have any excltisive right to the words ... 
but they have a right to call upon this Court to restrain the Defendant from fraudulently using 
precisely the same words'; Perry (1842) 73: 'I own it does not seem to me that a man can 
acquire property merely in a name or mark; but whether he has or not a property in the name 
or the mark, I have no doubt that another person has not a right to use that name or mark for the 
purposes of deception'; Croft (1843) 88: 'the right which any person may have to the protection 
of this Court, does not depend upon any exclusive right which he may be supposed to have to 
a particular name ... His right is to be protected against fraud, and fraud may be practised 
against him by means of a name'. 
22 Leather Cloth (1863) 142. This view was confirmed in the same year by Hall (1863), a 
partnership action where the value of a trade mark was at issue. The court, relying on Millington 
(1838), held that 'the jurisdiction of the Court in the protection of trade marks rests upon 
property, and that fraud in the Defendant is not necessary for the exercise of that jurisdiction' 
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After registration of trade marks became possible, the proprietary right which enjoyed 
protection differed in instances of trade mark infringement and instances of passing off. 
While in passing off proceedings the proprietary right to be protected was sometimes 
viewed as property in a mark, name, or get-up, it was eventually recognised as the 
property in the goodwill of the business.23 
2.1.3 Development of the remedy 
The first movements towards reform of the structure and procedure of English courts 
affecting the grant of injunctive relief occurred in 1852. The Chancery Practice 
Amendment Act of that year provided that a chancery court could not, before deciding 
whether to grant equitable relief, refer a matter to a common-law court for determination 
of a question of law. The Act consequently empowered the chancery court itself to 
determine such legal title or right. 24 This was of obvious benefit to litigants who had 
previously run the risk of the postponement of injunctive relief until an action at 
common law had determined the extent of their legal rights. The next development 
came in 1854 when common law courts were authorised to grant injunctive relief in 
addition to damages.25 The party had, however, to prove a legal right acknowledged 
by the common law.26 In 1858, Lord Cairns' Act allowed chancery courts to grant 
damages if they had jurisdiction to grant an injunction.27 
(at 156). 
23 Spalding (1915) 284. 
24 Sections 61-62 of the Chancery Practice Amendment Act 1852. 
25 Section 79 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854. 
26 Kerly (1890) 289. An injunction to prevent trade mark infringement was, therefore, not sought 
from common-law courts before passage of the Judicature Act in 1875 because at common law 
fraud remained an essential of the action, despite the fact that chancery courts gave protection 
on the basis of property rights. See Crawshay (1842) 377: 'an intention to deceive is a necessary 
ingredient'. 
27 Section 2 of Lord Cairns' Act 1858. 
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Finally, in 1875, the courts of equity and common law were fused into a single supreme 
court and a single system of civil judicature was created by the Judicature Acts of 1873 
and 1875. All superior courts were given the power to grant all legal and equitable 
remedies, 28 and specific provision was made for the grant of injunctions.29 The 
Judicature Act of 1873 further provided that where there was any conflict between the 
rules of equity and common law, those of equity would prevail.30 
The interpretation of section 25(8), which gave all superior courts the power to grant 
injunctions, was almost immediately the subject of debate. It was argued that this 
section enabled courts to grant injunctions where neither chancery nor common law 
courts would have done so prior to the Judicature Acts. However, the Court of Appeal 
held in 1883 that this section gave no enlarged jurisdiction to courts, and that 
'there is nothing in the Judicature Act which enables any part of the High Court 
to issue an injunction in a case in which before the Judicature Act there was no 
legal right on the one side or no legal liability on the other at law or in equity'. 31 
These statutory developments meant that after fusion of the common-law and equity 
courts in 1875, any court could grant an injunction to prevent trade mark infringement. 
It was also no longer necessary to prove fraud before injunctive relief could be obtained 
at common law. The basis for the grant of injunctive relief for trade mark infringement 
was therefore the protection of a property right, not the prevention of fraud. The basis 
for granting injunctions against passing off remained unclear, with constructive fraud 
assumed once a defendant had been put on notice, until Spalding32 confirmed that the 
right protected was the proprietary right of the plaintiff to his goodwill, which made it 
28 Section 24(7) of the Judicature Act 1873. 
29 Section 25(8) of the Judicature Act 1873. 
30 Section 25(11) of the Judicature Act 1873. 
31 North London Railway (1883) 38. 
32 Spalding (1915) 284. 
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unnecessary to impute fraud before an injunction to prevent passing off could be 
granted. 
Currently, statutory provision is made for the High Court to grant an injunction in all 
cases in which it appears to be just and convenient to do so. 33 
2.2 SOUTH AFRICA 
2.2.1 Origins of the remedy 
The remedy of interdict is derived from Roman law. However, modern South African 
writers on the subject agree that, despite its Roman-law origins, the foundation of our 
law of interdicts derives from Roman-Dutch, rather than Roman, law.34 The remedy as 
applied in Roman law will therefore not be dealt with in any detail. 
In classical Roman law, an interdict was a prohibition or command by a magistrate 
issued at the request of an aggrieved person after a summary examination of the 
matter. If the prohibition was obeyed by the person against whom it had been made, 
nothing further happened. However, if it was disobeyed, further proceedings were 
instituted which resulted in a judgment. 35 The interdict was therefore a speedy remedy 
only if the prohibition was obeyed; if not, further proceedings took as long as the 
ordinary actio process.36 In post-classical law, the cognitio procedure replaced both the 
actio and interdictum procedures,37 although when an interdict was sought, the 
proceedings were speedier than in other instances. 38 
33 Section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK). 
34 Nathan (1939) 2; Prest (1996) 9. 
35 Kaser (1984) 424. 
36 Prest(1996) 11. 
37 Schulz (1969) 62. 
38 Prest (1996) 12. 
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Nathan states that in Roman law an interdict was a purely possessory remedy, and that 
the term 'extraordinary', as used to describe an interdict, merely indicated that it 
differed from the ordinary remedy by way of action.39 
After the Germanic conquest of the Roman Empire, the Roman interdict was adapted 
by German common law as the Mandatsprozess, which, in turn, became the foundation 
of the Roman-Dutch mandaat poenaa/. 40 The conclusions Prest reaches from Van 
Bynkershoek's Observationes Tumultuariae are that the mandaat poenaal of Dutch 
practice was an interdict, which could be final or pendente lite, and was an 
extraordinary remedy which could not be granted if another ordinary remedy -
damages - was available.41 It could be granted in various circumstances: to prevent 
abuse of court process; where an extraordinary remedy was required because no 
ordinary remedy was available; and finally, where the rights of the claimant had been 
breached.42 Van der Linden states that, to obtain an interdict, the court was approached 
to grant a mandaat poenaa/, which interdicted the defendant from continuing his 
unlawful actions on pain of a large penalty payable to the authorities.43 The Roman-
Dutch mandament poenaalwas, therefore, merely an interdict enforced by a penalty.44 
Its purpose was to assist a person who had a right which was being infringed, when 
damages would not be a suitable remedy. 
2.2.2 Development of the remedy 
South African legislation dealing with superior courts does not detail the orders which 
39 Nathan (1939) 2-3. 
40 Prest (1996) 17. 
41 Idem at 18-20. 
42 Idem at 21-22. 
43 Van der Linden (1806) 3.1.4.7; see further Prest (1996) 24-26. 
44 Prest (1996) 26. That the term mandaat poenaal encompassed both prohibitory and mandatory 
interdicts is clear from Van der Linden (1794) 2.19.3 where he discusses mandatory interdicts 
as mandamenten van attentaten poenaa/. 
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such courts may make, presumably because it is accepted that they may grant any 
order which they are not expressly prohibited from making.45 So the power of a division 
of the High Court to grant an interdict in both trade mark infringement and passing off 
proceedings derives from common law.46 
In South Africa, the Roman-Dutch principles were accepted from an early stage and the 
influence of English law was minimal.47 In a nutshell, the distinction between the 
English injunction and the South African interdict lies in the nature of the right 
protected. Because of its origins in equity, the injunction was available not only when 
a right had been infringed, but also when fraud had been committed. By contrast, the 
Roman-Dutch and South African interdict requires a clear right before final relief will 
be granted. Although this distinction is not of crucial importance in the field of 
intellectual property, as both statutory trade marks and goodwill were viewed as the 
object of proprietary rights at an early stage, the distinction still colours the 
requirements for injunctive relief in the two countries. 
3 REQUIREMENTS FOR FINAL RELIEF 
3.1 ENGLAND 
3.1.1 Basis of remedy 
The historical development of this remedy is still reflected in the views of courts and 
writers on the availability of final injunctive relief. What appear to be conflicting 
statements are often encountered: the allegation that an injunction is always in the 
discretion of the court, together with the statement that a plaintiff whose proprietary 
45 Harms (1996) 84; Taitz (1985) 36. 
46 However, section 34(3)(a) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA) also specifically provides that 
a court may grant an interdict when a registered trade mark is infringed. 
47 Prest (1996) 33. 
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rights are interfered with is prima facie entitled to an injunction, is merely one 
example.48 Such seeming inconsistencies derive from the origins of the remedy: first, 
the fact that such relief was available only when common-law remedies were 
inadequate; second, the emphasis that has always been placed on the discretionary 
nature of equitable relief. 
One of the bases on which equity courts assumed jurisdiction to grant injunctions, was 
the enforcement of legal rights inadequately protected by the common law.49 
Traditionally, the primary question before such injunctions were granted, was whether 
legal remedies such as damages were inadequate, which justified intervention by a 
court of equity. The answer to this question was viewed as determining the jurisdiction 
of the court to hear the matter, as it would not intervene if a remedy at law (the common 
law) could be considered adequate.50 Only after the court was satisfied that relief at law 
was inadequate, did it proceed to consider, in its discretion, whether justice required 
the grant of equitable relief. 51 
A distinction was therefore drawn between jurisdictional restraints52 and discretionary 
factors. Tilbury points out that this distinction meant that, while the discretionary factors 
were all weighed against each other to determine whether or not to grant equitable 
relief, the adequacy of other remedies such as damages was a factor which required 
independent and a priori determination.53 In effect, a court had to determine whether 
48 Bean (1994) 13, 16. 
49 This is known as an 'equitable injunction in the auxiliary jurisdiction': see Meagher (1992) 535; 
Tilbury ( 1990) 284. By the end of the nineteenth century, all forms of industrial property were 
viewed as the object of proprietary rights: see Meagher (1992) 553. 
50 'The very first principle of injunction law is that prima facie you do not obtain injunctions to 
restrain actionable wrongs for which damages are the proper remedy': London & Blackwell 
(1886) 369; see also Spry (1990) 374. 
51 Tilbury (1990) 275. 
52 This term is merely an abbreviation of the notion that a court of equity is restrained from granting 
an injunction (in other words, does not have jurisdiction) if a common-law court could grant an 
adequate remedy: see Sharpe (1983) 281. 
53 Tilbury (1990) 275. 
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it had jurisdiction to hear each matter which came before it. To determine the adequacy 
of other relief required a consideration of the relevant facts in each particular case, 
which often included a consideration of aspects viewed as forming part of the 
discretionary factors.s4 This was not always workable and resulted in some confusion 
as to what 'inadequacy of the remedy at law' entailed.ss 
More recent authorities and decisions have abandoned this distinction and merely 
follow a general test - whether it is more just to grant an injunction than to award 
damages.s6 
3.1.2 Method of classification 
The English emphasis on the discretionary nature of injunctive relief has also resulted 
in neglect of the requirements which must be met before injunctive relief will be 
granted. Writers and the courts have focussed on the various discretionary factors 
which will be considered, without dealing in any systematic fashion with the 
requirements which must be proved.s7 The one writer who does deal with them 
describes them as 'of cardinal, if sometimes attenuated, importance·.sa He states that 
to obtain an injunction, it was eventually established that a plaintiff had to show that he 
had a legal right; that it was of a proprietary nature; that it was either threatened or had 
already been infringed; that the infrjngement was likely to continue; and that damages 
54 Idem at 282. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Beswick (1968) 102; Evans Marshall (1973) 379; Spry (1990) 375. 
57 The majority of writers deal with the issues described here as requirements, under a general 
heading of discretionary considerations: see, for example, Bean (1994) 13-19 and Spry (1990) 
374-391. For comparative purposes it is more logical to deal with them in the same manner as 
with South African interdicts - to distinguish between requirements and defences. 
58 Meagher (1992) 536. 
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would not be adequate recompense to him.59 This formulation is used in the discussion 
of the various requirements which follows. 
3.1.2.1 Legal right 
The existence of a legal right60 does not present problems in respect of the statutory 
intellectual property rights, as registration is a prerequisite for the institution of 
proceedings. It is more problematic in respect of passing off, as English law does not 
recognise a 'law of tort' but rather various individual torts, one of which is passing off. 
If, therefore, a specific act does not fall within the accepted definition of passing off, the 
plaintiff will not have a cause of action, irrespective of whether the defendant's action 
has caused him injury. 61 
3.1.2.2 Proprietary nature of the right 
In the light of the numerous exceptions which the courts have identified,62 writers are 
not unanimous on the continued existence of this requirement.63 The issue is not 
relevant for intellectual property, as modern legal views accept all forms of intellectual 
59 Ibid. These requirements have also been formulated in various court decisions: for example, in 
Pride of Derby ( 1953) 197 the requirements of a proprietary right, wrongful interference, and a 
continuing wrong are mentioned. 
60 In other words, a cause of action: see Meagher (1992) 537; Tilbury (1990) 305. 
61 Halsbury Injunctions (1979) 523; Meagher (1992) 537; Wadlow (1995) 39. An example of this 
is found in Clark ( 1848) 118-119 where a doctor was held not to be entitled to an injunction to 
prevent a chemist selling pills under his name because he was not 'in the habit of manufacturing 
and selling pills' and so could not establish an offence at law. 
62 Meagher (1992) 589 views it as still necessary to obtain an injunction in the auxiliary equitable 
jurisdiction; Spry (1990) 330 regards it as existing only in a few particular circumstances. 
63 That this was originally a requirement, is clear: in the intellectual property field the court refused 
an injunction in Clark (1848) 118, because the plaintiff could not show that a proprietary right 
was affected, while in Emperor of Austria (1861) 239 the court confirmed that damage must be 
done to a proprietary right before an injunction could be granted. 
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property, including goodwill, as involving proprietary rights.64 
3.1.2.3 Actual or threatened infringement 
A plaintiff must show some threat or probability that infringement will be commenced, 
continued, or repeated before a court will grant a final injunction. In trade mark 
infringement matters, proof of an actual infringing act is sufficient and frequent 
repetition need not be shown before an injunction can be sought. Actual infringement 
need also not have occurred if it can be proved that the defendant contemplates or has 
threatened to commit an infringing act.65 Infringement in respect of statutory trade 
marks does not require proof of damage, while in passing off matters a plaintiff must 
show that the infringement is likely to cause substantial damage to his goodwill.66 
3.1.2.4 Continuing infringement 
One of the primary reasons for the development of injunctive relief was that common-
law remedies could not effectively prevent ongoing infringement, as all that a plaintiff 
could do was to institute repeated actions to recover damages for each infringing 
action.67 Once a plaintiff has shown that the action complained of will be repeated, he 
is prima facie entitled to an injunction.68 In trade mark infringement matters, the courts 
have gone so far as to hold that deliberate or persistent infringement is sufficient to 
justify the assumption that the infringement will continue unless an injunction is 
64 Meagher (1992) 553; Spry's conflicting views to which Meagher refers in footnote 74 do not 
appear in later editions. 
65 Ker1y (1986) 318-319; Wadlcm (1995) 250. Such injunctions are known as quia timet injunctions: 
Bean (1994) 18. In Hendriks (1881) 650 the court held that' it is the duty of the Court now, not 
to wait until injury is done, when a Court of Law would have granted damages, but to interfere 
by way of prevention'. 
66 Annand (1994) 145; Wadlow (1995) 159. 
67 Sharpe (1983) 13; Spry (1990) 379. 
68 Imperial Gas Ught (1859) 609-610; Pride of Derby (1953) 197. 
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granted.69 In both trade mark infringement and passing off matters, courts have rarely 
viewed an undertaking by the defendant not to repeat the infringement as sufficient 
ground for the refusal of an injunction.70 On occasion, where the defendant was bona 
fide and the infringement unlikely to recur, an injunction has been refused and an 
undertaking accepted as sufficient.71 Rather than immediately granting an injunction, 
the courts have occasionally made a declaration giving the plaintiff leave to apply for 
an injunction should the infringement be repeated.72 
3.1.2.5 Damages not an adequate remedy 73 
As stated above, this requirement is viewed as a matter which primarily determines the 
jurisdiction of the court to grant the relief. However, it is no longer seen as necessary 
for a court to decide this issue separately before determining whether the other 
requirements have been met. The requirement that damages should be an inadequate 
remedy is merely a different phrasing of the requirement of 'irreparable injury'. 74 Some 
textbooks treat this requirement as strictly enforced and define 'irreparable injury' as 
injury which is substantial and can never be adequately atoned for or remedied by 
damages.75 More recent views, however, are that this requirement has become largely 
nominal and that the courts tend to view almost any damage as irreparable. 76 This is 
particularly so in the intellectual property field. One reason is that continuing 
69 Leahy(1893) 158. 
70 Kerly (1986) 318; Wadlow (1995) 578. 
71 Kerly (1986) 318. 
72 Wayne Myers (1954) 439. 
73 This requirement is dealt with at greater length in chapter 4 at 2.1.2.3.2: Inadequacy of 
damages. 
74 Meagher (1992) 538. He states that all damage in equity is considered irreparable if not 
adequately compensable in damages. 
75 Halsbury Injunctions (1979) 522. 
76 Meagher (1992) 538; Spry (1990) 376. 
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infringement cannot be prevented by an award of damages. A further, related reason 
is that if a plaintiff can only claim damages but not prevent further infringement, he is 
effectively licensing his intellectual property to all comers. 77 It has been suggested that 
the grant of an injunction, in preference to damages, allows a plaintiff to fix his own 
price for use of his property, should he choose to permit use, instead of forcing him to 
accept an objective valuation by the court. 78 
3.1.3 Discretionary considerations 
As stated above, the grant of a final injunction is within the discretion of the court, 
irrespective of whether the above requirements have been met. Early injunctions, 
viewed as exceptions to the usual forms of relief, were granted with extreme caution. 
Once injunctions were more commonly available, a more liberal attitude prevailed. 
Current thought is that where damages and other alternative relief are inappropriate, 
and when there is sufficient likelihood that the threatened injury will occur or recur, an 
injunction will be granted in the absence of countervailing circumstances.79 
3.1.3.1 Hardship 
The first such circumstance is the hardship which an injunction will cause to the 
defendant. Although this is clearly much less important in the context of final, as 
opposed to interlocutory, injunctions, a court will, in the exercise of its general 
77 Comish (1996) 59. 
78 Sharpe (1983) 10. 
79 Spry (1990) 384. See the oft..quoted dictum in Pride of Derby (1953) 197 in respect of the 
exercise of the court's discretion where a proprietary right is at issue: 
'the fallacy ... is based on the statement made on their [the defendants'] part that an 
injunction is purely discretionary - if by that is meant that, in a case where a person's 
rights, such as the plaintiffs' rights, are being damaged and there is a threat of 
continuing damage, the question whether an injunction will be granted is determined by 
the court on the balance of convenience on one side or the other. In my judgment that 
is not a correct statement of the position. It is, I think, well settled that if A proves that 
his proprietary rights are being wrongfully interfered with by B., and that B. intends to 
continue his wrong, then A. is prima facie entitled to an injunction, and he will be 
deprived of that remedy only if special circumstances exist'. 
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discretion, refuse an injunction if the defendant can show that it would cause 
disproportionate harm.so The balance of convenience, which is always considered in 
interlocutory injunctions, is irrelevant in a consideration of final injunctions. 
3.1.3.2 Bona fides of defendant 
The fact that the defendant was ignorant of the rights of the plaintiff does not prevent 
the grant of a permanent injunction in either trade mark infringement or passing off 
proceedings.s1 The defendant's innocence becomes relevant to the grant of relief only 
when his bona tides negates any possibility of further infringement.s2 
3.1.3.3 Fraud 
A more relevant consideration is the issue of fraud or deceptive behaviour by the 
plaintiff. The maxim that 'he who comes to equity must come with clean hands' still 
applies when a court exercises equitable jurisdiction. However, the objectionable 
conduct must relate to the relief sought.s3 The leading trade mark decision in this 
regard is Leather Cloth where it was held that a trade mark which was calculated to 
deceive the public in a material respect would not be protected by a court of equity.s4 
Where the deception is not material, a plaintiff will usually not be penalised.ss 
80 Spry (1990) 392. 
81 Kerly (1986) 319; Wadlow (1995) 491. 
82 Cairns (1988) 32. 
83 Bean (1994) 14. In Imperial Chemical (1981) 6 the court refused to consider a defence that the 
plaintiffs were guilty of an abuse of a dominant market position in terms of article 86 of the 
Treaty of Rome, since there was no nexus between this breach and the defendants' passing off. 
84 Leather Cloth ( 1863) 871; statements in the trade mark were untrue descriptions of the goods 
sold under the mark. 
85 In Ford (1872) 633 a description of the plaintiff as a 'patentee' of the goods, when no patent 
existed, was held not to disentitle him from obtaining a final injunction. Story.2 (1877) 146, 
discussing the similar case of Marshall (1869) 653, where the court had held that the use of the 
term 'patent' did not necessarily imply that the article was secured by letters patent, stated that 
the true reason for not refusing the injunction was that the misdescription did not affect the value 
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Various types of misrepresentation can occur in trade mark matters. The first are those 
inherent in the mark, such as occurred in Leather Cloth and Perry,86 where injunctions 
were refused because the marks were misleading. This form of misrepresentation is 
considered the most serious because it comes to the notice of everyone familiar with 
the mark and will therefore rarely be immaterial.87 False claims as to the existence of 
a patent are rarely viewed as material in modern decisions, while false claims to 
registration as a trade mark, although a criminal offence, 88 are also seldom viewed as 
material misrepresentations. Wadlow states that in every instance the fundamental 
question is whether the plaintiff is attempting to protect a part of his trade by his own 
misrepresentation. 89 
3.1.3.4 Delay 
Another discretionary consideration relates to the time within which the plaintiff seeks 
to enforce his rights. Mere delay does not usually prevent the grant of final injunctive 
relief unless statutory limitations exist.90 In one instance delay can affect the right to 
injunctive relief- where the mark loses its distinctiveness or becomes generic.91 
of the article or the grounds on which it was sold. 
86 Peny(1842) 76. 
87 Wadlow (1995) 474. 
88 Section 95 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). 
89 Wadlow (1995) 480. He cautions that, despite dicta that the courts today expect a higher 
standard of commercial honesty, the standard of fairness and honesty demanded from a plaintiff 
is lower than in the nineteenth century, which entails that early cases should be approached with 
caution (at 473). 
90 Spry (1990) 407. However, as Wadlow (1995) 501 states, prescription or limitation periods will 
not affect the right to an injunction if the infringement is ongoing, although damages or profits 
may no longer be recovered. However, in Bulmer (1978) 135 the court did state that delay 
simpliciter, provided that it was inordinate, could result in the refusal of an injunction. 
91 Section 46(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK) provides that registration may be revoked 
if 'in consequence of acts or inactivity of the proprietor, it has become the common name in the 
trade for a product or service for which it is registered'. 
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However, acquiescence or laches may serve as a-bar to obtaining an injunction. 
Tilbury draws a useful distinction between the two concepts: acquiescence is delay 
plus an abandonment of rights, while laches is delay plus prejudice to the defendant 
or third parties.92 Consequently, where a plaintiff, with knowledge that the defendant 
is violating his rights, represents, expressly or by implication, that he will not enforce 
those rights, a court may refuse an injunction because of the plaintiff's acquiescence.93 
Similarly, if, after infringement of his rights, a plaintiff takes no action and the 
consequence of this inaction is that it becomes unjust to grant the relief in question, a 
court may refuse an injunction by applying the doctrine of laches. While this distinction 
between the two defences remains important, modern judicial thought no longer 
distinguishes between legal and equitable rights when considering either defence, but 
bases their application on the question of whether it would be unconscionable to allow 
a party to prevent behaviour that he had previously encouraged. 94 
3.2 AUSTRALIA AND CANADA 
The principles on which final injunctions are granted by Australian and Canadian courts 
are identical to those followed by English courts. 95 Although early Canadian decisions 
92 Tilbury (1990) 291. 
93 Section 48( 1) of the Trade Mark Act 1994 (UK) also prohibits the opposition of the use of a later 
registered mark if the proprietor has knowingly acquiesced to its use for a continuous five year 
period. 
94 Habib (1982) 36: 
'the law as it has developed over the past 20 years has now evolved a far broader 
approach . . . and one which is in no way dependent upon the historical accident of 
whether any particular right was first recognised by the common law or was invented by 
the Court of Chancery. [it] ... requires a very much broader approach which is directed 
rather at ascertaining whether, in particular individual circumstances, it would be 
unconscionable for a party to deny that which, koo.Ningly or unknowingly, he has allowed 
or encouraged another to assume to his detriment'. 
The court did not, however, refer to Bulmer (1978) where the distinction between legal and 
equitable rights was still drawn (at 135-136). 
95 Cairns (1988) 31-36; Fox (1972) 453454; McKeough & Stewart (1991) 33-34; Ricketson (1984) 
20-21. H01NeVer, in Canada a plaintiff has two additional causes of action not available in other 
jurisdictions: depreciation of goodwill in terms of section 22 and statutory passing off in terms 
of section 7(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1953 (Cn). 
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held that delay per se was reason for the refusal of permanent relief, this is no longer 
the position and, as in England, acquiescence or laches must now be proved for such 
a defence to succeed.96 
3.3 SOUTH AFRICA 
3.3.1 Requirements for grant of relief 
The requirements for a final interdict were first formulated by Van der Linden at the end 
of the eighteenth century and remain the basis of our law on the subject. The three 
requirements are 
'[e]ene liquide regt aan de zyde van den versoeker; 
[e]ene gepleegde feitelijkheid aan de zijde van den Geinterdiceerden; immers 
eene gegronde vrees, dat 'er eene zoodanige feitelijkheid door hem gepleegd 
zal worden; 
[d]at 'er geen ander gewoon middel is waar door men met het zelfde gevolg 
geholpen worden'.97 
Van der Linden's three requirements have since the middle of the nineteenth century 
been accepted as reflecting our law on the subject.98 The Appellate Division set the 
seal on this acceptance in the seminal Setlogelo decision in 1914. However, an 
analysis of these requirements indicates that, simple as they appear, they can give rise 
96 Fox (1972) 454; Sharpe (1983) 38. 
97 Van der Linden (1806) 3.1.4. 7: 
'[a] clear right on the part of the applicant; 
an act of interference committed on the part of the person to be interdicted; or at any 
rate a vvell-founded apprehension that such an act of interference will be committed by 
him; 
that there is no other ordinary remedy by which one can be protected with the same 
result' (translation in Nathan (1939) 8-9). 
98 Blackbum (1855) 211; Burger(1866) 356; Du Plessis (1912) 800; Patz (1907) 435-436; United 
Tobacco(1909) 157. 
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to confusion as to meaning and interpretation. 
3.3.1.1 Clear right 
Van der Linden uses the phrase 'een liquide regt' in both his works on the subject. 99 
Courts and translators have interpreted this as a 'clear' right. Nathan points out that a 
more precise meaning is a 'definite' right, which does not mean a right that is absolutely 
incontrovertible.100 Other writers have claimed th'3t the phrase connotes 'a right clearly 
established' .101 This implies that whether the applicant has a right is a matter of 
substantive law, while whether that right is clearly established is a matter of evidence. 
To be viewed as a clear right, the right for which protection is sought must be proved 
on a balance of probabilities. 
In trade mark infringement matters, the nature of the right and proof of its existence, are 
not usually in issue, as infringement proceedings may be instituted only in relation to 
registered marks, and registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of the mark. 102 
Therefore, unless the registration is under attack, the proprietor's right to sole use of 
the mark will be proved by submission of proof of registration. 
Passing off involves the infringement of existing goodwill. The existence of this goodwill 
must be proved. This requires proof of the association of the goodwill in the mind of the 
public with the business in question. 103 This obviously raises more difficult questions 
of proof than when infringement of a registered mark occurs. 104 
99 Van der Linden (1794) 2.19.1; Van der Linden (1806) 3.1.4.7. 
100 Nathan ( 1939) 6 footnotes 1 and 11. 
101 Jones & Buckle (1996) Act 93; Prest (1996) 43. 
102 Sections 33 and 51 of the Trade Marks Act 1993 (SA). 
103 Lorimar(1981) 1140. 
104 A discussion of these issues falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
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In intellectual property matters, the courts have held that a plaintiff must show prima 
facie not only that there is a right which is legally capable of protection, but also that 
the plaintiff is the person entitled to protection. 105 A personal right is insufficient and 
some form of proprietary right must be alleged. Accordingly, in copyright matters, it has 
been held that a plaintiff must be able to prove that he is, if not the original copyright 
holder, at least an assignee or exclusive licensee within the meaning of the Act. 106 A 
similar requirement will no doubt exist in respect of actions based on a registered trade 
mark, if the matter is in issue. 
3.3.1.2 Interference or injury 
The original Dutch wording was 'eene gepleegde feitelijkheid'. All writers agree that the 
term 'injury', which is commonly used by the courts, is neither a correct nor an accurate 
translation of this phrase. The generally accepted translation is 'an act of interference' 
which causes actual or potential prejudice. 107 The interference need not have already 
taken place and Van der Linden states that 'eene gegronde vrees' 108 that it will be 
committed is sufficient. The interference must be continuing, as the remedy protects 
existing rights, not past infringements; but the prejudice need not always be pecuniary 
in nature. 109 
In trade mark infringement matters, the injury consists of an infringing act as defined 
by the relevant legislation. Injury, therefore, consists of unauthorised use in the course 
of trade, of the identical mark, or one which so nearly resembles it as to be likely to 
deceive or cause confusion, in relation to the goods or services for which the mark has 
105 Avin Film (1979) 754. 
106 Rajshree Films ( 1979) 26. In this instance, in terms of sections 20 and 36 of the Copyright Act 
of 1965 (SA); currently in terms of sections 22 and 25 of the Copyright Act of 1978 (SA). 
107 Jones & Buckle (1996) Act 93; Nathan (1939) 30; Prest (1996) 44. 
108 Van der Linden (1806) 3.1.4.7. 
109 Nathan (1939) 30. 
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been registered, or similar goods or services. 110 Where the identical mark is not used 
by the infringer, proof of interference may be more difficult. The Act refers to use of a 
mark 'so nearly resembling it [the registered mark] as to be likely to deceive or cause 
confusion'111 and our courts have held, when interpreting similar provisions in earlier 
legislation, that actual proof of deception is not necessary when 'the court can see that 
it is calculated to deceive'.112 Damage need not be proved by the plaintiff because of 
the statutory nature of the infringement. 113 
The interference or injury in passing off matters is an act which 'was likely or calculated 
to deceive and thus cause confusion and injury, actual or probable, to the goodwill of 
the plaintitrs business'. 114 As passing off is a delict, the general requirements of 
Aquilian liability, including proof of actual or probable damage, must be met. 115 
3.3.1.3 Continuing infringement 
It is not always clear whether an interdict can be sought if the infringement is not of an 
ongoing nature, or once an undertaking to cease infringement has been given. 
Although the Appellate Division has held that an interdict is not a remedy for a past 
invasion of rights and that a plaintiff must establish continuing infringement of a trade 
mark before an interdict will be granted, 116 our courts are usually not persuaded by the 
undertaking of an intentional infringer to cease using the mark. As pragmatically stated 
by Schreiner J, 
110 Section 34(1)(a)-(b) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
111 Section 34(1 )(a) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
112 Glenton & Mitchell (1918) 265, in respect of trade mark infringement. 
113 Webster & Page (1986) 432. 
114 Adcock-Ingram (1977) 437. 
115 At 438. 
116 Philip Morris (1991) 735. 
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'there seems to be practical justification for holding that the deliberate copier 
should be interdicted even though he has given an undertaking' .117 
However, although not pertinently decided, it appears from dicta that, following English 
practice, our courts may refuse to grant an interdict if an acceptable undertaking has 
been tendered by an innocent infringer.118 
In a copyright matter, the court held that the fact that an infringement had occurred only 
once and that the plaintiff could show no reasonable ground to fear further 
infringements prevented the grant of an interdict. 119 But in a later decision, where the 
facts showed prima facie that the infringement had occurred once and for all, 120 it was 
held that it was necessary for a plaintiff only to tender positive proof that a defendant 
was likely to continue his infringement. When a defendant had merely ceased the 
infringement because of other circumstances, without a bona fide undertaking, an 
interdict was still appropriate.121 Undertakings not to repeat copyright infringement have 
generally not been viewed as rendering an interdict unnecessary, especially when the 
defendant has refused to concede that infringement has taken place or that the plaintiff 
has a valid cause of action. 122 The issue has not been decided in respect of trade mark 
infringement or passing off, but these decisions will doubtless be relevant if the issue 
is considered. 
117 Peter Jackson (1938) 454; see also G/enton & Mitchell (1927) 276; Kenitex (1967) 308. 
118 Glenton & Mitchell ( 1927) 277. 
119 Conde Nast (1950) 86. 
120 Performing Right (1966) 357. 
121 Performing Right (1966) 357 - closure of business premises; Performing Right (1973) 564 -
insolvency. 
122 SA Music Rights (1978) 1058; CCP Record Co (1987) 327; Ara Oy (1990) 377. 
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3.3.1.4 No other remedy 
An interdict will not be granted if some other adequate remedy is available. Such a 
remedy must be adequate in the circumstances; be ordinary and reasonable; be legal; 
and grant similar protection. 123 An interdict will not be granted if an award of damages 
will give an applicant adequate redress. But the court has a discretion in this regard 
and may in certain circumstances grant an interdict although the injury is capable of 
compensation. These circumstances include the 1efendant's financial position; whether 
the injury is a continuing violation of the plaintiff's rights; the difficulty of assessing 
damages; and the possibility that an award of damages will not be adequate 
compensation if granted at some future time only. 124 
Because damages are so difficult to prove and quantify in trade mark infringement and 
passing off litigation,125 they are not viewed as an adequate alternative to the grant of 
an interdict. 126 
4 DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FINAL RELIEF IN 
ENGLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA 
In South Africa, the only discretion which a court has in granting a final interdict, when 
the first two requirements have been met, is whether another remedy will afford similar 
protection. Unlike the English position, and due to the different origins of the remedy, 
considerations of convenience and prejudice are not relevant. Delay is also not a 
ground for refusal of an interdict unless it can be shown, in that particular instance, that 
the grant of an interdict would amount to unconscionable conduct on the part of the 
123 Minister of Law and Order ( 1994) 99; LAWSA Interdicts ( 1981) 297. 
124 Prest (1996) 46-47. 
125 Van Heerden & Neethling (1995) 72. 
126 Kenitex (1967) 308; Tullen (1976) 220; see also Performing Right (1973) 564 - copyright. 
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plaintiff. 127 This contrasts with the English position where, because of the equitable 
origin of the remedy, an injunction can be refused - at least in theory - irrespective of 
whether the plaintiff has proved all the necessary requirements. 
The English principle that an injunction will not be granted to a plaintiff who approaches 
the court with unclean hands was originally viewed as applicable in South Africa.128 
However, as pointed out by later authors and courts, this principle relates to equitable 
relief, and as the distinction between equitable and common-law relief is unknown in 
South Africa, it does not apply. Unless there is proof of dishonesty, a court will not 
refuse relief because of a party's negligence or bona fide oversight. 129 
5 PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING FINAL RELIEF 
5.1 ENGLAND 
The structure of the English High Court entails that jurisdiction is not territorially based 
but is determined by subject matter. Proceedings in which a final injunction is sought, 
in respect of both trade mark infringement and passing off, are instituted in the High 
Court, usually in the Chancery Division.130 Proceedings are commenced by writ. The 
plaintiff need not send a warning letter to the defendant before commencing action, but 
failure to do so may affect the award of costs. 131 The course of proceedings is similar 
to that in South Africa, with an exchange of pleadings followed by a trial in which oral 
evidence is presented to the court. However, in England it is possible to apply for 
summary judgment in respect of trade mark infringement and passing off claims, both 
127 LAWSA Interdicts (1981) 297; Prest (1996) 48. 
128 Zyp Products (1926) 232. 
129 Tut/en (1976) 221; Van Heerden & Neethling (1995) 184. In Scott and Leisure Research (1985) 
222 the court refused to grant an interdict because 'this representation is neither honest nor bona 
fide. It is moreover material.' 
130 Section 75 of the the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK): Wadlow (1995) 559. 
131 Wadlow (1995) 559. 
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unliquidated claims, if the plaintiff is of the opinion that the defendant has no defence 
to the claim, but has given notice of intention to defend the action. 132 The summary 
judgment procedure is not limited to liquidated claims, unlike the position in South 
Africa. 133 
The burden of proof in respect of all the requirements rests with the plaintiff. 
Trade mark infringement actions may be instituted by the proprietor of the mark or an 
exclusive licensee.134 A non-exclusive licensee may also institute proceedings if the 
proprietor fails to do so. 135 
An appeal of right lies to the Court of Appeal against the grant or refusal of a final 
injunction and, with the leave of the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords, from the 
former to the latter. 136 If a trial has taken place, the Court of Appeal will not, except in 
special circumstances, admit further evidence, other than evidence as to matters which 
occurred after the trial. 137 When considering an appeal on an injunction, the Court of 
Appeal does not substitute its own discretion for that of the trial judge, unless the judge 
has misdirected himself on the law. 138 The noting of an appeal does not operate as a 
stay of execution unless the court directs otherwise. 139 
132 RSC Order 14,r.1. 
133 Uniform Rule 32(1). 
134 Sections 14(1) and 31(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). 
135 Section 30(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). 
136 RSC Order 59,r.1. 
137 RSC Order 59,r.10(2). 
138 Bean (1994) 108. 
139 RSC Order 59,r.13. 
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5.2 AUSTRALIA AND CANADA 
In Australia, final relief for trade mark infringement and passing off may be sought in 
the Federal Court or in one of the various Supreme Courts. 140 
In Canada, action may be brought in the Federal Court or a provincial court. However, 
common-law rights must be enforced in provincial courts and a plaintiff who wishes to 
prevent passing off must seek relief from these courts, not the Federal Court, unless 
he relies on the form of statutory passing off contained in section 7(b) of the Trade 
Marks Act 1985.141 
The procedure in both jurisdictions is substantially similar to that in England and need 
not be repeated here. 
5.3 SOUTH AFRICA 
Proceedings to obtain a final interdict may be instituted in any division of the High Court 
which has jurisdiction ratione rei gestae or ratione domicilii. 142 The 1993 Trade Marks 
Act specifically provides that counterclaims relating to the validity of the mark may also 
be heard by that division, despite the fact that it would otherwise not have jurisdiction 
to amend the register. 143 Magistrates' courts no longer have jurisdiction to hear trade 
mark infringement proceedings. 144 
140 Sections 190-192 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Aus). 
141 Henderson (1993) 22-23. 
142 Section 34(3) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
143 Section 2(1)(vi) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). See PPS (1996) 210. Prior to this, the 
Transvaal Provincial Division had exclusive jurisdiction as forum rei sitae to hear matters 
affecting the register: Spier(1988) 102. 
144 Section 34(3) read with section 2(1)(vi) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). Section 44 of the 
Trade Marks Act of 1963 (SA) did not refer to a 'court' and it can therefore be assumed that 
jurisdiction was not limited to divisions of the Supreme Court, despite the definition of 'court' in 
section 2(1) which referred to divisions of the Supreme Court only: see also Webster & Page 
(1986) 377. 
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A final interdict must be sought by way of action procedure if there is any material 
dispute of fact. 145 This is usually present in opposed trade mark infringement and 
passing off proceedings. However, in the few instances when final interdicts have been 
sought on motion, the court has indicated its willingness to gra11t a final interdict, even 
if the papers reveal a dispute of fact, if the defendant has failed to request leave to 
apply for cross-examination of the deponents, or if his allegations are clearly 
untenable. 146 
In a few instances where relief has been sought on an urgent basis, the courts have 
granted a final interdict on the return day of application proceedings, if there is no 
factual issue to be resolved. 147 
The burden of proof in respect of all the requirements which must be met before a final 
interdict will be granted, rests with the plaintiff. 148 
The proprietor of the registered mark is usually the only person who may institute 
proceedings for infringement. 149 Notice of the action must be given to all registered 
users.150 
An appeal may be noted against the grant or refusal of a final interdict. Although early 
decisions refer to an appeal 'of right', 151 all judgments and orders granted by a division 
of the High Court are now appealable only with leave, either of the court which gave 
145 Harms (1996) 500; LAWSA Interdicts (1981) 295 and 298. 
146 Prinsloo (1938) 576; Juvena (1980) 223; Plascon-Evans (1984) 634-635; Haggar(1985) 581; 
Montres Ro/ex (1985) 59; PPS (1996) 212. 
147 Tullen (1976) 222. 
148 Nathan (1939) 60; Prest (1996) 60. 
149 The registered user may institute proceedings if the proprietor refuses to do so: section 38(4) of 
the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
150 Section 34(5) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
151 Setlogelo (1914) 226. 
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the judgment or the Supreme Court of Appeal. 152 The noting of an appeal suspends the 
operation and execution of the original order, unless the court which made the order 
directs otherwise. 153 
5.4 PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES 
The procedure to obtain a final injunction or interdict is very similar in the jurisdictions 
under discussion, with an exchange of pleadings followed by a trial at which oral 
evidence is presented to the court by both parties. However, two important differences 
between English and South African procedure exist. They may be important in respect 
of trade mark infringement and passing off proceedings, which are often market related. 
Where a market can be destroyed or flooded by infringing goods, delay in obtaining 
final relief can make any order which the court eventually grants irrelevant. 
The first difference is the possibility of obtaining summary judgment in respect of an 
unliquidated claim, 154 which is available in England but not in South Africa. This can 
result in a substantial saving of time and costs. Although it is not often appropriate in 
intellectual property matters, it is particularly valuable when it can be used. This is 
because in trade mark infringement and passing off proceedings, it is not uncommon 
for a defendant to enter appearance to defend an action with no hope of success but 
merely to enable him to continue infringement until trial. Summary judgment can be 
requested either after an interlocutory injunction has been obtained, to expedite the 
grant of a final injunction, or before interlocutory relief is requested, to obtain a speedy 
final, rather than interlocutory, order. But the plaintiff must make out an extremely 
strong case for the grant of summary judgment; this has been described as a 'claim to 
152 Section 20(4) of the Supreme Court Act of 1959 (SA}. 
153 Uniform Rule49(11}. 
154 A final injunction can be granted on an RSC Order 14 summons: Supreme Court Practice (1995) 
145; Smith Kline (1989) 401; Sony (1982) 200; Edenwest (1994) 282. 
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which there is no defence' .155 
The second distinction relates to appeals. Although the procedures are markedly 
different, this does not have much practical effect. In England, leave to appeal from a 
High Court judgment is not required. But the noting of an appeal does not automatically 
suspend judgment. As a result, it is fruitless for a party to note an appeal where he has 
no prospect of success, as he cannot continue infringement while the appeal is 
pending. In South Africa, where execution is suspended pending determination of the 
appeal, a party could note an appeal and so be able to continue infringement. The fact 
that leave to appeal is necessary, however, means that a party will not be allowed to 
note an appeal if he has no prospect of success but merely wishes to delay the 
effectiveness of the order. 
6 FORM OF ORDER 
As stated earlier, a prohibitory interdict requires a party to refrain from performing some 
act, while a mandatory interdict requires him to do something. The usual form of 
interdict is in the form of a prohibition. The majority of interdicts are requested, and 
granted, in this form. Because the form of order is identical in England, Australia, and 
Canada, only the position in England and South Africa will be discussed. 
6.1 ENGLAND 
6.1.1 Prohibitory injunctions 
The usual order in respect of registered trade marks is an absolute prohibition against 
infringement of the mark concerned. 156 Use of the identical mark on identical goods is 
155 Bean (1994) 89. However, in the two cases dealing with RSC Order 14 proceedings in respect 
of trade mark infringement, it was held that summary judgment would not be granted if the 
defendant could make out a 'triable issue': Sony (1982) 200; Edenwest (1994) 282. 
156 Kerly (1986) 319. 
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absolutely prohibited.157 Use of a similar mark on similar goods may also be prohibited 
if there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. 158 The form in which an 
injunction is phrased to prohibit infringement is rarely problematic, despite the 
argument that 'infringement', as a legal term, does not inform the defendant with 
sufficient clarity of what conduct is prohibited. 159 
The wording of an injunction against passing off can be problematic. It has been 
described as a compromise between protecting the rights of the plaintiff and allowing 
the defendant to trade legitimately. 160 A final injunction usually consists of a general 
prohibition against passing off together with a specific prohibition against the 
objectionable conduct. The specific prohibition is then qualified by a proviso against the 
defendant using the mark 'without clearly distinguishing' his product from that of the 
plaintiff. If this proviso were not included, the injunction would effectively give the 
plaintiff a monopoly on the mark concerned. 161 If a specific prohibition is omitted, 
subsequent enforcement of the injunction is more difficult, as the question of whether 
the conduct complained of amounts to passing off, needs to be reconsidered. 162 The 
courts are wary, however, of terminology that could be viewed as stating what actions 
will not constitute passing off.163 
The order will usually identify the persons to whom it applies; the most common version 
of the phrase is 'the defendants by their servants, workmen or agents' .164 
157 Section 10(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). 
158 Section 10(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). 
159 Cairns (1988) 43. 
160 Wadlow (1995) 578. 
161 Idem at 579. 
162 Ripley (1902) 451. 
163 Kerfoot (1908) 510. 
164 Marengo (1948) 253. 
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6.1.2 Mandatory injunctions 
Although the existence of mandatory injunctions is acknowledged in all textbooks on 
equitable relief, any discussion is usually preceded by a statement that they are more 
difficult to obtain than prohibitory injunctions. 165 Because English courts retain a 
discretion to grant any injunction, even once the various requirements have been met, 
questions such as the cost of compliance to the defendant, difficulties in formulating the 
order, and supervision of compliance with the order, tend to militate against their 
grant.166 
The mandatory injunction can take one of three forms. It can be restorative, requiring 
a defendant to undo a particular act which was done in violation of the plaintiffs rights; 
enforcing, demanding that the defendant carry out some act or perform some positive 
obligation; or quia timet, where there is only a threatened infringement.167 
The general discretion which a court will exercise when considering whether to grant 
such an injunction has been usefully summarised as follows: 
'whenever an injury to the plaintiff is shown, being an injury that might, before 
it took place, have been enjoined by a prohibitory injunction if the court thought 
fit, a mandatory injunction may be granted unless consequent prejudice to the 
defendant is so disproportionate that that course is unjust in all the 
circumstances. '168 
It can therefore be said that, although the same principles govern the grant of all 
injunctions, discretionary considerations more usually favour the defendant when a 
165 Bean (1994) 21; Tilbury (1990) 302. 
166 Tilbury (1990) 302. 
167 Idem at 301-302. 
168 Spry (1990) 535. 
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mandatory injunction is requested. 169 
Another issue which influences the discretion of a court is the behaviour of the parties, 
specifically the defendant's wilfulness. Thus, if the defendant has proceeded with 
conduct which he was requested not to perform, or has accelerated his activities to 
forestall a court order, the court will be less sympathetic to his allegations of hardship 
if forced to rectify those activities. 170 
A major consideration against the grant of mandatory injunctions is the difficulty of 
making an order which clearly defines the defendant's obligations. It has been held by 
the House of Lords that 'the court must ... see that the defendant knows exactly in fact 
what he has to do and this means not as a matter of law but as a matter of fact' .171 In 
this decision, the court held that this 'necessary and perfectly well settled condition' 
was not met by an order which imposed an unqualified obligation on the defendants 
without giving an indication of what was to be done. 172 A further consideration, once the 
order has been made, is that, if the defendant's obligation is of an ongoing or complex 
nature, the court is reluctant to undertake the task of supervision, which might require 
further judicial direction or intervention. 173 
From the above, it is clear that English courts are reluctant to grant mandatory orders 
unless absolutely essential. Although a number of mandatory orders have been granted 
in England, Australia, and Canada, the bulk of these relate to nuisance, trespass, or 
building encroachment, where such orders are usually both complex and costly. 
169 See also Sharpe (1983) 55 who discusses this aspect as 'balance of burden and benefit'. 
170 Sharpe (1983) 60-65; Spry (1990) 539. 
171 Red/and Bricks (1970) 666. 
172 At 667. 
173 Sharpe (1983) 13. 
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6.2 SOUTH AFRICA 
6.2.1 Prohibitory interdicts 
Where statutory trade mark infringment has been proved, an absolute prohibition may 
be made. Any use of the registered or a confusingly similar trade mark may be 
prohibited in relation to the goods or services for which the mark is registered. 174 The 
use of an identical or similar mark in relation to goods or services which raise the 
likelihood of deception or confusion, may also be prohibited. 175 
Where passing off has occurred, the plaintiff's right is not absolute and the prohibition 
restrains the defendant from using the mark 'without clearly distinguishing' it from that 
of the plaintiff. 176 
Such a prohibitory interdict may be granted in general terms, or where a particular form 
of infringement has been proved, in specific terms forbidding that form of infringement 
but coupled to a general prohibition. 177 A specific prohibition is valuable, as it makes 
proof of a subsequent breach of order easier in contempt proceedings. 178 
Unlike the English position, it has been held unnecessary to make the interdict 
applicable to employees and agents of the infringer. 179 
174 Section 34(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
175 Section 34(1)(b). 
176 Boswell (1985) 485. 
177 Roamer Watch (1980) 268; Bennan Bros (1986) 245. 
178 Webster & Page (1986) 315. 
179 Goddard (1924) 324. 
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6.2.2 Mandatory interdicts 
This form of interdict is to a large extent ignored in modern South African textbooks. 
Once the traditional distinction between mandatory and prohibitory interdicts has been 
mentioned, further discussion is limited to prohibitory interdicts. The distinction 
between the two forms is stated to be of little practical value, other than that mandatory 
interdicts are more difficult to enforce. 180 
A textbook on interdicts in South Africa, written in 1939, places more emphasis on such 
orders. Nathan points out that in its widest sense every court order, other than 
prohibitory interdicts and declaratory orders, is mandatory. However, he describes 
mandatory interdicts as summarily compelling a person to do something precise or 
particular if the plaintiff is to have his just rights. 181 Mandatory interdicts correspond to 
prohibitory interdicts as regards their origins, requirements, and procedure. Although 
Nathan gives a few examples of mandatory interdicts granted by our courts, 182 these 
orders are few and far between in the law reports of the past few decades. Thus, 
although their existence is still acknowledged, the pure mandatory interdict seems to 
find little application in modern South African practice. 183 
It is suggested that, as such orders have a clear legal basis, more creative use could 
be made of them to remedy specific types of harm caused by infringement, and 
suggestions of such orders will be given below. 184 
180 See Erasmus (1994) E8-2; Harms (1996) 499; LAWSA Interdicts (1981) 294. 
181 Nathan (1939) 306. 
182 Hartman ( 1903) 207, where the repondent was ordered to remove a signboard which created the 
impression that the shop concerned belonged to the respondent, not the applicant. 
183 Nathan (1939) 336-338. 
184 See 8.5.1 of this chapter. 
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7 ENFORCEMENT OF INTERDICTS 
7.1 ENGLAN0185 
A defendant who disobeys a prohibitory injunction or fails to comply with a mandatory 
injunction may be committed for contempt or a writ of sequestration may be issued 
against him.186 Breach of an undertaking given to court is punished in the same way.187 
RSC Order 45 refers to a refusal, neglect, or disobedience. Acts which are casual, 
accidental, or unintentional will not be viewed as breaches of the injunction. 188 Breach 
of an injunction constitutes contempt even though the injuntion exceeded the court's 
jurisdiction,189 or the breach was committed relying on legal advice that the acts were 
lawful. 190 Service on the defendant of the order of injunction, with a penal notice 
endorsed, is a prerequisite for contempt proceedings. 191 The court may also commit for 
contempt persons who were not parties to the original order but who, knowing of the 
injunction, aided and abetted the defendant in committing a breach. 192 A fine or an 
award of damages may also be ordered against the defendant. 193 
It can be difficult to obtain a committal order in trade mark infringement matters: there 
is frequently no factual dispute but rather disagreement as to whether the defendant's 
subsequent use of the mark amounts to a breach of the injunction. In such 
185 The position in Australia and Canada is similar and will not be dealt with separately. 
186 RSC Order 45, r. 5(1). 
187 Fricker (1991) 15; Supreme Court Practice (1995) 752. 
188 Supreme Court Practice (1995) 748. 
189 Fricker (1991) 48. 
190 Bean (1994) 94. 
191 RSC Order 45,r.7; Fricker (1991) 12. 
192 Bean (1994) 95. 
193 Idem at 101. 
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circumstances, the court is loath to decide what amounts to a new infringement action 
during committal proceedings. This is particularly so when the injunction is worded in 
general terms and does not merely prohibit specific actions. 194 
7 .2 SOUTH AFRICA 
Interdicts are classified as judgments ad factum praestandum. Enforcement of such 
relief is by way of contempt proceedings. Although contempt of court is a criminal 
offence and open to prosecution by the state, the more usual procedure is to approach 
the court which granted the order for assistance in compelling compliance. As civil 
contempt of court is defined as a wilful and mala fide failure to comply with the terms 
of the judgment, 195 a reasonable mistake on the part of the defendant will constitute a 
defence. The procedure is to approach the court which made the original order on 
motion and allege that the defendant had notice of the order but failed to obey it. The 
appropriate remedy for breach of the order is imprisonment. 196 As Erasmus points out, 
another remedy is damages, but as an interdict will not be granted if damages are an 
appropriate remedy, there will be few instances where pecuniary relief will compensate 
the injured party. 197 
8 VALUE OF FINAL INTERDICTS 
8.1 GENERAL 
It has been shown that the major difference between the grant of final coercive relief 
in England and South Africa is the overriding discretion which an English court retains. 
194 Cairns (1988) 48; Kerly (1986) 324. 
195 Consolidated Fish (1968) 523. 
196 The decision of the Constitutional Court in Coetzee (1995) does not prohibit imprisonment for 
contempt in all instances; it merely held that a committal order for failure to pay a judgment debt 
in terms of section 65F of the Magistrates' Courts Act of 1944 was unconstitutional (at 1394). 
197 Erasmus (1994) E8-14 footnote 10. 
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It is, however, rare for this discretion to result in an intellectual property judgment that 
would differ in the two jurisdictions. 
The procedural differences, while relevant, are also not responsible for vastly differing 
judgments. But I believe that in all jurisdictions an extremely useful form of interdict, the 
mandatory interdict, is underutilised. 
8.2 MANDATORY ORDERS IN TRADE MARK AND PASSING OFF 
PROCEEDINGS 
It has been shown that in all the relevant jurisdictions courts are reluctant to grant any 
kind of final mandatory interdict. Also, it is alleged to have little relevance in the 
intellectual property context. Textbooks on trade marks either ignore this form of 
interdict198 or state that it is seldom appropriate in such proceedings. 199 
However, an analysis of interdicts where the defendant is ordered to remove or alter 
something, and of such forms of relief as delivery up, Anton Piller, and disclosure 
orders, show that they are all orders which compel a defendant to do something rather 
than refrain from action. So it is not correct to state that all coercive relief in intellectual 
property proceedings is couched in a prohibitory form.200 
198 The following do not mention the mandatory form when discussing injunctions or interdicts: Fox 
(1972); Kerly (1986); Ricketson (1984); Shanahan (1990); Wadlow (1995); Webster & Page 
(1986). 
199 Cairns (1988) 14 footnote 5; McKeough & Stewart (1991) 33 footnote 135. 
200 Erasure or delivery up are statutory mandatory orders which compel the defendant to perform 
a positive action: sections 15-16 and 19 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK); section 34(3)(b) of 
the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA); section 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1953 (Cn) (disposition). 
A further mandatory order which can be made in the context of infringement proceedings is an 
order for removal of a mark from the register of trade marks: section 47(2)(3) of the Trade Marks 
Act 1994 (UK); sections 55 and 57(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1953 (Cn); section 92(3) of the 
Trade Marks Act 1995 (Aus); section 24(1) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
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8.3 STATUTORY MANDATORY ORDERS IN RELATED FIELDS 
Statutory provision also exists for mandatory orders in related fields. The two areas 
where this is most common are company law, which requires that companies change 
their names if misleading, and fair trading legislation, which protects consumers by 
requiring corrective advertising. 
8.3.1 Name changes 
While in trade mark infringement and passing off proceedings a defendant may be 
prohibited only from using the offending name, either per se or without distinguishing 
it, a change of corporate or trading style can be ordered in all jurisdictions. In England, 
a company can be directed to change its name if it gives a misleading indication of the 
nature of its activities.201 In Australia, a change of business name may be ordered if it 
is undesirable in terms of the relevant legislation of the various states.202 In Canada, 
a change of company name may be ordered if a name is 'deceptively misdescriptive'. 203 
In South Africa, a registered company can be ordered to change its name if it is 
undesirable or calculated to cause damage,204 a close corporation can be ordered to 
change its name if undesirable,205 and a business its name if calculated to deceive or 
mislead the public or cause annoyance or offence.206 
201 Section 32 of the Companies Act 1985 (UK). See Nishika (1990) 380, where the defendants 
were ordered to change their names in the course of passing off proceedings. Similar orders 
\Nefe made in interlocutory proceedings in G/axo (1996) 388 and Law Society (1996) 739. The 
court in G/axo held that the statutory procedure contained in section 32 of the Companies Act 
1985 need not be follCNVed (at 391) and instead granted a mandatory interlocutory injunction; this 
was approved and followed in Law Society (1996) (at 756). Neither of these orders can be 
viewed as strictly interlocutory, as the defendants were ordered to change their names 
immediately. 
202 Kercher (1990) 432; Shanahan (1990) 426. 
203 Section 12(1)(2) of the Business Corporations Act 1985 (Cn). 
204 Section 45(1) and (2) of the Companies Act of 1973 (SA). 
205 Section 20 of the Close Corporations Act of 1984 (SA). 
206 Section 5(1) of the Business Names Act of 1960 (SA). 
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8.3.2 Corrective advertising 
Another form of statutory mandatory order, a corrective advertising order, is found in 
Australia and America. 
In Australia, the Trade Practices Act makes provision for a court to order a person who 
has contravened certain provisions of the Act to publish corrective advertisements in 
terms specified by the court.207 These provisio~s all relate to commercial or trading 
conduct that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive.208 They are 
frequently used by traders in conjunction with common-law passing off proceedings.209 
A recent report in which the efficacy of the Act was considered, stated that corrective 
advertising orders were an extremely effective tool in various circumstances. Specific 
instances included contravention by well-established conduct over a significant period 
of time, and circumstances where the Trade Practices Commission (TPC) wanted to 
send a message to other offenders. The Commission also stated that it was a cost 
effective and efficient method of correcting perceptions of consumers and businesses, 
and that it had not been difficult to arrive at a reasonable and effective specification of 
corrective advertising.210 
The American Federal Trade Commission is empowered to issue orders requiring 
persons to cease and desist from unfair competition.211 While these orders were usually 
framed in the negative, from 1970 onwards orders have sometimes been requested in 
positive terms, requiring defendants in deceptive advertising cases to themselves place 
corrective advertisements for a specific period in a form imposed or approved by the 
207 Section 80A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Aus). Although section 80A requires the Minister 
or the Trade Practices Commission to apply to court, it has been held that any person can apply 
for an equivalent order in terms of section 80: HCF (1988) 491. 
208 Section 52(1 ). 
209 Kercher (1990) 298; McKeough & Stewart (1991) 297. 
210 Trade Practices Australia (1994) 76-77. 
211 Section 5(b) of Title 15 USC§ 45(b) (1970). 
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Commission.212 The embarrassment of these advertisements to the defendant is viewed 
as one of their great strengths, and a major reason for more cautious advertising, as, 
if a prohibitory injunction is all that is granted, a defendant has already reaped the 
benefit of his misleading advertisement and is merely told not to repeat it.213 
The examples given above of mandatory orders in related fields are not intended to be 
exhaustive. But they do indicate that the legislatures in different jurisdictions do not 
view mandatory orders as per se inappropriate or impossible to enforce. 
8.4 MANDATORY ORDERS WHICH HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN TRADE MARK 
AND PASSING OFF PROCEEDINGS 
Very few mandatory orders can be traced in the relevant jurisdictions. In a Canadian 
case, the court required the defendant to display prominently on its premises a notice 
disassociating its business from that of the plaintiff. 214 In an Australian case, the 
defendant was ordered to install an explanatory recorded message on its telephone to 
correct a misleading name.215 Other than final delivery up orders, these are the only 
examples of final mandatory orders. 
However, in a House of Lords decision of 1915, the court referred to the influence of 
misleading advertisements and suggested that 'a fair and honest trader, having his 
attention called to the fact that his advertisements were misleading, would do all in his 
power to counteract their effect'.216 An order for corrective advertising was not made, 
but the plaintiffs were awarded damages, calculated as the cost of counter-
212 CoffeCtive Advertising (1971) 478 and 488; Kaler (1994) 298; Heald (1988) 635-637. 
213 Corrective Advertising (1971) 482. 
214 Sony of Canada (1984) 273. 
215 Independent Locksmiths (1986) 432. 
216 Spalding (1915) 288. 
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advertisements.217 Wadlow states that while the cosf of corrective advertising can be 
recovered from a defendant, an order requiring the defendant himself to undo his 
misrepresentation has never been made.218 But the Spalding decision shows that, at 
a time when the influence of the media was comparatively slight, it was recognised that 
the effect of a misleading advertisement can be felt for a period well after publication, 219 
and that the defendant bears some responsibility to correct this.220 
A further type of order, occasionally made in respect of instances of parallel imports, 
is of mandatory effect, although an English court, when making such an order, 
pertinently held that it was a prohibitory injunction, with an 'unless' clause, rather than 
a mandatory injunction.221 These orders require a seller of parallel imports to inform 
purchasers that he is not an authorised dealer and that the goods are not covered by 
a manufacturer's guarantee, and also prohibit the sale of goods unless a label 
containing this information is affixed to the goods.222 Despite the denial of the first court 
which made such an order that it was mandatory in effect, a subsequent decision 
where an 'unless' order was made also contained an order to the defendant to change 
its name.223 
217 Spalding (1918) 117. 
218 Wadlow (1995) 579. 
219 Spalding (1915) 289. 
220 Spalding ( 1918) 117. 
221 Sony(1983) 308. 
222 Sony (1983) 307; Nishika (1990) 380. Although both orders were made in interlocutory 
proceedings, similar orders had been requested in the writ commencing action and it is clear 
from the judgments that the courts did not doubt that the same relief was available on action. 
223 Nishika (1990) 380. 
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8.5 THE VALUE OF MANDATORY ORDERS IN TRADE MARK AND PASSING 
OFF PROCEEDINGS 
It can be asked whether there is any need for mandatory orders in this field, given the 
fact that so few have ever been sought. Two major issues arise here: first, is there any 
need for such orders; and second, if such a need exists, why are they not sought? 
8.5.1 Need for mandatory orders 
American courts have granted a number of injunctions in which a defendant is required 
to take affirmative steps to distinguish his products so as to indicate their real source 
to the public. McCarthy gives various examples. They include advertisements 
disclaiming any connection with the plaintiff, notice to the trade of the court's decision, 
corrective advertising, telephone listings, product recalls, and customer refunds.224 
In appropriate circumstances, these can all be extremely effective methods of 
alleviating the damage caused by trade mark infringement or passing off, and of 
correcting consumer misconceptions. Such orders would be of particular value against 
habitual infringers and would be to the benefit of both the plaintiff and the consumer. 
They would also make final interdicts more useful: very often the delay between issue 
of writ or summons and trial makes any eventual prohibitory relief irrelevant, as the 
mark or goodwill has been destroyed if infringement continued during this period. It is 
for this reason that interlocutory relief is viewed as of greater assistance than final 
relief. However, if a defendant was aware that he would have to take positive action 
to correct his infringement, rather than merely stop infringement, he might be more 
cautious about his conduct before trial. 
A need for mandatory interdicts can also be seen in various codes of conduct and fair 
trading provisions. While they differ in the various jurisdictions, and are frequently not 
224 McCarthy (1996) 30.13 - 30.15. 
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of legal effect, their existence indicates a lacuna in the relief granted by a court. One 
example is the South African Consumer Code for Electronic Equipment, which applies 
to parallel imports.225 It requires that consumers be alerted to the fact that these goods 
are unauthorised, through labels and advertising warning that warranties and after-
sales service are affected.226 The provisions are actually a positive version of the 
'unless' orders made in England in respect of such goods, with the added requirement 
that advertisements must also provide this information. Compliance with the Code is 
not compulsory. However, non-compliance c3n result in an investigation by the 
Business Practices Committee; if the actions are declared to be a harmful business 
practice, they can result in a criminal prosecution.227 
8.5.2 Reasons for not requesting mandatory orders and their relevance 
One reason for the reluctance of plaintiffs to seek mandatory relief is the greater 
strength of case required before these orders will be made. In interlocutory 
proceedings, the American Cyanamid principles228 do not apply and a strong prima 
facie case must be made out.229 But this distinction does not apply to final orders, and 
there is no reason not to request mandatory relief in a final action, even if it was not 
sought in prior interlocutory proceedings. 
A further reason for the fact that mandatory relief is seldom sought in England, is the 
reluctance of English courts to grant such orders.230 This is not because of any 
perceived lack of jurisdiction, as it has been held that the courts have both statutory 
225 See, generally, Plaistowe (1996) 19. 
226 Consumer Code for Electronics Equipment (1995) 7. 
227 Section 12(7) of the Harmful Business Practices Act of 1988 (SA}. 
228 See 2.1.2.2 of chapter 4 below. 
229 But see Law Society (1996) 750 where American Cyanamid principles were applied and a 
mandatory interlocutory injunction granted. 
230 Principles governing the grant of mandatory interdicts in South Africa have not been articulated 
by our courts. 
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power and inherent jurisdiction to grant mandatory injunctions. 231 The reluctance stems 
from the view of the English courts that various problems surround the implementation 
of such orders. As was stated earlier, the majority of mandatory orders have been 
requested in areas of law such as trespass, nuisance, pollution of or damage to land, 
and encroachment. It is important to bear this in mind when considering the problems 
which the English courts have identified. 
The first is that the expense to the defendant of compliance with a mandatory injunction 
can be disproportionate to the damage caused to tre plaintiff. The Redlands Bricks 
decision, in which the principles governing mandatory relief were restated by the House 
of Lords, 232 is an example of this. The defendant was ordered by a lower court to 
restore support, at a cost in excess of 35 000 pounds, to the plaintitrs land, valued at 
about 1 500 pounds and used as a market garden. It is not surprising that the court 
decided that such an order offended against the principle that the cost to the defendant 
of any order had to be taken into account.233 It is unlikely that the forms of mandatory 
injunction or interdict suggested in trade mark infringement and passing off 
proceedings, will cost the defendant an amount disproportionate to the damage to the 
plaintiff. 
The second is the difficulty of formulating an order that informs the defendant precisely 
what he has to do. This issue also arose in Redlands Brick. The defendant was merely 
ordered to restore support to the land, with no qualification of how this was to be done, 
and no financial limit was placed on this obligation. The court restated the principle that 
a defendant had to be told what he was required to do, and held that only in the 
simplest of cases could a defendant merely be ordered to restore something to its 
231 Maclaine Watson (1989) 303. 
232 The decision dealt with quia timet mandatory injunctions; most of the principles apply, however, 
to all forms of mandatory injunctions. 
233 Redlands Brick (1970) 666-667. 
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previous position.234 The nature of trade mark infringement and passing off proceedings 
makes it unlikely that an imprecise order would be made, as the plaintiff will have had 
to persuade the court that certain specific acts should be ordered. The courts' 
objections to framing a prohibitory order in precise language235 are not relevant here; 
what will generally be requested is a prohibition against future infringement or passing 
off coupled with a specific mandatory order to correct past infringements. 
The final objection is that the court will be forced to supervise compliance with the 
order, and become involved in its implementation.236 Once again, it is doubtful whether 
this objection is valid for the type of mandatory orders suggested in the context of trade 
mark and passing off proceedings. None of the forms of mandatory order used in 
American trade mark infringement proceedings requires any form of ongoing court 
supervision. 
9 CONCLUSION 
Coercive relief is of great importance in intellectual property litigation. Damages are 
difficult to quantify, to prove, and often to recover, and a plaintiffs primary desire is to 
protect his mark so that it remains a valuable commercial commodity. Prevention of 
further infringement is obviously a plaintiffs first requirement. This form of interdict is 
frequently granted and its requirements and implementation have been spelt out in 
numerous decisions. However, the unavoidable delay between the start of infringement 
and a final order frequently makes an eventual prohibition a hollow victory. It has been 
shown that the remedy of injunction and interdict is flexible enough to accomodate a 
234 Ibid. 
235 See, for example, Kerfoot(1908) 510: 'it would be a very injurious practice to begin, to insert in 
an Order any qualifying words which leave it open to the person against whom the injunction is 
made to say that the Court has in anticipation laid down a course of conduct which he may 
pursue'. 
236 Sharpe (1983) 13-19 gives a list of such decisions. 
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variety of orders, whenever it is 'just and convenient' to do so.237 The mandatory form 
of interdict is too often overlooked or perceived to be unavailable in intellectual 
property proceedings. It is suggested thi:tt it can be a valuable tool to prevent or deter 
infringement. 
237 Section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK). 
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CHAPTER4 
INTERLOCUTORY INTERDICTS 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Many of the problems surrounding interlocutory relief are common to all jurisdictions. 
The primary aim of such relief is to preserve the status quo; but this relief is also seen 
as necessary to protect existing rights pending trial. 
In all jurisdictions interlocutory relief presents evidentiary problems. How much 
evidence must be led to obtain what is intended as speedy, temporary relief? The less 
evidence required, the sooner a plaintiff can approach the court for relief, but at the risk 
of prejudice to other parties. 
Interlocutory relief, though intended to be merely temporary, is in practice often of final 
effect. If this is so, should the criteria for the grant of relief which will have final effect 
differ from the criteria for relief which will be effective for a limited period only? 
These questions relate to all interlocutory orders. There is not necessarily one correct 
answer, or even any answer, to some of these questions. In this chapter, an attempt 
will be made to identify some of the problems which are of specific relevance in trade 
mark infringement and passing off litigation, and to discuss the solutions which have 
been adopted in England, Australia, Canada, and South Africa. 
Before this can be attempted, it is necessary to analyse the requirements for the grant 
of an interlocutory interdict. The procedure to obtain relief and the form of order are 
then considered. Finally, any differences in approach are identified and an attempt is 
made to determine which approach is preferable. 
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2 REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERLOCUTORY RELIEF 
2.1 ENGLAND 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The object of an interlocutory injunction in English law is said to be 'to preserve matters 
pending the trial of the matters in dispute' .1 The nature of the proceedings and the 
necessity for a speedy decision mean that the merits of the respective parties' cases 
are never fully canvassed, and, since 1975, are seldom given more than cursory 
attention. As a result, the criteria by which an application for interlocutory relief is 
decided differ completely from those used to decide the grant or refusal of a final 
injunction. 
2.1.2 Prohibitory interlocutory injunctions 
The requirements to be met before a final injunction will be granted are the same for 
prohibitory and mandatory orders. After a full hearing on the merits, the court can make 
whatever order it thinks just and convenient. However, because of the temporary nature 
of an interlocutory injunction and the fact that the merits are not fully canvassed before 
the grant of such an order, the strength of the plaintiff's2 case is assessed differently 
depending on the whether a prohibitory or mandatory order is sought. The weight 
accorded to strength of case as a criterion is considerably lighter for prohibitory orders 
than for mandatory orders, as, in the latter instance, a defendant has to perform some 
positive action rather than merely to preserve the status quo by refraining from action. 
The English approach to the criteria for the grant of prohibitory interlocutory injunctions 
changed radically in 1975. Before the seminal American Cyanamid decison by the 
1 Halsbury Injunctions (1979) 512. 
2 To avoid confusion, the tenns 'plaintiff' and 'defendant' will, except in quotations, be retained in 
this chapter, in preference to the technically more correct 'applicant' and 'respondent'. 
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House of Lords in that year, what is known as the 'traditional checklist'3 approach was 
applied. This checklist was largely the same for both prohibitory and mandatory orders. 
2.1.2.1 The traditional approach4 
The first question posed concerned the strength of the plaintiffs case. While it was not 
originally an absolute requirement that a strong prima facie case be made out, by the 
end of the nineteenth century this had become the norm. If a plaintiff could not do this, 
a court would not grant interlocutory relief. 5 
The next issue was that of irreparable harm to the parties. The plaintiff had to show that 
he risked some injury which could be compensated only through the grant of an 
interlocutory injunction. However, to minimise the risk of harm to the defendant, he also 
had to be in a position to give an undertaking to pay the defendant any damages he 
might sustain by reason of the interlocutory injunction, should the plaintiff be refused 
a final injunction at trial.6 
The balance of convenience was then assessed. Finally, either as part of the 
assessment of the balance of convenience or as a separate issue, the desirability of 
maintaining the status quo was considered.7 
Although this traditional approach allowed the courts to analyse coherently the various 
factors which would determine the grant or refusal of interlocutory relief, it was flexible 
and did not impose a consistent approach or standard.8 This led to discrepancies in the 
3 Sharpe (1979) 188. 
4 A useful summary of the traditional approach is contained in Series 5 (1996) 278-280. 
5 Sharpe (1979) 190. 
6 Idem at 191. 
7 Idem at 192-193. 
8 Idem at 188 and 196. 
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application of the various requirements: many judges viewed the strength of the 
plaintiff's case as a hurdle to be surmounted before attention could be given to the 
other requirements. 9 The problem was aggravated by the insistence of some courts on 
a 'strong prima facie case' before consideration of any other aspects. 10 
2.1.2.2 The American Cyanamid decision 
In American Cyanamid, after the grant of an interlocutory injunction in a patent 
infringement matter on the basis that a strong prima facie case had been made out, 11 
and its discharge by the Court of Appeal on the basis that no prima facie case had 
been proved, 12 the matter came before the House of Lords. It considered the 
requirements for interlocutory injunctions. 
Lord Diplock, who gave the judgment, pointed out that in both lower courts the 
requirement of a prima facie case had been viewed as a threshold test which had to 
be satisfied before the balance of convenience was considered. In effect this 
necessitated a trial of the infringement issue on conflicting affidavit evidence, without 
the benefit of oral evidence and cross-examination. 13 
He stated that the grant of interlocutory relief is both temporary and discretionary, and 
is made at a time when the existence of the right or its violation, or both, is uncertain 
and will remain uncertain until final judgment. The practice of granting interlocutory 
relief developed to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before 
this uncertainty could be resolved. So the object of an interlocutory injunction is to 
protect the plaintiff from injury for which he cannot adequately be compensated by 
9 Idem at 188 and 197. 
10 See as example of this attitude Cavendish (1970) 235; Hoffmann-La Roche (1975) 360. 
11 American Cyanamid(1975) 520. 
12 At 531. 
13 At 538. 
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damages. His need for protection must be weighed against the defendant's need to be 
protected against injury resulting from being prevented from exercising his own rights 
for which he cannot be adequately compensated by the plaintiff's undertaking in 
damages. The court must weigh these two requirements and determine where the 
balance of convenience lies. 14 
Lord Diplock went on to state that there is no rule which provides that a court may not 
take into account the balance of convenience unt:I it has been satisfied that, if the case 
went to trial solely on the evidence before it, the plaintiff would be entitled to a 
permanent injunction. It was not part of the court's function at the interlocutory stage, 
to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit. 15 
He then, in a unanimous judgment, formulated the following approach to determine 
whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted: (a) The court must be satisfied 
merely that 'the claim is not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a 
serious question to be tried'. 16 (b) The court must then consider the balance of 
convenience. To do this, it must first consider whether, if the plaintiff were to succeed 
at trial, he would be adequately compensated by an award of damages. If not, would 
the defendant, if the injunction were discharged at trial, be adequately compensated 
under the plaintiff's undertaking in damages.17 (c) Only where there is doubt as to the 
adequacy of the respective remedies in damages, do other matters which might affect 
the balance of convenience need to be considered. 18 (d) Where these other matters are 
evenly balanced, the status quo should be preserved. 19 
14 At 539-540. 
15 At 541. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 At 542. 
19 Ibid. 
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2.1.2.3 The post-American Cyanamid approach 
The traditional test emphasising the strength of the plaintiff's case, was thus replaced 
by a test where the adequacy of damages was seen as paramount. This has not met 
with universal approval and the decision has been the subject of much discussion. 
However, the guidelines proposed by Lord Diplock have been accepted as the leading 
source of law on interlocutory injunctions in England.20 
Although various special cases have subsequently been identified as unsuited to the 
application of the criteria suggested by Lord Diplock, American Cyanamid was a patent 
matter and it is generally accepted that these criteria should be applied to litigation 
concerning all forms of statutory intellectual property.21 It has also been pertinently held 
that passing off actions are particularly suited to the application of American Cyanamid 
principles.22 
The application of the various criteria to trade mark and passing off matters must 
therefore be considered. 
2.1.2.3.1 Serious question to be tried 
The first issue is whether there is a serious question to be tried. In the light of the 
court's description of a 'serious question' as a claim that is 'not frivolous or vexatious'23 
20 Bean (1994) 29. 
21 Annand (1994) 179; Comish (1996) 59; Kerly (1986) 321. 
22 County Sound ( 1991) 372. 
23 The use of the phrase 'frivolous or vexatious' has received justified criticism. In the Mothercare 
(1979) decision, the court stated at 472-473 that the phrase is also used in respect of striking out 
proceedings, where it has been described as meaning an action that 'is on the face of it unreal 
and one which no reasonable or sensible person could treat as a proper cause to bring before 
the court'. The court held that it cannot have been intended that this construction be placed on 
the interpretation of this phrase when used in respect of interlocutory proceedings. 
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but has a 'real prospect of succeeding',24 it is clear that a prima facie case, of whatever 
strength, need not be shown. 
When infringement of a registered trade mark is alleged, proof of a serious question 
is rarely difficult, and an allegation that the registration is invalid is usually not 
investigated in interlocutory proceedings.25 Any serious question will, therefore, relate 
to whether the marks are sufficiently similar to constitute infringement.26 
A 'serious question' in respect of passing off, was first described in the Mothercare 
decision as 'a case which is arguable and real', even though points of difficulty, factual 
and legal, were foreseen. 27 Although it was later held in various decisions that a 
plaintiff in a passing off case must show something more than an arguable case,28 the 
Court of Appeal finally held that nothing more than a triable issue is required.29 A clear 
statement of what must be proved in a passing off matter was recently given in the 
County Sound decision: the court held that for the tort of passing off to exist, the three 
elements of reputation (goodwill), confusion, and damage must be present, and that to 
obtain an interlocutory injunction the plaintiff must show that there is a serious question 
to be tried in respect of each element.30 
24 American Cyanamid ( 1975) 541. 
25 Carter& Parl<er(1960) 207; American Cyanamid (1975) 541 (patent registration); Cairns (1988) 
22; cf Meagher (1992) 599-600. 
26 The va;ious issues which could arise in this respect will not be dealt with. Annand (1994) 146-
148 discusses various of those that might arise under the 1994 Act. 
27 Mothercare (1979) 475. 
28 Newsweek(1979) 441; Athletes Foot(1980) 349; Pamass (1982) 329. The argument advanced 
in these cases was that, because the parties often accept the interlocutory order as finally 
determining the litigation, the criteria applied should correspond to those for the grant of final 
relief. 
29 Etan (1984) 386. 
30 County Sound (1991) 372-373. See also Law Society (1996) 752-753 on the necessity of 
showing a serious issue to be tried on the quantum of damage. 
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2. 1.2.3.2 Inadequacy of damages 
The inadequacy of damages is considered once the plaintiff has shown that there is a 
serious question to be tried. 
According to American Cyanamid, the court should first consider whether, if the plaintiff 
were successful at trial, he would be adequately compensated by an award of damages 
for the refusal of the interlocutory injunction, and whether the defendant is in a financial 
position to pay such damages. If damages are an adequate remedy and the defendant 
can pay them, the plaintiff cannot prove irreparable harm and an injunction will not be 
granted. However, if damages are inadequate, the court should then consider whether, 
if the defendant were ultimately successful, he would be adequately compensated by 
the plaintiffs undertaking as to damages if an interlocutory injunction had been 
granted.31 This approach results in adequacy of damages becoming the governing 
factor in a determination of the grant or refusal of interlocutory relief: other issues 
influencing the balance of convenience become relevant only when damages are not 
considered to be an adequate remedy. 32 
The manner in which the inadequacy of damages is assessed, is substantially the 
same as that used to determine irreparable harm in the traditional approach. Wadlow 
identifies four issues which arise under this heading: reparation, quantification, order 
of magnitude, and prospects of recovery. 33 
31 American Cyanamid (1975) 541. 
32 Net/on (1979) 534-535 is a good example of this approach. There the court held: 
'First the court should consider whether damages are an adequate remedy for the 
plaintiffs, which means are they capable of assessment with reasonable accuracy, and 
is the defendant of sufficient substance to answer any foreseeable amount which might 
be recovered? The respondents say they would be adequate in this case and if so that 
is of course the end of the case. If hOINever the court is of the opinion that damages are 
not an adequate remedy for the plaintiff, then it has to proceed to consider the like 
question in relation to the defendant. Here the appellants say that damages are an 
adequate remedy for the respondents, and if so that is an end of the case the other way' 
(emphasis added). 
33 Wadlow (1995) 545. 
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2.1.2.3.2.1 Reparation 
The damage suffered by trade mark infringement and passiny off is purely economic. 
Damages would in theory, therefore, always constitute adequate compensation. 
However, although the courts acknowledge that a sufficient sum of money can 
compensate for any wrong in this area of law, 34 this does not mean that damages are 
viewed as sufficient reparation, or that the damage that may be caused to the 
reputation or goodwill of either party is seen as unimportant.35 So the fact that damage 
is economic is no bar to the grant of interlocutory relief. 
2.1.2.3.2.2 Quantification 
It is generally accepted that intellectual property damages, whether caused by damage 
to reputation and loss of goodwill, or by pure loss of sales, are extremely difficult to 
quantify.36 It is for this reason that damages are usually viewed as inadequate. 
However, although it is not often pertinently mentioned in decisions, it has been 
emphasised that the damage must occur during the interlocutory period and not merely 
relate to irreparable harm which will arise if the objectionable conduct continues 
indefinitely.37 
2. 1.2.3.2.3 Extent of damage and financial strength of the parties 
The extent of the damage that will .be suffered is always relevant, as is the relative 
damage that either party will suffer. The courts occasionally indicate their awareness 
that what will amount to enormous damage to a small company or an individual may 
34 Dunhill (1979) 374: 'what is at stake is, essentially, money'. 
35 At 365 and 368; Mondaress (1981) 123. 
36 Combe International (1977) 471-472; Dunhill (1979) 365. 
37 Perell (1989) 555. 
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be relatively insignificant to a large corporation. They caution against allowing this 
aspect of the inquiry to be abused by financially strong plaintiffs to oppress smaller 
concerns.38 However, the ability of the parties to pay any award of damages after trial 
will always be an important consideration. 
The plaintiff will, in any event, be required to give an undertaking as to damages if an 
interlocutory injunction is granted; so his financial status is rarely in issue.39 Where the 
defendant is not financially strong and cannot cover any losses by the plaintiff, but any 
damage he might suffer could be covered by the plaintiff, an interlocutory injunction is 
usually granted.40 
2.1.2.3.3 Other matters which affect the balance of convenience 
According to American Cyanamid, the balance of convenience need be assessed only 
if there is doubt as to the adequacy of the respective remedies in damages available 
to either party. The court stated that it would be unwise to attempt to list the various 
factors which might have to be taken into account, or the relative weight to be attached 
to them, as they vary from case to case.41 Two of the more important factors are delay 
by the plaintiff and the good faith of the parties. 
2.1.2.3.3.1 Delay 
A factor which weighs very strongly against the plaintiff is any delay in the institution 
38 Apple (1977) 351; Vernon (1980) 191. 
39 In Combe International (1977) 473 the plaintiff had no assets in the jurisdiction but offered a 
bank indemnity in respect of liability on the undertaking for damages. 
40 Mothercare (1979) 475; Dunhill (1979) 365; Law Society (1996) 754. 
41 American Cyanamid (1975) 541-542. Some of these factors are more correctly classified as 
defences to a plaintiffs claim when a final injunction is sought. However, when interlocutory 
relief is sought, they are viewed as affecting the balance of convenience because of the overall 
consideration of both parties' cases required under the balance of convenience, in contrast with 
the relative weighing up of each party's case that occurs during trial hearings. Both Meagher 
(1992) 597 and Tilbury (1990) 323 describe such matters as defences. 
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of proceedings. This is viewed as an indication that he does not fear irreparable harm 
from the defendant's actions.42 Mere delay will suffice,43 as the defendant might 
prejudice his position during this period and this will affect the balance of convenience. 
It will also affect the determination of the status quo. According to Wadlow, unjustified 
delay of more than a few months is inevitably fatal to the plaintiff's case, even though 
delay of this length would have no effect on his rights at trial.44 
2.1.2.3.3.2 Good faith 
The good faith of either party is also relevant. This factor usually relates to the 
defendant, and the courts are generally unsympathic when a defendant has adopted 
a mark with ulterior motives. In one instance the court bluntly stated that the defendant 
'has brought its troubles on itself .45 Where the issue is one of passing off rather than 
trade mark infringement, the courts also regard the fact that the defendant is not 
prohibited from using the mark per se, but merely from using it without distinguishing 
it from the plaintiff's mark, as tipping the balance of convenience in the plaintiff's 
favour.46 
2.1.2.3.4 Preservation of the status quo 
Finally, where other factors are evenly balanced, American Cyanamid recommends the 
preservation of the status quo.47 The problem lies in determining the time at which the 
42 Meagher (1992) 597; Spry (1990) 480. 
43 In contrast to the situation when a final injunction is sought, where laches or acquiescence must 
be shown. See chapter 3 at 3.1.3.4. But see Law Society (1996) 755: 'such [interlocutory] 
injunctions are not awarded as a prize for the vigilant and automatically withheld from the less 
than vigilant'. 
44 Wadlow (1995) 555. 
45 Elan (1984) 382. See also Elanco (1979) 57 where the same view was expressed in respect of 
possible copyright infringement. 
46 Combe lntemational ( 1977) 4 73. 
47 American Cyanamid (1975) 542. 
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existing state of affairs should be preserved. While it is often accepted that this is the 
time immediately preceding issue of the writ, 48 some decisions view it as the time 
before the defendant embarked upon the activity sought to be restrained,49 and other 
decisions state that the relevant time may vary in different cases. 50 The last seems the 
view to be preferred; the time immediately before writ is issued usually means that the 
trade mark infringement or passing off is already in progress, and will thus be allowed 
to continue;51 but it might not be equitable in every instance to view the time before the 
infringement or passing off commenced as definitive. 
2.1.2.3.5 General derogations from American Cyanamid 
As previously stated, the American Cyanamid decision was almost immediately the 
subject of controversy. As early as the following year, it was described as having 
'perplexed the profession'. 52 The most recent judicial consideration of American 
Cyanamid reintroduced strength of case, albeit a watered-down version, and held that 
if it is apparent that one party's case is much stronger than the other's, this cannot be 
ignored by the court.53 But the bulk of the criticism, and subsequent refinements of and 
departures from the guidelines set out by Lord Diplock, do not relate to the intellectual 
property field. Only one issue need be considered, as in all other respects English 
48 American Cyanamid (1975) 542; Bean (1994) 33. 
49 Fel/owes (1976) 141. 
50 Dunhill (1979) 376; Berryman (1989) 157: 'A true status quo is npt a static condition.'; Tilbury 
(1990) 322: 'the meaning of status quo is not static'. 
51 Except in quia timet injunctions. 
52 Fellowes (1976) 130. In this decision, Lord Denning rather snidely described the progress of the 
proceedings in American Cyanamid as follows: 
'The hearing before the Court of Appeal took eight days. The plaintiffs then appealed 
to the House of Lords when it was estimated that the hearing would last 12 days. The 
House were clearly appalled by the prospect of hearing an interlocutory appeal for 12 
days. So they disposed of it in three days' (at 130). 
53 Series 5 (1996) 286. See also Charters (1997) 14. 
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works on trade marks and passing off view these guidelines as applicable.54 
2.1.2.3.6 The 'final effect' exception 
The only relevant exception relates to the 'special factors' mentioned by Lord Diplock 
at the close of his judgment in American Cyanamid.55 Subsequent decisions have 
identified as a 'special factor', or special case, interlocutory injunctions which finally 
determine the dispute. In these instances, the merits of the parties' cases will be more 
carefully considered. 56 In the leading decison on these cases, Lord Diplock himself 
distinguished American Cyanamid as it did not concern a situation where the 
determination of injunctive relief would finally dispose of the action. He held that in 
circumstances where interlocutory relief was definitive, the strength of the plaintiffs 
case would become 'a factor to be brought into the balance'.57 
It is common cause that in practice intellectual property cases seldom proceed beyond 
the interlocutory stage.58 The issue is then whether they should be judged by this 
stricter criterion. Whether intellectual property cases fall into this special category has 
not been pertinently considered in statutory intellectual property cases. Passing off 
cases were occasionally regarded as such,59 until the Court of Appeal held that they 
54 Annand (1994) 179; Ker1y (1986) 321. The only qualification to this statement is that in passing 
off cases the strength of the plaintiffs case can be relevant as it will affect the extent of the 
damage he is likely to suffer to his goodwill, and therefore his ability to prove inadequacy of 
damages; Wadlow (1995) 542. 
55 American Cyanamid (1975) 542: 'I would reiterate that, in addition to those to which I have 
referred, there may be other special factors to be taken into consideration in the particular 
circumstances of individual cases.' 
56 Fellowes (1976) 133. 
57 NWL Ltd (1979) 1307. 
58 Fellowes (1976) 134, in which this category of special cases was first defined, specifically 
mentions passing off and patent cases as examples of matters that seldom go to trial after 
interlocutory proceedings. 
59 Newsweek (1979) 441; Athletes Foot (1980) 349; Pamass (1982) 329. 
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did not qualify as special cases.60 
Subsequently, in the few intellectual property instances where the court has conceded 
that the grant or refusal of relief will have final effect, this has b~en viewed as affecting 
the balance of convenience, not as an example of a special case.61 
The problem appears to lie in the concept 'final effect'. In the NWL Ltd decision, Lord 
Diplock described these instances as 'exceptional' and viewed them as final, as 'there 
would be nothing left on which it was in the unsuccessful party's interest to proceed to 
trial' .62 Later in the same judgment he described them as having 'the practical effect of 
putting an end to the action because the harm that will have been already caused to 
the losing party by its grant or refusal is complete and of a kind for which money cannot 
constitute any worthwhile recompense'.63 In a subsequent decision, the grant of 
interlocutory relief which has final effect was described in the following terms: 
'If an injunction was granted to the plaintiffs, that would be an end to the 
substance of the matter and the injunction would not in effect amount to a 
holding operation: it would be giving the plaintiffs all that they came to court to 
seek, namely their injunction, and when the time came for trial there would be 
no point in a trial because the object of the plaintiffs would have been achieved 
seeing that the annual general meeting would have been held.'64 
60 Elan (1984) 386. 
61 B/azer(1992) 511: 'the effect of the injunction would be to change for all time the status [of the 
mark] in the United Kingdom'. Although Kerly (1986) 322 footnote 84 states that post-American 
Cyanamid experience indicates a significantly increased tendency for passing off and trade mark 
infringement matters to go to trial, because the merits are not as fully canvassed as under the 
traditional approach, other writers do not share this vieYJ (see, for example, Wadlow (1995) 540). 
62 NWL Ltd (1979) 1306. 
63 At 1307. 
64 Cayne(1984)232. 
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A study of these extracts makes it clear that something more than a decision by the 
parties not to proceed is presupposed - the final relief has become irrelevant. 
Intellectual property issues, where relief is economic in nature, rarely fall into this 
category.65 Although it is true that, in practice, the vast majority of intellectual property 
matters are decided at interlocutory stage, this is a pragmatic decision by the parties, 
not an objective necessity. So it is unlikely that the courts will draw a distinction 
between statutory intellectual property and passing off disputes. No such instance will 
probably be viewed as falling under the 'special cases' exception. This assumption is 
supported by Lord Diplock's description of such special cases as 'exceptional'. 66 Clearly 
the usual applications for interlocutory relief in intellectual property matters will never 
be described as such. 
2.1.3 Mandatory interlocutory injunctions 
The American Cyanamid guidelines are relevant only to prohibitory interlocutory 
injunctions and do not apply when a mandatory interlocutory injunction is sought. A 
mandatory interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted in the absence of 
special circumstances.67 It has been held that the court must feel a high degree of 
assurance that, at trial, it will appear that the injunction was rightly granted.68 In the 
leading decision on such injunctions in the copyright field, the court interpreted this as 
requiring the plaintiff to show that he has a 'high standard of probability of success' .69 
This is clearly a vastly different criterion to the 'serious issue to be tried' required for 
prohibitory interlocutory injunctions. As pointed out in this decision, the statutory 
65 In Elan (1984) 386, the court distinguished NWL Ltd (1979) on the basis that, although grant of 
the injunction would irrevocably and finally prevent the defendants from using the mark 
concerned, this was not the kind of case to which NWL Ltd referred as causing overwhelming 
damage or irrevocable harm, as the defendants could market their computers under another 
name. 
66 NWL Ltd (1979) 1306. 
67 Halsbury Injunctions (1979) 534. 
68 Shepherd Homes (1971) 351. 
69 Leisure Data (1988) 372. 
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authority to grant any form of injunction stems from section 37 of the Supreme Court 
Act 1981, which provides that an injunction may be granted when 'it appears to the 
court to be just and convenient to do so'. When applying this to the grant of mandatory 
interlocutory injunctions, the court must give full weight to the practical realities of the 
situation and weigh the respective risk of injustice to either party. 70 Although the courts 
accept that there is usually a greater risk of injustice attached to the grant of mandatory 
relief at an interlocutory stage, it has also been held that there can be greater risk of 
injustice when it is refused than when granted.71 In these instances the court will 
consider various factors in exercising its discretion. In a copyright matter, the court 
exercised its discretion in the plaintiff's favour and noted that there was no difficulty in 
formulating the order in an enforceable form; the order would not cause 
uncompensable loss to the defendant, while loss to the plaintiff would be very difficult 
to quantify; the status quo would be better maintained by granting the order; and the 
refusal of relief would render further relief irrelevant. 72 The court should in all instances 
look at the effect of the order on both parties and consider the risk of injustice; the 
actual wording of the order as mandatory or prohibitory73 is less important.74 In a recent 
passing off decision, the court stated that such orders are usually phrased in a negative 
form because courts are reluctant to grant mandatory relief on motion. It then held that, 
in appropriate circumstances, 'it is better not to be mealy-mouthed and to grant an 
70 Ibid. 
71 Films Rover(1987) 682. 
72 At 683-685. 
73 A mandatory order is sometimes phrased as a double negative to make it technically a 
prohibitory order: for example, in Dou/ton (1971) 600 the defendants were 'restrained from 
interfering with the right of the plaintiffs or either of them to have access to the subject die for 
the purpose of removing the same from its present place, and from refusing to be present when 
requested to do so'. 
74 Films Rover(1987) 680: 
'semantic arguments over whether the injunction as formulated can properly be 
classified as mandatory or prohibitory are barren. The question of substance is whether 
the granting of the injunction would carry that higher risk of injustice which is normally 
associated with the grant of a mandatory injunction.' 
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express mandatory injunction'. 75 
2.2 AUSTRALIA 
2.2.1 Prohibitory interlocutory injunctions 
Beecham Group is the leading Australian decision on the grant of such injunctions; it 
was given by the High Court in 1968. Although a patent case, the principles were 
stated as applicable to all interlocutory injunctions. The court identified two main 
inquiries which had to be conducted. The first was whether the plaintiff has made out 
a strong prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remained as it was, there 
was a probability that the plaintiff would be entitled to final relief. 76 The second was the 
balance of convenience, which the court described as whether the injury to the plaintiff 
if the injunction were refused would be outweighed by the injury suffered by the 
defendant if the injunction were granted.77 This approach is similar to the traditional 
English checklist. 
After the American Cyanamid decision, the question arose whether the two judgments 
could be reconciled. Some authors argue that the conflict between the two decisions 
is more perceived than real, and that there is little distinction between a 'strong prima 
facie' case, as required in Beecham Group, and an 'arguable' case, as required in 
American Cyanamid.78 Some authorities and subsequent decisions have indicated that, 
if there is actually a difference between the two concepts, the Beecham Group 
approach should be followed. It requires at least a strong possibility of success and 
does not relegate the strength of the parties' cases to a position of relatively minor 
75 G/axo (1996) 392 - the court, rather than granting the more common order restraining a 
company from continuing to be registered in its existing name, ordered it to change its name. 
This decision was approved in the subsequent Law Society (1996) 739 decision. 
76 Beecham Group (1968) 622. 
77 At 623. 
78 Meagher (1992) 594; Ricketson (1984) 20. 
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importance.79 However, others view the subsequent Murphy8° High Court decision, 
which refers to a 'triable issue', as importing the American Cyanamid test. 81 
In Australia, the balance of convenience is not determined in accordance with the 
methodology suggested by Lord Diplock in American Cyanamid. Instead, it is assessed 
by considering all relevant factors. 82 This results in a further and important difference 
to the English approach - the adequacy of damages is viewed as merely one of the 
factors influencing the balance of convenience, and not as an independent factor which 
is determined prior to any consideration of the balance of convenience.83 
The finality of relief is also not viewed as a special case requiring a stricter 
consideration of the merits: it is seen merely as a discretionary consideration, with the 
overall balance of convenience remaining the determining issue.84 
2.2.2 Mandatory interlocutory injunctions 
The requirements to be met here are the same as in England: a high degree of 
assurance that the plaintiff will succeed at trial must be shown.85 
79 Meagher (1992) 595; Ricketson (1984) 20 footnote 31. 
80 Murphy (1986) 651. This application for interlocutory relief was heard by six judges of the High 
Court, because of the subject-matter of the application. 
81 Ricketson (Study) 11; Shanahan (1990) 357; Tilbury (1992) 313. 
82 Tilbury (1992) 314. 
83 Idem at 314-315. See also Murphy (1986) 655, where this approach was followed. 
84 Spry (1990) 458; Tilbury (1990) 320. 
85 Tilbury (1990) 320. 
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2.3 CANADA 
2.3.1 Prohibitory interlocutory injunctions 
Before American Cyanamid, the requirement for the grant of interlocutory relief was the 
existence of a strong prima facie right coupled with an assessment of the balance of 
convenience. 86 Lord Diplock's judgment was not accepted immediately by Canadian 
courts,87 and even after it was accepted, the sequential procedure he suggested is not 
always followed.88 The American Cyanamid approach, as adapted by Canadian courts, 
embodies a three-step test: (a) Is there a serious issue to be tried? (b) Will the plaintiff 
suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted? (c) Considering all the 
circumstances, does the balance of convenience favour the grant of an interlocutory 
injunction?89 
Although a 'serious question to be tried' remains a threshold requirement which must 
be proved before any other factors will be considered, once this has- been done the 
various factors affecting the balance of convenience are not considered in a 'series of 
mechanical steps that are to be followed in some sort of drilled progression' .90 The 
courts tend to view the various factors as evidence affecting the assessment of the 
relevant risks of harm to the parties.91 A Canadian writer has noted the dangers 
inherent in making 'irreparable harm to the plaintiff' the first determining factor: this 
makes the wealth of the parties the basis for the grant or refusal of relief.92 He 
suggested that the value of American Cyanamid in Canada is that an application is no 
86 Fox (1972) 422 and 424; Sharpe (1983) 61. 
87 Tedelyne (1977) 450. 
88 Hughes (1993) 264. 
89 Fyfe (1995) 30. 
90 Turbo Resources (1989) 20. 
91 Sharpe (1983) 89. 
92 Idem at 77. 
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longer dismissed merely because the plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case. 
Instead, the application is determined by a consideration of all the relevant factors.93 
However, proof of irreparable harm has become a difficult issue in trade mark 
infringement proceedings. Canadian courts originally viewed the infringement of a 
proprietary right in a trade mark as sufficient to constitute irreparable harm not 
compensable in damages. They did not require any proof of actual harm or consider 
other issues affecting the balance of convenience.94 Also, the courts accepted the 
prima facie validity of the registered trade mark and held that validity could not be 
attacked in interlocutory proceedings unless a strong case had been made out.95 
This approach was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal in the Syntex decision. 96 
The court held, first, that evidence concerning irreparable harm must be clear and not 
spet:ulative, and it was insufficient for a plaintiff merely to allege that he was likely to 
suffer irreparable harm.97 Secondly, the court held that if the validity of the mark is in 
issue, it cannot assume a valid registration. 98 The result of this decision is that the 
threshold for establishing irreparable harm is much higher than was previously 
required. It appears that a plaintiff must prove irreparable harm separately from his 
trade mark rights. In a subsequent decision it was held that irreparable harm will not 
necessarily be inferred from evidence of confusion or from loss of goodwill: it must be 
proved separately.99 It has not yet been decided whether an attack on the validity of a 
trade mark which is not genuinely in dispute will also be sufficient to require proof of 
93 Idem at 76. 
94 Fyfe (1995) 31. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Syntex (1991) 129. 
97 At 135. 
98 At 138. 
99 Centre Ice (1994) 53. 
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irreparable harm unrelated to registered rights. 100 
It is clear, however, that before interlocutory relief will be granted in instances of 
registered trade mark infringement, substantial proof of actual harm, similar to that 
required for unregistered marks, is required. Also, unlike the position in other 
jurisdictions, the validity of a registered mark may easily be placed in issue. 
2.3.2 Mandatory interlocutory injunctions 
Mandatory interlocutory injunctions are difficult to obtain as the risk of harm is usually 
greater to the defendant than to the plaintiff. However, no principles differing from those 
used to determine prohibitory interlocutory relief have been identified, 101 and the 
balance of convenience determines the grant or refusal of such relief. 102 
2.4 SOUTH AFRICA 
2.4.1 Introduction 
An interlocutory interdict, as the name implies, is not a final determination of the rights 
of the parties. It follows that the requirements which must be met differ from those for 
a final interdict. Regrettably, the different function of a final and an interlocutory order 
is rarely emphasised by our courts, and interlocutory interdicts seem to be viewed as 
merely a lower form of final interdict, rather than a remedy created to serve a 
completely different purpose. 
This view of an interlocutory interdict as merely a lower form of final interdict can be 
traced back to Van der Linden. The historical development of the remedy of interdict 
100 Fyfe (1995) 36. 
101 Sharpe (1983) 89. 
102 Gestion Opera (1975) 193. 
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is dealt with elsewhere. 103 It is sufficient to note here that by the time Van der Linden 
wrote the textbooks which form the basis for the South African law of interdicts, 
interlocutory interdicts or interdicts pendente lite were frequently granted. 104 However, 
he did not pertinently distinguish between the two forms of relief in his works, or view 
interlocutory interdicts as a separate form of relief. He merely explained, when 
discussing the first requirement, that 
'en is dat recht twijffelachtig, dan is de zaak ongeschikt, om zonder een volledig 
onderzoek en Sententie, reeds bij het Mandament, als 't waare, gedetermineert 
te worden. - Zoo egter de daad, waar tegen Poenaal verzogt word, van dien aart 
is, dat deszelfs voortgang voor den Requirant onherstelbaar zoude wezen terwijl 
integendeel het nalaten van de daad aan den Gerequireerden geen irreparabel 
grief zou toebrengen, vermeenen wij, en hebben 'took te meermalen bij de 
Hoven zoo zien practiseeren, dat 't Mandament Poenaal zoo behooren verleend 
te worden, en aan den Requirant gelegenheid gegeven, om zijn recht (dat 
echter in allen gevalle apparent105 moet wezen), in p/eniore judicio te 
deduceeren' .106 
103 See chapter 3 at 2.2. 
104 Van der Linden (1794) 2.19.1: 'de Mandamenten Poenaal, dat is ... waar bij aan den Gedaagden 
dadelijk, en dus ook pendente lite, op verbeurte eener poenaliteit tegen de Hooge Overheid, het 
plegen van deeze of geene daad verboden word'. 
105 The 'MJl'd 'probable' is used by Nathan as translation of 'apparent' and he states that this means 
probable or prima facie: Nathan (1939) 7 footnote 1. However, while Van der Linden (1794) 
uses the word 'apparent', Van der Linden (1806) uses the term 'de hoogste waarschynlikheid' 
which is translated by both Nathan (1939) 8 and Juta (1891) 297 as 'the greatest probability'. 
106 Vanderlinden(1794)2.1.19.1: 
'[l]f the right be doubtful, then the case is not suitable to be decided by the interdict 
(alone), as it v1ere, without complete investigation and judgment - If, however, the thing 
against which an interdict is sought is of such a nature that its continuance would cause 
irreparable loss to the applicant, while on the contrary the discontinuance of that act 
would cause no irreparable injury to the respondent, we hold, and we have also seen 
that frequently applied in practice by the courts, that the penal interdict should be 
granted, and an opportunity be afforded to the applicant, to establish his right (which, 
however, must in all cases be probable) in a more complete judicial proceeding' 
(translation in Nathan (1939) 6). 
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Nathan did not deal with interlocutory interdicts and drew no distinction between the 
requirements that must be met in either instance.107 He merely stated that in the 
majority of cases, the remedy is given by way of an interlocutory application, pending 
an action to determine the rights of the parties. 108 
Later works and court decisions draw a clear distinction between interlocutory and final 
interdicts. The following requirements are generally accepted: (a) a right that is prima 
facie established though open to some doubt; (b) a well-grounded apprehension of 
irreparable harm, if the interlocutory relief is not granted and the ultimate relief is 
eventually granted; (c) the balance of convenience favours the granting of interlocutory 
relief; and (d) the absence of any other satisfactory remedy. 109 
2.4.2 Prohibitory interlocutory interdicts 
2.4.2.1 A prima facie right110 
This concept has raised problems and various approaches have been formulated. The 
generally accepted view is that the existence of a prima facie right requires prima facie 
proof of facts that establish its existence in terms of substantive law. However, because 
this right may be 'open to some doubt', it need not be proved on a balance of 
probabilities. The approach, when considering the degree of proof required, was that 
the facts as set out by the applicant, together with any facts set out by the respondent 
which the applicant could not dispute, had to be considered. The facts raised by the 
respondent were then considered. The court then decided whether, with regard to the 
inherent probabilities and ultimate burden of proof, the applicant should on those facts 
107 Nathan (1939) 10. 
108 Idem at 2. 
109 Boshoff (1969) 267; Prest (1996) 50-51. 
110 The terms 'prima facie right' and 'prima facie case' are used indiscriminately by the courts. 
Obviously, the plaintiff has to prove not only a prima facie right but also its prima facie 
infringement. 
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obtain final relief at the trial. 111 
More recently, this approach has been eased. The Appellate Division, while not 
pertinently formulating a different degree of proof to that of Webster, confirmed the 
balancing concept between strength of case and balance of convenience which was 
first suggested in Olympic,112 stating that the stronger the applicant's prospects of 
success, the less his need to rely on prejudice to himself and conversely, the more the 
element of 'some doubt', the greater the need for the other factors to favour him. 113 In 
a recent definition of the term, a full bench described a prima facie right as existing 
when there is a prospect of success in the claim for principal relief, albeit that the claim 
may be assessed as weak by the court. 114 
It is clear that the degree of proof required by the Sol:lth African courts has been 
lowered over the years. However, the American Cyanamid approach, that all that must 
be proved is a 'serious question to be tried', was held not to be part of our law in the 
Beecham decision, which reiterated the requirement of at least a prima facie case. 115 
A prima facie case is easier to prove in respect of trade mark infringement than 
passing off. Registration is prima facie proof of the exclusive right to use the mark 
111 Webster(1948) 1189, as qualified by Goo/ (1955) 688. 
112 In Olympic (1957) 383, the court held: 'The stronger the prospects of success, the less the need 
for such balance to favour the applicant: the weaker the prospects of success, the greater the 
need for the balance of convenience to favour him'. 
113 Eriksen (1973) 691. 
114 Ferreira (1995) 832. As this was a decision on a constitutional issue, this description can be seen 
as obiter as regards non-constitutional litigation. The court said as much: 'This court is not 
bound by the standard which applies in an ordinary application for an interim interdict' (at 836). 
(See Henderson (1996) 179 for a discussion of this decision.) In the subsequent Spur (1996) 
decision, an application for an interlocutory interdict to prevent passing off, the single judge 
hearing the matter reverted to the Webster and Goo/ approach: he referred to proof of a prima 
facie right as a 'threshold' test (at 714). 
115 Beecham (1977) 53. Although the American Cyanamid approach was accepted as sufficient in 
respect of constitutional issues, the court did so on the basis that it was not bound by the 
standard which appplies in an ordinary application for an interim interdict: Ferreira (1995) 836. 
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concerned. Although not pertinently decided so by our courts, it is unlikely that an 
attack on the validity of the registration wil1 be considered during interlocutory 
proceedings. 116 In passing off issues, the plaintiff will have to prove the existence of 
goodwill.117 In addition, in both instances the plaintiff will have to make out a prima facie 
case of confusing similarity between his mark and the offending mark. 
2.4.2.2 Apprehension of irreparable harm 
Where the applicant can prove a clear right, it is sufficient for him to show an existing 
or apprehended injury. However, Van der Linden's original requirement has mutated, 
as far as interlocutory interdicts are concerned, to the requirement that the 
apprehension of a prejudicial act118 and the apprehension of 'irreparable harm' must 
both be shown where all that can be proved is a prima facie right. 119 In both instances 
the apprehension must be objectively reasonable, although the applicant need not 
show that injury will follow on a balance of probabilities. 120 In intellectual property 
matters, this harm will always be economic. 
2.4.2.3 Balance of convenience 
The court here weighs the prejudice to the applicant if the interdict is refused against 
the prejudice to the respondent if it is granted. 121 This discretionary balance was 
described by Van der Linden as follows: 
116 Webster & Page (1986) 289. 
117 Idem at 412. See also Lorimar(1981) 1137. 
118 This requirement of interference or injury has been dealt with in chapter 3 at 3.3.1.2. 
119 Boshoff ( 1969) 267. However, in CIR Transkei ( 1991) 654 the court held that the requirements 
of irreparable harm and no alternative remedy need not be established if the plaintiff has made 
out a strong prima facie case. 
120 Free State Gold (1961) 518. 
121 Eriksen (1973) 691. 
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'Zoo egter de zaak, waar tegen Poenaal versogt wordt, van dien aard is, dat 
deszelfs voortgang voor den verzoeker onherstelbaar zoude wezen, terwijl 
integendeel het nalaten van die daad aan de partije geen onherstelbaar nadeel 
zoude toebrengen, behoort het Mandament Poenaal verleend, en aan den 
versoeker gelegenheid gegeven te worden, om zijn regt, hetwelk in allen gevalle 
de hoogste waarschynlykheid voor zig moet hebben, in een vollediger 
Rechtsgeding te behandelen' .122 
South African decisions have based their tests for the balance of convenience on this 
passage. But it would appear that the equivalent English principle has influenced the 
application of this requirement in South Africa, as recent cases show a trend towards 
determining the balance of convenience on equitable considerations, with 'fairness and 
justice' seen as influencing the discretion of the court. 123 This discretion, when the court 
decides who the balance of convenience favours, usually resolves itself into a 
consideration of the prospects of success in the main action. The stronger the 
prospects of success, the less need for the balance of convenience to favour the 
applicant; the weaker the prospects of success, the greater the need for it to favour 
him.124 
Although the damage which the parties will suffer is the primary factor when 
considering the balance of convenience, the parties' respective ability to pay damages 
is not a factor which the court takes into account. 125 The fact that the harm or damage 
122 Vanderlinden (1806) 3.1.4.7: 
'If, however, the thing against which an interdict is sought is of such a nature that its 
continuance would cause irreparable loss to the applicant, while on the contrary the 
discontinuance of that act would cause no irreparable injury to the (opposite) party, an 
interdict ought to be granted, and an opportunity given to the applicant to establish his 
right, which in any event must have the greatest probability in its favour, in a more 
formal suit' (translation in Nathan (1939) 8-9). 
123 Marinpine (1984) 234; Hamischfeger(1993) 491. 
124 LAWSA Interdicts (1981) 300. 
125 In Coalcor (1990) 360 the court held that the applicants, who were members of a large and 
powerful group of companies, would suffer damages which were probably irrecoverable. But, 
despite this and the further consideration that they had offered an undertaking to pay the first 
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suffered in trade mark infringement and passing off proceedings is economic, has not 
led South African courts to view financial strength as a major consideration when 
determining the balance of convenience. This is unlike the English position, of 
course. 126 
2.4.2.4 No other remedy 
Although this requirement is phrased identically to that for the grant of a final interdict, 
the emphasis differs. First, as pointed out by some writers, the requirement that 
irreparable harm must be proved, presupposes that no other satisfactory remedy exists: 
if some other remedy will give adequate relief, the harm cannot be described as 
'irreparable'. 127 Secondly, because the interdict is of limited duration, the courts are 
more likely to base the exercise of their discretion on the balance of convenience than 
on a strict view of this requirement. 128 Courts have held that where a claim for damages 
will be impractical to enforce or difficult to quantify, this remedy is 'inadequate'. 129 The 
'governing principle' postulated in American Cyanamid, which requires the court first 
to consider whether a plaintiff would be adequately compensated in damages if 
successful at trial, so that other factors influencing the balance of convenience become 
relevant only where there is doubt as to the respective remedies in damages available 
to the parties, has been rejected in South Africa. 130 
It has been stated that the extreme difficulty of ascertaining, quantifying, and proving 
damages in respect of trade mark infringement militates strongly in favour of the grant 
respondent's damages if the interlocutory interdict should not have been granted, this did not 
affect the balance of convenience as the grant of interlocutory relief would probably lead to the 
liquidation of th~ first respondent. 
? 
126 See 2.1.2.3.2.3: Extent of damage and financial strength of parties. 
127 Jones & Buckle (1996) Act 98. 
128 Prest (1996) 241. 
129 Van Niekerk (1959) 187; Beecham (1977) 58. 
130 Beecham (1977) 54. 
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of interlocutory reliet 131 Interlocutory interdicts were on occasion granted merely 
'because in this way the least damage will be caused and the damage will be most 
easily ascertained' .132 
2.4.2.5 Discretion 
The court has a wide discretion to grant or refuse an interlocutory interdict. 133 Unlike 
the limited discretion which a court has in respect of final interdicts once all the 
requirements have been fulfilled, a court has a discretion to grant or refuse an 
interlocutory interdict whether or not all the requirements have been proved. 134 Apart 
from the discretion exercised in respect of each of the various requirements mentioned 
above, this general discretion can also relate to the preservation of the status quo. 135 
The current attitude of the courts, as exemplified in the Beecham decision, is that the 
court should view its discretion to grant or refuse an interlocutory interdict in totality, 
and that the various discretionary considerations should not be viewed in isolation but 
as a single 'general discretionary jurisdiction' with the preservation of the status quo 
as merely one of the factors to be taken into account. 136 
Delay can be a ground for the refusal of an interlocutory interdict, 137 but it is usually 
linked to the discretion exercised in respect of the balance of convenience. 138 It has 
131 Webster & Page (1986) 317. 
132 CTC Co (1930) 84. 
133 Prest (1996) 234-236. 
134 Beecham ( 19n) 61. But see Knox D'Arcy ( 1996) 680 where the court held that this is not a true 
discretionary power but merely means that the court is entitled to have regard to a number of 
disparate features when coming to a decision. 
135 Ibid. 
136 At 60. 
137 Prest (1996) 214. 
138 Moroka Swallows (1987) 536. 
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been argued that if the applicant fails to institute proceedings as soon as possible, he 
clearly does not regard the situation as being of such gravity that an interlocutory 
interdict is required. 139 
2.4.3 Mandatory interlocutory interdicts 
South African courts and writers have paid no attention to the principles which govern 
the grant of mandatory interlocutory interdicts. It appears that such interdicts will be 
governed by the same requirements as for prohibitory interlocutory interdicts. 
3 PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
3.1 ENGLAND 
3.1.1 General remarks 
The structure of the English High Court means that jurisdiction is not a territorial 
consideration, but is determined by subject matter. Motions for interlocutory relief in 
intellectual property cases are heard by the Chancery Division in open court. 
Proceedings for interlocutory injunctions are applied for on motion, while proceedings 
for final injunctions are usually commenced by writ. 140 A plaintiff may not apply for an 
interlocutory injunction before he has issued a writ for final relief, except in matters of 
139 Crossfield (1925) 223: 'the applicant company must be the best judge of its needs in the matter, 
and the applicant has allOVtleCI this period of over two years to elapse, which shows that a matter 
of a few months cannot be so damaging to the applicant as a temporary interdict might be to the 
respondent'. 
140 The other method of commencing proceedings for final relief is by originating summons. These 
are seldom used in intellectual property matters, however, as they are appropriate when the 
construction of an Act or other question of law is at issue, or where there is no substantial 
dispute of fact - RSC Order 5,r.4(2). 
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extreme urgency .141 
3.1.2 Applications on notice 
The notice of motion is usually served on the defendant before the filing of the plaintiff's 
evidence. The matter is then considered by the motions judge, who gives directions 
by setting a timetable for the exchange of evidence and allocating a hearing date. Only 
then does the plaintiff serve evidence in chief. This is followed by the defendant's 
evidence in answer. Finally the plaintiff serves evidence in reply. The matter is then 
argued before the court. 142 
3.1.3 Ex parte applications 
An injunction may be sought ex parte where the matter is extremely urgent or where 
secrecy is essential. 143 If the matter is one of urgency, rather than secrecy, a practice 
has developed of giving the defendant informal notice so that he can attend court and 
possibly present argument or agree to terms. 144 Such orders are usually granted for a 
very short time, usually until the next motion day, when the matter can be heard inter 
partes. 145 
3.1.4 Burden of proof 
Although the burden of proof as regards the existence of a triable issue and the 
inadequacy of damages as remedy for the plaintiff lies with the plaintiff, the burden as 
141 RSC Order 29,r.1 (3). When this occurs, the writ must be left with the court so that it can be 
issued, or terms imposed for its issue: Supreme Court Practice (1993) 512. 
142 Wadlow (1995) 525-526. 
143 RSC Order 8,r.2(1). 
144 Bean (1994) 69-70; Wadlow (1995) 526. 
145 Supreme Court Practice (1995) 518. 
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regards the inadequacy of damages as remedy for the defendant lies with the 
defendant.146 
3.1.5 Orders for speedy trial 
Where it appears to the court, at the hearing of an interlocutory application, that it 
would be preferable to have the matter heard at trial rather than to consider the merits 
for interlocutory purposes, it may make an order for early trial instead of hearing the 
application. 147 
3.1.6 Undertakings 
An interlocutory injunction will seldom be granted unless the plaintiff tenders an 
undertaking in damages. 148 The undertaking is to pay compensation to the defendant 
for any loss he has suffered as a result of the grant of interlocutory relief, if such relief 
is not confirmed at trial. 149 The plaintiff's affidavit containing his evidence in chief must 
include information on his ability to honour the undertaking. Where he is not financially 
strong, the court can require either security or a payment into court to fortify the 
undertaking.150 
The defendant may give an undertaking, without admitting liability, in terms similar to 
the injunction sought by the plaintiff, if he does not wish to contest the matter at 
interlocutory stage. He is then obliged to honour it as if it were a court order. But the 
plaintiff is then required to give a cross-undertaking in damages to safeguard the 
146 Odgers (1991) 524. 
147 RSC Order 29,r.5. 
148 Bean (1994) 27. 
149 Graham (1878) 494; Civil Litigation (1990) 87. 
150 Bean (1994) 26-27; Zuckerman (1994) 571. 
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defendant. 151 The parties are bound by these undertakings. Neither party can ask the 
court to alter them before trial. 152 
3.1. 7 Form of order 
The plaintiff is required to file a draft order with any ex parte application. This must 
specify the relief sought, provide for the defendant to apply for discharge of the order, 
and contain an undertaking in damages and an undertaking to notify the defendant of 
the terms of the order. 153 This is not a prerequisite in inter partes motions. 
In trade mark infringement and passing off proceedings, the order is made in as limited 
a form as possible.154 In passing off matters, the courts have held that an order should 
prohibit the defendant from using the mark or get-up 'without distinguishing it'. But it is 
not their practice to say in advance what is or is not sufficient to be 'distinguishing' .155 
Orders are usually made applicable to the defendant, his servants, workmen, or 
agents.156 In a more modern form, they restrain the defendant from 'causing or enabling 
or assisting others to represent' 157 the prohibited acts. 
The undertaking required from a plaintiff seeking interlocutory relief does not form part 
of the order of court. But the court will not grant the relief unless this undertaking has 
been tendered by the plaintiff, together with evidence setting out the plaintiffs ability 
151 Civil Utigation (1990) 88. 
152 Kerly (1986) 322. 
153 Bean (1994) 75. 
154 Kerly (1986) 323; Wadlow (1995) 522. 
155 Brittain Publishing (1957) 135. The reason for not stating what will be sufficient to distinguish is 
stated by Harman J as follOVv'S: 'The Court cannot in advance say what will be enough and what 
will not be enough because it is very difficult to know how pig-headed the public may be' (at 
135). 
156 Marengo (1948) 253. 
157 Combe International (1977) 474. 
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to honour the undertaking. 
A successful party is usually awarded his costs in the cause. This means that he will 
recover his costs for the interlocutory proceedings if successful at trial but will not be 
responsible for the other party's interlocutory costs if finally unsuccessful. 158 
3.1.8 Appeals against interlocutory decisions 
Leave is required to appeal against the grant or refusal of an interlocutory injunction. 159 
If leave is granted, the appeal is heard by the Court of Appeal. Where an ex parte order 
has been made, a defendant must apply for its discharge before requesting leave to 
appeal.160 An appeal is a form of re-hearing, and the Court of Appeal examines the 
facts as at the time of the appeal, not of the original order. When hearing appeals from 
interlocutory orders, the court may agree to receive fresh evidence by way of 
affidavit. 161 But the Court of Appeal has pertinently stated that 'this court does not exist 
to provide a second bite at each interim cherry' and that there is a heavy burden on the 
appellant to show that the trial judge erred in principle. 162 
3.2 AUSTRALIA 
Interlocutory relief for trade mark infringement and passing off may be sought from 
either the Federal Court or one of the various Supreme Courts. 163 The procedure to 
obtain interlocutory relief is similar to that in England, and so need not be repeated. 
158 Wadlow (1995) 526. 
159 RSC Order 59,r.1B(f). 
160 Bean (1994) 107. 
161 Idem at 108. But see the Woolf Report (1996) 158 which recommends that new evidence be 
allowed only 'exceptionally'. 
162 Elan (1984) 384. This decision predates RSC Order 59,r.1B(f). 
163 Sections 190-192 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Aus); Shanahan (1990) 486. 
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Undertakings in damages are required from a plaintiff before a court will grant relief. 164 
3.3 CANADA 
Where interlocutory relief is sought in respect of a registered trade mark, action may 
be brought in either the Federal Court or a provincial court. However, common-law 
rights must be enforced in provincial courts, and a plaintiff seeking to prevent passing 
off must seek relief from a provincial court, unless he relies on the form of statutory 
passing off contained in the Trade Marks Act, rather than on passing off at common 
law.16s 
The procedure to obtain interlocutory relief is similar to that in England, with the 
important addition of a right to oral cross-examination of affidavit evidence. 166 It has 
been suggested that strength of case remains relevant in Canadian decisions, as 
disputed facts can be tested by cross-examination, unlike the position in England 
where oral cross-examination is not possible.167 Undertakings in damages are required 
before a court will grant interlocutory relief. 168 If interlocutory relief is refused, the 
defendant may be ordered to keep an account of sales.169 
3.4 SOUTH AFRICA 
3.4.1 General remarks 
Trade mark infringement and passing off proceedings are usually brought in the 
164 Ricketson (1984) 19; Ricketson (Study) 12. 
165 Section 7(b) Trade Marks Act 1985 (Cn); Henderson (1993) 22-23 and 206. 
166 Sharpe (1983) 70. 
167 Idem at 70 footnote 30. 
168 Idem at 80. 
169 Tedelyne (1977) 453. 
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division of the High Court which has territorial jurisdiction to hear the matter. The court 
will have jurisdiction either if the defendant is an incola of its area of jurisdiction or if the 
cause of action arose within such area.170 
Despite the fact that the jurisdictional limits of the magistrates' courts have been 
increased and that they may grant interdicts, it is rare for a passing off matter to be 
instituted in a magistrate's court. 171 For this reason, only High Court procedure will be 
dealt with. 
It is trite law that a final interdict must be sought by way of action procedure and an 
interlocutory interdict by way of motion procedure. 172 In practice, a final interdict is 
rarely sought without a prior application for an interlocutory interdict. The usual 
procedure to obtain such relief is for application proceedings to be launched in which 
an interlocutory interdict is sought, pending the outcome of an action to be instituted 
in which final relief will be sought. 173 
3.4.2 Applications on notice 
A summons for final relief, which usually includes a prayer for both damages and a final 
interdict, need not be issued prior to an application for interlocutory relief. But it must 
be alleged that proceedings for final relief will be instituted.174 The usual application 
170 Nathan (1939) 39; Prest (1996) 268-269. Different jurisdictional principles apply if the defendant 
is neither domiciled nor resident in South Africa: then the plaintiff must be an incola of the area 
of jurisdiction of the court concerned or the cause of action must have arisen within such area. 
In both instances arrest of the defendant or attachment of his property within the area must also 
have taken place. 
171 Infringement proceedings may be instituted only in the High Court (section 2(1)(vi) of the Trade 
Marks Act of 1993 (SA)). 
172 Harms (1996) 500 and 503-504; LAWSA Interdicts (1981) 295 and 298; Prest (1996) 213. 
173 Where no material dispute of fact exists, a final interdict may be sought on motion: Prinsloo 
(1938) 576. This occurs on occasion in intellectual property matters: Juvena (1980) 223; 
Plascon-Evans (1984) 634; Haggar(1985) 581; Montres Ro/ex (1985) 59; PPS (1996) 212. 
174 Prest (1996) 214. 
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procedure is followed.175 It commences with a notice of motion together with supporting 
affidavits containing all the facts and evidence the plaintiff wishes to place before the 
court. The founding affidavits must establish a cause of action. 176 This must be served 
on the defendant, who then has a set period within which to file an answering affidavit. 
The plaintiff may file a replying affidavit.177 The matter is then argued in open court. The 
Rules place no limits on the evidence which may be included in the affidavits.178 The 
only penalty for excessive documentation is an appropriate costs order.179 
3.4.3 Ex parte applications 
A further possibility is that an interlocutory interdict is sought on an urgent basis, 
without notice to the other party. 180 If this is granted, a rule nisi is issued calling on the 
defendant to show cause on the return day why the interdict should not remain in force 
pending the outcome of the principal action. The return day of an ex parte order may 
be anticipated on 24 hours notice. 181 
South African courts are sympathetic to the problems of protecting intellectual property. 
They will grant interlocutory relief when the application has been lauched without 
notice or warning, if the matter is sufficiently urgent or secrecy essential, although lack 
of notice has been held relevant to questions of costs. 182 In instances where relief has 
175 Uniform Rule 6. 
176 Prest (1996) 218. 
177 Prest (1996) 218. Further affidavits may be filed only with leave of the court - Uniform Rule 
6(5)(e). 
178 Although Uniform Rule 6( 15) allows the other party to apply for the striking out of scandalous, 
vexatious, or irrelevant matter, this is rarely useful where the applicaton is merely prolix. 
179 Prest (1996) 379. 
180 Idem at 220-223. 
181 Uniform Rule 6(8). 
182 Kenitex (1967) 309. 
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been sought on an urgent basis, the courts have on occasion granted a final interdict 
on the return day of application proceedings, if there is no factual issue to be 
resolved. 183 
3.4.4 Burden of proof 
The burden of proof in respect of all the requirements which must be met before an 
interlocutory interdict will be granted rests with the plaintiff. 184 
3.4.5 Undertakings 
When seeking an interlocutory interdict, plaintiffs have on occasion tendered an 
undertaking or offered security to pay any damages which the defendant might sustain 
as a result of the grant of the interdict if the main action fails. The first such order 
recorded in South Africa was in 1857,185 but, until recently, relatively few such 
undertakings have been incorporated in orders for interlocutory interdicts. 186 
Undertakings, or security, for damages suffered by the defendant have sometimes been 
tendered by plaintiffs in intellectual property matters, either in the founding affidavit or 
during the hearing. 187 
183 Tullen (1976) 222. 
184 Nathan (1939) 60; Prest (1996) 56. 
185 Ke//y(1857) 6. See also Natal Lanc/(1884) 16 where the court viewed this practice as of English 
origin. 
186 Hillman Bros ( 1937) 46: 'the court has power to annex reasonable conditions when exercising 
its discretion in granting an interim interdict on motion ... I propose granting the interdict subject 
to the condition that if in the action applicant fails to prove its allegations it agrees to be liable 
to respondent for any damages suffered by him'; Chopra (1973) 379: 'it is rare to impose such 
a condition. In the present case, the applicant is a peregrinus, and has, it would appear, no 
assets in this country ... If he ultimately fails, the respondents are not likely to be able to recover 
any damages suffered by them as a result of the interdict, and will certainly face severe and 
expensive difficulties in attempting to do so. This is, in my opinion, a proper case for me to 
exercise my discretion'. 
187 Chopra (1973) 379; Humphries (1972) 541; Stellenbosch Wine (1977) 254; Wilrose Timbers 
(1980) 302. 
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Recent decisions on interlocutory interdicts show a tendency by the courts to require 
an undertaking before an interlocutory interdict will be granted. While the court in Sibex 
held that the balance of convenience favoured the appellants 'in particular because 
the[y] have offered to make good any damages which the first respondent may 
suffer', 188 it did not include this offer in the order of court. More recently, the court itself 
required the plaintiff to provide the defendant with an undertaking to pay any damages 
which resulted from the grant of the interlocutory interdict if the plaintiffs were 
unsuccessful in the main action, and granted the interlocutory interdict 'subject to the 
condition that the applicant agrees and undertakes to be liable to the respondents for 
any damages proved to have been suffered by them'. 189 
The Appellate Division recently approved the practice of requiring an undertaking. In 
the first instance it held that '[i]n many instances justice dictates that the judge should 
require the giving of such an undertaking before there can be any question of the grant 
of an interim order',190 while conceding that an undertaking might be of little comfort to 
a defendant who has difficulty proving or recovering damages. 191 Later the same year, 
the Appellate Division held that the appellant's refusal to tender an undertaking to 
cover the respondents' losses, should it transpire that the interlocutory interdict should 
not have been granted, ensured that the balance of convenience favoured the 
respondents. 192 The court stated that such undertakings are 'a very common rider 
added to the court's order when an interdict is granted' .193 
The position in South Africa appears to be moving towards that in England, where an 
interlocutory injunction will not be granted unless the plaintiff furnishes an undertaking. 
188 Sibex (1991) 512. 
189 Shoprite Checkers (1994) 185. 
190 Cronshaw (1996) 690-691. 
191 At 691. 
192 Hix Networking (1996) 685. 
193 Ibid. The court cited Hillman Bros (1937) and Cronshaw (1996) as authority. 
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The converse order, where the refusal of an interlocutory interdict is coupled to an 
order requiring the defendant to keep records of further transactions to facilitate a 
possible claim for damages, has also on occasion been made in South Africa. 194 
3.4.6 Form of order 
It is common practice, although it is not a requirement, for the plaintiff to submit a draft 
order to the court for approval. In trade mark infringement matters, the order will 
generally prohibit both the specific infringement complained of and contain a general 
prohibition against infringement of the registered mark. In passing off matters, the order 
is frequently qualified: it merely prohibits the defendant from using the mark or get-up 
'without clearly distinguishing it' from that of the plaintiff. 195 
If summons in the main action has not been issued when the court makes an order 
granting interlocutory relief, the court will usually include an order that summons be 
issued within a prescribed period. 
Costs are usually in the cause. An award of costs is thus postponed until the merits 
have been fully canvassed. 
3.4. 7 Appeals against interlocutory decisions 
An appeal may be noted against the refusal of an interlocutory interdict. The grant of 
an interlocutory interdict will be appealable only if it can be viewed as a judgment or 
order which is final in effect and definitive of the rights of the parties, and has the effect 
of disposing of a substantial portion of the relief claimed in the main proceedings. 196 
194 Crossfield (1925) 224. In Ndauti (1947) 37, the court held that either party should, in proper 
cases, be required to give security. 
195 Boswell (1985) 485. 
196 Van Streepen (1987) 587. See Prest (1996) 348-355 for a full discussion of the concept 'final 
and definitive'. 
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Although early decisions refer to an appeal 'of right', 197 all judgments and orders 
granted by a division of the High Court are now appealable with leave only, either of 
the court which gave the judgment or of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 198 The noting of 
an appeal suspends the operation and execution of the original order, unless the court 
which made the order directs otherwise. 199 
The terms of an interlocutory interdict may be varied, or the interdict may be discharged 
if circumstances change.200 
3.5 OVERVIEW 
There are no substantial differences between the procedure to obtain interlocutory 
relief in the various jurisdictions. The English method of allowing the notice of motion 
to be filed before the evidence, possibly permits proceedings to be commenced earlier 
than in South Africa. However, it is debatable whether relief will be granted any sooner 
than in South Africa. The value of the undertaking required from a plaintiff before the 
grant of relief is discussed below and will not be canvassed here.201 
4 DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH TO INTERLOCUTORY RELIEF 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The interlocutory interdict is probably the most useful remedy available in intellectual 
property litigation. It is for this reason that the current basis on which interlocutory 
interdicts are granted or refused in the various jurisdictions has been considered in 
197 Set/oge/o (1914) 226. 
198 Section 20(4) Supreme Court Act of 1959 (SA). 
199 Uniform Rule 49(11). See also Prest (1996) 358. 
200 Harms (1996) 508; Prest (1996) 346. 
201 See 4.3.3 of this chapter. 
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some detail. It must now be determined whether the American Cyanamid or the South 
African approach is to be preferred. 
To do this, the first issue is to determine whether there is something more than a 
semantic difference between the two approaches. If a real difference is found, any 
problems arising from the American Cyanamid approach must be identified, and 
attempts to deal with these problems analysed. The same exercise will then be 
followed in respect of the South African approach. Finally, the problems attendant on 
the differing approaches must be compared and it must be decided whether the South 
African problems could be resolved by adopting the American Cyanamid approach. 
4.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE AMERICAN CYANAMID AND SOUTH 
AFRICAN APPROACHES 
Although the factors which play a role in the grant or refusal of interlocutory relief are 
similar in the two jurisdictions, the effect differs completely because of the sequence 
in which they are considered and the weight which is given to these factors. 
In England, once the plaintiff has shown that there is a serious question to be tried, the 
balance of convenience becomes the most important consideration. In accordance with 
American Cyanamid, the balance of convenience has, as primary test, whether 
damages will be an adequate remedy for either party. It is only when a court cannot 
reach a decision based on the adequacy of damages that other factors, including 
strength of case, are considered. 
By contrast, in neither Australia nor Canada is the sequential approach to a 
determination of balance of convenience followed. This means that financial strength 
is not given the same importance as in England, but is viewed together with other 
factors affecting the balance of convenience once a 'serious matter to be tried' has 
been shown. 
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In South Africa, strength of case is the primary test, and the plaintiff must always make 
out some form of prima facie case before the balance of convenience is considered. 
The practical effect of the English approach, where adequacy of damages is the 
primary test, is that the effect of the grant or refusal of relief is the most important 
consideration; the merits of the case are not considered.202 The same holds true for the 
Australian and Canadian approaches, as balance of convenience takes precedence 
over a consideration of the merits, although the financial position of the parties is not 
afforded the same weight as in England. 
The practical effect of the South African approach is that a plaintiff has to prove that 
there is a prospect of success in the principal case. This necessitates an inquiry into 
the merits, before the balance of convenience becomes relevant. 
So there is a difference in the criteria for interlocutory relief in the various jurisdictions. 
To determine which approach is to be preferred, the problems arising from the differing 
approaches must be identified. 
4.3 PROBLEMS ARISING IN ENGLAND FROM THE AMERICAN CYANAMID 
APPROACH 
4.3.1 Financial strength of parties 
As said above, the American Cyanamid approach takes the balance of convenience, 
not the merits of the issue, as primary consideration. However, this approach is taken 
a step further by viewing the adequacy of damages as first test when determining 
where the balance of convenience lies. 
The major problem arising from the fact that the adequacy of damages determines the 
202 American Cyanamid (1975) 541: 'its [the court's) greatest object viz abstaining from expressing 
any opinion upon the merits of the case until the hearing', quoting Wakefield (1865) 629. 
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grant or refusal of relief, is that this test favours the financially stronger party.203 
The American Cyanamid test requires first a consideration of whether, if the plaintiff 
were successful at trial,. he would be adequately compensated by an award of damages 
for the loss sustained by the defendant's continued infringement between the hearing 
of the application and the final order, and whether the defendant is in a position to pay 
such damages. If damages are adequate compensation and the defendant can pay 
them, an interlocutory injunction will be refused. 
The test then continues: if damages will not provide an adequate remedy for the 
plaintiff, the court considers whether, if the defendant is successful at trial, he will be 
adequately compensated under the plaintiff's undertaking in damages for the loss he 
has sustained in the interim. If damages are an adequate remedy and the plaintiff is in 
a position to pay them, the injunction will be granted.204 The financial strength of both 
parties clearly plays a major role in this consideration; in particular, a defendant can 
avoid the grant of an injunction only by showing that he is in a position to make good 
any losses suffered by the plaintiff. 
It has been shown that the damage suffered in intellectual property matters is always 
economic, but that damages are viewed as an inadequate remedy since they are so 
difficult to quantify. These considerations weight the grant of interlocutory relief even 
more strongly against the financially weaker party in trade mark infringement and 
passing off litigation.205 This party is usually the defendant, as the plaintiff in a 
traditional trade mark infringement or passing off matter usually has an established 
mark or some form of repute to protect, which presupposes a measure of financial 
203 This problem is more apparent in England than in Australia or Canada, as neither of the latter 
countries follOINS the American Cyanamid sequence for determining the balance of covenience. 
204 American Cyanamid(1975) 541. 
205 McKeough & Stewart (1991) 32: 'Put simply, whoever appears to be in a better position to make 
a subsequent claim for compensation is likely to find themselves on the wrong end of the 
interlocutory decision.' 
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strength. In such a situation, various factors make it unlikely that interlocutory relief will 
be refused. First, damages are seldom viewed as an adequate remedy. Second, even 
if they are adequate, the defendant must show that he is in a position to pay them. 
Third, although the plaintiff must tender an undertaking as to damages to compensate 
the defendant for any loss he may suffer, it is rare for him to be required to honour the 
undertaking. In these circumstances, the prospects of interlocutory success are 
weighted against a financially weaker defendant and an injunction will generally be 
granted, irrespective of the merits. 
The converse, although less likely, can also happen. A defendant who is financially 
stronger than the plaintiff can show greater loss pending trial. He thus makes it 
impossible for the plaintiff to tender a suitable undertaking as to damages. 
4.3.2 Finality of relief 
The American Cyanamid test presupposes that a trial will take place, when the merits 
will be fully canvassed, and that the relief will therefore be temporary. 
If the relief is merely a temporary measure prior to a trial, the fact that interlocutory 
relief is largely determined by the parties' relative financial strength would be more 
acceptable. But in practice, the vast majority of matters do not proceed to trial. As Lord 
Denning pointed out, in 99 cases out of 100 the proceedings go no further; the parties 
accept the prima facie view of the court or settle the case.206 This is particularly so in 
trade mark infringement and passing off matters, which are market related, as it is not 
financially feasible to revert to a name or get-up which has not been used for a few 
206 Fellowes (1976) 129. See also RHM Foods (1982) 678: 'The plaintiffs case is, on the face of it, 
a simple passing-off action and it is, of course, frequently the case that in such an action ... the 
hearing of an application for interlocutory relief may well, in practice, be determinative of the 
dispute between the parties, not because the interim decision necessarily reflects anything of 
the court's view of the merits of the case which fall to be heard at the trial but because, 
commercially, the grant or withholding of injunctive relief pending a trial renders it not worthwhile 
for one party or the other to continue to prosecute or defend the action for the purpose of 
obtaining potentially substantial but inevitably speculative damages'. 
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years. Standard English works state that, in most instances, the grant or refusal of 
interlocutory relief finally disposes of a matter.207 
4.3.3 Inadequacy of undertakings 
American Cyanamid also assumes that if the interlocutory order has been wrongly 
granted, the undertaking as to damages will adequately recompense the defendant. Is 
this in fact the position in trade mark infringement and passing off matters? 
First, the undertaking is given to the court, not the defendant. The entitlement to 
damages is in the court's discretion, and does not follow automatically upon the 
plaintiff's failure to obtain final relief. 208 
Second, the undertaking as to damages is cold comfort to a defendant, as it is usually 
available only at the end of a trial when a court makes an order refusing to confirm the 
interlocutory interdict.209 If, therefore, after the grant of an interlocutory order, the 
plaintiff does not proceed with an action which results in an order refusing a final 
interdict, the undertaking cannot be enforced by the defendant. Even if such an order 
is made, da~ges in trade mark infringement and passing off matters are accepted as 
difficult to quantify and to prove. If damages are difficult to quantify, an inquiry is 
usually ordered to determine their extent.210 An inquiry as to damages is at the 
207 Kerly ( 1986) 320: 'Experience shows that a successful motion for interlocutory injunction 
normally puts an end to the litigation and the infringement, with a great saving in expense 
compared with a full trial'. Wadlow (1995) 521: 'If the plaintiff can obtain an interlocutory 
injunction that is, in practice, almost always the end of the matter ... It is only slightly less 
unusual for actions to be ... pursued with vigour after one has been refused.' 
208 Universal Thermosensors (1992) 383; Cheltenham (1993) 1551. See also Zuckerman (1994) 
546-547. 
209 The defendant may apply for discharge of the injunction before trial, and then ask for 
enforcement of the undertaking. But even in these circumstances the court will usually postpone 
enforcement of the undertaking until after trial: see Cheltenham (1993) 1545. 
210 Hoffmann-La Roche (1975) 361; Cheltenham (1993) 1557. 
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defendant's own risk as to costs and he bears the onus of proving his loss.211 It is 
seldom that a defendant will embark on this course, as can be seen from the paucity 
of decisions and the unfortunate results such an inquiry can hold for the party who 
instituted it.212 
4.4 SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE AMERICAN CYANAMID 
APPROACH 
4.4.1 The 'final effect' exception 
Shortly after the American Cyanamid decision, Lord Diplock, who had given the 
judgment, expressly distinguished his views in that decision in instances when the 
grant or refusal of interlocutory relief would have the practical effect of putting an end 
to the action. He stated that, in such instances, the likelihood that the plaintiff will 
succeed in establishing his right to a final injunction at trial is a factor to be brought into 
the balance.213 So strength of case becomes relevant. In a subsequent decision, the 
court held that in these circumstances, if the plaintiff cannot present an overwhelming 
balance on the merits, but merely a triable issue whose outcome is doubtful, the issue 
should be tried and not pre-empted.214 However, these instances all relate to what Lord 
Diplock viewed as 'exceptional'215 instances where the interlocutory relief will render 
final relief irrelevant, and not to the general form of interlocutory relief where the parties 
211 Kerly (1986) 326-327. 
212 Zuckerman (1994) 546. An example of the unfortunate consequences that can result from any 
inquiry as to damages is found in Spalding (1918) 119, an instance where the plaintiff was 
awarded an inquiry as to the damages it had sustained. The court stated: 'The necessary but 
most regrettable consequence of such a state of things must be that the importance of who shall 
bear the costs of these proceedings is far greater than the importance of the question of who 
was right or wrong in the original matter in dispute between the parties.' See also the criticism 
of inquiries in general in Wallis (1889) 356. 
213 NWL Ltd (1979) 1307. 
214 Cayne(1984)236. 
215 NWL Ltd (1979) 1306. 
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merely take a pragmatic decision not to proceed to trial. When the 'final effect' 
argument was raised in passing off proceedings, it was pertinently held that such 
proceedings are not of the exceptional nature envisaged by Lord Diplock.216 Although 
the English courts therefore require a strong case to be made out by a plaintiff before 
they will grant an interlocutory injunction which has final effect, interlocutory injunctions 
in passing off proceedings are not viewed as having final effect and the same probably 
holds true for trade mark infringement proceedings.217 • Strength of case, therefore, 
remains irrelevant, despite the realities of the situation. 
In Australia, final effect is not viewed as an exception. The issue has not been 
considered by the Canadian courts.218 
4.4.2 Other solutions 
Courts are, to a greater or lesser extent, aware of the problems faced by litigants with 
limited means when the American Cyanamid approach is applied. This approach has 
been described as 'an instrument with which the rich can oppress the poor'.219 Thus in 
a few instances it has been held that a litigant cannot merely cite the financial disparity 
between the parties as determining the balance of convenience.220 In Canada and 
Australia, the problem is not as acute, as the sequence proposed in American 
Cyanamid is not strictly followed. But the ability to pay damages is always a factor 
which is taken into account. In trade mark infringement and passing off matters, the 
courts frequently view it as decisive, while they concede at the same time that the grant 
216 Etan (1984) 386. 
217 See 2.1.2.3.6 of this chapter. 
218 Berryman (1989) 141 submits that in such instances Canadian courts may require the plaintiff 
to make out a prima facie case. He argues that if a court views an interlocutory application as 
dispositive (final) it should state so explicitly and then make an immediate merit adjudication (at 
155). 
219 Vernon (1980) 191. 
220 Apple (1977) 351 - Performers' Protection Act 1963; Vernon (1980) 191 - copyright infringement. 
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of interlocutory relief will have final effect as it will force the defendant out of 
business.221 
One method of preventing the American Cyanamid test from prejudicing weaker 
defendants is to refuse an injunction on condition that the defendant pay a percentage 
of sales into a trust account to cover any eventual liability for damages. But this has 
been ordered very rarely and only after the defendant has tendered to do so.222 More 
usually, the court merely notes with regret that the grant of an interlocutory injunction 
might destroy the defendant's business but that the defendant is not in a position to 
offer a cross-undertaking as to damages.223 
4.4.3 Summary: the American Cyanamid approach 
Clearly, the English courts have not successfully dealt with the problems created by the 
American Cyanamid approach. The danger of allowing financial considerations to take 
precedence over any consideration of the merits is particularly acute in intellectual 
property matters, where the usual situation pits a financially strong plaintiff against a 
much weaker defendant. The courts ignore the realities of the situation - that the grant 
of an interlocutory injunction is often tactical relief which either destroys the defendant's 
business or places him in a weak bargaining position, rather than an essential to 
preserve rights pending trial. It has been said that in this respect legal theory and 
practice appear to conflict: while the basis of such application is to preserve and not 
to destroy rights, the latter is often the result. 224 
It must now be considered whether, despite these problems, the American Cyanamid 
221 Biba (1980) 420-421; CPC (UK) (1986) 533. 
222 Vernon (1980) - copyright infringement; CPC (UK) (1986) 535 - application for stay of order; 
trade mark infringement and passing off. 
223 Biba (1980) 420; CPC (UK) (1986) 533. 
224 Sofronoff ( 1987) 341. 
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approach should be followed in South Africa. To do so, it is necessary to analyse the 
problems arising from the South African approach, which views strength of case as the 
primary criterion. 
4.5 PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH 
4.5.1 Prima facie right 
The major problem in South Africa arises from the requirement that some form of prima 
facie case must be made out by a plaintiff seeking an interlocutory interdict. 
The problem lies in determining what is meant by a prima facie case. The recent 
equation of a prima facie case with 'trying to measure a shadow'225 is apt. Until the 
Setloge/o decision in 1914, there was not even clarity as to whether a clear right, rather 
than a prima facie right, had to be proved. Since then, although various permutations 
of the term have been used, the generally accepted requirement is a right which, 
'though prima facie established, is open to some doubt' .226 However, this definition does 
not answer the question as to how 'some doubt' is to be resolved. It was recently stated 
obiter that a right which is prima facie established though open to some doubt, exists 
when there is a prospect of success in the claim for principal relief, even though such 
prospect may be considered to be weak. 221 
4.5.2 Assessment of merits 
The next issue relates to the degree of proof needed to show a prima facie case at 
interlocutory stage and the manner in which the courts must assess this proof. It has 
been held that, although it may be impossible for a court at this stage of proceedings 
225 Ferreira (1995) 831. 
226 Eriksen (1973) 691. 
227 Ferreira (1995) 832. 
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to try to resolve difficult factual and legal questions on affidavit, the court cannot for this 
reason refrain from considering the relative strengths of each party's case.228 More 
recently, the degree of inquiry into the merits has been described as preliminary and 
necessarily superficial. 229 
4.5.3 Finality of relief 
The further issue which must be considered is the effective finality of interlocutory relief 
in South Africa. The factual position is the same as in other jurisdictions; the grant or 
refusal of interlocutory relief in market related fields often makes further litigation 
irrelevant.230 The Universal City decision, in which Anton Piller relief was sought for the 
infringement of copyright in films, is one example: the market value of films is 
temporary, and by the time the matter came before the Appellate Division, the order 
was of practical relevance to the parties only in respect of costs.231 So it can be 
accepted, not least of all because interlocutory relief is so frequently sought, that, in 
South Africa, too, such orders are frequently of final effect in trade mark infringement 
and passing off matters. 
4.6 SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
4.6.1 Prima facie right 
If the most recent definition of a prima facie right, which merely requires a weak 
prospect of success, is accepted as correct, it could be argued that South African 
courts are moving towards an American Cyanamid view of the merits. However, this 
228 Beecham (1977) 55. 
229 Ferreira (1995) 833. 
230 I think that the statement by Prest (1996) 214 - that an interlocutory interdict 'does not involve 
a final determination of these rights and does not affect their final determination' - is theoretically 
correct but ignores practical realities. 
231 Universal City (1986) 747. 
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has not resulted in the replacement of a consideration of the merits with the American 
Cyanamid primary test - the adequacy of damages. 
To deal with the different degrees of strength of case which might be proved at the 
interlocutory stage, South African courts usually apply the principle formulated in the 
Olympic decision once some form of prima facie right has been shown to exist. In terms 
of this principle, the stronger the prospects of success, the less need for the balance 
of convenience to favour the applicant, and vice versa.232 The balance of convenience 
is not first determined by a consideration of the adequacy of damages, as in American 
Cyanamid; adequacy of damages is merely one factor which forms part of the court's 
general discretion.233 This balancing exercise offers both parties the best chance of a 
fair and just decision pending trial. 
4.6.2 Assessment of merits 
In trade mark infringement and passing off matters, proof of a prima facie right usually 
involves a factual determination of degrees of confusion or evidence of reputation. 
Such matters rarely involve difficult questions of fact and law, unlike other forms of 
intellectual property. Although questions of confusion or reputation are frequently dealt 
with at length, this need not happen if the preliminary and superficial nature of the 
inquiry is borne in mind. If the parties do canvass the issues in unnecessary detail, the 
problem can be dealt with by an appropriate costs order. 
232 Olympic (1957) 383, approved by the Appellate Division in Eriksen ( 1973) 691 and most recently 
given in modem terminology in Ferreira (1995) 833: 'The strength of one element may make up 
for the frailty of another. The process of measuring each element requires a holistic approach'. 
233 Beecham (1977) 57. See also Coa/cor(1990) 360, where the fact that the defendant would be 
unable to pay any damages to the plaintiff in the event that the interdict should have been. 
granted, was viewed as less important when determining the balance of convenience than tbe 
fact that the grant of the interdict would result in the defendant's liquidation. 
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4.6.3 Finality of relief 
In South Africa, a different test is also applied when interlocutory relief will have final 
effect because further relief becomes irrelevant. The requirement is then that a clear 
right, rather than a prima facie right, must be proved.234 However, as in England, this 
stricter test does not apply when a final interdict is not sought merely due to financial 
or other practicalities. In such instances the usual criteria for interlocutory interdicts 
apply. 
In all jurisdictions, the problem of 'final effect' has no easy legally acceptable solution, 
as the problem is essentially economic rather than juristic. 
The American Cyanamid approach, where strength of case is of even less importance 
than under the South African approach, clearly offers no solution. 
The South African approach is to be preferred, since a consideration of the merits, 
albeit perfunctory, coupled with a general assessment of all factors affecting the 
balance of convenience, ensures a decision which must be fairer than a decision based 
largely on who can afford to pay any damages arising from the grant or refusal of 
interlocutory relief. 
4.6.4 Undertakings as to damages as a possible solution 
The English requirement that an undertaking as to damages should always be offered 
by the plaintiff has been suggested as a solution to some of the problems identified in 
the South African approach.235 The fact that such undertakings are on occasion 
234 Strautz (1964) 723 - disposal of joint assets; Cape Tex (1968) 529 - possessory lien. 
235 Prest (1996) 206-207. 
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tendered in trade mark infringement and passing off matters,236 in imitation of English 
practice, should not influence our courts. Although Prest argues strongly for their 
introduction, he concedes that determination of the amount tendered and 
implementation of the undertaking have not received judicial attention.237 He has not 
dealt with two major problems - instances when an action for final relief is never 
instituted, and the expense of an inquiry or other assessment of damages. The latter 
was referred to in Coalcor,238 and is dealt with in detail in chapter 6.239 The former has 
also not been considered by our courts, and court orders only impose liability for 
damages should the final action fail. 240 
His work also deals with interlocutory interdicts generally, and he does not deal 
specifically with the position regarding intellectual property disputes. As shown above, 
the bulk of interlocutory relief in trade mark infringement and passing off matters brings 
an end to litigation; this is coupled with the fact that in such matters, the parties are 
usually of disparate financial standing. An undertaking should not be viewed by the 
courts as a suitable substitute for an assessment of the merits; it is of little assistance 
to an impecunious defendant, who will not be in a position to attempt further litigation 
to ensure its implementation. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Although the American Cyanamid approach resolves the problem of proof of a prima 
facie case, it should not be followed by the South African courts. 
236 Humphries (1972) 541; Stellenbosch Wine (1977) 254; Wilrose Timbers (1980) 302; see also 
Webster & Page (1986) 317. 
237 Prest ( 1996) 205-207. 
238 Coa/cor (1990) 360 'respondent will ... in all probability not be in a financial position to pursue 
a claim for damages'. 
239 Chapter 6 at 2.7. 
240 Humphries ( 1972) 541 : 'in the event of applicant failing to obtain relief from the court in the 
principal case'; Shoprite Checkers (1994) 185: 'should the applicant's action fail'. 
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The nature and complexity of litigation has changed since Van der Linden set out the 
requirements for interdicts. He could not have envisaged delays between summons and 
trial of over two years, costs orders which exceeded any damages award, and the 
complexities of proving some causes of action. But this does not mean that his 
requirements, as evolved and adapted over the years in South Africa, should be 
jettisoned in favour of the American Cyanamid approach which derives from a 
completely different historical base. It must be remembered that the English injunction 
originated in equity, to assist parties when remedies at common law were inadequate; 
the South African remedy was evolved to protect rights. When it was said in American 
Cyanamid that the object of the court was to avoid expressing an opinion on the merits, 
the quotation came from a decision of 1865;241 in South Africa it was only since 1914 
that anything less than a clear right would suffice for the grant of interlocutory relief. 242 
Our courts are reluctant to move away from existing Roman-Dutch principles, and in 
this instance there is no good reason to do so. Current problems should be solved 
using existing principles, rather than by importing foreign concepts. 
No doubt many intellectual property practitioners would welcome the introduction of an 
American Cyanamid type of test for the grant of interlocutory relief. Clients who have 
marks or reputations to protect are usually financially strong, and face frequent and 
expensive litigation to protect their rights from the many 'ticks attracted to mongrels' -
to paraphrase the view of infringers taken in the Lorimar decision.243 A test where 
financial strength takes priority over the merits would be viewed as eminently desirable 
by the many concerns who fight an ongoing battle against infringers, who are generally 
not even in a position to pay the costs awarded against them. 
The realities of these situations are conceded. But, any test for interlocutory relief must 
be of general application, and be just and fair. The existing South African test is fair to 
241 Wakefield (1865) 629. 
242 Setloge/o (1914) 227. 
243 Lorimar(1981) 113. 
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both parties; the plaintiff with a strong case facing an instance of blatant infringement 
will easily prove a strong prima facie right. But where the merits are debatable, the 
interlocutory interdict in South African law will not become an instrument of oppression 
used by wealthy traders to put small, and possibly legitimate, competition out of 
business. 
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COMPENSATORY DAMAGES 
1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
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Compensatory damages are rarely sought in trade mark infringement and passing off 
litigation, supposedly because they are difficult to prove and quantify. In this chapter, 
the development of the remedy of compensatory damages is set out, and the general 
principles applicable for obtaining such relief are considered. Trade mark infringement 
and passing off are then considered to determine whether they, too, are amenable to 
this remedy. 
The English position is dealt with first. The entire English law of damages is coloured 
by the fact that a common-law remedy has been affected by equitable principles. To 
analyse current English law, it is, therefore, essential to deal with the common-law 
development of the remedy in some detail, to ascertain when and why equitable 
considerations influenced its further development. It is also necessary to trace how the 
protection of trade marks at common law evolved, as well as the distinction drawn 
between actions for deceit involving misappropriation of a trade mark and other actions 
for deceit, as this distinction has influenced the requirements for proof of damage in 
trade mark infringement matters. 
After sketching this background, the influence of equity on the liability of a defendant 
is addressed. Two issues are considered: the liability of an innocent defendant, and the 
effect of a plaintiff's fraud. At common law, neither party's motives affected liability for 
damages; whether this remains the position is considered. 
The current English law of damages is then briefly examined. General principles are 
stated and an attempt is made to determine how damages in instances of trade mark 
infringement and passing off are quantified. The various heads of damages which may 
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be claimed are set out and the 'lost profits' and royalty bases of quantification 
described. An important issue when dealing with quantification is proof of damages. It 
is attempted to illustrate that the distinction made at common law between the proof of 
actual damage required for misappropriation of a mark and other actions for deceit has 
not affected the requirement that proof of actual damage is essential before substantial 
rather than nominal damages can be obtained. 
The positions in Australia and Canada are then dealt with briefly, as there is no 
substantial difference between the remedy in these jurisdictions and in England. 
The South African position is then considered. While English law is complicated by the 
relationship between common law and equity, the South African law of damages has 
been similarly complicated by the grafting of English procedure onto Roman-Dutch 
substantive law. For this reason, it is necessary first to set out the original Roman-
Dutch principles and then to consider the effect of English practice on these principles. 
It is also essential to determine whether the argument that English law does not require 
proof of actual damage before damages for trade mark infringement and passing off 
can be recovered, is valid for South Africa. I will argue that in South Africa, too, actual 
damage must be proved before any award of compensatory damages is made. 
It is argued that a defendant's liability in South Africa is firmly linked to the delictual 
requirement of fault, avoiding the problems of liability arising in English law. 
The basic principles of the South African law of damages are stated and their 
application to trade mark infringement proceedings considered. The accepted heads 
of damage are set out and the two possible bases for calculating damages are 
discussed. The introduction of the new method of calculating damages, on the basis 
of a reasonable royalty, is considered. A distinction is drawn between calculations 
based on actual royalties, and calculations based on notional royalties. As neither 
basis has been used in South Africa, English and American views on both actual and 
notional royalty calculations are set out. Their application in the South African context 
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is then considered. 
Finally, it is argued that the current compensatory principles governing all awards of 
damages in South Africa do not meet the needs of litigants and that Parliament should 
create a specific legal basis on which to award damages in intellectual property 
disputes. 
2 DEFINITIONS 
Brief definitions of some terms used when discussing damages in the various 
jurisdictions are required, both because the terminology in these jurisdictions differs 
and because the meaning ascribed to these terms has changed over time. 
2.1 ENGLISH LAW 
2.1.1 Distinction between damage and damages 
Halsbury defines 'damage' as the disadvantage suffered by a person as a result of the 
act or default of another, and injuria as damage which gives rise to a legal right of 
recompense. 1 Damages are defined as 'the pecuniary recompense given by process 
of law to a person for the actionable wrong that another has done him'. 2 
2.1.2 Types of damages 
An early textbook on torts states that three kinds of damages exist: nominal, ordinary, 
1 Both McGregor ( 1988) 7 and Tilbury ( 1990) 37 state that the terms 'damage', 'loss', and 'injury' 
are interchangeable. 
2 Halsbury Damages (1975) 412. The definition given by Tilbury (1990) 37 makes the relationship 
between damage and damages clearer: he defines damages as the award which is made by a 
court after translating all the elements of damage in any particular case into monetary terms for 
the purpose of the judgment. 
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and exemplary.3 Although the terminology has changed, this division remains useful in 
defining the various forms of damages which might be awarded to a successful 
plaintiff.4 
2.1.2.1 Compensatory damages 
Pollock defined ordinary damages as 
'a sum awarded as a fair measure of compensation to the plaintiff, the amount 
being, as far as can be estimated, that by which he is the worse for the 
defendant's wrong-doing, but in no case exceeding the amount claimed by the 
plaintiff himself. s 
While this definition remains appropriate, such damages are now known as 
compensatory damages, with a distinction drawn between special and general 
compensatory damages. Special damages relate to past pecuniary loss calculable at 
the date of trial. General damages, by contrast, are all other items of damage both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary.6 This definition addresses the current distinction 
between specific and general damages: Halsbury points out that in early decisions the 
term general damages described damages which the law implied in instances when 
damages were 'at large' ,7 while special damages were those which had to be proved 
when damages were an essential element of the action.8 
3 Pollock (1904) 180. 
4 Only compensatory damages will be dealt with in this chapter. However, a brief definition of all 
three types of damages is given, as the other types of damages are referred to in the chapter. 
5 Pollock (1904) 184. 
6 Halsbury Damages (1975) 416. McGregor (1988) 13-17 discusses the various meanings of these 
terms in some detail. 
7 Damages 'at large' is the expression used to describe the damages recoverable in torts 
actionable per se: Tilbury (1990) 38. 
8 Halsbury Damages (1975) 416. 
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2.1.2.2 Nominal damages 
Nominal damages are defined as a sum of little value which is awarded 'with the 
purpose of not giving any real compensation'.9 Prior to the Judicature Acts, which gave 
the court a certain discretion in the award of costs, nominal damages were of great 
importance as they ensured that the plaintiff was also awarded costs.10 However, where 
damages constituted an essential element of the action, an award of nominal damages 
could not be made, as the plaintiff had to prove actual loss. 11 
2. 1.2.3 Exemplary and aggravated damages 
In the early twentieth century, the terms 'exemplary' and 'aggravated' damages were 
used interchangeably. 12 Currently, although both terms refer to an award of more than 
the normal measure of damages based on the defendant's motives or conduct, a 
distinction is drawn between aggravated damages, which are viewed as compensatory, 
and exemplary damages, which are punitive. 13 
2.2 AUSTRALIAN AND CANADIAN LAW 
The definitions used in these jurisdictions correspond to those in use in England and 
will not be repeated. 
9 Pollock (1904) 180. 
1 O Idem at 181. The current position is that a plaintiff who has been awarded nominal damages is 
no longer necessarily regarded as the successful party for purposes of a costs order: see 
Burrows (1994) 270. 
11 Burrows (1994) 269; Pollock (1904) 183. 
12 See, for example, Pollock (1904) 185 and 188. 
13 Halsbury Damages (1975) 416. 
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2.3 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW14 
2.3.1 Distinction between damage and damages15 
Damage has been defined as the loss sustained by a person as a result of the wrongful 
invasion of his rights by another. 16 The corresponding Latin terminology is 'damnum', 
which comprises both actual loss (damnum emergens) and prospective loss (lucrum 
cessans). 11 Damages is the sum of money payable as compensation for the loss so 
sustained; the corresponding Latin term is 'interesse' .18 
2.3.2 Types of damages 
In delicts under the actio legis Aquilia, which include trade mark infringement and 
passing off actions, the primary form of damages is compensatory. The concepts 
'nominal' and 'exemplary' damages were imported through English influence but their 
existence in South Africa is no longer certain. 
2.3. 2. 1 Compensatory damages 
Although the terms 'general' and 'special' damages derive from English law, they do not 
bear their traditional English meaning in South African law. While the term 'general 
14 Any attempt to provide definitions of the terms used when the South African law of damages is 
considered is problematic. Not only is there confusion between South African and English 
terminology, but the translation of terms into English and Afrikaans has caused problems with 
accurate rendition of the various concepts. In addition, terms derived from Roman law, but no 
longer bearing their original meaning, are found. The definitions given are thus basic and do not 
attempt to reflect the theoretical underpinnings of the subject. LAWSA Damages (1995) and 
Visser (1993) contain full discussions. 
15 In Afrikaans more comprehensibly known as 'skade' and 'skadevergoeding'. 
16 LAWSA Damages (1979) 6. 
17 Erasmus (1975) 112; Visser (1993) 20. 
18 Erasmus (1975) 112-113; LAWSA Damages (1979) 6. 
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damages' is more commonly used in the contexts of liability for breach of contract and 
delictual liability for bodily injury, in a broader delictual context the term connotes the 
damage presumed to flow from an unlawful act. The term 'special damages' relates to 
damage which the law does not presume to be the necessary consequence of the act 
complained of; such damage must be pleaded specially and established by evidence. 19 
It is generally accepted that these terms should be used with circumspection in South 
Africa.20 
The term 'damages at large' is not used in South Africa, although it is sometimes 
encountered in early decisions: there it bears the same meaning as in English law. The 
notion of delictual liability without the need to prove damage is unknown in our common 
law. 
2. 3. 2. 2 Nominal and exemplary damages 
The terms 'nominal' and 'exemplary' damages, when used in South African decisions, 
connote the same as in English law. 
3 DAMAGES IN ENGLISH LAW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In English law, the historical distinction between common law and equity colours the 
issue of damages. Originally, action had to be instituted at common law and damages 
were the only relief available. The rise of the courts of chancery opened the door to 
injunctive relief, which, in the context of trade mark infringement and passing off, 
assumed greater importance than an award of damages. In addition, a chancery court 
could grant pecuniary relief in the form of an account of profits. (Under an account of 
19 Visser (1993) 19, where the word 'damage' is used. In his revision of LAWSA Damages (1995) 
14 the same concepts are described as damages. 
20 LAWSA Damages (1979) 6 and (1995) 14. 
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profits, the defendant is compelled to pay the plaintiff any profit that he has made from 
infringing sales.21 ) In contrast, the common-law basis for an award of damages was 
compensation for the plaintiff's loss, rather than the disgorgement of the defendant's 
gains. 
The different legal foundations of the action for misuse of a mark in the two courts also 
affect the choice of remedy. At common law, fraud was an essential requirement of the 
action, while the chancery view that a property right was being protected meant that 
relief could sometimes be obtained in equity but not at common law. Also, relief in 
equity was subject to various equitable defences, which could not be raised in an 
action at common law. 
These distinctions survived the fusion of the two courts at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Although it has recently been held that damages are available against an 
infringer who had not acted fraudulently,22 an account of profits cannot be ordered 
against him.23 So a plaintiff will seek damages rather than an account of profits if there 
is a chance that any of the equitable defences can be raised. 
All previous trade mark legislation has provided that a plaintiff may 'prevent or recover 
damages'.24 It has always been accepted that this was not an exhaustive list of 
remedies and this view is confirmed in current legislation, which provides that 'all such 
relief by way of damages, injunctions, accounts or otherwise is available to him as is 
available in respect of the infringement of any other property right' .25 It is clear that 
21 Houvever, chancery courts would not grant an account of profits unless this was coupled with an 
injunction. Therefore, if the need for an injunction had passed, the court would refuse to grant 
an account: Jesus College (1745) 263; Baily (1829) 75. 
22 Edenwest (1994) 279. 
23 Wadlow (1995) 585. 
24 Section 77 of the Trade Marks Act 1883; section 42 of the Trade Marks Act 1905; section 2 of 
the Trade Marks Act 1938 (UK). 
25 Section 14 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). 
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English law accepts that damages are a common-law rather than a statutory remedy. 
It is also trite that the same relief is available where passing off, rather than statutory 
trade mark infringement, is involved. 
3.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REMEDY 
3.2.1 Origins of the remedy of damages 
In the English legal system, compensatory damages are traditionally viewed as the 
preserve of common law. Restitution and coercion are, however, the preserve of 
equity.26 A review of the origins of English common law and the development of the 
common-law courts is inappropriate for present purposes.21 It is sufficient to state that 
the earliest common-law courts granted restitution, not damages.28 A shift by the 
common-law courts from the grant of specific relief to the grant of substitutionary relief 
occurred in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.29 This development has been linked to 
the rise in importance of the writ of trespass,30 under which a wide variety of wrongs 
could be pursued. As some of the wrongs pursued under this writ could give rise only 
to substitutionary relief, this gradually came to be the only form of relief available under 
the writ. 31 A further reason for the shift from specific to substitutionary relief was the 
problem of enforcement procedures. At common law, a judgment could not be enforced 
26 Sedgwick (1880) 10-11. A common-law court was first empovvered to grant an injunction in 1854, 
in terms of section 79 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854, while a chancery court could 
first grant damages in 1858, in terms of section 2 of Lord Cairns' Act 1858. Prior to this 
legislation, there was a strict division of the relief available, with damages available only at 
common law and injunctions available only at equity. 
27 For a general review of this process, see Baker ( 1990) 14-111 ; Kiralfy ( 1962) 110-135 and 263-
343. 
28 Washington (1931) 345. 
29 Ibid. 
30 This writ was later known as action on the case, and most of the law of torts developed from 
these writs: Kiralfy (1962) 877. 
31 Tilbury (1990) 7. 
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by imprisonment for contempt and an order for specific relief could therefore not always 
be enforced. In contrast, an order for damages could be enforced by seizure and sale. 32 
Actions to recover damages at common law when a mark had been misappropriated 
were based on the action for deceit; fraud on the part of the defendant had to be 
proved. There is a paucity of early decisions on such actions in common-law courts. 
Various reasons can be suggested for the disinclination of plaintiffs to seek the 
assistance of these courts; some were of general relevance, while others arose from 
the nature of the right for which protection was sought when the misappropriation of a 
mark was in issue. 
The formality of the procedure and difficulties in drafting pleadings were one reason. 33 
A further reason was that, in the eighteenth century, when the jury was either not given 
directions by the trial judge, or did not consider itself obliged to heed such directions, 
a new trial could be ordered if the jury award was considered excessive, which meant 
that the parties could face further litigation.34 The availability of equitable relief meant 
that chancery courts became the preferred forum. This was particularly so in trade mark 
infringement matters, when an injunction to prevent further infringement was of primary 
importance in protecting the mark. 
Once damages became the usual form of relief granted at common law, two major 
conceptual difficulties emerged: the first was the basis on which damages should be 
awarded, and the second, the assessment of such damages. 
3.2.2 Compensation as basis of award 
In early common law, little distinction was made between the concepts 'crime' and 'tort', 
32 Ibid. 
33 Baker (1990) and Kiralfy (1962) deal at length with these problems. 
34 Washington (1931) 364; Sharpe (1774) 943. 
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and consequently between payment of money as punishment and as compensation. 35 
Remnants of this attitude can still be found in areas of intellectual property law, with the 
existence of conversion damages36 and additional damages37 in respect of copyright 
infringement, and, until the 1964 decision of Rookes, 38 the general availability of 
exemplary damages when flagrant infringement had been proved. 
Other than the few remaining instances where additional or exemplary damages may 
be awarded, it has been accepted for well over a century that, in English law, the basis 
of an award of damages is compensation and the object of such an award is to put the 
plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the tort not been committed.39 
3.2.3 The influence of the jury on the assessment of damages 
Before 1854, trial by jury was the only form of trial at common law.40 The jury, who were 
responsible for all findings of fact, also had to determine the amount of damages to be 
awarded to a successful plaintiff.41 This meant that until the end of the eighteenth 
century, the English law of damages was concerned with the limitation and control of 
jury awards, rather than the general principles to be applied when determining the 
amount to be awarded.42 
35 The distinction between the two concepts took longer to develop than in civil law jurisdictions: 
Erasmus (1975) 272; Ogus (1973) 4-5. 
36 Section 7 of the Copyright Act 1911 (UK). 
37 Section 17(3) of the Copyright Act 1956 (UK); section 97(2) of the Copyright Act 1988 (UK). 
38 Rookes(1964)1226. 
39 Burrows (1994) 21; Ogus (1973) 17; Sedgwick (1880) 34. 
40 The Common Law Procedure Act 1854 permitted trial by a judge alone, provided the parties 
consented. The development of the jury system, from a collection of witnesses to its more 
modem form, is dealt with by Kiralfy (1962) 240-248; Sedgwick (1880) 24-27. 
41 Sedgwick (1880) 25. 
42 Washington (1931) 346. He deals fully with this topic in his article. 
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With the decline in the importance of the jury, general principles for the assessment of 
damages finally evolved. 
3.2.4 The legal foundation of the action for damages in trade mark infringement 
matters 
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, in proceedings before the King's court, which 
later became known as the common-law court, action could not be instituted without 
the issue of a writ, as these writs gave the King's justices the power to hear and 
determine the rights of the parties.43 There were a limited number of these writs, 
however, and if a case could not be brought within an existing writ, no remedy was 
available at common law.44 The writ of trespass, which became common in the 
thirteenth century, is generally viewed as the source of the law of tort.45 This writ was 
based upon an act of violence, initially by 'force of arms' against the person, land, or 
chattels of the plaintiff,46 and later, when actual violence was no longer a prerequisite, 
became the innominate action on the case, which merely required proof that the 
damage suffered by the plaintiff was caused by the defendant.47 By the end of the 
thirteenth century, the only remedy which a common-law court would grant in respect 
of either trespass or the action on the case was damages.48 
One such action on the case was that of deceit.49 This action originated as a remedy 
for the abuse of legal proceedings, but by the late sixteenth century had developed into 
43 Kiralfy (1962) 294. 
44 Idem at297. 
45 Baker (1990) 455. 
46 Idem at 376. 
47 Baker (1990) 73. 
48 Kiralfy (1962) 401. 
49 Oraper(1939) 442; Kiralfy (1962) 307. 
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the general tort of deceit.50 A survey of cases based on deceit during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries is pointless in the present context, as the recognition of trade 
marks and their protection commenced only in the late eighteenth century, and relief 
at common law for misappropriation of a mark was available from 1824 only.51 Although 
Wadlow argues that it is simplistic to assume that a legal cause of action based on 
fraud developed seamlessly from the tort of deceit, and was subsequently superseded 
by the equitable protection of property rights, 52 for purposes of the present study it is 
sufficient to state that early trade mark infringement cases at common law did not 
protect property rights but were based on fraud by the defendant.53 
Southern, a common-law decision dating from 1618, is generally cited as the first 
decision in which a reference is made to the availability of legal protection for trade 
mark infringement. It is of value here, because it confirms that the basis of any action 
founded on trade mark infringement was then viewed as an action on the case for 
deceit. Although Southern concerned the sale of counterfeit jewels, the decision is 
famous because Doderidge J referred obiter to an earlier decision in which a clothier, 
or possibly a purchaser, instituted action against another clothier who had fraudulently 
used the first clothier's mark. Although there is confusion about who instituted action,54 
those reports which mention Doderidge J's dictum confirm that the clothier's action was 
50 Baker (1990) 521; Kiralfy (1962) 428. 
51 Rogers (1910) 40. 
52 Wadlow (1995) 9. 
53 Baker (1990) 522. 
54 If action had been instituted by the purchaser, the decision would not be viewed as relevant for 
trade mark purposes; it is only because one of the five differing reports of Southern states that 
the clothier's action was instituted by the proprietor of the mark that it has assumed such 
importance for trade mark purposes. Popham's Report of 1659 pertinently states that the clothier 
whose mark was copied instituted action (at 144); Croke's Report of 1659 states that the 
purchaser instituted action (at 471); while Rolle's Report of 1676 states that it is not clear who 
instituted action but that it appeared to be the purchaser - 'mes Mr Justice Dodridge [sic] ne dit 
per quel deux ceo gist lou per le cloathier que primerment avoit le dit marke, ou pur le vendee, 
mes semble que gist pur le vendee' (at 28). 
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an action on the case for deceit.55 While it is understandable that an action by a 
purchaser who had been fraudulently misled would be based on deceit, the report in 
which the clothier is mentioned as plaintiff also stated that the action was for deceit, 
despite the fact that the clothier might have been defrauded, but had not been 
deceived. 
When trade mark protection was finally confirmed at common law more than two 
centuries later in the Sykes decision, the foundation of the action remained that of an 
action on the case for deceit. Despite the fact that, on the reported facts, the plaintiff 
manufacturer had not been deceived, but had instituted action because his mark had 
been imitated, the court appeared to have regarded it as settled law that the action was 
one for deceit. 56 The action for deceit might appear a strange basis for an action for 
misappropriation of a mark, as the plaintiffs complaint was that third parties, not he 
himself, had been deceived. However, it must be remembered that an action could not 
be instituted at common law unless it fell within an existing writ, and it is generally 
accepted that this extension of the action for deceit was for pragmatic purposes, to 
assist plaintiffs, and not based on any legal development. Earlier, in 1783, Lord 
Mansfield had held that a plaintiff could not prevent trade mark infringement where both 
parties were using the name of the original inventor, but that the position would differ 
if the defendant sold a medicine of his own under the plaintiffs name or mark, as 'that 
would be a fraud for which an action would lie'.57 
Subsequent cases brought at common law were all instituted as actions on the case 
for deceit. In 1842, action to prevent use of a mark was again described as 'in the 
nature of an action for deceit' and the court held that the declaration had to state that 
'the defendant was sciens of the matter by which he deceived; and that he did it also 
55 Southern (Popham) (1659) 144; Southern (Croke) (1659) 471; Southern (Rolle).2 (1676) 28. 
56 Sykes (1824) 543; see also the commentary on this decision in Schechter (1925) 138. 
57 Singelton (1783) 293. 
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et fraudulenter'.58 By 1863, Lord Chancellor Westbury, describing the different basis for 
the grant of relief at common law and equity, held that 
'at law the proper remedy is by an action on the case for deceit: and proof of 
fraud on the part of the Defendant is of the essence of the action: but this Court 
will act on the principle of protecting property alone'.59 
Later that year, he repeated and elaborated on this principle, to alleviate the 
uncertainty as to the grounds on which an equity court protected trade marks. 
Interestingly, after confirming that at law the remedy for piracy of a trade mark was by 
an action on the case in the nature of a writ of deceit and that the remedy was founded 
on fraud, he proceeded to say that 
'originally it seems that an action was given not only to the trader whose mark 
had been pirated, but also to the buyer in the market, if he had been induced by 
the fraud to buy goods of an inferior quality'.60 
This is a strange inversion of the historical development of the action, which was 
available to a deceived purchaser long before it became available to a defrauded 
trader. 
It can therefore be accepted that all actions at common law to recover damages for the 
unauthorised use of a trade mark were instituted as actions on the case for deceit, with 
proof of fraud as an essential element of the action. It must be remembered that, in 
contrast, proceedings instituted in chancery courts to prevent infringement or 
unauthorised use of a mark, and to obtain an account of profits, were from 1838 based 
58 Crawshay (1842) 385. 
59 Edelsten (1863) 199. 
60 Leather Cloth (1863) 139. 
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on the plaintiffs property rights; fraud was not an essential allegation.61 
After the fusion of the two courts in 1875 by the Judicature Acts, the distinction 
between the common-law action for deceit and the equitable right to protect property 
was maintained. In 1897 the Court of Appeal described a passing off case as a 'clear 
case of common law fraud, a case for which the old action of deceit would have lain'.62 
In the following year the same court held: 
'This is an action for a wrong. It is an action for deceit; for fraudulently 
pretending that the Defendant's goods were the Plaintiffs' goods, and so trying 
to pass them off'. 63 
The distinction between actions at common law and equity, and the remedies available 
in each instance, remains relevant today, as it affects both the liability of the defendant 
to pay damages or an account of profits and the defences available to a defendant.64 
3.2.5 The essential distinction between actions based on misuse of a mark and 
other actions for deceit 
Before registration of marks became possible, no distinction existed at common law 
between trade mark infringement and passing off. Both were based on the unlawful use 
of another's mark which was calculated to deceive. Marks were protected against 
misuse by others through the common-law action for deceit for which fraud was an 
essential element. In addition to fraud, other forms of actions for deceit required a 
further essential element - proof of actual damage suffered by the plaintiff. Damages 
61 Millington (1838) 352. 
62 Magnolia Metal (1897) 394. 
63 Jamieson (1898) 191. 
64 The modern relevance of the differing bases of the action at common law and equity is 
discussed under 3.3 of this chapter. 
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were the 'gist of the action' in actions for deceit and real damage was viewed as the 
foundation of the plaintiffs right.65 This was in contradistinction to torts 'actionable per 
se' where damages were described as being 'at large'.66 
In one of the first reported common-law decisions on the grant of damages for 
misappropriation of a mark, the requirement of proof of damage as an essential 
element of the action was discarded. The issue was whether special damages had to 
be proved, or whether damages were 'at large' and therefore assumed. In the lower 
court, the plaintiff had alleged that he had suffered damage both from lost sales and 
because the infringing product was of an inferior quality. In his directions the judge had 
instructed the jury to determine whether the infringing product was inferior; but he had 
also informed them that even if it was not inferior, 'the plaintiff was entitled to some 
damages, inasmuch as his right had been invaded by the fraudulent act of the 
defendants'.67 The jury found that the infringing product was not inferior and awarded 
the plaintiff nominal damages of one farthing. This verdict was upheld by four judges 
of the King's Bench, one of whom held that 'the act of defendants was a fraud against 
the plaintiff; and if it occasioned him no specific damage, it was still, to a certain extent, 
an injury to his right.'68 
This decision was of great importance, as it was at total variance with the requirements 
for other actions on the case. The fact that the court referred to no authority when 
giving this judgment, and gave very brief reasons for its decision, seems to indicate that 
the distinction between deceit in the form of the misappropriation of a mark, and other 
forms of the action for deceit, was already recognised and accepted. 
Surprisingly, only Wadlow considers this in any detail; other writers merely state that 
65 Pollock (1904) 183. 
66 Tilbury (1990) 38. 
67 Blofeld (1833) 411. 
68 Ibid. 
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this decision was an 'important advance in trade-mark law'69 or cite the decision as 
authority that mere proof of infringement entitles the plaintiff to nominal damages.70 
Wadlow argues that the development probably took place because of difficulties in 
proving damage,11 which is why it became sufficient to prove that the defendant's 
misrepresentation was merely calculated to cause damage. 72 
A further reason for dispensing with proof of special damage can be postulated if the 
historical division between common law and equity is considered. Before granting an 
injunction in equity, a chancery court would often refer a plaintiff to common law, first 
to institute action there to prove that he had a legal right capable of equitable 
protection.73 In such instances, although a common-law court could grant only 
damages, the plaintiff had to obtain a verdict there before he could return to chancery 
for an injunction. A plaintiff would then seek only nominal damages at common law and 
so avoid the necessity of submitting proof of actual damage. The courts assisted such 
plaintiffs by holding that proof of actual damage was not essential for an award of 
nominal damages, as this allowed the court then to order costs in the plaintiff's favour. 
Without this concession, a plaintiff would have been liable for costs of the action at 
common law as he had failed to prove any liability for damages, when all he actually 
sought was an injunction from a chancery court. One example of such a situation is 
found in Rodgers, where the defendant at common law moved for a retrial on the basis 
that the plaintiff had failed to prove special damages. The court, following Blofeld, held 
that proof of actual damage was not relevant, as the plaintiffs 'did not come to court for 
the mere purpose of recovering the amount of damage in the particular case, but to try 
69 Schechter (1925) 142. 
70 Kerly (1986) 326. 
71 See Mi//ar(1769) 2318 on the difficulties of proving damages at common law in an action on the 
case for copyright infringement. It can be assumed that similar problems were encountered when 
misappropriation of a mark was in issue. 
72 Wadlow (1995) 148. 
73 Motley ( 1837) 17 is one example. 
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whether the defendants might, with impunity adopt the plaintiffs' mark'.74 
The principle that actual damage need not be proved before a cause of action existed 
remains important today. As the cause of action is complete without proof of damage, 
an injunction can be obtained without such proof. Whether an award of compensatory 
damages will be granted without proof of actual damage, is dealt with later in this 
chapter. 75 
It has been shown that the remedy of damages was available only at common law, and 
that the remedy is governed by common-law principles. But the courts' desire to assist 
plaintiffs in obtaining equitable relief led to the introduction of equitable concepts. This 
impacted particularly on the requirement of proof of damage and the liability of a 
defendant to pay damages. 
3.3 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES 
Once trade mark infringement or passing off has been proved, the question of the 
defendant's liability for compensatory damages arises. Two issues must be considered: 
the motives of the defendant, and misrepresentation or illegality on the plaintiff's part. 
Problems surrounding both issues can be traced to conflicts between law and equity. 
At law, fraud by the defendant was always an element of the action. Once the tort had 
been proved, a plaintiff had a right to an award of damages. An award of damages 
would, therefore, not be made against an innocent defendant, as the element of fraud 
would not have been proved; the entire action would be dismissed. Conversely, the 
motives of the plaintiff played no part in the determination of liability for common-law 
damages. In equity, the existence of the tort did not depend on proof of fraud by the 
defendant. Equitable relief was always discretionary, however, and a court of equity 
could withhold pecuniary relief to indicate disapproval of the behaviour of either party. 
74 Rodgers (1847) 123-124. 
75 See 3.5.2.1 of this chapter. 
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As equitable concepts gradually eroded common-law principles after the fusion of the 
two courts, fraud disappeared as an element of the action. But damages were still 
viewed as a common-law remedy, and therefore available as of right, not at the 
discretion of the court. So it must be considered whether the court's equitable 
discretion to consider the motives of both parties has been introduced in respect of a 
common-law remedy. 
3.3.1 The innocence of the defendant76 
The position of an innocent defendant as regards statutory infringement and passing 
off will be dealt with separately, as this requires an examination of the effect of 
legislation on the remedy of damages. 
3.3. 1.1 Trade mark infringement 
The first statute to deal with trade marks dates from 1875. It provided that registration 
was necessary for the proprietor to 'be entitled to institute any proceedings to prevent 
infringement'.77 An amendment during the following year provided for proceedings to 
'prevent or recover damages',78 and this phrase is found in every subsequent trade 
mark statute before 1994.79 It has always been accepted that this was not an 
exhaustive list of the relief available and that the proprietor of an infringed mark could 
enforce his rights in the same manner as the holder of any other property right. This 
has now been statutorily confirmed in the Trade Marks Act 1994. 80 
76 See generally, Kelbrick (1996) 204. 
77 Section 1 of the Trade-marks Registration Act 1875. 
78 Section 1 of the Trade-marks Registration Amendment Act 1876. 
79 Section 77 of the Trade Marks Act 1883; section 42 of the Trade Marks Act 1905; section 2 of 
the Trade Marks Act 1938 (UK). 
80 Section 14(2). 
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The inclusion of the right to recover damages in the various statutes can be interpreted 
in two ways. 
First, it can be argued that the fact that statutory provision is made for the recovery of 
any damages suffered by the proprietor of a registered mark always entitles him to do 
so, irrespective of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Viewed in this light, it is 
understandable why, before the Trade Marks Act 1994, a court might grant damages 
against an innocent infringer but refuse an account of profits for which no statutory 
provision existed. 
Second, it can be argued to the contrary that to determine the relief available for trade 
mark infringement, reference to the common law has always been necessary, despite 
the existence of legislation. The Edelsten decision set out the principles governing 
relief available in both courts in respect of trade mark infringement before the 
enactment of legislation. 
In equity: 
'For although it is well founded in reason, and also settled by decision, that if A 
has acquired property in a trade mark, which is afterwards adopted and used by 
Bin ignorance of A's right, A is entitled to an injunction; yet he is not entitled to 
any account of profits or compensation, except in respect of any user by 8 after 
he became aware of the prior ownership.'81 
At common law: 
'At law the proper remedy is by an action on the case for deceit: and proof of 
fraud on the part of the Defendant is of the essence of the action: but this Court 
will act on the principle of protecting property alone, and it is not necessary for 
81 Edelsten (1863) 78. 
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the injunction to prove fraud in the Defendant. '82 
Historically, therefore, fraud has been an essential element of any common-law action 
to recover damages.83 
A brief chronological review of the few decisions on the issue after fusion of the two 
courts confirms this statement. The first time an innocent trade mark infringer's liability 
to pay damages was pertinently considered was in 1909, in the S/azengerdecision. 84 
There it was stated that damages cannot be granted against an innocent infringer. In 
this decision, Neville J held that the principle of Ede/sten still held true, despite the 
statutory rights created by trade mark legislation since that decision. He refused to 
grant an account of profits or inquiry as to damages. He then considered whether the 
fact that Edelsten dealt with an equitable account of profits, rather than a common-law 
inquiry as to damages, affected its relevance. He held that 'nowadays, where the right 
to compensation exists, there is no distinction between an account of profits and an 
inquiry as to damages, and it rests with the plaintiff to elect whether he will take one 
form of relief or the other'.85 He proceeded to find that, as the defendants were unaware 
of the plaintiffs' rights, there was no right to compensation but only a right to an 
injunction. The defendants' innocence protected them against the grant of both 
equitable and common-law financial remedies. 
The following year, in an action for trade mark infringement where damages or an 
account of profits were requested in the alternative, the court stated: 
82 Ibid. 
83 The statement in Kerly (1986) 326 - that mere proof of an infringement entitles the plaintiff to 
damages loses sight of the fact that the common-law case cited as authority, Blofeld (1833), 
based this finding on the fact that the act of the defendants was a fraud against the plaintiff. 
84 Slazenger(1909) 261. 
85 Ibid. While this might be correct in the sense that after the passage of the Judicature Acts of 
1873 and 1875 a plaintiff could elect either form of relief, it cannot be intended to mean that 
there is no distinction between the effect of the two remedies. 
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'As the law stood under the old Trade Mark Act the cases were quite clear that 
an innocent infringer was not liable for damages. Since the alteration, under 
which the registration of a Trade Mark gives the owner of a Trade Mark property 
in the Trade Mark, it was thought that the law required reconsideration, and it 
would not be considered to be in accordance with the old decisions; but Mr 
Justice Neville in the case of Slazenger v Spalding held that the new Act of 
Parliament had not made any difference.'86 
By 1923 the Lord Constable of Scotland, when hearing an action for trade mark 
infringement and damages, stated that '[t]here is well settled English authority against 
the recovery of damages for the innocent use of a Trade Mark by another'. 87 
However, in the 1924 Henry Heath decision, the court, without referring to any previous 
decisions, stated that 'a legal right has been infringed, and prima facie the Plaintiffs are 
entitled to damages, which, of course, the Plaintiffs take at their own risk as to costs'. 88 
In this instance the defendants had, in all innocence, published an advertisement using 
the plaintiff's mark and 'sold at least two hats at that price' (14s 11d)! 
The next relevant case was a 1926 decision dealing with trade mark infringement and 
passing off where an inquiry as to damages had been requested. No authority is given 
for the statement that, because of the innocence of the second defendant, 'it may be 
that as a result of that no claim for damages may be made against him' .89 
In the same year, because of lack of proof of damage, an award of damages was 
refused against an innocent infringer. Nominal damages were also not awarded.00 
86 Horsfield (1911) 178. 
87 Hindhaugh (1923) 371. 
88 Henry Heath (1924) 457. 
89 Champagne Heidsieck (1926) 103. 
90 Societe Francaise (1928) 280. 
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Later, in 1937, inquiries as to damages were granted in two decisions,91 in neither 
instance with any consideration by counsel or the court of whether such an order was 
justified in the light of earlier case law. In 1982, when the issue was next raised, the 
court granted an inquiry for trade mark infringement damages only after the plaintiffs 
counsel had conceded that there was doubt whether such an order would be granted 
for innocent passing off.92 
However, the 1994 Edenwest decision stated categorically that damages were 
available for innocent trade mark infringement. 93 
The defendant in this matter had conceded that the plaintiffs were entitled to an 
injunction against it, but opposed the grant of an inquiry as to damages. It submitted 
that it was an innocent infringer and, as damages were recoverable only where a 
defendant was shown to have acted dishonestly, the court could not require it to pay 
damages in respect of either trade mark infringement or passing off. The question of 
the defendant's innocence, in the sense that it had no knowledge of the infringing 
nature of the goods, was not disputed by the plaintiffs. They submitted, however, that 
this innocence was irrelevant to their right to damages. 
The court dealt with the liability for trade mark infringement and passing off separately. 
The liability to pay damages when a registered trade mark has been innocently 
infringed was discussed first. With Kerly as authority,94 and after a brief consideration 
of some of the decisions referred to above, Blackburne J pronounced it settled law that 
innocence on the part of an infringer is no defence to a claim for damages for trade 
mark infringement and ordered an inquiry. I believe that the court was not necessarily 
91 Fialho (1937) 193; Ravenhead Brick (1937) 341. 
92 Sony (1982) 206. 
93 Edenwest (1994) 279. 
94 Kerly (1986) 327-328: 'whilst knowledge or absence of knowledge does not affect the right to 
damages'. 
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correct to rely on Kerly's categorical statement that 'knowledge or absence of 
knowledge does not affect the right to damages'. Kerly's authority is Spalding (which 
dealt with passing off, not infringement of a registered mark) and Henry Heath (an 
instance of trade mark infringement where an inquiry as to damages was granted but 
no reasons for judgment were given). While the most recent edition of Kerly cites only 
the above two decisions as authority, earlier editions mention two further decisions 
where Spalding was not considered - according to Kerly because no decision on the 
point was necessary.95 Interestingly, in the first of these, Hindhaugh, a Scottish case 
dating from 1923, Kerly's fourth edition is cited as authority for the proposition that 
'there is well settled English authority against the recovery of damages for the innocent 
use of a Trade Mark by another'. 96 
The finding by the Edenwest court that the point is 'settled law' seems justified when 
only the most recent decisions are considered. However, the chronological review 
above of all the decisions on the point illustrates that this finding was actually not 
justified. Spalding is cited as authority by both Kerly and in those decisions in which an 
inquiry was granted. But it is not authority for the liability of an innocent trade mark 
infringer, as it deals only with passing off.97 The issue of innocent trade mark 
infringement was not canvassed in any of the above decisions, other than Slazenger 
where it was held that as the defendants did not know of the plaintiffs' rights, there was 
no right to compensation, only a right to an injunction. 
Before Edenwest, the available authority on the grant of damages against an innocent 
infringer of a registered trade mark can be summarised as follows: in the only case in 
which the issue was pertinently considered, the court refused to order an inquiry. This 
has subsequently been quoted with approval; the decision relied on by textbooks and 
some later decisions is inappropriate, as it deals with passing off rather than trade mark 
95 Kerly (1972) 344 footnote 30; Kerly (1983) 303 footnote 32. 
96 Hindhaugh (1923) 371. 
97 For this reason, the decision has been discussed below under passing off and not in the section 
dealing with trade mark infringement. 
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infringement; and in three decisions an inquiry was granted without the issue being 
canvassed. 
However, unless the Edenwest decision is overturned, the position in England is that 
innocence is not a bar to the grant of damages for statutory trade mark infringement. 
3.3.1.2 Passing off 
In the only reported decision prior to Spalding, damages were refused in respect of 
innocent passing off.98 The 1915 House of Lords decision in Spalding is generally cited 
as authority for the proposition that damages are available in respect of innocent 
passing off. In this matter, the defendant had sold products discarded by the plaintiffs 
as 'new and improved' stock, and the plaintiffs had instituted action for an injunction 
and damages. It is clear from comments made by the House of Lords and the lower 
court that the defendants were not perceived by the courts to be completely innocent 
in their behaviour;99 neither court used the term 'innocent' at any stage to describe the 
defendants. That part of the Spalding judgment100 relied on as authority for the principle 
that damages may be granted against an innocent infringer is not completely 
persuasive. The phrase 'it has long been settled that actual passing-off of a defendant's 
goods for the plaintiffs need not be proved as a condition precedent to relief in Equity 
either by way of an injunction or of an inquiry as to profits or damages' must be seen 
in the light of what precedes it. Lord Parker, dealing with general principles of passing 
off, was discussing whether misrepresentation is sufficient or whether actual passing 
off is required. His citation of Edelsten illustrates this. Where he then states that the 
representation need not be fraudulently made, and '[t]he representation is in fact 
treated as an invasion of a right giving rise at any rate to nominal damages'101 without 
98 Gledhill & Sons (1911) 451. 
99 Spalding (1913) 397; Spalding (1915) 286 and 288. 
100 Spalding (1915) 283. 
101 Ibid. 
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any authority cited and in a general discussion of principle rather than while 
considering the specific relief sought by the plaintiffs, his statement must be regarded 
as obiter. 
Not all textbooks view this decision as sufficient authority for the proposition that 
damages may be granted against an innocent infringer. While the two most recent 
editions of Kerly rely on Spalding as authority, earlier editions, which appeared after 
Spalding, do not refer to this decision and consider the issue to be 'open' .102 In contrast, 
Wadlow's interpretation of Spalding is that the decision confirmed that at common law 
a representation must be fraudulently made, while in equity complete innocence of the 
party making a misrepresentation is a reason for limiting an account of profits to the 
period after the defendant became aware of the true facts. 103 
The Spalding decision did not immediately alter the attitude of other courts. In Vokes 
the defendants were viewed as having 'acted completely innocently'104 and the court 
merely stated, without discussion, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages. In 
Draper, although the defendants had consented to the order that an inquiry as to 
damages be held, two of the three judges queried the order on the basis of the absence 
of fraudulent intent on the part of the defendants. In fact, Goddard LJ seriously doubted 
'whether it is the law that damages can be claimed for innocent passing-off, 105 while 
Clauson LJ queried whether fraud was a necessary element of conduct leading to a 
judgment for damages.106 The Marengo decision dealt with 'completely' innocent 
passing off. The claim for damages had been withdrawn by the time the matter reached 
the House of Lords; some of the bench expressly stated that they were not venturing 
an opinion on whether damages could be awarded where the defendant was 
102 Kerly(1960)396;Kerly(1966)444; Kerly(1972)447. 
103 Wadlow(1995)491. 
104 Vokes (1932) 145. 
105 Oraper(1939) 443. 
106 At 441. 
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innocent. 107 In a subsequent decision, the court considered the Draper headnote and 
interpreted it as meaning that 'it is an open question whether more than nominal 
damages could be given in an action for passing-off, without fraud' .108 In the present 
case, only nominal damages were sought and granted. The court held that no fraud or 
dishonesty was involved but it still clearly considered the defendants negligent.109 
Again, as recently as 1982, the court refused to grant an inquiry as to damages in 
respect of passing off, because it doubted whether such an order could be made 
against an innocent infringer. 110 
However, the Edenwest court held that damages were also available for innocent 
passing off, once again relying on Kerly. Kerly cites Spalding as authority for the 
statement that a plaintiff is entitled to an inquiry even though the defendant was 
completely innocent, but then notes that there is argument to the contrary based on the 
historical requirement that fraud was a necessary ingredient of an action at common 
law for the recovery of damages.111 In Edenwest, Blackburne J, expressing his own 
view on the topic, surmised that the difficulty in determining whether damages are due 
in respect of innocent passing off has its origin in the fact that at common law passing 
off meant dishonest passing off and proof of dishonesty was required; in equity, 
however, although dishonesty was not an essential requirement for the court to grant 
injunctive relief, the judge declined to award an account of profits where the passing 
107 Marengo (1948) 247, 251-252 and 254. 
108 Procea (1951) 220. 
109 Per Roxburgh J at 213: 
'I entirely acquit him of all dishonest or improper motives; but he knew that that was 
untrue. .. . [H]e at any rate would have been bound to have realised, had he thought 
about it - that 'process' and 'Procea' are words likely to introduce the utmost confusion . 
. . . [H]e did not see the danger of the course he was pursuing'. 
110 Sony (1982) 206. 
111 While Kerly relies on Spalding in his 1983 and 1986 editions, strangely enough this decision is 
not referred to in the 1972 edition, in which it is stated: 
'A successful plaintiff in a passing-off action is entitled to nominal damages, whether the 
defendant was fraudulent or not. Whether a plaintiff is entitled to claim more than 
nominal damages - ie is entitled to an inquiry as to damages - against a defendant who 
innocently passed-off is an open question' (at 447). 
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off was merely innocent. He then thought it 
'a little unreal that, in respect of a tort which did not achieve its modern form until 
the early part of this century, the nature of the relief available, where passing off 
is established, should today be governed by considerations which applied to the 
cause of action at an earlier stage of its development'. 112 
The question of whether damages could be ordered in respect of innocent passing off 
was not settled before Edenwest, as was indeed conceded by Blackburne J. It is also 
clear that earlier courts found Lord Parker's statements in Spalding less persuasive 
than did Blackburne J. Authors of textbooks also do not agree on the issue. Although 
Kerly feels that an inquiry may be granted in respect of innocent passing off, 113 Wadlow 
does not share this view. He argues that although the state of mind of a defendant is 
irrelevant for the existence of the action, so that fraud is not a requirement and its 
absence not a defence,114 innocence is a defence to a claim for an account of profits. 
He argues that it should also be a defence to an inquiry into damages, and that neither 
remedy should be available to a plaintiff until he has put the defendant on notice, that 
is, until after the passing off has ceased to be 'innocent'. 115 
3.3.1.3 Effect of the Edenwest decision 
The historical position that at common law dishonesty had to be proved, or alternatively 
that in equity a discretion existed, for the award of financial compensation, prevented 
a completely innocent defendant from suffering the financial loss of an order for an 
account of profits or inquiry as to damages. To argue that dishonesty is no longer a 
requirement, but that damages should still be awarded, is to remove the safeguards 
112 Edenwest (1994) 293. 
113 Kerly (1986) 430. 
114 Wadlow (1995) 200. 
115 Idem at 491-492. 
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which both common law and equity made available to a defendant. 
In the final part of the Edenwest judgment, Blackburne J, dealing with the distinction 
between innocent passing off and innocent trade mark infringement, states that he 
cannot see why damages should not be equally recoverable, as the two wrongs are 
closely related and may arise from the same act.116 This view is echoed by Hurdle in her 
analysis of this judgment: 
'Mr Justice Blackburne's decision in Gillette [Edenwes~ is no doubt a sensible 
one treating trade mark infringement and passing off actions alike and breaking 
away from 19th century anomalies.'111 
However, I believe that the fact that two distinct causes of action may result from a 
single act, is no reason for the relief afforded to correspond - the same act can also 
give rise to criminal and civil liability. While the correctness of an award for an inquiry 
into damages against an innocent trade mark infringer is not as clearcut as was 
assumed in Edenwest, such an award can at least be justified by the statutory nature 
of the right and the statutory provision for this relief. 110 
No such justification exists in respect of passing off. A defendant who was neither 
dishonest nor negligent should enjoy the 'anomalous' protection of the law which either 
requires dishonesty or grants the court a discretion in the award of pecuniary relief. 
116 Edenwest (1994) 291. 
117 Hurdle (1994) 20. 
118 The justification for an award of damages in respect of trade mark infringement cannot be 
sought in the allegation that registration serves as notice to the world and that infringement can 
therefore never be innocent. Spalding (1915) 261 pertinently states that in the absence of 
express statutory provision, registration does not serve as notice and no Trade Marks Act 
contains such a provision. 
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3.3.2 Fraud or misrepresentation by the plaintiff119 
The famous maxim that 'he who comes to equity must come with clean hands' is 
accepted as still applying when a plaintiff approaches a court for equitable relief such 
as an injunction or an account of profits. But it is not clear whether this defence is 
limited to equitable relief or whether it also exists at common law and therefore affects 
the award of damages. 
General principles of the law of torts provide that, where a plaintiffs behaviour is 
clearly a crime or a fraud on the public, and so offends against public policy, recovery 
of damages may be refused on the principle ex turpi causa non oritor actio, provided 
that the criminality is connected with the loss he suffered. 120 Therefore, if a plaintiffs 
business is illegal or fraudulent, an action for passing off in which he seeks to protect 
the goodwill in such business will not succeed. 121 
The more usual situation in trade mark and passing off proceedings, however, is where 
the plaintiffs mark or get-up contains a material misrepresentation. In such instances 
an injunction has been refused on occasion because of the equitable 'clean hands' 
doctrine. 122 The availability of damages in such an instance has seldom been 
considered, and the judgments are not consistent. 
In one of the earliest common-law cases, the plaintiff was awarded damages although 
119 The fraud or misrepresentation of a plaintiff invalidates a registered trade mark in two instances. 
First, a defendant can allege that the mark was unregistrable, and therefore invalid, as contrary 
to public policy or to accepted principles of morality, or of such a nature as to deceive the public 
(section 3(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK)). Second, a defendant can allege that the mark 
is liable for revocation in consequence of the use made of it, by the proprietor or with his 
consent, as it is liable to mislead the public, particularly as to the nature, quality, or geographical 
origin of the goods or services (section 46(1)(d) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK)). Note, 
though, both these grounds of invalidity render the whole action unsustainable, and do not solely 
affect the grant of damages. They will therefore not be discussed further. 
120 Clerk & Lindsell (1989) 96; Tilbury (1990) 100. 
121 Wadlow (1995) 471. 
122 Peny (1842) 76; Leather Cloth (1863) 871. 
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he had marked his goods as patented despite the fact that the patent had expired. 123 
In an early chancery decision, an injunction was refused because of the plaintiffs 
misrepresentation but he was given leave to bring an action at common law and, if 
successful, request an injunction.124 
Some thirty years later, a chancery appeal court held obiter that, although the point had 
never been raised at common law, a misrepresentation which was calculated to 
deceive the public would be a defence to a common-law action on the basis of the 
principle ex turpi causa non oritur actio.125 However, shortly thereafter the Court of 
Appeal held that proof that the plaintiff had been guilty of a misrepresentation to the 
public and therefore did not have 'clean hands', would 'not afford any answer to his 
Common Law claim for damages in that action for deceit' .126 
There are no recent decisions on whether misrepresentation by a plaintiff would be a 
bar to an award of damages. Wadlow argues that, despite contrary opinion, the better 
view is that the defence exists at common law as well as in equity, and that a plaintiff 
who was guilty of fraudulent trade or sufficiently serious misrepresentation should be 
refused all relief and have his action dismissed with costs. 121 
Wadlow's terminology, though, indicates misrepresentation of a substantially more 
serious nature than that usually complained of when 'clean hands' is raised as an 
equitable defence. I believe that serious forms of fraud or misrepresentation have 
always led to a refusal to entertain the action, whether at common law or in equity, on 
the basis of the ex turpi causa principle. So a misrepresentation by the plaintiff which 
amounts to serious fraud on the public will prohibit both an award of damages and an 
123 Sykes (1824) 542. 
124 Peny(1842) 77. 
125 Ford(1872)631. 
126 Jamieson ( 1898) 191. 
127 Wadlow (1995) 471. 
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account of profits. But a misrepresentation which is not material will not disbar a 
plaintiff from a damages award, although an account of profits, which is discretionary, 
might be refused. 
It has been shown that, as regards innocent defendants, the common-law protection 
they enjoyed against an award of damages in the absence of fraud, has been 
discarded without the adoption of the equitable discretion of a court to grant pecuniary 
relief. As regards the plaintiffs conduct, I believe that the equitable 'clean hands' 
requirement does not affect awards of damages and serious misrepresentation is 
necessary before the defendant can raise the plaintiffs fraud as a defence. 
3.4 ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Damages suffered in trade mark and passing off matters are always viewed as pure 
economic loss - financial damage attributable to the defendant's wrong. 128 
3.4.2 Basic principles 
It has always been accepted that the award of damages is intended to put the plaintiff 
in as good a position as he would have been in had no tort been committed. 129 The 
question then arises of how this position is determined. 
Various general principles have developed to determine how compensatory damages 
are assessed. 
128 McGregor (1988) 1079; Tilbury (1990) 37. Lawson (1980) 126, commenting on the dearth of 
authority on economic loss, surmises that '[t]his is apparently a part of law where the problems 
are either so easily solved as not to cause any trouble or else very difficulf. 
129 Burrows (1994) 16. 
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3.4.2.1 Form in which damages must be awarded 
English law follows the 'once and for all' rule that a court must assess in a lump sum 
all past, present, and prospective loss resulting from the tort. 130 While the purpose of 
this rule is to prevent endless litigation, the problem arises that any assessment of 
future loss can be guesswork only. 
Damages must also be awarded unconditionally, as, if some condition is attached to 
the award, this could also lead to further litigation. While it has been argued that this 
cannot be a general rule, 131 in the field of intellectual property no deviation has ever 
been suggested. 
3.4.2.2 Date for assessment 
A trial court can take into account evidence of all events that occur up to the date of 
judgment.132 The term 'trial court' must be taken to include an official referee or master, 
as, in trade mark issues, the trial court usually makes a finding only on the merits and 
rather than making an award of damages itself, grants an inquiry as to damages, to be 
heard by a referee or master. In such instances, it is statutorily provided that damages 
in respect of a continuing cause of action133 are assessed down to the time of 
assessment. 134 This is so as the master or referee is in the same position as a trial 
judge, in that the amount of damages has not been determined. An appeal court is also 
allowed to hear evidence on matters which have occurred after the date of trial.135 
130 Burrows (1994) 99. 
131 Tilbury (1990) 42. 
132 Burrows (1994) 105. 
133 If an interlocutory injunction has not been granted, infringement or passing off will frequently be 
a continuing cause of action: see Kerly (1986) 327. 
134 RSC Order 37,r.6. 
135 RSC Order 59,r.10. 
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However, guidelines have been imposed which require this discretion to be exercised 
with restraint; 136 new matters will seldom be viewed as of sufficient import to justify 
further evidence on damages, where the trial court has made an award of damages or 
they have been determined at an inquiry. 
In assessing damages, the time for determining the value of money or property is 
traditionally either at the date of the loss for which damages are being awarded or at 
the date of the accrual of the cause of action. 137 However, it has been held that this is 
merely a prima facie rule: damages will be assessed at the date necessary to 
compensate the plaintiff adequately. 138 Finally, in the territorially limited field of trade 
marks and passing off,139 the different rules which apply to liabilities sounding in foreign 
money will seldom be relevant. 
3.4.2.3 Taxation 
Until 1955, English courts did not deduct income tax which a plaintiff would have had 
to pay on his lost profits. In that year, however, it was held that the amount of income 
tax which a plaintiff would have had to pay on his lost earnings should be deducted 
from the amount of damages to which he was entitled .140 This principle has been 
criticised on three counts. 141 First, it requires judges and practitioners who are not tax 
experts to argue and decide complex questions of the plaintiff's tax liability. Second, 
Inland Revenue loses taxes it would otherwise have gained. Third, it can leave the 
plaintiff undercompensated. But it appears that this principle is now generally accepted 
136 Mulholland (1971) 679-680; see also Burrows (1994) 106. 
137 Burrows (1994) 107. 
138 Mcinnes (1992) 17. 
139 A registered trade mark enjoys protection in the United Kingdom only (section 9 of the Trade 
Marks Act 1994 (UK)); passing off requires a goodwill in the United Kingdom. 
140 Gourley (1956) 207-208. 
141 See Burrows ( 1994) 133-134 for a full discussion of these criticisms. 
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in English law, unless the award is not subject to taxation. 142 
The basic principles set out above are relevant to all instances of assessment of 
damages. It must now be determined how they apply when damages are sought for 
trade mark infringement or passing off. 
3.5 QUANTIFICATION OF DAMAGES IN TRADE MARK INFRINGEMENT AND 
PASSING OFF ACTIONS 
Claims for damages for trade mark infringement and passing off share the same basis 
and are frequently included in the same action.143 It is trite that in both instances 
damages are difficult to quantify. However, a general principle of the law of damages 
is that if a plaintiff has proved loss but it is impossible to quantify that loss with 
mathematical accuracy, the court is not absolved from assessing the damages as best 
it can. 144 The locus classicus in this regard reads: 
'As much certainty and peculiarity must be insisted on, both in pleading and 
proof of damage, as is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances and to 
the nature of the acts themselves by which the damage is done. To insist upon 
less would be to relax old and intelligent principles. To insist upon more would 
be the vainest pedantry.'145 
To determine how damages are quantified, it is necessary first to state what heads of 
damages are allowed, then to determine how the plaintiff's losses are calculated, and 
finally to consider whether any duty rests on the plaintiff to mitigate these losses. 
142 Burrows (1994) 133. 
143 Kerly (1986) 325; McGregor (1988) 1081. 
144 Mcinnes (1992) 12. 
145 Ratcliffe (1892) 532. 
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3.5.1 Heads of damages 
It has been held that a plaintiff is entitled to recover 'any loss of trade actually suffered 
by the plaintiffs, either directly from the acts complained of, or properly attributable to 
the injury to the plaintiffs' reputation, business, goodwill and trade and business 
connection caused by the acts complained of .146 
3.5.1.1 Loss of sales 
The first major head of damages for both trade mark infringement and passing off is 
loss of sales and the profits attendant on such sales. This can include both losses prior 
to judgment and prospective losses. 147 However, factors which must be taken into 
account are the existence of lawful competition, special efforts made by the defendant 
to promote sales, and the possible lowering of prices to counter legitimate competition. 
None of these will be included in an assessment of lost profits. 148 
3.5.1.2 Injury to goodwill 
The second head of damages is injury to goodwill.149 While damages for loss of sales 
are usually available only where the parties are in a competitive situation, injury to 
goodwill may occur whether or not the parties are in competition. Two forms of injury 
to goodwill exist. The first is the confusion created by the existence of inferior goods 
which bear a similar name to the plaintiffs product. The second is the risk of injurious 
146 Spalding (1918) 117. 
147 Cairns(1988)121. 
148 Burrows (1994) 179. 
149 Cairns (1988) 121 states that 'loss of profits' and 'damage to goodwill' are two descriptions of the 
same loss. This view is not generally accepted; already in Spalding (1918) 122 they were 
accepted as separate heads of damages; see Carty (1996) 488 who also views the two as 
separate heads of loss. 
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association with a defendant who has a bad reputation. 150 
3.5.1.3 Other heads of damages 
Two further heads of damages have been identified by Carty in a recent article. She 
states that 'loss of control' by the plaintiff over his own reputation has been accepted 
in a few instances as a further head of damages, as has restriction on expansion 
potential. 151 
3.5.1.4 Mitigation damages 
Finally, damages incurred when mitigating damage can sometimes be recovered. But 
very few such instances have come before English courts and only three forms of 
mitigation damages have been recognised. They are dealt with below. 152 
3.5.2 Calculation of damages 
There are two methods by which the damages suffered by a plaintiff can be calculated. 
The first, most commonly used in instances of infringement and passing off, is an 
assessment based on the lost profits of the plaintiff. The second, which is more 
common in patent and copyright matters, is an assessment based on a reasonable 
royalty which the plaintiff would have received for licensing the matter which has been 
infringed. 
3.5.2.1 Lost profits basis 
This method of calculating damages accords with the compensatory theory on which 
150 Carty (1996) 488-489 fully discusses both forms. 
151 Carty (1996) 489-491. 
152 See 3.5.3 of this chapter. 
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awards of damages are traditionally based. The measure of damages is the same for 
trade mark infringement and passing off. Where a court has found both, no distinction 
is generally made between the damages flowing from infringement and those flowing 
from passing off .153 
Some basic principles are usually followed by the courts. The first is that lost sales by 
the plaintiff cannot be calculated as the equivalent of sales made by the defendant, as 
matters such as the difference in price and quality will affect this determination. 154 
However, this principle is not applied consistently: in some instances the courts have 
calculated the plaintiff's loss as being all sales made by the defendant. 155 
It has also been held that it is inappropriate to equate damages suffered by the plaintiff 
with profits made by the defendant,156 and that if this basis of calculation is desired, the 
plaintiff should not claim damages but seek an account of profits.157 
If the defendant's sales or profits cannot be used as the criterion, how should loss of 
sales be determined? Most dicta dealing with this aspect are unhelpfully vague. The 
statement that the court must 'on a consideration of all the evidence in this case, ... 
award such sum as we think is properly and reasonably shown to be, by taking all 
proper inferences into account, the damage suffered by the Plaintiff by reason of the 
wrongful acts of the Defendants'158 in the leading decision on damages in this field, 
does not take the matter much further. Probably the most accurate description of how 
such damages are assessed is that it is the function of the court 'not to make precise 
calculations on detailed evidence, but rather to decide upon a figure which was, in all 
153 Aktiebolaget Manus (1954) 246. 
154 Magnolia Metal ( 1897) 399; Draper ( 1939) 437. 
155 Alexander(1895) 366. 
156 Aktiebolaget Manus (1954) 249. 
157 Leather Cloth (1865) 301. 
158 Draper(1939) 437. 
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the circumstances of the case, of the right order of magnitude' .159 
When loss of sales is assessed, the courts have frequently attempted to exclude profits 
which would have been lost in any event due to lawful competition or price cuts 
unconnected with the infringement.160 
A further principle is that proof of actual deception, which has caused the plaintiff's 
loss, is not required before a court may grant substantial damages. In the leading 
English decision on damages for trade mark infringement, it was held that ordinary 
business knowledge permits the assumption that the presence of a large quantity of 
infringing goods on the market will cause damage, and that to refuse more than 
nominal damages unless actual infringing sales are proved 'violates common sense'. 161 
However, this statement should not be seen as implying that actual financial loss need 
not be proved before a court will grant substantial damages. In this decision, the 
statement that actual deception need not be proved was made by a court hearing an 
appeal from an inquiry into damages. The plaintiff had already proved substantial 
actual damages. All that the court confirmed in this and a subsequent decision162 was 
that the causal link between a misrepresentation which was 'calculated to cause 
damage' and proof of actual financial loss, would be assumed, without requiring proof 
of actual deception which caused such loss. 
The assessment of injury to goodwill has also been described as being determined by 
'ordinary business knowledge and common sense' and assessed as a 'rough estimate', 
as the injury is something which cannot be determined by evidence. 163 
159 Unik (1983) 123. 
160 A/exander(1895) 367; Spalding (1918) 121; United Horse Shoe (1888) 267 and 269. 
161 .oraper(1939)436. 
162 Plomien (1943) 215. 
163 Oraper(1939) 440. Hovvever, in A/exander(1895) 363 the plaintiff submitted proof of lost income 
to support a claim for injury to reputation. 
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When determining the value at which goods would be assessed in tort, it has been held 
that the market value of the goods, not their replacement cost, is the proper measure.164 
3.5.2.2 Royalty basis 
No provision is made in any current intellectual property legislation for the 
determination of damages on the basis of a reasonable royalty. The Copyright Act 1988 
merely refers to relief 'by way of damages' in respect of copyright and designs. 165 The 
Patents Act 1977 uses the same terminology. It is, therefore, somewhat strange that 
it is commonly accepted that a royalty basis is acceptable in patent and copyright 
litigation as a method of calculating damages. However, as early as 1867,166 this was 
accepted as basis for the calculation of patent damages. By 1914, the House of Lords, 
in a patent matter where the amount of the award of damages was in issue, considered 
it perfectly usual that 'a fair test of the loss would be the amount the Appellants would 
have had to pay to acquire legally the power which they usurped' .167 This decision 
confirmed that a royalty basis could be used to assess damages when appropriate, and 
the proposition has been accepted by authors on damages and intellectual property. 168 
In England, a reasonable royalty is thus viewed as a method of calculating damages, 
not as a separate remedy. When an actual royalty rate exists, this is used to calculate 
damages. But, when there is no actual rate, the courts have on occasion used a 
164 Smith Kline (1989) 10. 
165 Sections 96(1) and 229(2) respectively. 
166 Penn (1867) 87. 
167 Watson Laidlaw (1914) 116. The court's argument at 119-120 was that a plaintiff was entitled 
to damages on the basis of compensation for sales actually lost, and to damages on the basis 
of a reasonable royalty for the rest of the defendant's sales. While this argument has been 
criticised by BurrOINS (1994) 180 as being closer to an attempt to reverse unjust enrichment than 
to compensate the plaintiff, it is nevertheless accepted as good law by authors such as Laddie 
(1995) 925. 
168 Annand (1994) 178- patents and copyright; Burrows (1994) 179 - intellectual property; Clerk & 
Lindsell (1989) 1594 - patents; Laddie (1995) 925 - copyright; Mayne (1894) 54 - patents; 
McGregor (1988) 1082 - patents, 1086 - copyright. 
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notional royalty rate. 169 
Two questions arise when the royalty basis is used. The first is whether the calculation 
of damages on this basis has the effect of franking the infringing items, so that all 
infringing goods are viewed as legitimate, as the infringer has paid a royalty for their 
use. This issue was raised before an English court in an instance of copyright 
infringement and the suggestion rejected. The lower court held that, unlike the position 
where a plaintiff elects an account of profits, payment of damages on a royalty basis 
does not 'waive the tort'.110 This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal. It held that this 
basis of calculation 'can in no way be considered to be a licence to the defendants after 
the event to sell the infringing goods, or to raise some form of waiver or estoppel' .171 
This approach is supported by the fact that delivery up is available as further 
independent relief for a plaintiff, whether he elects to calculate damages in the 
conventional fashion or on a royalty basis.112 The second query is: on which items can 
the plaintiff claim a royalty? All items manufactured or all items sold? Although the 
issue has not been pertinently considered, it seems to be accepted that royalties are 
payable only in respect of goods which have been sold, as delivery up can be 
requested in respect of unsold goods. 173 
Although often used in claims for patent and copyright infringement, 174 the calculation 
169 PB Cow (1961) 240; Lewis Trusts (1982) 286. 
170 Lewis Trusts (1982) 287. 
171 Lewis Trusts (1983) 464. 
172 Neither section 99 of the Copyright Act 1988 (UK} nor section 16 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 
(UK} limits the availability of delivery up orders in such instances. 
173 PB Cow(1961} 239. The court refers to 'the application of the reserved royalty rate to the totality 
of infringing sales' when dealing with an actual, rather than notional, royalty basis. However, 
royalties in this instance were granted only on the sales which the plaintiff himself would have 
made, not on total sales by the defendant (at 241). 
174 It is interesting that the court in Net/on (1979) 538 viewed it as common knowledge that 
damages measured on a royalty scale would be very much lower than if measured as 
manufacturing profits or profits on sales. 
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of damages on the basis of a reasonable licence fee has been generally regarded as 
unsuitable for trade mark infringement or passing off, and lost profits have been the 
starting point for calculating damages. 175 Some of the reasons for viewing the royalty 
basis as unsuitable have been the illegality of licensing a mark at common law unless 
the owner retained control over the quality of the product, 176 the disfavour with which 
English courts viewed character merchandising, 177 and the prohibition in the 1938 Act 
on trafficking in trade marks. 178 
Only one English decision has pertinently addressed the issue. In Dormeuil the court 
had to decide whether a reasonable royalty was a suitable alternative basis for 
assessing trade mark and passing off damages. The court first noted that there was no 
reported authority for relief being granted on this basis in such actions. 179 After 
considering various patent cases, Knox J held that there was a marked difference 
between patent and trade mark actions, as there was a strong element of property in 
patent cases, because the state conferred a monopoly on the holder of a patent, and 
it was on that basis that every sale of an infringing article was accepted as damage to 
the patentee. In trade mark cases, in contrast, it is not accepted that every sale of 
infringing matter which a defendant makes can be attributed to the plaintiff, 180 which 
makes it difficult to accept the proposition that a royalty can be awarded on every 
transaction which is a trade mark infringement or an instance of passing off. 181 
However, character merchandising is more favourably viewed under the 1994 Act182 
175 Annand (1994) 179. 
176 GE Trade Marl< (1973) 297. 
177 The leading decision is Hollie Hobbie (1984) 189. 
178 Section 28(6) of the Trade Marks Act 1938 (UK). 
179 Dormeuil (1990) 464. 
180 Magnolia Metal ( 1897) 399; Draper ( 1939) 437. 
181 Dormeuil (1990) 464. 
182 Annand (1994) 215-217. 
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and the Act contains no provision which pertinently prohibits trafficking. It has been 
suggested that, with the deregulation of licensing, loss of opportunity to license might 
become a recognised head of loss.183 If this does become the case, acceptance by the 
courts of a royalty basis for damages may be more likely. Although one author 
considers the introduction of a royalty basis in trade mark law as desirable, as it is said 
to avoid the complexity of assessing injury to goodwill,184 this is not always so. An 
English court deducted an amount from the sum due on a reasonable royalty rate in 
respect of a design infringement - it accepted the argument that certain sales would 
have been made irrespective of the plaintiff's design, because of the defendant's own 
goodwill and marketing tactics.185 
3.5.3 Mitigation of damage 
In certain circumstances, a plaintiff will not be awarded damages otherwise proved 
due, because he failed to minimise his losses. This concept is known in English law as 
mitigation of damage.186 Two principles are identified by Burrows.187 First, a plaintiff 
cannot recover damages for avoidable loss; he is expected to take all reasonable steps 
to minimise his loss.188 Second, he should not incur unreasonable expense in an 
attempt to do so. 189 
In the sphere of trade mark litigation, the duty to mitigate has limited application. 
183 Idem at 179. 
184 Cairns (1988) 125. 
185 PB Cow (1961) 241. 
186 'Mitigation' is also the term used when dealing with the issue of whether a defendant's bona tides 
has the effect of decreasing an award: McGregor (1988) 169 suggests that it not be used in this 
sense, as such use leads to confusion. 
187 Burrows (1994) 69. 
188 Ibid; see also McGregor (1988) 168. 
189 Burrows (1994) 73-74. 
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3.5.3.1 Avoidable loss 
The duty of a plaintiff to take steps to avoid loss is subject to a test of reasonableness; 
the owner of a mark is expected to respond to infringement or passing off like a 
reasonable businessman. 100 But the burden to prove that he has not done so rests on 
the defendant.191 In trade mark infringement matters, the most usual method of avoiding 
loss is for a plaintiff to take prompt action to protect his mark. While, in the light of 
general principles of mitigation, it could be expected that damages might be affected 
if he does not do so, no recent instances of such a reduction are found in English 
decisions.192 Kerly, referring to two old passing off decisions where damages were 
refused on the ground of delay, states that it is not easy to see on what principle they 
were refused, or how damages could be refused when statutory infringement was in 
issue. 193 His view is reinforced by two decisions. In the first, the plaintiff delayed 
re-entry into the English market because of threats of legal proceedings by the 
defendant. The court did not consider this delay a reason to refuse or reduce 
damages. 194 In the second, the Master refused exemplary damages because of the 
plaintiffs delay, but did not view it as ground for reducing compensatory damages.195 
Clearly, the burden on a plaintiff to mitigate damage is not viewed as substantial in 
trade mark infringement matters. The only decision where a failure to mitigate has 
affected the grant of damages is never cited as authority for the limitation of a 
defendant's liability because of the plaintiffs inaction. In this decision, the court refused 
to award damages for the period during which the plaintiff failed to advertise its product 
190 Cairns (1988) 134. 
191 McGregor (1988) 172. 
192 An account of profits has been limited because of delay, as it is an equitable remedy: Ford 
(1872) 633. Delay will, of course, affect the grant of interlocutory relief. 
193 Kerly (1986) 328. 
194 Aktiebo/aget Manus (1954) 248. 
195 Unik (1983) 125. 
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and criticised the plaintiff for not informing its agents of the true position. 196 
3.5.3.2 Expenses incu"ed in mitigation 
The cost of counter advertisements was accepted as a mitigation expense by the lower 
court in Spa/ding. 197 The lowering of prices to counteract infringing sales has been 
recognised as an expense on one occasion198 but refused on another. 199 Refusal was 
justified because a price reduction by the plaintiff to counter the defendant's 
infringement is not usually viewed as a reasonable mitigation expense which can be 
recouped from the defendant: it can seldom be proved that the price reduction in 
question was in response to the defendant's conduct, and not to legitimate 
competition. 200 
In Dormeuil, the court allowed the expenses of notifying foreign suppliers that their 
actions were infringing, but did not allow the costs of litigation overseas to prevent 
further infringing transactions, as this was held to be something for which the foreign 
suppliers, not the local infringer, were liable.201 
From the above survey of how damages are quantified, it is clear that, once he has 
determined heads of damages, a plaintiff will usually use the lost profits method of 
quantification. Here, proof of actual loss must be submitted, although the courts assist 
plaintiffs by not requiring them to present instances of actual confusion: the causal link 
between infringement and actual loss is assumed. The assessment of damages on a 
notional royalty basis is seldom used and is viewed as inappropriate in trade mark 
196 Spalding (1918) 122. 
197 At 117. 
198 Alexander ( 1895) 367. 
199 United Horse Shoe (1888) 268. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Dormeuil (1990) 469. 
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infringement and passing off proceedings. 
4 DAMAGES IN AUSTRALIAN LAW 
4.1 DEVELOPMENT OF REMEDY 
The historical development of the remedy in Australia corresponds to that in England. 
It has been accepted by the Australian courts that the remedy is of common-law origin, 
and that the tort had its origins in the action for deceit.202 
Currently, the Trade Marks Act provides that a court may, at the option of the plaintiff, 
grant either damages or an account of profits against the infringer of a registered trade 
mark.203 
4.2 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES 
4.2.1 The innocence of the defendant 
4.2.1. 1 Trade mark infringement 
The only reported decision which deals pertinently with the issue of innocent trade 
mark infringement is Co/beam Palmer. 204 The innocent defendant had, prior to trial, 
consented to an account of profits to run from the period after he received notice. 
Confirming that the remedy of accounts was available only after notice, the court held 
that an inquiry as to damages might be governed by different considerations. It noted, 
however, that cases on the point were conflicting.205 Writers also do not agree. Some 
202 Ange/ides (1927) 61. 
203 Section 126 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Aus). 
204 Co/beam Pa/mer(1970) 25. 
205 At 35. 
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believe that damages may be awarded even for innocent infringement,206 whilst others 
support the view that only nominal damages may be awarded where a defendant has 
acted innocently.207 
4.2.1.2 Passing off 
Whether damages can be awarded when passing off has occurred innocently has also 
not been pertinently dealt with by an Australian court. In 1929 the High Court held that 
"'fraud" for the purpose mentioned is not necessarily such as would support an action 
of deceit, but would be constituted by persistence after notice' .208 Although this 
statement has been cited subsequently when dealing with claims for damages, it must 
be remembered that the 'purpose' referred to was the grant of an injunction, not the 
award of damages. In Henderson, the High Court held, with reference to the period 
before the defendants became aware of the existence of the plaintiff, that '[i]n respect 
of distribution before this time the defendant, as an innocent distributor, will not be 
made liable in damages'.209 Interestingly, Spalding is cited as authority for this 
statement. The subsequent full court decision did not deal with the issue, as the court 
found that the claim for damages had not been established.210 However, when it 
discussed the nature of a passing off action, the full court did state that fraud was no 
longer an element of the action and that, after the Judicature Acts, the practice had 
been established of awarding an account of profits or inquiry into damages where fraud 
had not been proved.211 This finding was based on a quotation from an article by 
Morison, but the court omitted Morison's subsequent statement - that 'the only question 
remaining is whether the defendant is liable in damages if he did not know and could 
206 McKeough & Stewart (1991) 35; Shanahan (1990) 359. 
207 Ricketson ( 1984) 721. 
208 Turner (1929) 362. 
209 Henderson (1969) 229. 
210 At 236. 
211 At 237. 
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not reasonably have known the circumstances which rendered confusion likely ... [T]he 
authorities at present appear to be opposed to the imposition of liability in such 
circumstances' .212 
In 1976 appellants before the High Court argued that an award of damages could not 
be sustained, as fraud was not sufficiently alleged or proved. The court found it 
unnecessary to decide the point, as it found sufficient fraud in the appellants' 
persistence in the use of the offending name after notice of the likelihood of 
deception.213 The Henderson decision was not referred to by the court and is also not 
referred to by textbook authors. While Shanahan states that substantial damages are 
not available for innocent passing off and believes that it is unclear whether even 
nominal damages will be awarded, 214 Wadlow's interpretation of the Turner and BM 
Auto Sales decisions is that, if the conduct was originally innocent, a plaintiff may 
recover damages only in respect of damage which has arisen after notice has been 
given.215 
4.2.2 Fraud or misrepresentation by the plaintiff 
No court appears to have pertinently considered the effect of a plaintiff's misconduct 
on the availability of damages. However, in Ange/ides, the court held obiter that while 
such conduct might bar a plaintiff from equitable relief, 'such conduct would not, it 
212 Morison (1956) 55. Morison's view is thus that, while fraud is no longer an essential element, a 
completely innocent infringer will not be held liable for damages. 
213 BM Auto Sales (1977) 371. 
214 Shanahan (1990) 398, supported by Ricketson (1984) 582. 
215 Wadlow (1995) 492. His view is shared by McKeough & Stewart (1991) 284. Wadlow's 
interpretation reflects the statutory position created by section 68 of the Trade Marks Act 1955 
(Aus), which provides that, where passing off has arisen from the use of a mark registered by 
the defendant, a court will not award damages if the defendant was unaware, and had no 
reasonable means of ascertaining, that the plaintiffs mark was in use, and immediately ceased 
use on receipt of this information. This provision has not been repeated in the Trade Marks Act 
1995 (Aus). 
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seems, afford any defence to an action at common law for deceit'.216 
4.3 ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 
The basic principles used to assess damages correspond to those followed in England. 
It is accepted that the object of a damages award is compensation for the plaintiff's 
loss.211 The effect of tax liability on an award depends on whether the award itself is 
subject to taxation.218 Finally, Australian authors on intellectual property state that their 
courts have been reluctant to formulate 'unnecessarily rigid and technical principles'.219 
Instead, the courts have preferred the flexibility of assessing each case on its merits, 
so that the measure of assessment to be adopted depends on the particular 
circumstances. 
4.4 QUANTIFICATION OF DAMAGES 
The heads of damages are the same as in England, and English cases are usually 
cited as authority.220 In principle, mitigation damages may be recovered. 221 
4.5 CALCULATION OF DAMAGES 
Damages are generally calculated on the lost profits basis. But Australian writers seem 
less averse to the notion of assessment on a royalty basis, although this has never 
been canvassed in a trade mark or passing off decision. Ricketson views it as a 
216 Ange/ides (1927) 83. 
217 Tilbury (1993) 390. 
218 Kercher (1990) 174; Tilbury (1993) 175. 
219 McKeough & Stewart (1991) 35. According to Ricketson (1984) 721, the tribunal makes a 'rough 
estimate'. 
220 Ricketson (1984) 722. 
221 Tilbury (1993) 399. 
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suitable basis if a plaintiff has been willing to license his mark to the defendant as 
registered user,222 while other writers view it as suitable if the infringement consists of 
conduct that the plaintiff would have been prepared to authorise or license.223 
The duty to mitigate loss, and the effect of a failure to mitigate on an award of 
damages, are recognised in Australian tort law224 although no intellectual property 
matters have dealt pertinently with the issues. 
5 DAMAGES IN CANADIAN LAW 
5.1 DEVELOPMENT OF REMEDY 
The English development of the remedy has formed the foundation for the Canadian 
approach to damages. 
Currently, the Canadian Trade Marks Act 1953 gives the court a wide discretion to 
grant relief. It provides that, where any act has been done contrary to the Act, the court 
'may make any such order as the circumstances require including provision for relief 
by way of injunction and the recovery of damages or profits'.225 The wording of the Act 
seems to imply a greater discretion than its 1994 English counterpart, which merely 
states that relief 'is available', 226 without making it clear whether this section gives an 
English court any discretion to award damages. But the standard Canadian textbook 
on trade marks appears to support the English approach that a successful plaintiff is 
222 Ricketson (1984) 722. 
223 McKeough & Stewart (1991) 35. See also Condon (1989) 39 and Wells (1989) 164 on the royalty 
basis for copyright infringements. 
224 Tilbury (1990) 130. 
225 Section 53. 
226 Section 14(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). In England, the accepted view is that a court 
does not have a discretion on whether to grant damages to a successful plaintiff, as damages 
are a common law remedy and equitable considerations do not apply. 
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entitled to an award of damages and that Canadian courts do not exercise the 
discretion implied by the Act.221 This view is supported by section 22(2), which provides 
that a court may decline to order the recovery of damages or profits in actions for the 
depreciation of goodwill. 
5.2 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES 
5.2.1 The innocence of the defendant 
5.2.1.1 Trade mark infringement 
The position of an innocent infringer of a registered mark has been considered only 
once by a Canadian court. In JH Munro the court, relying on Slazenger, held that the 
plaintiff was entitled to damages against an innocent infringer only after notice.228 While 
this appears to reflect the position in Canada, Fox criticises this decision and states 
that the judge misdirected himself, as Spalding was settled law on the point both in 
respect of passing off and trade mark infringement.229 As Best says in her article, 
Spalding is a passing off case and Fox's criticism is therefore inconsistent.230 Cairns is 
less definite than Fox on the position of the innocent infringer; he merely states that 
authorities on damages are very confused. 231 
5.2.1.2 Passing off 
No Canadian case on innocent passing off has been reported. With reference to 
227 Fox (1972) 461. He refers, however, to 'the award of an order for the recovery of damages or 
profits as of right' which is also problematic, as the grant of an account of profits is always 
subject to equitable considerations: see Cairns (1988) 145. 
228 JH Munro (1942) 227. 
229 Fox (1972) 462. 
230 Best (1985) 228. 
231 Caims(1988)141. 
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English decisions, Fox states that there is doubt whether more than nominal damages 
can be recovered,232 while Best refers to dicta in a Canadian decision to the effect that 
a court would have awarded only nominal damages if the defendant had been 
innocent.233 
5.2.2 Fraud or misrepresentation by the plaintiff 
Canadian courts have not dealt with this issue. Cairns is of the opinion that fraudulent 
trade or misrepresentation are defences to an action at law,234 but gives no authority for 
this statement. 
5.3 ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 
The basic principle that damages are compensatory in nature is accepted.235 It has 
been pertinently held that damages may be assessed right up to the completion of the 
reference or enquiry by the Master as to the amount of damages or profits.236 In 
Canada, the effect of income tax on an award of damages is not taken into account. 237 
The approach to the assessment of damages is the same as in England - a 'rough 
estimate' on the facts of the case.238 
5.4 QUANTIFICATION OF DAMAGES 
The heads of damages recognised in Canadian law are the same as those recognised 
232 Fox (1972) 648. 
233 Best (1985) 225, referring to Seagoing Uniform (1975) 216. 
234 Cairns (1988) 145. 
235 Idem at 119; Fox (1972) 465. 
236 Dubiner(1966) 433. 
237 Burrows (1994) 134. 
238 Fox (1972) 466. 
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by English law.239 It is also stated that mitigation damages may be recovered, although 
the courts usually include these damages under the head of loss of profits. 240 
5.5 CALCULATION OF DAMAGES 
The usual basis for the calculation of damages is that of lost profits. However, Fox 
states that if a plaintiff would have made no sales, the royalty basis is applied when 
quantum is assessed. 241 Cairns suggests that such an approach is suitable when the 
defendant makes his sales in a different product or geographical market, but points out 
that a plaintiff may then have difficulty establishing misrepresentation or loss of 
royalties.242 Neither author deals with the discrepancy between using a royalty basis 
when there is no actual loss to the plaintiff, and general compensatory principles which 
apply to claims for damages. The royalty basis of calculation has been used in a 
Canadian case for wrongful appropriation of personality, where the court held that the 
measure of damages would be the amount the plaintiff should reasonably have 
received for permission to publish the drawing in issue.243 But the court held that the act 
complained of was wrongful appropriation of personality, not passing off, despite the 
fact that the parties shared a common field of activity, as the act would not give rise to 
confusion between the two businesses.244 
The duty to mitigate loss is recognised and damages have on occasion been reduced 
239 Idem at 465-466. 
240 Cairns (1988) 121 footnote 109. In Pro Arts (1980) 379, the court estimated damages at the 
standard rate of sales, despite the fact that a number of sales had been made at a lower rate, 
on the basis that the plaintiff should not suffer because of its attempt to mitigate its loss. 
241 Fox (1972) 468. 
242 Cairns (1988) 126 footnote 153. 
243 Athans (1977) 596. 
244 At 591; see also Krouse ( 1973) 24 where the appeal court rejected the finding of the trial court 
that passing off had occurred by use of the plaintiffs photograph, as the parties did not share 
a common field of undertaking. 
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because of unjustifiable delay in instituting action.245 
It is clear that both Australian and Canadian courts follow the English approach to 
damages for infringement and passing off, and it is therefore unnecessary to view them 
as separate jurisdictions when comparing the English position with the South African. 
6 DAMAGES IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
< 
When discussing the South African law of damages, Erasmus notes the strange 
dichotomy in South African law in that 'whereas the existence of liability is determined 
in accordance with the substantive iaw which is Roman-Dutch in origin, the 
quantification of liability is largely governed by rules and concepts derived from English 
law' .246 In addition, when comparing South African and English principles, it must be 
remembered that other bases for pecuniary relief in respect of trade mark infringement 
and passing off are available in England, while in South African law the only form of 
pecuniary relief is compensatory damages. 
In this section, basic principles of Roman-Dutch law are set out and English influences 
on them considered. The requirement of actual loss is considered when dealing with 
a possible distinction between actions based on misuse of a mark and other Aquilian 
actions. The effect of fault as a requirement for Aquilian liability on the liability for 
damages follows. Basic principles used when assessing damages are dealt with, and, 
finally, the different methods for quantifying damages and the effect of the statutory 
introduction of a royalty basis is analysed. 
245 Cairns (1988) 135. 
246 Erasmus (1975) 280. 
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6.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REMEDY 
6.2.1 Roman and Roman-Dutch origins of the remedy 
What we today understand by damages is not the meaning this term bore in classical 
Roman law. Roman law did not have a general concept of damages or general liability 
for damages.247 Liability for damages arose only in certain specified instances. The 
judge was then required to determine the extent of liability in accordance with set 
formulae. 248 In these instances a judgment sounding in money had to be given, but this 
was either a fixed sum, a sum determined by the judge in his discretion, or a sum which 
could not exceed a specified amount. 249 In all instances,250 the amount awarded was 
determined objectively without any correlation between the amount awarded and the 
actual loss suffered by the plaintiff.251 
It was only in the Middle Ages that interesse was viewed as compensatory, in terms of 
loss suffered by the individual plaintiff. However, Erasmus points out that the 
development of this concept was weakened by the failure to develop general criteria 
for the method of assessment and limitations on the extent of liability.252 
Roman-Dutch jurists showed little interest in determining the fundamental rules of 
247 Erasmus (1975) 105. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Idem at 106. 
250 Erasmus (1975) 107 states that one of the earliest shifts from an objective to a subjective 
method of assessment occurred in respect of Aquilian actions for the loss of slaves or animals, 
when the loss suffered by the individual plaintiff was taken into account when assessing value, 
but that details of further development are obscure. 
251 Erasmus (1975) 107 and Visser (1993) 9 both note that in Roman law id quad interest did not 
denote a method of assessing the plaintiffs loss, but the freedom given to the judge to assess 
the amount of liability without regard to the value of the object concerned. 
252 Erasmus (1975) 113. 
Chapter 5: Compensatory damages 187 
damages, and the principles they stated were based on medieval antecedents.253 The 
principles accepted in this period as governing the assessment of damages include the 
following which are of particular relevance: 254 (a) interesse is defined in terms of actual 
loss suffered; (b) liability for damages includes liability for loss of profits, if the 
expectation of profits was certain; (c) the Aquilian action is available only when there 
is proof of actual damage, and adequate proof of loss must be adduced; and (d) in 
Aquilian actions, damages have no penal function: the defendant is liable only for the 
actual damage sustained. The notion of non-compensatory damages was unknown in 
such actions. 
6.2.2 English influences on the South African law of damages 
Although the Cape came under British rule in 1806, Roman-Dutch law remained the 
common law, and was accepted as the common law in Transvaal, Orange Free State, 
and Natal.255 However, changes were made to procedural law and the rules of court 
were altered in accordance with British practice.256 The imposition of a foreign system 
of adjective law on Roman-Dutch common law had an enormous influence on further 
development. 
Procedural changes meant that the terminology of the English law of damages was 
introduced, which in turn led to the assimilation of substantive English concepts such 
as 'nominal' and 'punitive' damages, and the blurring of the distinction between the 
compensatory nature of Aquilian actions and compensation under the actio 
iniuriarum. 257 
253 Idem at 269. 
254 Erasmus (1975) 269; Visser (1993) 11. 
255 Hahlo & Kahn (1960) 17-21. 
256 A full discussion of these developments is found in Hahlo & Kahn (1973) 566-578. 
257 Visser (1993) 12. 
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Changes to the law of evidence resulted in changes to the evidentiary material which 
could be introduced.258 From 1852, the possibility of a civil trial by jury introduced the 
distinction between the functions of judge and jury, which resulted in the assessment 
of quantum on a purely factual basis with no articulation of general principle. 259 
After 1910, the establishment of the Appellate Division led to a general resurgence of 
Roman-Dutch principles. In the area of delictual damages, the distinction between the 
Aquilian action and the actio iniuriarum was recognised and the basic principle of 
Aquilian liability as patrimonial loss restated.260 However, as a result of the strong 
system of precedent, a complete rejection of English concepts was problematic in the 
field of damages, as the courts were faced with judicial decisions in which English 
principles had been approved and adopted. In addition, detailed rules of assessment 
are a modern development and South African courts still refer to English decisions in 
this regard.261 
As a result, while the existence of liability for damages is determined in accordance 
with Roman-Dutch principles, the quantum of liability has been substantially affected 
by English law. 
6.2.3 Legal foundation of the action for damages for trade mark infringement 
and passing off 
The current Trade Marks Act provides that a successful plaintiff is entitled to 
damages.262 However, as with other forms of intellectual property, it is accepted that 
both the basis of liability and its factual determination must be established in terms of 
258 Erasmus (1975) 279. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Erasmus (1975) 366. 
261 LAWSA Damages (1995) 6. 
262 Section 34(3)(c) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
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the South African common law.263 Both trade mark infringement and passing off are 
viewed as species of delict, and general delictual principles govern the award of 
damages. 
A delict is described as a wrong which can be redressed by civil proceedings. In 
contrast with the English situation where specific torts are recognised, each with its 
own requirements, all delicts share the same basic requirements; conversely, if all 
these requirements are met, the act complained of will be viewed as a delict, despite 
the fact that it has not previously been recognised as such by the courts. 264 The 
requirements for Aquilian liability265 are conduct, wrongfulness, causation, fault, and 
patrimonial loss.266 The fault element can take the form of intention (dolus) or 
negligence (culpa). Intention is defined as the direction of the will at causing a 
particular consequence in the knowledge that it is wrongful, while a person is negligent 
if his conduct does not conform to the standard of care required by the law - that of the 
reasonable man. 267 
As indicated earlier, damages for patrimonial loss suffered by the commission of a 
delict are recovered by the actio legis Aquiliae or Aquilian action.268 The purpose of this 
action is to obtain damages for the wrongful and culpable causing of patrimonial 
damage.269 
263 Visser (1993) 348; Webster & Page (1986) 311. 
264 Dun & Bradstreet (1968) 218. 
265 Although a delict can give rise to both Aquilian liability and liability under the actio iniuriarum, 
only the former will be discussed as the actio iniuriarum is not aimed at the recovery of 
patrimonial loss, but designed as remedy for non-patrimonial loss: LAWSA Damages (1995) 5 
and 13. 
266 Wille (1991) 647. 
267 Kruger(1966) 430. 
268 At 645-646. 
269 Van Heerden & Neethling (1995) 56. 
190 Chapter 5: Compensatory damages 
In Roman law, this remedy was available first for physical damage of a specified 
nature; later it developed into a more general liability for patrimonial loss.210 While some 
writers doubt that in Roman-Dutch law it had developed into a general remedy for all 
culpable and wrongful acts causing patrimonial damage,211 by the nineteenth century 
our courts viewed it as such, 212 and the question is not in issue. 
Although the influence of English law during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries led to the introduction of such concepts as the 'tort' of passing off'.273 and 
damages 'at large'274 in South African decisions, the resurgence of Roman-Dutch law 
after that period has resulted in the acceptance of purely Roman-Dutch principles when 
substantive rights must be determined. 
In delictual actions, it is accepted that Aquilian liability will also exist for damage to 
incorporeal objects. As early as 1922 the Appellate Division recognised the Aquilian 
action as being available for all forms of unlawful competition, provided that the general 
delictual requirements are present.215 This obviously included such traditionally 
recognised forms of unlawful competition as trade mark infringement and passing off. 
6.2.4 Possible distinction between delicts based on misuse of a mark and other 
delicts in Aquilian actions 
The next issue is whether the requirements for proof of damage when trade mark 
infringement or passing off has occurred differ from those for other delicts. It was 
270 Idem at 57. 
271 Van Heerden & Neethling (1995) 58. 
272 Cape of Good Hope Bank (1886) 376. 
273 Policansky ( 1935) 97. 
274 Stuurman (1893) 37; Nicolson (1897) 387; see also the discussion of these decisions by 
Erasmus (1975) 282. 
275 Matthews (1922) 507. 
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illustrated above276 that, in English law, development of the tort resulted in actions for 
infringement or passing off being sustained without proof of any actual damage. It 
became sufficient to prove that the misrepresentation was calculated to cause damage 
for a cause of action to exist both in equity and at common law; nominal damages could 
be awarded without proof of any actual damage. 
This notion seems to have found a measure of acceptance in South Africa. The 
standard South African textbook on passing off and infringement, in its discussion of 
damages as a remedy, states that our courts have accepted the proposition that 
confusion in itself imports a sufficient risk of damage to support the action. 277 Writers 
on unlawful competition share this view. Van Heerden and Neethling state that '[i]f the 
court is convinced, on the ground of the probabilities revealed by the evidence, that 
damage has actually been suffered - and in this regard proof of a (reasonable) 
likelihood of deception or confusion seems to be accepted by the courts as sufficient 
indication of "a real possibility of damage being done to the plaintiff'' - it must assess 
the damages to the best of its abilities' .278 
It appears from these works that it is considered possible that, if a reasonable 
likelihood of confusion can be proved, some damages will be awarded without any 
proof of actual damage. 
This cannot be a correct reflection of the South African position. Damage is an 
essential element of any delictual claim, whether the relief sought is an interdict or 
damages. It is trite that actual damage can be difficult to prove in instances of trade 
mark infringement and passing off. This is especially so when an interdict is sought to 
prevent further infringement or passing off: very often the acts complained of are 
threatened or have only just started but will clearly cause substantial loss if allowed to 
276 At 3.2.5 of this chapter. 
277 Webster & Page (1986} 464, relying on Capital Estate (1977} 932 and Old Apostolic Church 
(1975) 689. 
278 Van Heerden & Neethling (1995) 195-196. 
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occur or continue. For this reason our courts have assisted plaintiffs seeking an 
interdict by holding that proof of confusion will suffice to meet the requirement that 
damage must have occurred or be imminent. But the purpose of this remedy must not 
be forgotten: an interdict is granted to prevent damage, not as compensation for 
damage which has already occurred. 
In the field of Aquilian liability, the basic principle is that 'there should have been actual 
damnum in the sense of loss to the property of the injured person by the act 
complained of .279 The Appellate Division has held that 'under the lex Aquilia there is 
only an action for damnum injuria datum - for pecuniary loss inflicted through a legal 
injury, and the defendant is not called upon to answer the plaintiff's case before the 
plaintiff has proved both the pecuniary loss and that it directly results from what is, in 
the eye of the law, an injuria'.280 From this excerpt it is clear that for the existence of 
Aquilian liability, proof of pecuniary loss is essential. This approach is correct, as the 
purpose of an Aquilian action is to compensate for past losses, or definite future loss. 
The confusion as to what proof of damage a court requires has probably arisen due to 
the paucity of decisions dealing with claims for damages in respect of trade mark 
infringement and passing off. The passages cited above which imply that actual 
damage need not be proved for the grant of damages, all rely on decisions in which the 
court had been asked to grant an interdict, not damages.281 The two decisions which 
are relied on to support the proposition that a South African court will award substantial 
damages without proof of 'special damage' are unconvincing.282 In Mills, the plaintiff 
alleged damages of a thousand pounds for unauthorised use of a trade mark, but was 
awarded twenty-five pounds. The court held that '[t]he small amount of damages is 
owing to the want of proof of specific damage, for although there might have been other 
279 Union Government ( 1911) 665. 
280 Matthews (1922) 507. 
281 Volkskas (1952) 347 (see also 351 ); Old Apostolic Church (1975) 689; Capital Estate (1977) 932. 
282 See for this proposition Van Heerden & Neethling (1995) 195; LAWSA Damages (1995) 60. 
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cases, the only ones before us are those of Tucker and Locke'.283 In Gertzen, the 
plaintiff claimed a hundred pounds as damages for passing off. The court found for the 
plaintiff and awarded five pounds. It stated: 
'the fact that a sale of the goods as being the goods of the plaintiff has taken 
place is proof of some damage, however small the quantity may have been of 
the false article that was sold. The conclusion one arrives at is, that if that had 
not been sold, the right article would have been sold, and to that extent profit 
would have been made. Some damages have been proved.'284 
In both instances the court awarded such damages as the plaintiff had proved; in 
neither instance can the damages award be viewed as 'substantial' when the amount 
claimed is considered. 
There is no doubt that damages are available for trade mark infringement or passing 
off.285 But there is only one recent instance of an award of damages by a South African 
court in this field. 286 In the Atlas Organic decision, dealing with unlawful competition 
including passing off, damages were awarded, after careful quantification by the 
court.287 I believe that our courts will not easily grant substantial damages without actual 
proof of loss, and that confusion has arisen only because of the lack of decisions on 
damages in this field. 
283 Mills (1863) 234. The persons referred to are two purchasers who had both bought a number of 
bags of the misleadingly labelled flour. 
284 Gertzen (1910) 30. 
285 Moroka Swallows (1987) 536: '[i]n the very nature of the delict of passing off the only remedies 
... damages to compensate the victim for what he has lost through the wrongdoer's interference 
with his goodwill'; Atlas Organic (1981) 202. 
286 No reported clecision exists in which damages have been awarded for trade mark infringement 
per se: Dean (1986) 117; Job (1995) 27. 
287 Atlas Organic (1981) 204-206. 
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6.3 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES 
Once infringement or passing off has been proved, the issue arises of whether the 
defendant is always liable to pay damages. In South African law it is accepted that 
Aquilian liability arises only if fault on the defendant's part exists. 288 However, it is 
necessary to establish whether this principle has been altered by legislation or deviated 
from in the light of conflicting English views. 
Then it must be determined whether the doctrine of 'clean hands' has been adopted 
from English law or exists independently in South Africa. 
6.3.1 Fault as essential element for Aquilian liability 
6.3.1.1 Trade mark infringement 
No South African decision has been reported in which the position of an innocent trade 
mark infringer has been pertinently considered. Interdicts have been awarded against 
innocent infringers,289 but damages have never been sought. 
In the absence of specific judicial authority, the relevant legislation must be considered. 
Before the implementation of the 1993 Trade Marks Act in South Africa, where for the 
first time the various remedies available to a successful plaintiff are detailed, legislation 
was silent on the subject, except to provide that registration was a precondition for the 
institution of proceedings 'to prevent, or to recover damages for' infringement.200 In 
accordance with a possible interpretation of the similar absence of stated remedies in 
288 Van Heerden & Neethling (1995) 195. 
289 Apollinaris Co (1911) 237; adidas (1976) 540. 
290 Section 43 of the Trade Marks Act of 1963 (SA); section 124 of the Trade Marks and Copyright 
Act of 1916 (SA). 
Chapter 5: Compensatory damages 195 
British legislation,291 it could be argued that the statutory provision for the recovery of 
damages entitles the proprietor of a registered mark to an award of damages, 
irrespective of the defendant's guilt or innocence. However, when considering the 1963 
Act, our courts have held that the failure of Parliament to make specific provision for 
various types of relief 'serves as an indication that the lawmaker never intended to alter 
the remedies available for infringement under our common law'.292 At common law, 
infringement is viewed as a species of delict and the recovery of damages would be by 
way of an Aquilian action, for which fault, in the form of intent or negligence, is 
required. This view is strengthened by our courts' interpretation of the nature of other 
forms of statutory damages. Dealing with the award of damages in terms of the Designs 
Act of 1967, the Appellate Division held: 
'The measure of damages is not mentioned in the Act. Since the wrong is a 
species of delict, the measure will be delictual'. 293 
Similarly, when considering the award of damages in terms of the Copyright Act of 
1978, the court held that '(t]he damages claimable under s 24(1) of the Act are ordinary 
delictual damages regulated by the common law'.294 In the light of these decisions, I 
think that it is extremely unlikely, despite the similar legislative provisions, that a South 
African court will follow the English courts and award damages if infringement has been 
completely innocent - neither intentional nor negligent. It also seems unlikely that the 
1993 Trade Marks Act will be interpreted differently. Section 34(3) states that, where 
a trade mark has been infringed 'the court may grant ... (c) damages ... (d) in lieu of 
damages, a reasonable royalty'.295 Even if it could be argued that relief is now founded 
on some basis other than that of the common-law delict, a court will hesitate to exercise 
291 See 3.3.1.1 of this chapter. 
292 Montres Ro/ex (1985) 66; LAWSA Trade Marks (1995) 120. 
293 Omega (1978) 471. 
294 Priority Records (1988) 292. 
295 Emphasis added. 
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the discretion provided by the Act contrary to basic common-law principles. 
6.3.1.2 Passing off 
A plaintiff need not show fault on the part of the defendant to obtain an interdict and 
therefore neither intent nor negligence need be proved.296 However, any action for 
damages for passing off is Aquilian in nature,297 and all the requirements of Aquilian 
liability must be met,298 including fault in the form of intent or negligence.299 It is relatively 
easy to prove intentional passing off. However, unlike the position in England, 
negligence on the part of the defendant is also viewed as fault. 300 Our courts have 
formulated the lower fault requirement as follows: '[i]t was enough for the appellant to 
prove negligence on the respondent's part ... coupled with objective foresight of a 
reasonable likelihood of deception or confusion with consequent impairment of the 
appellanfs goodwill'.301 It follows that innocent passing off will never found an action for 
damages in South Africa, as complete innocence presupposes the absence of fault in 
the form of intention or negligence. 
6.3.2 Misconduct by plaintiff 
The only South African cases dealing with the plaintiffs behaviour as a factor affecting 
the grant of relief, have all been applications for interdicts, not actions for damages. In 
the earliest such decision, Zyp Products, the court held that a material false 
representation would debar a plaintiff from relief, relying on an English chancery 
296 Kenitex (1967) 309; William Grant (1990) 920. 
297 Geaty(1964) 440. 
298 Dun & Bradstreet (1968) 218. 
299 Van Heerden & Neethling (1995) 195. 
300 Ibid. See also Unk Estates (1979) 281. 
301 Unk Estates (1979) 281. 
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decision.302 Subsequent decisions held that this was not a correct reflection of our law 
and that mala tides, fraud, or dishonesty had to be proved before a plaintiff would be 
debarred from relief. 303 The principles laid down in these decisions apply equally to 
actions for damages. 
6.4 ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 
6.4.1 Introduction 
As in England, the damages suffered in trade mark and passing off matters are viewed 
as pure economic loss - patrimonial loss not resulting from a physical injury to 
property. 304 
6.4.2 Basic principles 
The traditional method of assessing damage is by the sum-formula approach, in which 
damage is determined by subtracting the plaintiffs present patrimonial position from the 
hypothetical patrimonial position he would have been in had the delict not been 
committed.305 This approach is reflected in judicial decisions. The locus classicus states 
that a successful plaintiff is entitled 'to recover the difference between that universitas 
as it was after the act of damage, and as it would have been if the act had not been 
committed'. 306 
302 Zyp Products (1926) 232, relying on Leather Cloth (1865) 137. 
303 Volkskas (1952) 349; Rusmarc (1975) 631; Tu/Jen (1976) 221; Scott and Leisure Research 
(1985) 220-221; Cambridge Plan (1987) 842. 
304 Visser (1993) 55 footnote 103. 
305 LAWSA Damages (1995) 18-19. 
306 Union Government ( 1911) 665. 
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6.4.2.1 Form in which damages must be awarded 
The 'once and for all' rule applies and has the effect that a plaintiff may institute only 
one claim for all damage arising from a single cause of action.307 Both existing 
patrimonial loss and future loss must therefore be included in a single action. 
6.4.2.2 Date for assessment of damages 
It is frequently stated that the date for determining damage is the date of the 
commission of the delict.308 However, the date for determining the damages which have 
resulted from the delict, should be the latest stage in the litigation when evidence may 
be presented to the court - immediately before judgment.309 It appears that, while the 
market value of property is used to assess damages,310 the market value is determined 
at the date of commission of the delict.311 As far as judgments sounding in foreign 
currency are concerned, there is debate about the time when currency conversions 
must be made.312 
6.4.2.3 Taxation 
While there is debate about the effect of income tax on awards for damages in the 
general delictual sphere, 313 and the English Gourley doctrine had been applied on 
307 LAWSA Damages (1995) 23. On the application of this rule in South Africa generally, see Van 
der Walt (1977) 425-485. 
308 LAWSA Damages (1995) 20; Visser (1993) 76. 
309 Visser (1993) 76. Boberg (1989) 487 discusses these times for assessment from a different 
perspective and vievvs events after the elate of commission of the delict as relevant supervening 
events. 
310 Visser (1993) 329. 
311 Idem at 332. 
312 Idem at 151; see also discussion at footnote 44. 
313 Boberg (1989) 543-545. 
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occasion by provincial divisions,314 the Appellate Division refused to deduct tax from an 
award of damages which it ordered in respect of registered design infringement. It held 
that the damages awarded would probably still be income and therefore taxable. 315 
While criticism has been levelled at this decision for 'once again avoiding the issue',316 
it can be assumed that any attempt to reduce an intellectual property damages award 
by arguing that it is not subject to taxation, will be futile unless proof can be furnished 
to the court that it is actually not taxable. 
6.5 QUANTIFICATION OF DAMAGES IN INFRINGEMENT AND PASSING OFF 
ACTIONS 
It is accepted in South African law that there is no significant difference in the principles 
governing damages for trade mark infringement and for passing off.317 However, this 
does not make a consideration of the principles used to determine quantum in these 
matters any easier, since there is no reported decision on damages for infringement of 
a registered trade mark,318 and very few decisions on damages for unlawful competition, 
including passing off. Despite this paucity of authority, our courts echo the English view 
that damages in these matters are extemely difficult to determine.319 It is accepted as 
general principle that a plaintiff who has produced the best available evidence in court 
should not be non-suited merely because his loss is difficult to quantify: the court must 
do the best it can with the materials to hand.320 As regards unlawful competition, it has 
been said that too much emphasis should not be placed on mathematically precise 
proof of loss; instead, the court should, on the probabilities revealed by the evidence, 
314 Pitt (1957) 287; Oberho/zer(1970) 342. 
315 Omega (1978) 476. 
316 See generally Boberg (1989) 545. 
317 Webster & Page (1986) 327. 
318 Dean (1986) 117; Job (1995) 27. 
319 See, for example, Kenitex (1967) 308; Tu/Jen (1976) 220; Cambridge Plan (1987) 847-848. 
320 Boberg (1989) 477-478. 
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make an assessment of the loss and estimate an amount of damages.321 
6.5.1 Heads of damages · 
Although the matter has never been considered pertinently in the context of a claim for 
damages, it appears that the two accepted heads of damages in trade mark 
infringement and passing off matters are diversion of custom from the business of the 
aggrieved party, and injury to his business reputation.322 The possibility of mitigation 
damages is mentioned in the standard South African text on trade marks,323 and is 
recognised as available when appropriate.324 
6.5.2 Calculation of damages 
As stated above, there are very few reported decisions on damages in this or related 
areas. It is therefore somewhat futile to attempt to extrapolate any general principles 
on the calculation of damages. It must also be remembered that our courts and 
textbooks tend to refer to English authority when discussing actions for damages in this 
field. This is despite the fact that in respect of both statutory trade mark infringement 
and passing off the measure of damages is delictual and must therefore be determined 
in accordance with the general principles of Aquilian liability.325 
Prior to the 1993 Trade Marks Act, the lost profits basis was viewed as the only method 
of calculating damages in instances of trade mark infringement and passing off. 
However, the 1993 Act introduced the possibility of a claim for a reasonable royalty in 
321 Visser (1993) 346; see also lntemational Tobacco (1955) 17. 
322 Lorimar(1981) 1138. 
323 Webster & Page (1986) 464. 
324 Visser (1993) 233. 
325 Omega (1978) 471. 
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lieu of damages,326 so that both methods of calculation must be considered. In respect 
of both methods of calculation, the Act also provides that damages can be recovered 
for infringements which took place after acceptance but before registration.327 
6.5.2.1 Lost profits basis 
The measure of damages is the same for trade mark infringement and passing off. It 
can be assumed that if both are found, a court will not distinguish between them. 
Various methods of calculation have been attempted to determine loss of sales or 
profits. In one decision where damages were claimed for unlawful competition, the 
plaintiff hedged his bets and claimed damages on three alternative bases. The first was 
the difference between expected profits and actual sales. In casu, this basis was 
rejected, because the calculations were unreliable.328 (But in an earlier decision the 
plaintiffs calculations had been accepted as correct. 329) The second proposed basis 
was by reference to the defendant's sales. This was rejected in casu330 and in an earlier 
decision,331 as it could not be assumed that all sales made by the defendant would have 
been made by the plaintiff. It has been held that, for this basis of calculation to be 
accepted, a plaintiff must prove on a balance of probabilities, the extent of the 
infringement, the proportion the plaintiff would have sold but for the infringement, and 
the profit that would have been made on such sales.332 The third, and ultimately 
successful, basis of calculation was to take proven unlawful sales as basis and 
326 Section 34(3)(d) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
327 Section 34(3)(c) and (d). 
328 Atlas Organic (1981) 205. 
329 International Tobacco (1955) 21-22. 
330 Atlas Organic (1981) 205. 
331 Omega (1978) 471. 
332 At472. 
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calculate the profit the plaintiff would have made on these sales. 333 This last method 
does not accord with previous dicta to the effect that the plaintiff will not merely recover 
damages for proven infringements, but was apparently justified in the circumstances. 
It is accepted that a court must make an assessment that will not necessarily be 
completely accurate: in this regard it has been held that the benefit of the doubt must 
be given to the plaintiff and that 'this does not mean that there is a bias against the 
wrongdoer but only that he cannot be heard to complain if in the circumstances created 
by himself damages may have been over-estimated against him'.334 
A court will award damages for future loss of sales if there is some probability, not a 
mere possibility, of such damages. These damages need not be proved with any 
accuracy; the court will then attempt a 'fair estimate' of probable loss.335 
When claiming damages for lost profits or sales, the burden of proof is always on the 
plaintiff to establish these damages.336 The Appellate Division has held, in a defamation 
action by a trading corporation, that where the defendant has raised the possibility that 
a general recession would have resulted in a lower turnover than projected, the burden 
remains on the plaintiff to prove that it would not have been affected by the recession. 337 
However, an earlier decision on a similar cause of action confirmed that in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, it may be assumed that market conditions remained 
unchanged during the relevant times. It would consequently appear that the defendant 
must furnish some evidence of changed market conditions before a plaintiff is expected 
to shoulder a burden of rebuttal.338 
333 Atlas Organic (1981) 205. 
334 lntemational Tobacco (1955) 17. 
335 At 25-26. 
336 Omega (1978) 471. 
337 Caxton (1990) 573. 
338 lntemational Tobacco (1955) 19. 
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When damages are claimed for injury to goodwill as well as for lost profits, it has been 
held that there is a measure of overlap, as injury to reputation is usually reflected in 
lower profits, and that this is a factor to be taken into account when computing 
damages. 339 
6.5.2.2 Royalty basis 
The possibility that damages may be calculated on the basis of a reasonable royalty 
has recently been introduced in all intellectual property legislation.340 
Prior to statutory provision for this formulation of damages claims, no attempt had ever 
been made to claim damages for trade mark infringement or passing off on a royalty 
basis. Similarly, no attempt has been made to formulate a damages claim on this basis 
in a patent action. 341 In a claim for damages based on infringement of a registered 
design, it was attempted to claim damages based on reasonable royalties for all the 
infringing products. The attempt was later abandoned. In this instance, the Appellate 
Division held that, although this type of claim is recognised in England, in the present 
case it was not necessary to decide whether it was available in South Africa.342 
Damages have also been awarded on what has been termed a royalty basis in a few 
instances of copyright infringement. However, a study of these decisions reveals that 
in all recent instances, action was instituted by a society which was authorised to 
licence performance of copyright material. What was awarded was in fact actual 
339 Caxton (1990) 574-575. 
340 Section 65(6) of the Patents Act of 1978; Section 24(1)A of the Copyright Act of 1978 (SA); 
section 34(3)(d) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA); section 53(3) of the Designs Act of 1993. 
341 Burrell (1986) 384; LAWSA Patents (1984) 64. 
342 Omega (1978) 476. 
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damages in the form of lost licence fees, not some form of notional royalty. 343 
The above decisions show that the notion of a royalty basis for damages claims was 
unknown in South African intellectual property law before 1988. When assessing the 
effect of its introduction, three issues must be considered. First, is it a new substantive 
remedy in the field of intellectual property law? Second, why was this innovation 
introduced? And finally, how should it be calculated? 
6.5.2.2.1 The legal basis of a claim for royalties 
To determine the legal basis of a claim for reasonable royalties, it is necessary to study 
the wording of the various statutes. The concept was first introduced in the Patents Act 
by the 1988 amendment. This provided that 'damages ... may be calculated on the 
basis of the amount of a reasonable royalty' .344 Next was the Copyright Act. The draft 
Bill of 1991 did away with all references to an account and provided that a copyright 
owner was entitled to 'damages or ... in lieu of damages, relief by way of notional 
royalties'. It also provided that, as against an innocent infringer, a plaintiff 'shall not be 
entitled under this section to any damages or notional royalties'. 345 The Bill was not 
passed in this form. In the amending Act, references to an account of profits were 
deleted and the following relief was introduced: 'damages ... may, at the option of the 
plaintiff, be calculated on the basis of the amount of a reasonable royalty'. 346 The Act 
343 Performing Right (1966) 356; Performing Right (1973) 565; SA Music Rights (1978) 1056. The 
Seare/le (1893) 172 decision cannot be viewed as an award on a royalty basis; the court merely 
ordered a percentage of the gross proceeds of the infringing performance to be retained by the 
deputy sheriff pending an action for damages. 
344 Section 65(6) of the Patents Act of 1978 as inserted by section 3(c) of the Patents Amendment 
Act of 1988. 
345 Copyright Bill of 1991. 
346 Section 24(1 )(A) of the Copyright Act of 1978 (SA) as inserted by section 21 (b) of the Copyright 
Amendment Act of 1992. Section 24(1)(B) provided that, when calculating the amount of 
damages in terms of section 24(1)(A), the court had to take the nature and extent of the 
infringement into account and the amount which could be payable to the copyright owner in 
respect of the exercise of copyright by some other persons. This has not been retained in the 
1977 amending Bill. 
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also ·provided that a plaintiff was not entitled to damages against an innocent 
infringer.347 No mention was made in this section of whether a plaintiff was entitled to 
a royalty against an innocent infringer, presumably because a reasonable royalty was 
viewed as a method of calculating damages. The Trade Marks Act of 1993 followed, 
with a provision that 'in lieu of damages, a reasonable royalty which would have been 
payable by a licensee for the use of the trade mark concerned ... '. 348 The Designs Act 
of 1993 contained a provision similar to that of the Trade Marks Act. 349 While the first 
two Acts clearly refer to a method of calculating damages, the latter Acts can be 
interpreted as creating a new substantive remedy. This was also clearly the intention 
of the 1991 copyright Bill. 
The draft Bill on amendments to intellectual property will alter all the above provisions. 
The amendments to the patent, copyright, and design legislation will provide that in lieu 
of damages, a plaintiff may be awarded 'an amount calculated on the basis of a 
reasonable royalty'. 350 But the Trade Marks Act of 1993 provides that a plaintiff may 
recover 'in lieu of damages ... a reasonable royalty'. 351 One assumes that Parliament 
does not intend to create two different versions of the same relief and that the differing 
wording of the Trade Marks Act is an oversight, or is not viewed as of any relevance.352 
Whether 'an amount calculated on the basis of a reasonable royalty' in lieu of damages 
is a substantive remedy, is uncertain in the absence of any judicial authority. It is 
possible to interpret these proposed amendments as creating a substantive remedy, 
347 Section 24(2) of the Copyright Act of 1978 (SA). 
348 Section 34(3)(d) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
349 Section 35(3) of the Designs Act of 1993. 
350 Clauses 46, 54, and 76 of the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill of 1997. 
351 Clause 63. 
352 This assumption is supported by the stated intention in the preamble to the Bill, as regards the 
Copyright Act, to 'amend the provisions relating to damages and other compensation for the 
infringement of copyright in order that it corresponds with [sic] the Trade Marks Act, 1993 and 
the Designs Act, 1993'. 
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when the proposed changes to the wording of the Patents and Copyright Acts are 
considered. However, support for the opposite point of view can also be found in the 
fact that section 34(5) of the Trade Marks Act has not been altered by the 1997 Bill: it 
still provides that a registered user can recover damages, without mention of a 
reasonable royalty. One can argue that this omission indicates that a reasonable 
royalty is viewed as falling within the concept 'damages'. 
The issue is relevant because the creation of a new statutory form of pecuniary relief 
can be interpreted as doing away with the delictual requirements which traditionally 
must be met before pecuniary relief is granted. In particular, it can than be argued that 
fault is not a requirement before an award of a reasonable royalty can be made. It can 
also be argued that the object of relief is no longer merely compensation for patrimonial 
loss. 
In particular, when considering whether fault is a requirement before 'an amount 
calculated on the basis of a reasonable royalty' can be awarded to a plaintiff, the 
changes to copyright legislation clearly indicate that the issue was not considered. 
Where the original Bill excluded the liability of an innocent infringer for both damages 
and notional royalties, the amendments exclude only liability for damages. This 
omission can support either point of view: the first argument is that, to replace an 
account of profits which in English law does not require fraud, a new substantive 
remedy has been introduced which does not require fault in the Aquilian sense. The 
opposite, equally valid argument, is that a reasonable royalty is not viewed as a 
substantive remedy but as a method of calculating damages, which is why it was 
unnecessary to exclude it when amending section 24(2) of the Copyright Act. 
I believe that neither the amending Bill nor previous legislation can be scrutinized for 
guidance, as the various discrepancies between them can support either point of view. 
To determine whether a new remedy has been created, guidance must be sought from 
the attitude of our courts to other forms of pecuniary relief unknown to Roman-Dutch 
law. In the first half of this century, the courts frequently granted relief which was of 
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English, rather than Roman-Dutch, origin. However, the resurgence of Roman-Dutch 
law and the emphasis on Aquilian principles, which was particularly evident in the field 
of delictual damages,353 has resulted in the courts no longer granting relief which does 
not accord with delictual principles. Neither nominal nor exemplary damages are 
currently recognised in South African law. 354 When considering additional damages in 
terms of the Copyright Act, our courts have held that it was not the intention of 
Parliament 'to empower the court to award any form of damages unrecognised by 
South African common law'.355 An account of profits, available in terms of copyright 
legislation until 1992, was given equally short shrift: a court held that, to determine 
what was meant by an account, 'one must look to the ordinary remedies available in 
our law for the infringement of proprietary rights generally'. 356 In the light of the attitude 
of the courts to the introduction of foreign concepts and remedies, and their refusal to 
interpret statutory relief other than in accordance with Roman-Dutch principles, it is 
unlikely that any submission that a 'reasonable royalty' is a substantive remedy which 
does not require compliance with Aquilian principles will be viewed favourably. 
6.5.2.2.2 Possible reasons for the introduction of a reasonable royalty 
No reports by the committees which drafted the above legislation exist to explain the 
reasons for this innovation. The first suggestion that the introduction of reasonable 
royalties would be appropriate came from Burrell in 1986, when he suggested the 
amendment of the Patents Act to authorise an award of damages on a royalties basis.357 
Its introduction in the Copyright Act was viewed with approval by Dean in 1992.358 No 
353 Erasmus (1975) 365. 
354 LAWSA Damages (1995) 16-17. 
355 Priority Records (1988) 293. 
356 Video Parl<town (1986) 640. In this decision, the judge also stated that 'it irks me to discover in 
South African legislation doctrines and concepts which are foreign to us, imported holus bolus 
into the body of our law'. 
357 Burrell (1986) 384. 
358 Dean (1992) 757. 
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other calls for its general introduction have been made, and no reasons given for why 
it is necessary. It can only be assumed that the oft-cited difficulties in proving damages 
in intellectual property proceedings encouraged Parliament to attempt to formulate an 
easier method for determining damages. The royalty basis has now been available, in 
instances of patent infringement, for nearly ten years. No reported decision exists in 
which it has been used as a method of calculating damages, and one can only query 
whether the problems concerning the recovery of damages have actually been 
alleviated by its introduction. 
6.5.2.2.3 The calculation of a reasonable royalty 
The method of calculating a reasonable royalty has not been considered by the South 
African courts in any area of intellectual property. It is thus necessary to look elsewhere 
for guidance on the basis for such a calculation. While it is futile to undertake a full 
survey of all permutations of such calculations, as they are more generally appropriate 
in other areas of intellectual property, now that the remedy has been given statutory 
recognition in respect of trade mark infringement in South Africa, some general 
guidelines which could be applied here will be attempted. 
The English position as regards patents and copyright will be taken as starting point, 
and compared with the position in America, where royalties form a more common basis 
for calculating damages. However, it must be remembered that in both jurisdictions, 
other pecuniary relief, not based on the plaintiff's loss, is also available. In England, a 
plaintiff can elect an account of profits, rather than damages;359 the Copyright Act 1988 
also provides for additional damages in instances of flagrant infringement.360 In 
America, both the Lanham Act and the Copyright Act allow a plaintiff to recover both 
damages and profits,361 while the Patents Act allows a plaintiff to receive damages 
359 Section 96(2) of the Copyright Act 1988 (UK); section 61(1)(d) read with section 61(2) of the 
Patents Act 1977 (UK). 
360 Section 97(2) of the Copyright Act 1988 (UK). 
361 Title 15 USC § 1117; Title 17 USC § 504. 
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'adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable 
royalty for the use of the invention'.~ Therefore, while in both jurisdictions the purpose 
of a damages award, whether based on lost profits or a reasonable royalty, is viewed 
as compensatory, other pecuniary relief which can serve a different function also exists. 
By contrast, in South Africa, with the exception of the Copyright Act which still provides 
for additional damages in instances of flagrant infringement,363 compensatory damages 
are the only form of pecuniary relief available. 
In both England and America, damages are calculated on an existing licence or royalty 
basis and, where this does not apply, on a notional royalty basis. I believe that the 
concept 'reasonable royalty' can include both notional and actual royalties: where an 
actual licence which was presumably viewed as reasonable by the parties does not 
exist, a notional royalty basis can be used as long as the plaintiff can demonstrate that 
it is reasonable. 
6.5.2.2.3.1 The actual licence basis 
6.5.2.2.3. 1. 1 England 
In England, the actual licence basis is commonly used to calculate damages in 
instances of patent infringement. It is viewed as a method of determining actual lost 
profits, in other words, as purely compensatory. Writers on the issue state that this 
basis is available only where a plaintiff actually licenses his invention. The royalty basis 
then determines the amount that a plaintiff has lost by not licensing the invention.364 
This basis applies where the parties are in a competitive situation and the plaintiff 
grants licences.365 The measure of damages is then what he would have charged for 
362 Title 35 USC § 284. 
363 Section 24(3) of the Copyright Act of 1978 (SA). 
364 McGregor (1988) 1081. 
365 Comish (1996) 61. 
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a licence. However, in a competitive situation where the plaintiff does not normally 
grant licences, the usual lost profits basis, not a notional royalty basis, will be used.366 
This approach is supported by the House of Lords who viewed the actual rates at 
which use had been licensed, as a correct basis for assessing damages and refused 
to allow a higher rate of a notional royalty which the infringer 'ought fairly to have paid' 
for use of the invention.367 The court reaffirmed the proposition that 'the measure of 
damages is the loss suffered by the plaintiff' and held that a higher rate 'reflected an 
inclination towards punitive damages'.368 
6.5.2.2.3.1.2 America 
The English view is criticised in America369 and not followed by the courts there in 
instances of patent infringement. The courts argue that to limit damages to an actual 
royalty does not dissuade infringement, as all that the infringer runs the risk of paying 
is what he would in any event have been liable to pay. While some courts have dealt 
with the problem by working on the basis of a reasonable royalty 'for an infringer' which 
is much higher than the usual negotiated royalty basis, other courts have merely 
increased what they consider a reasonable royalty. 370 This approach clearly does not 
accord with stated compensatory principles. 371 
A stricter approach is followed by courts in instances of trade mark infringement. In 
Boston Hockey, the defendant had offered the plaintiff a sum for an exclusive licence 
366 Idem at 62. 
367 General Tire (1975) 832-833. 
368 Ibid. 
369 Skenyon (1988) 767. 
370 Panduit Corp ( 1978) 1158-1159; see also Skenyon ( 1988) 768. 
371 See in this regard Title 35 USC § 284 (patents) - 'damages adequate to compensate'; Title 15 
USC§ 1117 (trade marks) - 'such sum ... shall constitute compensation and not a penalty'; Title 
17 USC§ 504 (copyright) - 'to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of 
the infringement'. 
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and a lower sum for a non-exclusive licence. Both were refused and the defendant 
proceeded to infringe the mark. The district court based damages on the amount 
offered for an exclusive licence. However, the Court of Appeal held that the existence 
of a prior licensee meant that the plaintiff could not have granted an exclusive licence 
and reduced the award of damages to the lower amount tendered for a non-exclusive 
licence.372 A subsequent court stated that this decision 'stands for the proposition that 
any royalty-based measure of damages must exhibit a strictly rational correlation 
between the rights appropriated and the measure of damages applied' and proceeded 
to hold that '[r]oyalties normally received for the use of a mark may be a proper 
measure, if that measure comports with the equitable limitations of section 1117 and 
bears a rational relationship to the rights appropriated'. 373 
6.5.2.2.3.2 The notional royalty basis 
6.5.2.2.3.2.1 England 
The other possible basis for calculating damages is the notional or reasonable royalty 
rate. In England this basis is found only in instances of copyright infringement. 
Although this method of calculation is sometimes used, it can be seen as a 
contradiction of the actual royalty basis which attempts to determine the plaintiffs real 
loss. No English court or writer has dealt with this discrepancy. English decisions are 
therefore not of much assistance, in particular because a notional royalty basis has 
usually been agreed between the parties before or during litigation.374 However, English 
courts have emphasised the compensatory principle, stating that it is necessary to 
consider, first, whether the infringing material was a material factor in inducing the 
infringing sales, and, second, whether the plaintiff would have made all those sales 
372 Boston Hockey (1979) 76. 
373 Bandag (1984) 920 (emphasis added). 
374 PB Cow (1961) 240; Lewis Trusts (1982) 286. 
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himself.375 This approach regrettably introduces evidentiary problems which the royalty 
basis was intended to overcome. 
6.5.2.2.3.2.2 America 
The notional royalty basis is also used in America, where there is uncertainty about the 
extent of its application, as it remains linked to the concept of compensatory damages. 
It has seldom been used in the trade mark field. It occasionally finds application in an 
existing franchise relationship where, although termed a reasonable royalty, it bears 
closer resemblance to an actual royalty basis. 376 However, in one instance of 
infringement where the defendant created the false impression that he was a 
franchisee, the court refused to use the royalty rate payable by franchisees as basis; 
it held that the defendant did not use everything for which a franchisee pays. 377 In the 
only other application of a royalty basis for trade mark infringement, the court also used 
an existing fee previously offered by the defendant, to determine the royalty basis.378 
Clearly, although termed a reasonable royalty, the American courts have never used 
a purely notional royalty as basis in instances of trade mark infringement. Some 
authors view it as helpful, and suggest basing the calculation of a notional royalty on 
the prevailing rates for analogous rights, on the differences in price between branded 
and unbranded consumer goods, or on the plaintiffs advertising/sales rati0. 379 However, 
McCarthy criticises the royalty basis. He states that it in effect compels the plaintiff to 
license the defendant at a rate that the defendant proposed and the plaintiff originally 
375 PB Cow (1961) 239-240. The suggestion in Watson Laidlaw (1914) 120 by the House of Lords -
that a plaintiff was entitled to not only his actual damages but, on the principle of 'price or hire', 
also to royalties for sales he would not have made himself - has not been followed. See 
McGregor (1988) 1085 for criticism of this earlier approach. 
376 McCarthy (1996) 30.127. 
377 Bandag (1984) 920. 
378 Boston Hockey (1979) 71. 
379 Koelemay (1982) 543-545. 
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refused.380 The courts have also described a royalty basis as 'little more than nominal 
damages' in a trade mark counterfeiting matter. 381 
The notional royalty basis finds greater application in instances of damages for patent 
infringement, as the Act provides that damages may not be less than a reasonable 
royalty.382 Two bases are usually used here: either the '25 per cent rule' or the 'willing 
buyer/willing seller' rule. The first accepts that 25 per cent of the profits earned by the 
licensee is a reasonable royalty for the licensor.383 This method of calculation has been 
criticised as, at best, crude, and ignoring aspects such as investment risk and return. 384 
The second method of calculation is the 'amount which a prudent licensee ... would 
have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and 
which would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee'.385 It has been argued that 
the words 'reasonable' and 'prudent' in this citation indicate a more objective test for 
the determination of a royalty.386 But this approach is also open to criticism as it 
indicates to an infringer that he will not be liable to pay more than he would have 
negotiated in any event. 387 Various other, more sophisticated (and complicated), 
methods of calculation have been proposed or used on occasion.388 
380 McCarthy (1996) 30-128. This objection is based on the facts of Boston Hockey (1979), where 
the court awarded, as damages, an amount previously tendered by the defendant as royalty. 
381 Playboy Enterprises (1982) 1272; see also the discussion by McCarthy (1996) 30.128. 
382 Title 35 USC § 284. 
383 Lee (1992) 126 discusses this rule in detail. 
384 Parr (1993) 171. 
385 Georgia-Pacific (1970) 1120 approved by the Court of Appeal in Georgia-Pacific (1971) 297. The 
decision of the district court sets out fifteen criteria which are relevant when determining the 
willing buyer licence amount; the quotation is the last of these criteria. An analysis of all the 
criteria can be found in Culbertson (1988) 756-757. 
386 Baker ( 1987) 128. 
387 Parr(1993) 119. 
388 A discussion of these methods falls outside the ambit of this thesis, but can be found in Parr 
(1993) 123-200. 
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However, whatever the method of calculation used, the essential problem when looking 
to American law for assistance is that the Federal Circuit has required that reasonable 
royalties have to be calculated by in-depth analysis. It requires a trial court to articulate 
fully the reasons for determining a certain royalty rate; 389 if the assessment is not 
supported by specific findings, the Federal Circuit remands appeals for explanation.390 
6.5.2.2.3.3 South African application 
It has been suggested that the intention of the South African legislature when 
introducing the 'reasonable royalty' was to make it easier to obtain damages for 
intellectual property infringements.391 From the above it is clear that reference to other 
jurisdictions will not be of much assistance. The actual royalty rate, if one exists, is 
merely a method of calculating actual damages. As such, legislative provision need not 
have been introduced to use this method of calculation. The notional royalty rate has 
been used very seldom in trade mark infringement and passing off proceedings, and 
is generally viewed as inappropriate. When used or referred to, it is clear that it is 
based on general compensatory principles392 and that questions of proof are every bit 
as complicated as proof of actual damages. I believe that, in the light of these 
problems, it is unlikely that a reasonable royalty will be of any assistance to a plaintiff 
in trade mark infringement or passing off proceedings, and that this innovation does not 
address the problem traditionally experienced in obtaining pecuniary relief in South 
Africa. 
389 Baker (1987) 128. 
390 Ropski (1990) 189. 
391 Dean (1992) 756; Rutherford (1995) 7. 
392 H011Vever, Parr ( 1993) 120 argues that in America the current trend is towards a higher rate than 
would have been negotiated. 
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6.5.3 Mitigation of damage 
A plaintiff is not expected to mitigate damages by changing a mark or ceasing 
manufacture of the product concerned, and our courts have rejected any assessment 
of damages which would in effect require such mitigation.393 
Mitigation damages have never been considered in a trade mark context. However, in 
a copyright decision, the court was prepared to award as damages the expenses 
incurred in establishing infringement.394 As damages in all areas of intellectual property 
law are considered to have the same delictual basis, mitigation damages will 
presumably be available if the issue ever arises in respect of trade mark infringement 
or passing off. 
7 CONCLUSION 
7 .1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the substantive law which governs awards of compensatory damages 
has been set out. Some differences between the remedy in English jurisdictions and 
in South Africa have been highlighted, and problems arising from these differences 
identified. These problems will be briefly considered and an attempt made to determine 
whether solutions exist. Then the value of compensatory damages will be considered 
and alternatives suggested. 
393 International Tobacco (1955) 21. 
394 SA Music Rights (1978) 1057. The court distinguished between investigations which were 
incurred after infringement, to prove the infringement in court, and investigations to establish 
whether infringement was taking place. The former would be recoverable, if at all, as part of the 
costs of action; the latter were damages flowing from the defendant's unlawful conduct. 
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7.2 PROBLEMS ARISING DUE TO THE DIFFERENT LEGAL SYSTEMS 
A strong English influence pervades South African intellectual property. Where South 
African authority is lacking, there has been a tendency to cite English authority, without 
due consideration of whether the basic principles of the two legal systems correspond. 
Three issues where differences between the legal systems have resulted in problems 
in the South African law of compensatory damages as it applies to instances of trade 
mark infringement and passing off require consideration. These issues are: whether 
fault remains a requirement for the award of damages; whether proof of actual loss is 
necessary before an award of compensatory damages will be made; and whether the 
introduction of a royalty basis for the calculation of damages is appropriate. 
7.2.1 Fault as requirement for damages 
No claim for damages has ever been instituted in South Africa against an innocent 
trade mark infringer. I believe that, in the light of general delictual principles, any such 
claim would be unsuccessful and the English Edenwest decision would not be followed 
by our courts. 
However, it is likely that most English decisions prior to Edenwest which are cited as 
authority for awards of damages against innocent infringers, would have been decided 
in similar fashion in South Africa: our legal system considers negligence as sufficient 
to meet the requirement of fault. In the majority of English decisions, the courts 
criticised the defendant's behaviour. In South Africa such behaviour would be viewed 
as negligent and therefore sufficiently blameworthy to justify an award of damages. The 
South African position is thus that a completely innocent defendant will not be liable for 
damages. However, a defendant cannot escape an award of damages by alleging that 
his behaviour was not fraudulent or intentional if it is viewed as negligent in the specific 
circumstances. 
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7 .2.2 The necessity of proving actual damages 
In all jurisdictions, proof of actual damage is not required for the grant of injunctive 
relief. However, in addition, actual damages need not be proved before an award of 
nominal damages will be made in England. These two facts have resulted in the 
suggestion that actual loss need not be proved in South Africa before an award of 
compensatory damages will be made. 
I believe that this is not a correct reflection of the South African position. Damage is an 
essential element of any delictual claim, whether the relief sought is an interdict or 
damages. It is trite that actual damage can be difficult to prove in instances of trade 
mark infringement and passing off. This is especially so when an interdict is sought to 
prevent further infringement or passing off: very often the acts complained of are 
threatened or have only just commenced but will clearly cause substantial loss if 
allowed to occur or continue. It is for this reason that both the South African and the 
English courts have assisted plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief by holding that proof of 
confusion will suffice to meet the requirement that damage must have occurred or be 
imminent. However, the purpose of the interdict remedy must not be forgotten: an 
interdict is granted to prevent damage, not as compensation for damage which has 
already occurred. 
In England, the extension to claims for damages of this concession as to the form of 
proof required took place for historical reasons. Plaintiffs frequently had to establish 
their legal right at common law before they could obtain an injunction in equity. To 
assist them, the common-law courts would grant nominal damages without requiring 
proof of actual damage, as this was not a requirement for equitable relief. 
This historical distinction does not exist in South Africa. The passages cited above, 395 
which imply that actual damage need not be proved for an award of damages, all rely 
395 See 6.2.4 of this chapter. 
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on decisions in which the court had been asked to grant an interdict, not damages.396 
These decisions rely to some extent on English authority for holding that proof of actual 
damage is not essential before damage will be assumed and an interdict granted.397 
While these principles can be accepted for injunctive relief, they cannot be accepted 
unquestioned for Aquilian relief, where the object of relief is compensation for 
patrimonial loss. 
In the field of Aquilian liability, the basic principle is that 'there should have been actual 
damnum in the sense of loss to the property of the injured person by the act 
complained of.398 The Appellate Division has held that 
'under the lex Aquilia there is only an action for damnum injuria datum - for 
pecuniary loss inflicted through a legal injury, and the defendant is not called 
upon to answer the plaintiff's case before the plaintiff has proved both the 
pecuniary loss and that it directly results from what is, in the eye of the law, an 
injuria' .399 
From these excerpts, it is clear that for the existence of Aquilian liability, proof of 
pecuniary loss has always been viewed as essential. It has been shown that the 
assumption that English law allowed a claim for substantial damages without proof of 
396 Volkskas (1952) 347 (see also 351); Old Apostolic Church (1975) 689; Capital Estate (1977) 932. 
397 One example is the reliance in Old Apostolic Church (1975) 689 on Kerly (1972) 364; the 
identical quotation will be found in Kerly (1986) at 346. However, this quotation was taken from 
a discussion of the foundation and nature of the action for passing off, not from that section 
where damages are discussed. When discussing damages for trade mark infringement, Kerly 
(1986) states at 326 that, at common law, mere proof of infringement entitles a plaintiff to 
nominal damages; but if the plaintiff claims substantial damages, the onus of showing what loss 
he has actually sustained lies upon him. At 430, dealing with damages for passing off, it is stated 
that a court may award more than nominal damages without proof of special damage, relying 
on Draper (1939). However, it must be remembered that this decision was an appeal from an 
inquiry as to damages; the plaintiffs had shown substantial losses but had not proved that these 
losses were necessarily due to the defendant's passing off - see Draper.1 (1939) 239. 
398 Union Government (1911) 665. 
399 Matthews (1922) 507. 
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any actual loss is incorrect: all that was usually awarded was nominal damages. Thus, 
even if English rules for the assessment of damage are accepted in the absence of 
South African authority, it cannot be stated that an Aquilian action for damages will be 
successful without proof of actual loss. To hold otherwise could lead to the clearly 
impossible situation that a plaintiff who had obtained an interdict preventing 
infringement or passing off, would be entitled, on the same evidence, to demand 
compensatory damages provided that he could show fault. This is the logical 
conclusion if the proposition is accepted that, by proving confusion, a plaintiff has 
proved damage, and is therefore entitled to some damages. 
7 .2.3 The royalty basis of quantification 
The award of damages on the basis of a reasonable royalty was introduced to assist 
a plaintiff in proving intellectual property damages.400 In South Africa, the only 
foundation for Aquilian damages is compensatory, and an award on a royalty basis will 
therefore also be determined on compensatory principles. The concept 'reasonable 
royalty' can include both an actual royalty basis and a notional royalty. If an actual 
licence agreement exists, it is clearly appropriate to use it to assess damages, so that 
the introduction of a royalty basis by the legislature was unnecessary. However, 
calculation on a notional royalty basis is problematic. In England and America this 
basis is viewed as unsuitable for trade mark infringement and passing off matters. Also, 
when the notional basis has been applied in England and America in respect of other 
forms of intellectual property, the courts have imposed strict evidentiary requirements. 
These requirements are as onerous as those to prove actual damages. It must also be 
remembered that in England and America a plaintiff has other pecuniary relief available 
which is not based on compensatory principles. In England, a plaintiff can recover the 
defendant's profits, rather than his losses, while in America he can recover both his 
losses and the defendant's gains, and have a possible claim for increased damages.401 
400 Dean (1992) 757; Rutherford (1995) 7. 
401 See Title 15 USC§ 1117(b). 
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For this reason, a plaintiffs need for assistance in proving damages is not as pressing 
in these jurisdictions. 
In South Africa, it is fairly certain that a court will view the royalty basis of quantification 
as having its basis in Aquilian compensatory principles. It is therefore unlikely that the 
courts will accept a purely speculative notional royalty suggested by a plaintiff, as a 
suitable basis for the calculation of damages. If the courts then import similar 
evidentiary requirements to those in other jurisdictions to determine a reasonable 
royalty, a plaintiff will find this basis even more problematic than the lost profits basis. 
I believe that, if Parliament wishes to assist plaintiffs in obtaining damages for 
intellectual property infringements, it is necessary to create another form of damages 
by statute and to state pertinently that it is not based on compensatory principles. 
7 .3 ALTERNATIVES TO COMPENSATORY DAMAGES 
A possible alternative to compensatory damages is the introduction of the concept 
'statutory damages', available in America for copyright infringement and now introduced 
in the new Canadian Copyright Act 1997. Statutory damages are described as a 
monetary remedy elected by the plaintiff in place of proving actual damages and 
awarded at the discretion of the court within a specified monetary range. 402 
While this is a uniquely American remedy, there is nothing new to it. Its legislative 
history can be traced back to the Statute of Anne, the first English copyright legislation, 
which provided for damages of one penny per infringing sheet.403 According to 
decisions under that statute, this remedy was introduced because the common-law 
remedy of damages was inadequate and proof difficult.404 The first American federal 
402 Hay (1985) 241. 
403 Section 1 of the Statute of Anne 1709. 
404 Mi//ar(1769) 2350. 
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copyright statute also contained a fixed damages rate for unpublished works.405 The 
1909 Copyright Act introduced statutory damages into federal legislation, by providing 
that a court could award statutory damages in lieu of actual damages and profits, in an 
amount which appeared to the court to be just, but within certain limits.406 The 1976 
Copyright Act improved on these provisions to address problems encountered by the 
courts in the interpretation of the previous statute, and the current American 
provisions401 have been adopted verbatim in the Canadian Copyright Act 1997.408 
Statutory damages were introduced in America specifically because proof of damages 
was viewed as difficult in instances of copyright infringement.409 While various problems 
were experienced with interpretation of the 1909 provisions, it is stated that the majority 
of these have been clarified by the 1976 Act. 410 
The purpose of such damages is described as both to compensate the injured copyright 
owner and to deter ;the copyright infringer.411 However, the deterrent function is 
emphasised, and while the 1909 Act pertinently stated that these damages were not 
to be awarded as penalty, 412 the current Act acknowledges this deterrent function. 413 
Various problems have been experienced by the American courts when considering 
405 Section 2 of Act of 31 May 1790. 
406 Title 17 USC§ 101(b) (1976) (repealed 1978). 
407 Title 17 USC§ 504(c). 
408 Section 38. 1. 
409 Ferch (1984) 491-492. 
41 O Not all these problems are relevant in the South African context: a full discussion can be found 
in Ferch (1984) and Hay (1985). 
411 Hay(1985)250. 
412 Title 17 USC§ 101(b) (1976) (repealed 1978). 
413 Title 17 USC§ 504(c). See also Simensky (1987) 28. 
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awards of statutory damages.414 The first relevant problem pertains to proof of damage. 
Under the 1909 Act, some courts argued that the purpose of such damages was to 
compensate a plaintiff who could establish the fact of injury but not the amount of 
damages. Other courts held that an award of the minimum amount was mandatory, 
even though the existence of actual damages had not been proved.415 The second, and 
related, problem was whether a plaintiff could elect statutory damages when actual 
profits or damage were ascertainable.416 The 1976 Act dealt with both these problems 
by giving the plaintiff an absolute right to elect statutory damages and making the 
minimum award compulsory.417 The minimum award was also problematic as it was 
uncertain whether it was to be made against an innocent infringer.418 This was dealt 
with in the current Act by setting a lower minimum award for innocent infringers.419 This 
is viewed as striking a reasonable balance between the parties' respective rights while 
remaining consistent with the deterrent function of the provisions. 420 
It is stated that the factors which a court considers when determining the amount of an 
award satisfy both the compensatory and the deterrent aims of these provisions.421 
Factors mentioned by the courts include the extent of infringement, volume of infringing 
business, revenue lost by plaintiff, culpability of the infringer, and the need to deter 
other infringers.422 
414 Only those problems which might be relevant in South Africa will be mentioned here: a full 
discussion can be found in Ferch (1984) 485 and Hay (1985) 241. 
415 Ferch (1984) 491-492. 
416 Idem at 492. 
417 Title 17 USC§ 504(c)(1) - 'in a sum of not less than $250'. 
418 Ferch (1984) 497. 
419 Title 17 USC§ 504(c)(2). 
420 Ferch (1984) 506. 
421 Hay (1985) 251. 
422 Idem at 252. See also Keenan (1986) at 827. 
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When a minimum amount is awarded, an award of statutory damages clearly shows 
traces of the English concept of nominal damages. It can also be viewed as having a 
punitive effect, as it is linked to blameworthiness on the defendant's part.423 Neither of 
these concepts is unknown to South African law, although they have been rejected 
here as being of English origin. The two primary functions of statutory damages, 
compensation and deterrence, are both acknowledged in South African law, although 
only the compensatory function is relevant for delictual damages. The adoption of 
statutory damages by the new Canadian Act, which states that '[b]ecause the extent 
of infringement is particularly difficult to prove ... [this remedy] ... would effectively 
guarantee a minimum award once infringement is proven and would serve to deter 
future infringements'424 shows that the remedy is not unacceptable in jurisdictions which 
have an English background. The fact that this remedy exists for copyright infringement 
only is by historical accident, as the history of the remedy shows. I believe that it is 
equally appropriate in trade mark proceedings and will serve the deterrent function 
required by TRIPS.425 
I believe that the introduction of such a remedy would help to alleviate the problems 
experienced by South African plaintiffs. 
However, it is apparent that for this or any other remedy which purports to assist 
plaintiffs in obtaining pecuniary recompense to be successful, Parliament will have to 
state clearly that the remedy is not based on Aquilian principles and must not be 
assessed on a compensatory basis. Parliament will also have to deal with the amount 
of evidence required before such a remedy is granted, as otherwise evidentiary 
requirements will make any innovation less accessible to litigants. 
423 This is acknowledged in the wilfulness provisions of Title 17 USC§ 504(c)(2); see also Hay 
(1985) 256-257. 
424 News Release Canadian copyright legislation (1996). 
425 See chapter 8 at 3.1.2 below. 
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CHAPTER& 
INQUIRY1 AS TO DAMAGES 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Awards of damages for trade mark infringement or passing off are not uncommon in 
England. By contrast, no South African court has ever made such an award for trade 
mark infringement, and damages for passing off have been awarded in one or two 
decisions only. 
In this chapter, the procedure which must be followed when damages are sought is 
investigated to determine whether this affects the incidence of damages awards. 
Damages for trade mark infringement or passing off are always viewed as unliquidated, 
and so only the procedure to obtain unliquidated damages is considered. 
This chapter starts with a study of the English procedure. The historical reasons for the 
separation of merits and quantum are briefly sketched, and an attempt is made to 
distinguish between a separation of issues and an inquiry as to damages. 
An inquiry is the usual order given when damages are sought in intellectual property 
proceedings. The current procedure before and on inquiry is detailed. The status of a 
judgment after an inquiry and matters incidental to such a judgment are set out. Finally, 
problems encountered in England with the implemenatation of inquiry procedure are 
considered. 
The differences between English inquiries and their Australian and Canadian 
equivalents are then determined. 
In South Africa unliquidated damages are usually obtained by way of action procedure. 
This procedure is dealt with in general terms, after which orders for a separation of 
1 English legislation and decisions use the spelling 'inquiry' while South African legislation refers 
to an 'enquiry'. The English form is used except in quotations. 
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issues are considered. 
The 1993 Trade Marks Act makes statutory provision for inquiries as to damages.2 
Before this legislation, some attempts were made to introduce inquiries into South 
African practice. They are briefly described. The distinction between inquiries and a 
separation of issues in South Africa is considered. Finally, the advantages of the 
inquiry procedure and legislative changes required to ensure its local acceptance are 
discussed. 
2 ENGLAND 
2.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
2.1.1 Common Law 
Before the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, an award of damages could be made 
only by a common-law court. These courts consisted of a judge and jury. The judge 
decided issues of law, the jury issues of fact. The amount of damages to be awarded 
to a successful plaintiff, as distinct from issues of liability for damages, was viewed as 
an issue of fact and so was determined by a jury, not by the judge deciding the legal 
issues. When issues of fact were tried by a jury, the jury would simultaneously also 
assess damages.3 However, when a judge merely made a finding on an issue of law, 
and held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages without specifying an amount, the 
judgment was viewed as interlocutory and a writ of inquiry was issued to the sheriff, 
directing him to have the question of damages tried by a jury.4 The sheriff then 
furnished a return to the court stating the amount of damages found due, and the court 
2 Section 34(4) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
3 Stephen (1860) 98. 
4 Millar (1952) 368-369; Stephen (1860) 98. 
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entered final judgment in this amount.5 
The first move away from the assessment of damages by a jury is found in the Common 
Law Procedure Act 1852, which provided that when it appeared to the court that the 
amount of damages sought by a plaintiff was 'substantially a matter of calculation', 6 the 
court could direct that the amount be ascertained by a master of the court. This was 
viewed as the equivalent of 'the finding of a jury upon a writ of inquiry'.7 
The Common Law Procedure Act 1854 permitted these courts to grant injunctions,8 
previously the prerogative of chancery courts. It also set in motion the decline of jury 
trials, by providing that the parties could agree in writing to leave 'the decision of any 
issue of fact'9 to the court, and that damages could be assessed 'where necessary, in 
open court, ... by any judge who might otherwise have presided at the trial thereof by 
jury'_ 10 
So the position at common law from 1854 was that when damages were awarded, they 
could, depending on the circumstances, be assessed by a judge, a jury, or a master. 
2.1.2 Equity 
Chancery courts traditionally granted injunctive relief, together with an account of 
profits when appropriate. Lord Cairns' Act 1858 granted these courts the power to 
5 Ibid. 
6 Section 94 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1852. 
7 Ibid; see also Stephen (1860) 98 footnote (I). 
8 Section 82 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854. 
9 Section 1. 
10 Ibid. 
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award damages. 11 Damages could be assessed either by the chancery court itself12 or 
by a jury constituted on the same basis as a jury at common law.13 The assessment of 
damages could also be referred to a common-law court for assessment by a jury. 14 
The position in equity from 1858 was therefore that a chancery court could order an 
injunction and account of profits, which was assessed by a master, 15 or an injunction 
together with damages, which were assessed either by the court itself, by a common-
law jury, or by a jury constituted in chancery. 16 
2.1.3 Development after fusion of the courts 
The Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 did not simplify matters. The 1873 Act created 
the office of official referee, 17 and gave this official the power to conduct investigations 
and examinations, and conduct trials on issues of fact or questions of account. 18 It is 
clear from decided cases of the time, that official referees were entrusted with both 
inquiries as to damages and the determination of accounts of profits. 19 
11 Section 2 of Lord Cairns' Act 1858. 
12 Section 5. 
13 Section 3. 
14 Section 6. 
15 Eichengrun (1985) 467; Stoljar (1964) 220; see also Crosley (1838) 428 for the problems of 
taking an account before a master. The office of master in chancery was abolished in 1852. 
These officials were subsequently knolNn as chief clerks until 1897, when the title of master was 
reintroduced: see Halsbury Courts (1975) 449 footnote 1 and Kerly (1890) 283. This was merely 
a change in name and did not affect the allocation of work to such officials. 
16 In Penn (1867) 85, the chancery court, when itself determining damages on an existing royalty 
basis, stated that if the plaintiff had not granted licences, the question of damages would have 
been one of great difficulty. The judge added: 'I do not hesitate to say I should not have 
attempted to grapple with it, but I should have sent it to a jury to settle the amount of damages' 
(at 85). 
17 Section 83 of the Judicature Act 1873. 
18 Section 57. 
19 Siddell (1892) 163 - accounts; Alexander (1895) 362 - inquiry; Ashover Fluor (1911) 356 -
inquiry. 
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Neither Act, however, affected the availability of trials by jury20 or methods of procedure 
in force at common law or in equity before their enactment.21 Although the Rules of 
Court promulgated together with the 1875 Judicature Act contain references to 
inquiries, these were to inquiries in the context of default judgments. The rules provided 
that interlocutory judgment could be entered and a writ issued to assess damages, but 
also that the court could, instead of a writ of inquiry, order that damages 'shall be 
ascertained in any way in which any question arising in an action may be tried'. 22 While 
no pertinent provision was made for inquiries after trial,23 it can be assumed that similar 
procedures applied in respect of such inquiries. It consequently appears that after 
fusion of the two court systems, damages could be assessed by either a court official, 
the court itself, or a jury. An inquiry could be ordered by any of the newly created 
divisions of the High Court.24 
Unlike subsequent legislation,25 the Judicature Acts did not grant the chancery division 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear intellectual property matters. However, such matters were 
traditionally brought in this division, where jury trials were a rarity, and where the court 
was accustomed to referring accounts and inquiries to court officials. Assessment of 
damages by the court itself, or by a jury, became increasingly less common, and the 
current situation is that assessment of damages by a court is the exception, rather than 
20 Section 72 of the Judicature Act 1873; sections 20 and 22 of the Judicature Act 1875. 
21 Section 73 of the Judicature Act 1873; section 21 of the Judicature Act 1875. 
22 Orders 13(6) and 24(4) of the Rules of Court 1875. 
23 Order 33 of the Rules of Court 1875, titled 'Inquiries and Accounts', dealt with interim 
proceedings, not inquiries after a judgment. 
24 Sections 16 and 24(3) of the Judicature Act 1873. 
25 Currently section 61(1), read with schedule 1 paragraph 1(i) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 
(UK), assigns all causes and matters relating to patents, trade marks, registered designs, 
copyright, or design rights to the chancery division. The Court of Appeal held in McCain 
lntematiOnal (1981) 82 that passing off matters should be brought in the chancery division; see 
also Kerly (1986) 431. 
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the rule. 26 
2.2 THE ORDER OF AN INQUIRY AFTER JUDGMENT 
There is a greater acceptance of the separate determination of liability and quantum 
in English law than in South African law. This may be ascribed to both common-law 
and chancery practice. The traditional approach at common law, whereby a judge 
determined liability and then referred assessment of damages to a jury, has resulted 
in the view that damages are not determined at a trial on the merits, but at a later stage. 
In chancery proceedings, the calculation of damages is frequently complicated.27 These 
courts have also assumed that the calculation of damages will be postponed for later 
determination. 28 
2.2.1 Distinction between a split trial and an inquiry 
The separation of issues, for separate trials on the issues of liability and damages, is 
usually determined before trial by order of court29 or in terms of a summons for 
directions.30 It is usually granted only if there is a clear indication that the issues of 
liability and damages are sufficiently distinct. 31 
26 Both Kerly (1986) 327 and Wadlow (1995) 580 assume that if anything other than nominal 
damages are awarded, the order will be for an inquiry, and the court will not itself assess 
damages. See also Smith Kline.1 (1989) 403, where the defendant's request for the court to 
order payment of a sum rather than an inquiry was described as 'somewhat unusual'. 
27 Odgers (1991) 374. 
28 In the British Thomson-Houston (1925) patent decision, the court, after postponing judgment to 
canvass the issue with other judges, held as follows: 'The proper form of order in these cases, 
as in all other motions for judgment in the Chancery Division, where damages are given, will be:-
Direct an inquiry as to damages' (at 306). See atso Blanco White (1974) 427 footnote 62: 'It is, 
of course, normal Chancery procedure, that the court does not assess damages at the trial but 
orders an inquiry.' 
29 RSC Order 33,r.3. 
30 RSC Order 25,r.1 read together with RSC Order 33,r.4(2). 
31 Supreme Court Practice (1995) 593; Halsbury Practice and Procedure (1982) 369. 
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An inquiry as to damages also presupposes that merits and quantum are not 
considered together. However, this is not viewed as a splitting of trials, and it is not 
necessary to obtain leave to have damages determined at an inquiry once the merits 
have been decided. The reason for this is not clear, but is probably linked to the 
historical development of the inquiry procedure at common law and in equity.32 
This is not the only distinction between a separation of issues and an inquiry. While a 
split trial presupposes two distinct trial actions, an inquiry may follow after a motion or 
summons for summary judgment.33 Also, trial procedure is not necessarily followed at 
an inquiry, as the evidence is frequently presented on affidavit. Finally, the request for 
an inquiry, rather than damages, in the document commencing proceedings, has the 
effect that no pre-trial disclosure of information relating to damages need be made 
during preparations for a trial or other hearing on the merits. 
2.2.2 Discretion of the trial court to order an inquiry 
When an injunction is granted in trade mark infringement and passing off proceedings 
the plaintiff is usually also granted an inquiry as to damages. However, this is not a 
fixed rule and the court may refuse an inquiry if satisfied that it would be fruitless. In an 
early instance of infringement, the court refused an inquiry on the basis that there was 
insufficient evidence of sales to justify such an order. 34 In Spalding, the court held that 
the minimal evidence of actual damage was not sufficient reason to deprive the 
plaintiffs of an inquiry, as '[t]he improbability of their proving much is not the same thing 
as the legal certainty that they can prove nothing'.35 In both these decisions, the 
evidence on damage presented to support actions for an injunction appeared 
32 In the early Wallis (1889) 356 decision, the court objected to the 'splitting up of the trial into two 
inquiries - first as to the right; and secondly, as to the amount of damages'. 
33 Sony (1982) 202-203; Edenwest (1994) 280. 
34 Sanitas (1887) 533. 
35 Spalding (1915) 289. 
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sufficiently slight to justify the court's finding. 
However, this must not be interpreted as confusing proof of damage with proof of the 
quantum of damages. This is illustrated by the McDonald's decision, where the court 
pertinently considered its discretion to order an inquiry. The court held that if a plaintiff 
has an arguable case for claiming damages, the court will as a matter of ordinary 
justice, make an order for an inquiry.36 It distinguished between issues relating to proof 
of damage and proof of quantum as follows: 
'There is no need to prove damage at the trial; the statement of claim made it 
quite clear that what was being asked for was an enquiry; the risk of damage 
justified the grant of an injunction, and it was not necessary, according to normal 
practice, to establish the precise damage relied upon at the trial. '37 
The court has also on occasion granted a small sum as damages rather than an inquiry 
when it felt that an inquiry would be futile.38 It therefore appears that, although the court 
has a discretion as to whether to order an inquiry, this will be exercised against the 
plaintiff only in the most extreme instances. 
2.3 PRE-INQUIRY PROCEDURE 
The Supreme Court Rules which govern inquiries are not limited to inquiries as to 
damages after trial but deal with all forms of inquiries. Inquiries can relate to purely 
formal matters, or can be indistinguishable from a full trial with witnesses.39 It is for this 
reason that no standard procedure is imposed by the rules, which allows the procedure 
36 McDonald's (1987) 118. 
37 At 120. Wadlow (1995) 580-581 confirms this view: 'discovery in the action does not cover 
quantum of damage, and the plaintiff does not come to court prepared to prove how much 
damage he may have suffered'. 
38 Samuelson (1931) 590. 
39 Supreme Court Practice (1995) 725. 
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to be adapted to suit the subject-matter of the specific inquiry. 
2.3.1 Pleadings and procedure before the inquiry order 
In England, although a plaintiff must specifically state the relief or remedy he claims in 
his statement of claim,40 he is not required to specify or quantify general damages in 
his pleadings.41 Most damages in trade mark infringement and passing off proceedings, 
including loss of profits,42 are classified as general damages (damages which are a 
result of damage which is the 'necessary and immediate consequence of the wrongful 
act'). 43 This has the effect that the plaintiff need not canvass damages in his writ or 
statement of claim, or furnish further particulars as to the damages he claims. The 
plaintiff merely includes a prayer for an inquiry as to damages in his writ, and the issue 
of damages is then not considered further until a finding on the merits has been made. 
There is statutory provision that discovery need not be made regarding certain issues 
where other issues or questions are to be determined first.44 The practical effect of an 
inquiry or a postponement of a consideration of quantum is, therefore, also that, before 
the hearing on the merits, there is no need for discovery or other pre-trial procedures 
relating to the assessment of damages.45 The court, when ordering an inquiry, may give 
directions for compliance with these procedures; if it does not, a summons for 
directions must be taken out. 
40 RSC Order 18,r.15(1). 
41 Halsbury Damages ( 1975) 483; McGregor ( 1988) 1119-1120; Supreme Court Practice ( 1995) 
309. 
42 McGregor (1988) 1121; Wadlow (1995) 582. 
43 Perestrello (1969) 485. 
44 RSC Order 24,r.2(5)(b); RSC Order 24,r.4. 
45 Fellner (1991) 1; Halsbury Practice and Procedure (1982) 367; Supreme Court Practice (1995) 
438. 
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2.3.2 Summons for directions 
The first step after a trial or other hearing at which the court has ordered an inquiry as 
to damages,46 is to obtain directions on how the inquiry must be carried out, to regulate 
matters such as discovery, evidence, and the presentation of particulars of special 
damages.47 If the court does not itself give directions when ordering the inquiry,48 a 
summons for directions must be taken out. The summons for directions procedure was 
first introduced in 1954 to shorten trials and cut costs by ensuring a thorough stock-
taking of the issues in an action and the manner in which evidence should be 
presented at trial.49 This procedure is very useful as the specific issues of fact and law 
arising in a particular instance are considered, and the prescribed procedure can be 
adapted to suit the specific circumstances. The order provides that such directions 
may be given as 'appear best adapted to secure the just, expeditious and economical'50 
disposal of the action. In trial actions a summons must be taken out after close of 
pleadings;51 where an inquiry has been ordered, summons may be taken out whenever 
the plaintiff wishes to proceed.52 A variety of considerations which could shorten 
proceedings may be dealt with in a summons for directions, while in directions on 
inquiries, matters such as discovery, the question of whether evidence will be 
presented orally or on affidavit, and the filing of documentary proof are addressed.53 
46 The procedure created by RSC Order 43,r.3 is not relevant, as the inquiry has been ordered 
after, not during, trial. 
47 Halsbury Practice and Procedure (1982) 370. 
48 RSC Order 44,r.3(1)(a). 
49 Supreme Court Practice (1995) 471. 
50 RSCOrder25,r.1(1)(b). 
51 RSC Order 25,r.1. 
52 Nicols (1985) 447; Wadlow (1995) 564. See also RSC Order 37,r.4(3). 
53 Nicols (1985) 447. 
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2.3.3 Discovery and documentary proof 
As the summons for directions allows a wide latitude in the directions which may be 
given, the court or master giving directions may order discovery of anything which 
assists proof of quantum. The same principles prevail as apply to discovery in respect 
of any other issue.54 The defendant may even be ordered to make discovery and lodge 
evidence on affidavit before the plaintiff is required to serve his evidence in support of 
his claim.ss This is of great value to a plaintiff, who frequently requires information 
which is specifically within the defendant's knowledge to formulate his claim for 
damages. The courts do attempt to protect the defendant to some extent. In one 
instance the court stated obiter that, had the defendant not admitted supplying 
infringing goods, it would not have granted discovery to the extent requested by the 
plaintiff until he had formulated the particulars of infringement he was intending to rely 
on at the inquiry.ss 
The defendant will usually be ordered to make full discovery of documents showing 
infringing production and sales, and can be ordered to set out names and addresses 
of purchasers of infringing goods.s7 If the plaintiff alleges loss of profits, he may be 
ordered to make discovery of documents showing his business records.sa In all 
instances the test is whether discovery is relevant to the issue at hand - the 
determination of damages. Discovery will not be ordered against either party if the 
relevance of the documents cannot be shown.s9 The court may also impose safeguards 
54 British United Shoe (1929) 317. The general principles governing discovery fall outside the ambit 
of this work. A useful summary of them is contained in O'Hare (1993) 403-439. 
55 This was done in Nicols (1985) 447. In Aktiebolaget Manus (1949) 288, the court stated that, in 
general, discovery by the defendant before the plaintiff had given particulars of the infringement 
which were to be relied on at the inquiry, would be discouraged, as it amounted to a fishing 
expedition, although in the particular circumstances the court was prepared to order discovery. 
56 Aktiebo/aget Manus (1949) 288. 
57 Blanco White (1974) 434; Terrell (1994) 458. 
58 Ibid. 
59 British United Shoe (1929) 320; Aktiebolaget Manus (1949) 290. 
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on the inspection of documents to ensure that the documents are viewed only by 
persons who need the information they contain for the stated purpose.60 
The defendant cannot avoid the obligation to discover by alleging that information is 
unavailable or has been destroyed. In General Tire, the Court of Appeal held that 
'deliberate destruction of records or, in particular circumstances, a failure to keep 
records may give rise to unfavourable inferences' .61 In a subsequent decision, the court 
held that as a consequence of the defendants having lost or destroyed relevant 
documents after the action commenced, the court would not give them the benefit of 
any doubt about the extent of sales; it would, in the absence of any contrary 
documentation, presume that sales were made after the date from which knowledge 
was assumed. This was so despite the fact that the burden of proving loss rested on 
the plaintiffs.62 The unfavourable inferences which will be drawn from a defendant's 
failure to make full disclosure or discovery ensure that a defendant does not attempt 
to evade liability by refusing to disclose information which could assist the plaintiff in 
quantifying his claim. 
2.3.4 Notice to parties and witnesses 
The party entitled to an inquiry must give notice of the date of hearing to the party 
against whom judgment was given.63 This notice is compulsory, whether or not the 
defendant appeared in the action, and the master has no power to dispense with its 
service.64 
60 Aktiebolaget Manus (1949) 290; Kerly (1986) 338. 
61 General Tire.1 (1975) 267. 
62 lnfabrics (1985) 81. 
63 RSC Order 37,r.1. 
64 Supreme Court Practice (1995) 635. 
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Witnesses may be subpoenaed to attend the proceedings.65 
2.4 PROCEDURE ON INQUIRY 
An inquiry normally takes place in chambers, rather than in open court, unless a judge 
is hearing it in the form of an action where oral evidence is led.66 
2.4.1 Pleadings and evidence 
Evidence may be placed before the master either on affidavit, or, if disputes of fact or 
law arise, by oral evidence.67 The decision on the form in which evidence will be 
presented is usually made during the summons for directions. 
If the evidence is to be presented on affidavit, the plaintiff files an affidavit in support 
of his claim, followed by the defendant's evidence in reply.68 The matter is then argued 
before the master by the parties' legal representatives. 69 
When evidence is presented orally, the procedure is very similar to that of a civil trial. 
The plaintiff's legal representative opens the proceedings and then calls the plaintiff 
and any witnesses. This is followed by the defendant's evidence. In Draper, the court 
stated that when inquiries involve the consideration of a number of questions of mixed 
fact and law, it would be of assistance to the court if the issues were defined with 
precision by points of claim and defence.70 This procedure has now been adopted. If 
oral evidence is to be led, the master directs the service of points of claim and points 
65 RSC Order 37,r.1 (3). 
66 Cleveland Graphite (1951) 182. See also RSC Order 37,r.4(1). 
67 Odgers (1993) 376. 
68 See Nicols (1985) 447-448. 
69 Odgers (1993) 376. 
70 Draper.1(1939)231. 
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of defence, which have the same function as pleadings in an action. 71 
A combination of the two procedures can also be used with evidence on affidavit 
supplemented by cross-examination where necessary.72 
It is clear that the procedure can be adapted to suit the complexity of the matter; simple 
inquiries being conducted by the less expensive motion procedure and more complex 
inquiries by trial procedure. 
2.4.2 Proof of damages 
The plaintiff has to prove both the fact and the amount of damage before he can obtain 
substantial damages.73 A failure to prove either the fact of damage or its extent will 
result in an award of nominal damages where a right has been infringed.74 Trade mark 
infringement and passing off proceedings are 'one of the class of cases in which the 
law presumes that the plaintiff has suffered damage',75 as a right has been infringed. 
This quotation is sometimes relied on to allege that more than nominal damages can 
be obtained without proof of actual loss. The contrary argument was made above76 -
this quotation cannot be read as implying that substantial damages will be awarded 
because of this presumption. McGregor cautions that it is unwise of a plaintiff to rely 
on such presumptions, as a failure to produce evidence of damages may result in an 
award of small or nominal damages. 77 McGregor's view is supported in the paragraph 
following the Draper quotation above: 
71 Odgers (1993) 376. An example of these points appears in Lewis Trusts (1982) 283-285. 
72 Draper.1 (1939) 231; Cleveland Graphite (1951) 182; General Tire.1 (1975) 207. 
73 McGregor (1988) 1134. 
7 4 Idem at 1134 footnote 1. 
75 Oraper(1939) 442. 
76 Chapter 5 at 3.5.2.1. 
77 McGregor (1988) 1137. 
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'That does not mean that the plaintiff cannot give evidence showing that he has 
suffered damage in fact. The more he can show that he has suffered damage 
in fact, the larger the damages he can recover. The more the defendant can 
show that he has suffered no damage in fact, the less he will recover.'78 
Decided cases also confirm McGregor's view: in an early inquiry the court held that 'it 
lies on the Plaintiffs to prove some distinct damage from the use of their trade-mark by 
shewing loss of custom or something of that kind',79 and refused to grant any damages. 
In a more recent decision, where the facts showed that the plaintiffs would be unlikely 
to produce evidence of actual lost sales, the court, although granting an inquiry, 
referred to it as a 'weak' case. It was not, however, prepared to deprive the plaintiffs 
of 'the opportunity - which may turn out to be wholly unsuccessful, but that is a matter 
for them - of seeking to establish that the exposure of this advertisement caused them 
some assessable damage'.80 This does not imply that a plaintiff must always submit 
evidence from purchasers who were actually deceived;81 merely that some evidence 
of quantifiable damages is required. Finally, the House of Lords has held, on appeal 
from an inquiry as to damages, that there are two essential principles when assessing 
a claim for damages: 
'first, that the plaintiffs have the burden of proving their loss: second, that the 
defendants being wrongdoers, damages should be liberally assessed but that 
the object is to compensate the plaintiffs and not punish the defendants'. 82 
In some inquiries, detailed calculations based on the parties' evidence and on 
78 Draper(1939) 442. 
79 Leather Cloth (1865) 302. 
80 McDonald's (1987) 122. 
81 Plomien (1943) 215-216. 
82 General Tire (1975) 824. 
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discovery, are presented to the master or court,83 who then decides which heads of 
damage may be allowed. In other instances, agreed calculations by accountants, based 
on information obtained on discovery and from evidence, form the basis for 
assessment.84 The court once again decides which damages will be allowed, but 
awards these damages on the basis of figures previously agreed upon by the parties. 
But in all instances the minimum information which must be presented includes the 
turnover of both parties and the number of infringing items manufactured or sold by the 
defendant.85 It is only after adequate information has been submitted that the courts 
sometimes state that a robust approach must be taken and that precise or exact 
calculations cannot be made. 86 Such statements are not made where only minimal 
information has been tendered. 
If the trade mark infringement or passing off has not ceased before the inquiry, it may 
be viewed as a continuing cause of action. Damages may then be assessed to the date 
of the inquiry finding. 87 
2.5 JUDGMENT 
2.5.1 Order of the master or court 
An order as to quantum of damages is viewed as replacing a jury finding on damages. 
References to the manner in which a jury would assess damages are frequently 
encountered. 88 It is accepted that it is impossible to assess damages with mathematical 
83 See Spalding (1918) 106 where particulars of various heads of damage are detailed; also United 
Horse Shoe (1888) 262; PB Cow(1961) 239. 
84 Plomien (1943) 210; Gerber Garment (1995) 392. 
85 PB Cow (1961) 239; Lewis Trusts (1982) 284-286; Unik (1983) 124; Gerber Garment (1995) 
392. 
86 PB Cow(1961) 239; Unik(1983) 123. 
87 RSC Order 37,r.6. 
88 Watson Laidlaw (1914) 113; Juggi La/-Kamlapat (1928) 79; PB Cow (1961) 239. 
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accuracy in any inquiry. The calculation of damages is described as a rough, or a 
reasonably accurate estimate made on the evidence before the master or court.89 
However, because the court is assessing a question of fact, it has also been held that 
before making a finding on damages the master or judge should 'express in detail the 
manner of his approach to his estimation of amount'. 90 The master or judge is therefore 
expected to set out the basis on which he reached his conclusions, and not merely to 
state the amount he has found due. It is clear, however, that he is not expected to be 
satisfied that the amount he awards is mathematically correct but merely that it is, 'in 
all the circumstances of the case, of the right order of magnitude'. 91 If the inquiry has 
been conducted before a master, he then certifies the amount of damages he has found 
due and files this certificate in the chancery division office.92 The decision of a judge 
is delivered in the normal fashion. 
2.5.2 Costs and payment into court 
If there were no sanction against a plaintiff, an inquiry would often be requested 
despite the unlikelihood of any substantial award, or inflated claims would be made. It 
is for this reason that costs of an inquiry are always reserved. This means that these 
costs will not be allowed on taxation; each party must pay its own costs unless the 
court makes a specific order dealing with them.93 The plaintiff who proceeds with an 
inquiry is, therefore, at risk of being liable for at least his own costs. Inquiries can often 
be as or more expensive than the preceding trial,94 and even if a plaintiff obtains some 
damages, the court's refusal to make a costs order, or the grant of a costs order 
89 United Horse Shoe (1888) 267; Aktiebolaget Manus (1949) 250; Gerber Garment (1995) 396. 
90 PB Cow (1961) 239; see also A/exander(1895) 368. 
91 Unik (1983) 123. 
92 RSC Order 37,r.2. 
93 Halsbury Practice and Procedure (1982) 547. 
94 See, for example, Aktiebolaget Manus ( 1949) 291, where counsel for the defendant informed 
the court that the costs of appeal against a discovery order preceding an inquiry would be less 
than the expense of making discovery of more than 200 000 documents. 
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against him, may result in expenses in excess of any damages he has recovered. 95 
The costs of all proceedings in the High Court and the Court of Appeal are in the 
discretion of the court, which has the full power to determine by whom and to what 
extent the costs are to be paid.96 Although a party has no right to a costs order and the 
discretion of the court is described as unfettered and absolute, this discretion must be 
exercised judicially in accordance with reason and justice. 97 
When applied to the costs of an inquiry, the court's discretion has on occasion resulted 
in conflicting costs awards. Although an award of costs has sometimes been made in 
favour of a plaintiff who has been granted a fraction of his original claim for damages, 
on the basis that he has had substantial success in the inquiry,98 in other similar 
instances the court has either made only a partial costs order in the plaintiffs favour, 99 
or has ordered the plaintiff to pay the inquiry costs. 100 But, a defendant cannot be 
certain that he will escape a costs order against him, even if he feels that the claim is 
grossly exaggerated. 
However, the position changes where a defendant makes a payment into court. The 
rules provide that, when a court exercises its discretion as to costs, it must take 
95 Spalding (1918) is a good example: the inquiry lasted for ten days with more than 50 witnesses 
and two subsequent appeals against the inquiry lasted a further fifteen days, which lead the court 
to remark that '[t]he necessary but most regrettable consequence of such a state of things must 
be that the importance of who shall bear the costs of these proceedings is far greater than the 
importance of who was right or who was wrong in the original matter in dispute between the 
parties' (at 119). 
96 Section 51(1) and (3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK). 
97 Halsbury Practice and Procedure (1982) 549-550. 
98 Plomien (1943) 216 - 7 406 pounds claimed but 750 pounds awarded; Aktiebo/aget Manus 
(1954) 250- more than 67 000 pounds claimed but 10 000 pounds awarded. 
99 Draper (1939) 444 - 48 000 pounds claimed but 2 000 pounds awarded; the plaintiffs were 
granted half their costs. 
100 Spalding (1918) 123 - over 20 000 pounds claimed but 250 pounds awarded. 
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account of any payment into court and the amount of such payment. 101 The general 
practice is that if a plaintiff accepts a payment into court, he is entitled to his costs to 
date. If he refuses the payment and the amount of the judgment is larger than the 
payment, he will usually be entitled to all costs of action. If, however, the court finds the 
defendant liable for an amount less than that paid into court, the plaintiff is entitled to 
costs up to date of payment, but becomes liable for the defendant's costs after that 
date.102 This is also accepted practice when costs of an inquiry are in issue.103 The 
existence of the procedure allowing payments into court protects a defendant against 
a plaintiff who makes inflated or unjustified claims. 
2.5.3 Interest on the award of damages 
2.5.3.1 Statutory provisions 
General provisions for the payment of interest on damages awards were first enacted 
in 1934.104 Such payment is currently regulated by section 35A of the Supreme Court 
Act 1981. This statute gives a court a discretion whether to award interest at all, and, 
if so, at what rate, on what part of the damages, and for what period between the 
accrual of action and the date of judgment. 105 Different provisions apply after judgment, 
when the judgment debt carries interest at a statutorily determined rate from the time 
of entering judgment until the judgment has been satisfied. 106 
The basis for an award of interest is seen as compensatory: the defendant has 
101 RSC Order62,r.9(1)(b). 
102 Odgers (1991) 444-445; O'Hare (1993) 352. 
103 PB Cow (1961) 241. 
104 Section 3(1) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. 
105 McGregor (1988) 370-371. 
106 Section 17 of the Judgments Act 1838. 
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deprived the plaintiff of the use of his money and has been able to use it himself. 107 
A claim for interest must be specifically pleaded, 108 and the statute in terms of which 
interest is claimed must also be mentioned. 109 An order for interest in terms of section 
35A runs until the date of final judgment - the date on which the damages are 
assessed, not the date on which the inquiry was ordered. After that date, interest on 
a judgment debt can be recovered in terms of the Judgments Act 1838.110 Despite the 
existence of legislation from 1934, interest was until relatively recently not usually 
requested on awards of damages in instances of intellectual property infringement. 
2.5.3.2 Period for which interest is granted 
In an instance of patent infringement, the trial court awarded interest for the whole 
period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of judgment, on 
the basis that the plaintiffs had been kept out of some of their money from the onset of 
infringement.111 On appeal, the House of Lords held that in normal commercial practice, 
royalties in respect of use before grant of a patent are not expected to be paid before 
grant. Also, as no evidence of interest being paid for this period had been submitted, 
the Law Lords allowed interest to run only from grant of patent, not from the earlier date 
allowed by the trial court.112 In an instance of copyright infringement, the court granted 
interest from the date on which the defendant was held to have had knowledge of 
107 Halsbury Damages (1975) 490. 
108 RSC Order 18,r.8(4). 
109 Supreme Court Practice ( 1995) 299; see also McDonald's ( 1987) 113, where it is stated that the 
claim need appear only in the prayer, not in the body of the pleading. 
110 Section 17. 
111 General Tire.1 (1975) 233 - the interest awarded by the court a quo from the commencement 
of infringement in 1958 until judgment in 1973 amounted to 459 000 pounds on an award of 
930 000 pounds. 
112 General Tire (1975) 837. 
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infringing behaviour. 113 The normal practice is to award interest on damages awards 
for economic loss from the date on which the loss occurred. 114 However, if the loss 
cannot be quantified until judgment, as when an inquiry is ordered, the court has a 
discretion to award interest from the date upon which the cause of action arose or any 
later date. 115 
2.5.3.3 Rate of interest 
Various rates of interest are used, the most common being the commercial rate, which 
is the rate which the plaintiff would have had to pay to borrow the money, 116 or the 
'ordinary' interest rate, which is the rate of interest available on monies invested in 
court on special account during the relevant period. 117 
2.6 APPEALS FROM AN INQUIRY 
An appeal from the decision of a chancery master on an assessment of damages lies 
directly to the Court of Appeal.118 The appeal is 'by way of rehearing',119 which does not 
mean that the witnesses are heard afresh, but that the court considers all the evidence 
presented in the lower court. 120 The grounds on which a court of appeal will interfere 
with an assessment of damages are 
113 lnfabrics (1985) 86. 
114 Supreme Court Practice (1995) 40. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Gerber Garment (1995) 420. 
117 Supreme Court Practice (1995) 40; see General Tire.1 (1975) 233 for how this is calculated if 
the rate fluctuates. 
118 RSC Order 58,r.2(b). Before 1982 appeals from chancery masters lay to a single judge, not the 
Court of Appeal. 
119 RSC Order 59,r.3(1). 
120 Supreme Court Practice (1995) 962. 
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'that this court should be convinced either that the judge acted upon some wrong 
principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very 
small as to make it, in the judgment of this court, an entirely erroneous estimate 
of the damage to which the plaintiff is entitled' .121 
This general view is reflected by courts hearing appeals against inquiry findings in 
intellectual property matters. A court will not alter the award unless persuaded that the 
master was wrong, and not merely because the court would itself have assessed 
damages at a different figure. 122 
2. 7 PROBLEMS RELATING TO INQUIRIES 
From an early stage, complaints have been voiced about the cost of inquiries. In 1889, 
the Court of Appeal described the practice of referring cases to the official referee for 
the assessment of damages as 'a melancholy spectacle to see a common law cause 
which might have been heard in one day transformed and inflated into a Chancery suit 
which had lasted Heaven knew how long' .123 It proceeded to hold that 
'[i]t must not be taken ... that in every case in the Chancery Division the Court 
ought to direct an inquiry as to damages instead of assessing the damages 
itself. Cases ought only to be referred to other persons to assess the damages 
where the inquiry involved questions of detail which it would be wasting the time 
of the Court to investigate' .124 
In 1918, referring to an inquiry before an official referee, it was remarked that 'as a rule, 
the matters in dispute are contested with the utmost elaboration and at great 
121 Flint (1935) 360. 
122 Unik (1983) 122. 
123 Wallis (1889) 356. 
124 Ibid. 
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consequent expense to the parties' .125 
On occasion, the court has itself been asked to assess damages. The parties bluntly 
stated that 'if one has an inquiry in a case of this kind it is going to involve a great deal 
of time and money' .126 In this instance, the court stated that it would not have been 
prepared to deal with the question of damages on this basis unless the defendants had 
requested it. 127 This was despite the fact that the determination of damages was merely 
a computation based on the prices charged in different countries for sales of an agreed 
amount of infringing goods. 
The complaints about the duration and expense of an inquiry must, however, be seen 
in the context of a normal trial action where damages must be quantified. I think that 
any attempt to quantify unliquidated damages will be time-consuming and expensive, 
and that the inquiry procedure, where proceedings can be tailored to suit the facts of 
the matter, will usually be less expensive than trial proceedings. However, where the 
amount of damages is easy to establish, the procedure exists for the parties to ask the 
trial court to assess damages. This facility should be better utilised. It is, in any event, 
probable that where the extent of damages does not require judicial determination, the 
parties themselves will settle on a figure. There are for this reason very few reported 
cases where the court has been asked to assess damages at the end of a hearing on 
the merits. 
3 AUSTRALIA 
The inquiry procedure is available in Australia 128 and is substantially similar to that in 
125 Spalding(1918) 119. 
126 Smith Kline.1 (1989) 403. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Interestingly, the Designs Report (1995) 271 refers to submissions by the Institute of Patent 
Attorneys of Australia as to the frustration of having to undertake separate proceedings to 
quantify costs after a finding of liability. Other submissions were that this led to a risk of delay 
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England. English decisions form the bulk of the authority referred to by the Australian 
courts. 
However, there are some important points of difference. First, the court may itself give 
special directions as to the inquiry and set out particular circumstances relevant to the 
inquiry. 129 These are included in the order of court and the proceedings must then be 
conducted in accordance with the order. The court order also specifies which matters 
are to be the subject of the inquiry; matters not covered by the order cannot be raised 
at the inquiry.130 The order made in the leading Australian decision on accounts, where 
the same procedure is followed, shows that the order deals with matters more 
commonly included in an English summons for directions. 131 But a summons to 
proceed, the equivalent of the English summons for directions, is also available to the 
parties .132 
A notice of judgment ordering an inquiry need be served only on parties who have an 
interest in the proceedings but were not formally parties to the action. Failure to serve 
the notice on a party will result in his not being bound by the outcome of the inquiry. 133 
An inquiry is usually conducted before a registrar or master. 134 But the court may also 
decide to hear the matter itself. In one instance the judge making the order already had 
knowledge of the case and expressed the hope that by taking the account himself he 
tactics and the danger of a defendant entering liquidation so that the remedy was no longer 
available. 
129 Laws of Australia Civil Procedure (1994) 19. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Co/beam Pa/mer(1968) 48. 
132 Laws of Australia Civil Procedure ( 1994) 21. 
133 Cairns (1992) 573. 
134 Idem at 574. 
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would limit expenses for the parties. 135 
Where a master or registrar has heard the inquiry, the result is communicated to the 
court in a certificate which merely states the result of the inquiry, not the evidence on 
which the result is based. Unlike the position in England, a procedure exists for a party 
against whom the matter has been decided to seek a judge's opinion. 136 The judge may 
give an opinion but will not interfere with the master's decision unless it is clearly 
wrong. 137 Once settled and filed in court, the certificate becomes binding and can then 
be appealed.138 
The most important, and most useful, differences between Australian and English 
procedure are that the judge hearing the case on the merits may give directions on the 
inquiry procedure and may himself conduct the inquiry if he regards this as necessary 
or helpful. 
4 CANADA 
The position is substantially the same as in England. The decided cases referred to by 
Canadian authors are primarily English, and no difference in approach is evident. 139 If 
the damages are more than nominal, the assessment of quantum is almost invariably 
postponed to a post-trial reference. 140 The reference is to a registrar or referee, not a 
master. 141 A Canadian court has approved the assessment of damages for intellectual 
135 Co/beam Pa/mer(1968) 46. 
136 Cairns (1992) 576. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
139 See Cairns (1988) 101-106; Fox (1972) 459-466. 
140 Cairns (1988) 109 footnote 46. 
141 Section 40 of the Exchequer Court Act 1952. 
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property infringement as a continuing cause of action, until the date of inquiry. 142 It has 
also been held that, where a plaintiff has already elected to take an inquiry rather than 
an account of profits, he cannot after trial attempt to change the basis of recovery 
because he is unable to prove damages.143 The decision of a registrar or referee can 
be appealed to the trial division, and from where a further appeal lies to the Court of 
Appeal.144 
5 SOUTH AFRICA 
5.1 GENERAL PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN DAMAGES 
It is generally accepted that a claim for unliquidated damages may be brought only by 
action 145 and that a combined summons must be used. 146 Although the court has on 
occasion held that where the facts are not in dispute there is nothing in law prohibiting 
a creditor from claiming money owing to him by notice of motion, it was pertinently held 
in the same decision that this did not apply to unliquidated claims for damages.147 
It is possible for the merits and quantum to be assessed separately. Uniform Rule 33(4) 
provides that, on application by any party to a pending action, the court may decide a 
question of law or fact separately from any other question. The court may refuse such 
an application only if it appears that the questions cannot conveniently be decided 
separately. The party desiring separation must apply on notice before or during the 
trial. 148 When considering the meaning of the word 'convenient' in the rule, it has been 
142 Dubiner ( 1966) 427. 
143 Cadbury Schweppes (1995) 132. 
144 Section 27(1) of the Federal Court Act 1970; Gastebled (1974) 430. 
145 Visser (1993) 431. 
146 Uniform Rule 17(2)(a). 
147 Regal Trading (1956) 767. 
148 Erasmus (1994) 81-237. 
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held that it is not used in the narrow sense of 'facility or ease or expedience'149 but 
rather as 'fitting, and fair' to the parties concerned. 150 The court must weigh up the 
advantages and disadvantages likely to follow from the grant of this order, and 
although not called upon to give a decision on the merits, must consider the cogency 
of the point because, unless it has substance, a separate hearing will be a waste of 
time and costs. 151 
This procedure is frequently used to obtain separate trials on merits and quantum of 
damages. The court may, when giving judgment on the merits, give directions with 
regard to the hearing on damages. 152 The usual procedure is for the court to make a 
finding on the merits and postpone the other issues sine die. 153 The separation of 
issues is usually requested shortly before or during the trial on the merits, and this 
procedure does not relieve the plaintiff from quantifying damages in his pleadings or 
from making discovery and complying with other pre-trial requirements on the issue of 
quantum, until separation of issues has been ordered. There is no statutory provision 
that excuses the parties from the obligation of complying with pre-trial requirements as 
regards the postponed issue, although compliance with these requirements might be 
difficult to enforce. 
5.2 PLEADINGS 
5.2.1 Statutory provisions 
Uniform Rule 18(10) provides that 'a plaintiff suing for damages shall set them out in 
such a manner as will enable the defendant reasonably to assess the quantum thereof. 
149 Minister of Agriculture (1976) 363. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Malinde (1990) 68. 
152 Uniform Rule 33(5). 
153 Swisstoo/ (1977) 606. 
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The decisions which deal with information required in terms of this rule must be read 
in the light of the abolition of further particulars for purposes of pleading in 1988.154 It 
has been suggested that the effect of the abolition of further particulars is that the 
particularity to which the other party is entitled for the purpose of pleading will now 
have to be included in the initial pleading. 155 Although it was held in a subsequent 
decision that the ultimate test remains whether the pleadings comply with the general 
rule, 156 the court stated that the absence of an opportunity to clarify an ambiguity by 
way of further particulars might encourage greater particularity in the initial pleading. 157 
5.2.2 General and special damages 
A distinction has traditionally been drawn between the particularity required for general 
and special damages. Some decisions have held that a party need not furnish 
particulars of general damages, 158 while a defendant is entitled to be told how special 
damages are computed. 159 The problem with this approach is that the distinction 
between general and special damages is not always clear. 160 In broad terms, it can be 
stated that, in delict, special damages relate to pecuniary loss of which the quantum 
154 Before this amendment to the rules, Uniform Rule 21(1) provided that a party was entitled to 
request such particulars as were strictly necessary to enable him to plead or to tender an amount 
in settlement. 
155 Loots (1988) 152. 
156 Uniform Rule 18(4): 'Every pleading shall contain a clear and concise statement of the material 
facts upon which the pleader relies for his claim, ... with sufficient particularity to enable the 
opposite party to reply thereto'. 
157 Trope (1992) 210. 
158 Israel (1942) 166. 
159 Durban Picture (1976) 337. 
160 Durban Picture (1976) 337: 'the distinction is artificial and of limited assistance'. The use of these 
terms in English tort law is influenced by the fact that damages need not be pleaded and by the 
existence of torts actionable per se; this has resulted in the attribution of different meanings to 
these terms for purposes of pleading and for burden of proof (see McGregor (1988) 14-15). 
South African law does not draw these distinctions but the terminology of English law has been 
used, which has resulted in the confusion as to the meaning of these concepts. 
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can be reasonably assessed, 161 while general damages relate to claims which a party 
cannot substantiate with any accuracy .162 It appears to be accepted that loss of profits 
founds special damages, as it is viewed as an actual loss, 163 while injury to reputation 
gives rise to general damages. 164 
5.2.3 Information required in pleadings 
The general requirement is that damages must be set out in a way which enables the 
defendant reasonably to assess their quantum. 165 
Traditionally, special damages had to be set out in some particularity and an indication 
had to be given of how the various amounts had been calculated.166 It has been held 
that even if a defendant had knowledge of how the various amounts were calculated, 
he was entitled to have these calculations recorded in the plaintiffs pleadings to define 
the issues clearly and bind the plaintiff. 167 In contrast, it was held in a subsequent 
decision that the plaintiff need not provide particulars of general damages, as all the 
defendant requires is the ground on which the claim is based to enable him to establish 
the true nature of the claim against him. 168 The defendant was, however, not entitled 
to an 'advance abridged edition' of the plaintiffs evidence and could also not expect to 
be supplied with all the information he might require to make an adequate tender. 169 
161 Sasol (1992) 472. 
162 Simmonds (1980) 758. 
163 Durban Picture (1976) 337; Caxton (1990) 561. 
164 Caxton (1990) 561. 
165 Uniform Rule 18(10). 
166 Durban Picture (1976) 337. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Simmonds (1980) 758. 
169 At 759. 
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More recent decisions no longer draw a strict distinction between special and general 
damages in delictual actions, but merely hold that a defendant is entitled to be 
furnished with sufficient evidence about the plaintiffs case to enable him reasonably 
to assess the quantum of the damages. 170 
5.2.4 Amendment 
A party may amend a pleading at any stage before judgment. 171 A plaintiff may 
therefore increase a claim for damages after close of pleadings when discovery has 
placed him in a better position to quantify damages, or even during the hearing. In both 
instances the amendment is subject to a costs order. 172 The other party is entitled to 
object to a request for amendment, 173 but the court will usually allow an amendment 
unless the application is mala fide, or the amendment will cause the other party an 
injustice which cannot be compensated for by a costs order. 174 An amendment which 
is merely a fresh quantification of the original claim or the addition of a further item of 
damages, will therefore seldom be refused. 175 Although, if the prescriptive period has 
expired, 176 a plaintiff may not introduce a claim for damages based on a new cause of 
action in an amendment, this will seldom happen in trade mark infringement and 
passing off proceedings where there is usually a single cause of action. Amendment 
is a valuable procedure for a plaintiff who will often discover the extent of infringement 
at a late stage after discovery, or after cross-examination of the defendant, and who 
can at that stage adjust his claim accordingly, either by re-quantifying the original claim 
170 Bell, Van Niekerk (1985) 131; Sasol (1992) 472. 
171 Uniform Rule 28(10). 
172 Uniform Rule 28(9) and (10). 
173 Uniform Rule 28(3). 
174 Corbett (1995) 78; Moo/man (1927) 29. 
175 Evins (1980) 836. 
176 Ibid. 
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or by adding a further item of damages. 177 
5.3 PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE 
After close of pleadings, the parties are entitled to take certain steps to prepare for trial, 
some of which are relevant to assessing a claim for damages. 178 
5.3.1 Further particulars 
A party may request further particulars strictly necessary to enable him to prepare for 
trial. A party who fails to supply these particulars may be compelled to do so, or risk 
having his claim or defence dismissed or struck out. 179 The purpose of permitting further 
particulars is to prevent surprise and to enable a party to prepare his case once he 
knows what his opponent intends proving. 180 However, the purpose is not to obtain 
evidence or information which will be given in cross-examination. 181 Through further 
particulars a party may therefore ascertain the type of information his opponent will 
lead to prove or deny allegations regarding quantum. 182 
5.3.2 Discovery and inspection 
After close of pleadings, 183 parties can request discovery of any document which is or 
177 Custom Credit (1972) 475. 
178 These steps will not be discussed in any detail, as they are relevant to all trial preparation. 
179 Uniform Rule 28(2) and (4). 
180 Schmidt (1990) 402. 
181 Von Gordon (1961) 213. However, in this decision the court seemed to be guided more by a 
reluctance to set a precedent in divorce actions than by the merits of the request. 
182 See Omega (1978) 470. 
183 Uniform Rule 35(1) provides that discovery can be requested before close of pleadings with 
leave of a judge. 
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has been in the other party's possession or control, 184 and can request inspection of 
such document.185 Discovery need be made only of documents which may advance the 
case of the party requesting discovery or damage the case of the party making 
discovery. Documents which merely advance the case of the party making discovery 
but which he does not intend using at trial need not be discovered. 186 The claim or 
defence of a party who fails to give discovery may be dismissed or struck out, 187 and 
further discovery can be requested if it is suspected that other relevant documents have 
not been disclosed. 188 A further sanction for failure to discover is that the party who 
failed to disclose a document may not use the non-discovered document at trial, 
although other parties may do so. 189 
Limited discovery of specified documents is also available before close of pleadings, 
after intention to defend has been filed. 190 The rule provides for production of a clearly 
specified document which is relevant to a reasonably anticipated issue. When 
damages are claimed annual statements showing loss of profits and the like may be 
requested by the defendant. 191 
5.3.3 Other methods of obtaining information before trial 
Courts usually view the discovery procedure as providing a plaintiff in trade mark 
infringement or passing off proceedings with sufficient information to quantify his 
184 Uniform Rule 35(1). 
185 Uniform Rule 35(6). 
186 Erasmus (1994) 81-250. 
187 Uniform Rule 35(7). 
188 Uniform Rule 35(3). 
189 Uniform Rule 35(4). 
190 Uniform Rule 35(14). Uniform Rule 35(12) will seldom be relevant, as it is unlikely that a party 
will refer to a specific document relating to issues of damages in trade mark infringement or 
passing off pleadings. 
191 This procedure is also available to a plaintiff who wishes to file a replication. 
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damages. 192 However, on rare occasions courts have been prepared to give plaintiffs 
in such matters other assistance. In one instance, when refusing an interlocutory 
interdict, the court ordered that, pending the action, the respondent 'keep an account 
of all its sales so as to enable the applicant, if it is so advised, to claim, in addition to 
an absolute interdict, damages'. 193 In certain instances the Anton Piller order for 
preservation of evidence can also be used to obtain advance discovery. 194 
5.4 TRIAL 
5.4.1 Proof of damage 
The plaintiff must prove both the fact of damage, its extent, and the amount of 
compensation to which he is entitled.195 All of these must be proved on a 
preponderance of probabilities. 196 Where the amount of compensation is not capable 
of precise calculation, for example in instances of loss caused by trade mark 
infringement or passing off, 197 the court must estimate the amount of damages as best 
it can on the available evidence. 198 It has been held, in an instance of copyright 
infringement, that once a plaintiff has produced all the evidence he can reasonably be 
expected to produce, a court will, in assessing the damages, do the best it can with the 
material before it.199 So a plaintiff may not be non-suited because damages cannot be 
192 Rectifier(1981) 288; Video Parktown (1986) 642. 
193 Waddington (1968) 48. 
194 See, generally, Prest (1996) 188-189. 
195 LAWSA Damages (1995) 86. See also Swisstool (1977) 608; Omega (1978) 471. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Visser (1993) 438. 
198 Corbett (1995) 76. 
199 CCP Record (1989) 449. This view was also confirmed by the court of the commissioner of 
patents when conducting an inquiry in Reeves (1975) 338. 
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exactly computed, provided that he has produced the best available evidence.200 
When lost profits are claimed, a plaintiff may be expected to furnish evidence of gross 
annuai profit, as well as non-factory expenses including increases in selling charges, 
delivery charges, and advertising charges so that nett profit can be calculated.201 In 
other instances, lost profits have been calculated on the basis of extrapolated sales 
minus actual sales minus cost of lost sales and other expenses.202 From the very few 
decisions dealing with the calculation of lost profits in instances similar to those of trade 
mark infringement or passing off, it is clear that no general guidelines can be given and 
that the required information will vary depending on the circumstances. Damages 
based on loss of reputation of a trading concern are usually roughly estimated taking 
the value of the goodwill as starting point.203 
5.4.2 Evidence 
Generally, evidence must be presented orally and witnesses may be cross-examined. 
Witnesses may be subpoenaed to be present in court.204 Although provision exists for 
evidence to be presented on affidavit, on commission or by interrogatories,205 such 
evidence is usually of a formal nature. 
200 Corbett (1995) 76. In International Tobacco (1955) 22 the court held: 'Since the plaintiff has put 
forward evidence on which damages can be assessed it should not fail in its claim in my view 
because there might have been still more evidence which might or might not have assisted.' This 
appears to be a less onerous requirement than that of 'best evidence'. A substantial amount of 
evidence had, however, been presented to the court. 
201 International Tobacco (1955) 22. 
202 Caxton (1990) 568. 
203 International Tobacco (1955) 20; Caxton (1990) 574. 
204 Uniform Rule 38(1)(a). 
205 Uniform Rule 38(2), (3) and (5). 
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5.5 JUDGMENT 
5.5.1 Order of the court 
The order of the court is that of a judge following on a trial in open court. The court will 
usually give reasons for its decision. 
5.5.2 Costs and offers to settle 
Although the court has a discretion in any award of costs, the general rule is that a 
successful litigant in a claim for damages is entitled to his costs.206 This remains the 
position even if the plaintiff recovers much less than actually claimed, although claims 
for unrealistic amounts have been penalised by a refusal of costs or a costs order on 
magistrates' courts scale. 207 
However, in one instance of copyright infringement, the court awarded costs on 
Supreme Court scale despite the fact that the plaintiff recovered an amount of R1 ,50 
only, because of the complexity of the issues involved, particularly those relating to the 
question of damages.208 
The danger of a costs order can be minimised by an offer to settle.209 This procedure 
is derived from the English payment into court and the object of the rule is to limit costs 
and act as deterrent against unnecessary litigation by a plaintiff.210 The procedure is 
less satisfactory than its English equivalent where an actual payment into court is 
made, as there is no guarantee that the defendant has the funds to pay in accordance 
206 Visser (1993) 442. 
207 Idem at 443. 
208 Priority Records (1988) 295. 
209 Uniform Rule 34. 
210 Erasmus (1994) 81-239. 
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with his offer. This is of particular relevance in trade mark infringement and passing off 
proceedings where the defendant is often financially weak. Although the court retains 
a discretion as to any costs order,211 the general rule is that if the court awards a lesser 
amount than that offered, the plaintiff has to pay costs from the date of offer.212 If a 
greater amount is awarded, the plaintiff is awarded his costs.213 
5.5.3 Interest on the award of damages 
At common law a debtor is liable for interest on a monetary debt when he is in wrongful 
default of making payment.214 But where a claim for unliquidated damages is 
ascertained only after 'long and intricate investigation',215 the defendant is not in mora 
until the amount has been assessed by the court. 216 A claim for interest as an item of 
special damages, distinct from mora interest, has also not been allowed.217 A plaintiff 
is, however, entitled to interest from the date of judgment,218 and interest runs despite 
the noting of an appeal.219 South African law also has the rule that interest will run only 
until it reaches an amount equal to the capital sum due.220 
In 1994, when refusing pre-judgment interest on an unliquidated claim, the Appellate 
Division held that if this refusal was 'contrary to commercial realities and inequitable, 
211 Uniform Rule 34(12); Omega (1978) 477. 
212 Omega (1978) 478. 
213 Harms (1996) 439; see also Omega (1978) 471. 
214 Standard Chartered (1994) 777. 
215 Victoria Falls (1915) 31. 
216 Standard Chartered (1994) 779. 
217 At 778. See also Swisstool ( 1977) 607. 
218 Section 2 of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act of 1975; see also International Tobacco (1955) 
28. 
219 Visser (1993) 166. 
220 Ibid. 
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then the only remedy is appropriate legislation'.221 The Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 
has now been amended and provides that unliquidated debts can bear interest from 
date of service of summons, although the part of the debt consisting of the present 
value of a future loss does not bear interest before the date on which quantum is 
determined.222 A court may now make such order as appears just in respect of the 
payment of interest, its rate, and the date from which it accrues.223 
5.6 APPEALS AGAINST AN AWARD OF DAMAGES 
Any High Court judgment is appealable only with leave from the court concerned or, 
failing that, the Supreme Court of Appeal.224 
When hearing an appeal, a court is slow to interfere with an award of damages which 
was a matter of estimation and discretion, and will not merely substitute its own 
award.225 But an appeal court is bound to interfere where there has been irregularity 
or misdirection,226 where no sound basis exists for the award of the trial court, or where 
there is a substantial variation between the award made by the trial court and that 
which the appeal court considers appropriate.227 In Caxton, the appeal court reduced 
the amount of damages awarded as lost profit because the trial court had dismissed 
the effect of a general recession on profits as irrelevant. 228 It also reduced the amount 
awarded for loss of reputation because of the disparity between the amount it would 
221 Standard Chartered (1994) 779. 
222 Section 2A(1 )-(3) of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act of 1975 as amended by the Prescribed 
Rate of Interest Amendment Act of 1997. 
223 Section 2A(5). 
224 Section 20(4) of the Supreme Court Act of 1959 (SA). 
225 Corbett (1995) 78; LAWSA Damages (1995) 89. 
226 Omega (1978) 474-475. 
227 Corbett (1995) 78; LAWSA Damages (1995) 89. 
228 Caxton (1990) 573. 
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have awarded and the amount awarded by the trial court. 229 
5. 7 THE EXISTENCE OF INQUIRIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The general trial procedure which must be followed to obtain unliquidated damages 
has been set out. It must now be determined whether the English inquiry procedure 
exists in our law. Attempts to introduce this procedure prior to legislative intervention 
will be dealt with first. Current statutory provision for the inquiry procedure will then be 
detailed, and the implementation of this procedure in the light of general statutory 
provisions regulating litigation will be considered. Finally, the advantages of the 
introduction of the inquiry procedure will be considered. 
5.7.1 Attempts to introduce inquiry procedure 
The first reference to an inquiry dates from a 1924 trade mark decision, where the court 
held that 'if the court thinks that substantial damage has occurred, it ought to order an 
inquiry, following the principal English cases'.230 Neither the form of order, nor its 
correctness appears to have been considered, and the order was clearly made in 
imitation of existing English procedure, not because it was considered available in 
terms of South African law. 
A request for an inquiry was next made in 1975.231 An exception was raised to a 
counterclaim in which the defendant alleged that he had suffered damages due to 
breach of contract, but was unaware of its quantum and so entitled to an inquiry as to 
the quantum of damages and payment of such damages as were found due.232 It was 
229 At 575. 
230 Goddard (1924) 323. 
231 An inquiry was ordered prior to this in Dan River (1969); see the reference to this decision in 
Harvey Tiling ( 1977) 328. 
232 Victor Products (1975) 962. 
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alleged by the defendant that this procedure was appropriate in a claim for damages 
for breach of contract, because it was standard practice in English infringement actions, 
it had been followed in such an action in a South African court, and because there was 
no reason in principle why the procedure could not be used in an action for contractual 
damages.233 The court was, not surprisingly, unpersuaded by this reasoning and found 
no grounds to justify 'such an innovation' .234 
The issue was considered in more detail in Harvey Tiling, an action for damages for 
breach of confidential information. An inquiry had been requested. The court, after 
considering the comparable English position, held that the form of English order was 
not apt under South African procedure, as the trial judge, not a master, decides all 
issues in an action.235 However, the court viewed the substance of such an order as 
being in accordance with South African procedure, as it was merely an order for the 
postponement of the action so that the damages suffered by the plaintiff could be 
investigated and determined as a separate issue by the trial court.236 The court 
accordingly ordered that the action be postponed for determination of the question of 
damages in terms of Uniform Rule 33(4).237 
An inquiry was requested in a number of intellectual property actions following this 
decision. In the Swisstool design infringement action, an inquiry was requested and a. 
postponement of the hearing on damages granted in the trial court.238 During the 
subsequent appeal this procedure was described by the Appellate Division as an 
233 At 963. 
234 At 964. 
235 Harvey Tiling (1977) 328. 
236 Ibid. 
237 At 330. This procedure was subsequently approved in Hudson & Knight (1979) 228; Harchris 
(1983) 555 and Video Parktown (1986) 642. 
238 Swisstool (1977) 605-606. 
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'inquiry into damages' .239 In another instance, the postponement of application 
proceedings for the question of damages to be investigated and determined by the 
court, was refused on the basis that a claim for damages should be pursued by 
action.240 A request for the court to order an inquiry, made during application 
proceedings, has also been refused for the same reason. 241 But where action 
proceedings were instituted on a statement of agreed facts, the court was prepared to 
grant a postponement for the question of damages to be determined.242 This was 
approved by the Appellate Division during the subsequent appeal.243 
The inquiry procedure was considered in some detail in Montres Ro/ex. This was an 
instance of trade mark infringement where an application was brought for a final 
interdict and an account of profits, or alternatively, an order directing an inquiry into the 
damages suffered by the applicant and payment of the damages found due. After 
holding that an account of profits was not available in trade mark infringement 
proceedings, the court held that an inquiry can be accepted in principle, since 'the 
remedy is directed to a determination of the damages actually sustained by the plaintiff, 
can serve a useful purpose and is not inconsistent with any fundamental tenet of our 
legal system' .244 The court then discussed the absence of specific regulatory 
procedures to govern an inquiry. It viewed an inquiry as a type of reference to a referee 
in terms of section 19bis of the Supreme Court Act, rather than subscribing to the more 
common view that it was merely a separation of issues in terms of Uniform Rule 
33(4).245 Finally, the court refused to grant such an order in the context of motion 
239 Omega (1978) 476. 
240 Atlas Organic (1978) 698. 
241 Haggar(1985) 582. 
242 Sodastream (1984) 432. 
243 Berman Bros (1986) 246. 
244 Montres Ro/ex (1985) 68-69. See Dendy (1986) 291: 'a need exists for machinery enabling the 
court to come to the assistance of the applicant'. 
245 At69. 
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proceedings, and suggested that the applicant could pursue this remedy by way of 
action.246 
These cases indicate that while an inquiry is viewed as a procedure which can be 
accommodated in the South African legal system, it is generally viewed as differing little 
from an order for a separation of issues, and will not be granted on motion. 
5. 7 .2 Statutory provision for inquiries 
The Trade Marks Act of 1993 makes specific provision for an inquiry for the purposes 
of determining the amount of any damages or reasonable royalty. It states that the court 
may prescribe such procedures for conducting an inquiry as it deems fit. 247 The 
regulations promulgated under this Act contain no reference to this procedure. Draft 
legislation envisages a similar provision in the Copyright Act of 1978.248 
Prior to the introduction of this procedure in the Trade Marks Act, it was recognised in 
the patent regulations, 249 although the Patents Act of 1978 makes no provison for the 
remedy. Earlier patent legislation and regulations did not mention inquiries. It was 
merely stated that all proceedings had to be instituted before the commissioner of 
patents and who was given powers equivalent to those of a single judge.250 Despite 
this, inquiries were ordered by the court of the commisioner of patents from at least 
1971. In the Harvey Tiling decision, Nicolas J stated that it was common practice to 
order inquiries in this court and referred to a decision he had made in his capacity as 
246 At 70. 
247 Section 34(4) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
248 Clause 54(18) of the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill of 1997, amending section 
24(18) of the Copyright Act of 1978 (SA). 
249 Regulation 98. 
250 Sections 76(1) and 77(1) of the Patents Act of 1952. 
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commissioner. 251 The inclusion of inquiries in the patent regulations merely seems to 
have confirmed an existing practice in the commissioner's court. The High Court has 
approved this procedure in the court of the commissioner252 and held parties bound to 
an agreement to postpone proof of damages to a later date,253 and a number of orders 
in terms of regulation 98 have been granted.254 
5.7.3 Application of inquiry procedure in South Africa 
The inquiry procedure in trade mark infringement proceedings has now received 
statutory recognition in South Africa. But the danger exists that it could meet the same 
fate as the account of profits, which was available in South Africa in terms of previous 
copyright legislation,255 but was rejected by the courts as contrary to Roman-Dutch 
principles. 256 
To determine whether it will be accepted by the courts, it is necessary to consider 
whether this is a substantive remedy or a procedural aid. The problems foreseen by our 
courts in the implementation of the procedure will then be discussed. The differences 
between an inquiry and a separation of issues will finally be considered. 
5.7.3.1 Substantive or procedural remedy 
In English law, when an inquiry as to damages is ordered, it is assumed that this order 
251 Harvey Tiling (1977) 328-329. Burrell (1972) 210 also states that inquiries are commonly 
ordered. See also Reeves (1975) 328, where the action in the commissioner's court was 
postponed sine die; subsequent proceedings were referred to as an inquiry as to damages. 
252 GIL Inc (1988) 192. 
253 Se/ero (1982) 217. 
254 T J Smith (1986) 524; National Bolts (1988) 209. 
255 Section 24( 1) of the Copyright Act of 1978 (SA) - prior to amendment by Copyright Amendment 
Act of 1992; section 18(1) of the Copyright Act of 1965 (SA}. 
256 Video Parktown (1986) 642; see also Montres Ro/ex (1985) 64-65. 
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includes a further order to pay any amount found due to the plaintiff at the inquiry. The 
remedy can, therefore, be viewed as a substantive remedy which grants damages to 
a successful plaintiff. South African legislation makes provision for a procedural, not 
a substantive, remedy. Both the Trade Marks Act and the proposed amendment to the 
Copyright Act state that a court may award damages or a reasonable royalty, and, 'for 
the purpose of determining the amount of damages or a reasonable royalty' ,257 the court 
may direct that an inquiry be held. An inquiry in South Africa is thus a procedural aid 
to quantifying damages, not a substantive remedy. No objection to its introduction can 
be raised on this basis. This has also been confirmed by our courts.258 
5.7.3.2 Procedural problems foreseen by courts 
When considering inquiries, South African courts have on occasion raised queries 
concerning the implementation of this procedure. 
The first, and one that is often referred to as making implementation of the procedure 
unlikely,259 is the fact that in England inquiries are conducted before a master, not the 
court, while no equivalent official exists in South Africa. I think that this is not a serious 
hurdle. In both England and Australia, inquiries may be heard before a master or 
adjourned into court to be heard by a judge. In the court of the commissioner in South 
Africa, where inquiry procedure is used, the commissioner, who is a judge of the High 
Court, conducts the inquiry. The criticism levelled at accounts of profits in Montres 
Ro/ex as an 'additional burden on our already strained judicial resources'260 cannot be 
raised against inquiries, as a postponement of the investigation of damages would also 
257 Section 34(4) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA); clause 54 of the Intellectual Property Laws 
Amendment Bill of 1997. 
258 Montres Ro/ex (1985) 69: 'the remedy is directed to a determination of the damages actually 
sustained by the plaintiff, can serve a useful purpose and is not inconsistent with any 
fundamental tenet of our legal system'. 
259 Harvey Tiling (1977) 328; Montres Ro/ex (1985) 67. 
260 Montres Ro/ex ( 1985) 67. 
268 Chapter 6: Inquiry as to damages 
require judicial attention. The suggestion made in Montres Ro/ex - that an inquiry 
should be conducted by a referee, not the court - is inappropriate.261 Section 19bis 
provides that matters which require 'extensive investigation of documents or scientific, 
technical or local investigation which in the opinion of the court cannot be conveniently 
conducted by it', or matters relating to accounts, may be referred to a referee for inquiry 
and report.262 The determination of damages has always been conducted by a court, 
and it is difficult to imagine a referee who is more competent to assess damages than 
a judge of the High Court. In addition, as Erasmus points out, section 19bis covers to 
some extent the same ground as RSC Order 36,263 which is not viewed as governing 
inquiries as to damages in English law. 
The other problem raised by the courts is the absence of provisions to regulate the 
inquiry procedure in the Uniform Rules.264 Section 34(4) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 
merely provides that when ordering an inquiry the court may prescribe such procedures 
as it deems fit. Uniform Rule 33(5), which regulates procedure on separation of issues, 
also merely states that the court may give any direction with regard to the hearing of 
any other issues which may be necessary. So this perceived problem is not confined 
to the inquiry procedure. 
5.7.3.3 Differences between postponements and inquiry procedure 
Our courts have usually viewed an inquiry as akin to a separation of issues in terms of 
Uniform Rule 33(4) and ordered separation rather than an inquiry, when an inquiry was 
sought. There are, however, some important differences between a separation of 
261 Montres Ro/ex (1985) 69. 
262 Section 19bis( 1) of the Supreme Court Act of 1959 (SA). 
263 Erasmus (1994) A1-38. 
264 Omega (1978) 476; Montres Ro/ex (1985) 69. The absence of rules to which the Appellate 
Division referred in Omega (1978) 476 actually related to postponements in terms of Uniform 
Rule 33(4), not inquiries. Although an inquiry had been requested in the particulars of claim, the 
hearing of the plaintiff's other claims were merely postponed sine die. See Swisstool ( 1975) 385; 
Swisstool (1977) 606. 
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merits and quantum in South African practice, and the English form of inquiry. 
First, in England an inquiry as to unliquidated damages may take any form. It can be 
conducted on affidavit alone, on affidavit with cross-examination, or by presentation of 
oral evidence. The master is at liberty to give any directions which he thinks 
appropriate to the given facts of the particular case. 
In South Africa it has always been held that unliquidated damages must be determined 
on action, and that motion proceedings are inappropriate.265 This means that an inquiry 
will have to be conducted in the form of action proceedings, as is currently the case 
when the quantification of unliquidated damages is postponed for later hearing. 
Second, in England an inquiry may be ordered after any other proceedings, and need 
not be ordered only after a trial. 
The requirement that unliquidated damages must be determined by way of action in 
South Africa has resulted in the refusal of requests for orders postponing the 
assessment of damages, or for inquiries, when they are requested during motion 
proceedings. Our courts have held that relief of this nature must be sought by way of 
action, not on motion.266 
Third, an English inquiry is requested in the original writ or summons that commences 
proceedings. This has as a result that, although damages are claimed, no specific 
amount is stated. No pre-trial procedures such as discovery, expert witness statements, 
and the like need be followed as regards quantum of damages. Compliance with these 
procedures is necessary only after a decision on the merits has been reached and a 
summons for directions issued. 
265 Room Hire (1949) 1161. 
266 Atlas Organic (1978) 699-postponement for assessment of damages; Paramount (1983) 262 -
account; Montres Rolex (1985) 70 - inquiry; Ara Oy (1990) 375 - postponement for determination 
of profits payable or additional damages. 
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In South Africa, the particulars of claim must contain a claim for damages in a specific 
sum, although that sum can later be amended. A claim for damages must also be of 
sufficient particularity to enable the defendant reasonably to assess quantum. A 
separation of issues is usually requested just before trial or during trial.267 Pre-trial 
discovery, further particulars and other procedures must, therefore, cover both merits 
and quantum. The whole issue of quantum is accordingly not postponed; what is 
postponed, is the hearing of that issue. In this regard it should be noted that the rules 
contain no provision that pre-trial procedures as regards quantum need not be 
complied with even after a separation of issues has been granted. 
The same holds true of the inquiry procedure contained in the Trade Marks Act of 1993. 
Section 34(3), which details the relief a court may grant, provides that damages or a 
reasonable royalty, may be granted. Section 34(4) then provides that, to determine this 
amount, the court may direct that an inquiry be held. The whole issue of quantum is not 
postponed, merely the hearing. Quantum will have to be covered in the pleadings and 
pre-trial disclosure. 
5.8 ADVANTAGES AND ACCOMMODATION OF INQUIRY PROCEDURE IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
It has been shown that there are crucial differences between the English inquiry 
procedure and the South African separation of issues. It must now be determined 
whether there are any advantages to the introduction of the English inquiry procedure 
in South Africa. If advantages exist, can our procedures accommodate such inquiries? 
If not, what changes must be introduced? 
267 Harvey Tiling (1977) 329: 'Ordinarily an application for an order under Rule 33(4) will be made 
at the beginning of the trial, but an order in terms thereof can be made at any time up to 
judgment'. 
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5.8.1 Possible advantages 
I think that there are two major advantages to the English inquiry. The first relates to 
costs. When all consideration of the issue of quantum is postponed, as in England, 
substantial savings can be effected. If a plaintiff is unsuccessful on the merits, no 
expenses have been incurred on the issue of quantum. If a plaintiff is successful and 
an inquiry is ordered, the parties have greater information on the extent of infringement 
and a defendant has more knowledge of his possible liability for damages. In addition, 
a plaintiff has some idea of whether a claim for damages is viable and whether the 
defendant's circumstances make such a claim worth instituting. This means that if an 
inquiry is ordered, there will be a likelihood of a substantial amount being recovered 
as damages, as our courts have the same discretion as an English court to refuse the 
grant of an inquiry if there appears to be no prospect of success. 
The second advantage of an inquiry is that it can be ordered after motion proceedings. 
While our courts refuse to hear the issue of unliquidated damages on motion, they 
occasionally grant a final interdict on motion. 268 The introduction of the English form of 
inquiry would mean that a plaintiff who obtained a final interdict on motion could at that 
stage be granted an inquiry. The view of our courts that inquiries should be sought on 
action269 makes the procedure ineffective; if action proceedings must be used, why 
request an inquiry rather than damages per se? 
I believe that these advantages make an attempt to introduce the English form of 
inquiry worthwhile. 
5.8.2 ACCOMMODATION OF THE ENGLISH INQUIRY PROCEDURE 
The procedural problems identified by South African courts when considering whether 
268 United Tobacco (1909) 157; Montres Ro/ex (1985) 59. 
269 Montres Ro/ex (1985) 70. 
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the inquiry procedure can be implemented here have already been discussed. The 
three major distinctions between the English form of inquiry and a separation of issues 
in terms of Uniform Rule 33(4) have been identified. It must now be determined 
whether these distinctions make the English form of inquiry inappropriate in the South 
African context. 
5.8.2.1 Grant after motion proceedings 
The first distinction is that South African courts have refused to grant an inquiry or 
postponement for damages to be assessed when it is requested in motion proceedings. 
It is possible to obtain on motion a final interdict prohibiting trade mark infringement or 
passing off.270 It is at that stage that a plaintiff will want an order for an inquiry; if he is 
required to institute action procedure merely to obtain an order for an inquiry, he might 
as well sue for damages instead. An inquiry, as described in South African legislation, 
is a procedural aid, not a substantive remedy. So there is no reason why it cannot be 
granted after motion proceedings. I believe that this is so even if the general view that 
damages cannot be awarded on motion is subscribed to, as the order of an inquiry is 
not the equivalent of the grant of unliquidated damages. 
The further problem that can be raised - that damages can be awarded only if the 
requirements for an interdict have been met, together with the additional requirement 
that fault in the sense of intention or negligence must be proved - is also not 
insurmountable. When granting final interdicts on motion, our courts have on a number 
of occasions made a finding as to the defendant's state of mind on affidavit evidence.271 
270 PlascorrEvans (1984) 634- trade mark infringement; Haggar (1985) 581 - passing off; Montres 
Ro/ex (1985) 59 - trade mark infringement. 
271 In Stellenvale (1957). the trade marks were held not sufficiently similar for an interdict to be 
granted on motion but the court held that 'it is nonetheless abundantly clear that the respondent 
deliberately copied the applicanfs label' (at 243). In PlascorrEvans (1984), where a final interdict 
had been granted by the court of first instance, the Appellate Division held that the mark had 
been used 'with the ulterior object of deceiving or confusing and of making use of the goodwill 
attaching to the Micatex mark' and confirmed the interdict (at 646). In Haggar (1985), the court 
granted a final interdict on motion; it held that 'the inference that in doing so the first respondent 
had as its object the fraudulent deception of the purchaser for use, is not only justified, but 
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I believe that there is accordingly no valid reason why a court cannot grant an inquiry 
at the close of motion proceedings, if the court is prepared to grant a final interdict and 
also has found that the defendant acted intentionally or negligently. 
5.8.2.2 Damages to be assessed by way of action 
The next distinction between the English inquiry and our practice is the requirement in 
South Africa that unliquidated damages can be sought by way of action only. This 
would have the effect that all inquiries must be conducted as trials and can never take 
place on affidavit, as is the position in England. Our courts base this requirement on 
the Room Hire dictum to that effect.272 This full bench decision was, however, not an 
application for damages, but for cancellation of a contract and ejectment. The 
statement that damages had to be sought by way of action was therefore obiter. 273 The 
real ratio of this decision is that a material dispute of fact cannot be determined on 
affidavit,274 and that affidavit evidence is unsuitable for the ascertainment of 'genuinely 
disputed facts'. 275 
In most instances the quantum of unliquidated damages will give rise to material 
disputes of fact and trial proceedings will be necessary. However, in intellectual 
property disputes, this is not always the position. Loss of profits can be proved by 
inescapable' (at 574). In Montres Ro/ex (1985), a final interdict was granted on motion; the court 
found that 'the conclusion is inescapable that respondent knowingly infringed applicant's rights' 
(at 58). 
272 Room Hire (1949) 1161: 'There are on the other hand certain classes of case (the instances 
given by Dowling J, are matrimonial causes and illiquid claims for damages) in which motion 
proceedings are not permissible at all.' 
273 The dictum on which Murray AJP relied in the Room Hire decision, that of Dowling J in Williams 
(1949) ('in contemporary practice any dispute, save matrimonial causes and claims for damage, 
but not excluding money counts, may be decided by motion proceedings in an appropriate case' 
(at 839)), was also obiter, as what was being heard was an application for a money judgment -
liquidated damages. 
274 Room Hire (1949) 1162; see also Harms (1996) 197. 
275 Room Hire (1949) 1161; see also R Bakers (1948) 631. 
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affidavit, or settled by accountants, as is done in England.276 The introduction of a 
reasonable royalty as a basis for damages can make quantification a mere calculation, 
which is capable of determination on affidavit. As was said in Room Hire, 'it is (with 
respect) difficult to appreciate what greater advantages are derived by a judicial officer 
from viva voce evidence, than from affidavits when he has to ascertain only the law to 
be applied'.277 I believe that if an inquiry is granted, it is not essential that it should be 
conducted by way of action. In all instances the test whether action or motion 
procedure is appropriate is that of a 'material dispute of fact'; and it is for the court 
giving directions on the conduct of the inquiry to determine the correct procedure. 
5.8.2.3 Postponement of whole issue of quantum 
The final distinction between the English inquiry and South African procedure is that 
if an inquiry is sought in the writ commencing action, the issue of damages is not 
addressed further until after a finding on the merits. In South Africa, a claim for 
damages must be set out with particularity and pre-trial procedures complied with, 
despite the fact that the plaintiff might have very little knowledge of the extent of his 
damages at that stage. Webster and Page deal with this problem and state that this 
has as result that a genuine claim for damages may fail because it cannot be 
adequately pleaded, while once a trial on the merits has been completed, the plaintiff 
has knowledge of the extent of the defendant's misconduct. 278 
This is the one problem that does require legislative intervention. I believe that this 
could be done by way of amendment to Uniform Rule 33(5) to cover both a separation 
of issues and inquiries as to damages. This subrule could then contain this sentence: 
'Where a postponement is granted for the issue of damages to be investigated 
276 This was done in the Reeves (1975) 329 inquiry proceedings in the commissioner's court. 
277 Room Hire (1949) 1161. 
278 Webster & Page (1986) 468. 
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and determined by the court, the court may order that the parties need not 
comply further with the provisions of rules 21 (2), 35, 36 or 37 in so far as they 
pertain to this issue, and where an inquiry as to damages is requested, these 
rules and the provisions of rules 18(4) and 18(10) need not be complied with in 
so far as they relate to the issue of damages'. 
Another option is to amend section 34( 4) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 to read as 
follows: 
'Where a proprietor seeks damages or, in lieu of damages, a reasonable royalty, 
and he requests an inquiry as to damages in the summons or notice of motion 
commencing proceedings for infringement, the provisons of rules 18(4), 18(10), 
21 (2), 35, 36 and 37 of the Uniform Rules need not be complied with in so far 
as they relate to the amount of damages and the manner in which such 
damages are computed. The court may then, after an order on liability is made, 
give directions regarding compliance with these rules.' 
This has the added advantage of indicating that an inquiry may be sought by way of 
motion proceedings. 
Webster and Page submit that the defendant will not be prejudiced by any 
shortcomings in the pleadings relating to damages, since these will be rectified before 
that issue comes to trial.279 Also, this will result in a saving of litigation costs: if the 
plaintiff is unsuccessful on the merits, or, even if he is successful but he decides not 
to seek damages, no costs on the issue of damages will have been incurred.280 
This is not an unknown procedure. The patent regulations provide that if a plaintiff 
claims an inquiry, he need not specify in his pleadings the amount of the damages 
279 Webster & Page (1986) 468. 
280 See also Harvey Tiling (1977) 329 which mentions the further advantage that premature or 
unnecessary disclosure of confidential information is avoided. 
276 Chapter 6: Inquiry as to damages 
allegedly suffered orthe manner in which they are computed.281 
5.8.2.4 Procedural guidelines 
The final problem, and one that our courts have raised when refusing to grant an 
inquiry, is the absence of procedural guidelines on how the inquiry should be 
conducted. As pointed out above, the same objections hold true when a separation of 
issues is granted, and yet such orders are frequently made without inconvenience to 
the court or the parties. I believe that one of the values of an inquiry is the absence of 
procedural requirements. This makes it possible for the court hearing the merits to give 
guidelines on further conduct of the matter, as it will usually have a good idea of the 
possible complexity of any claim for damages. If this court feels unable to do so, which 
is possible if the suggested amendment to the Uniform Rules is made, a procedure akin 
to that introduced by Uniform Rule 37 A can be used to require the parties to attend a 
conference before a judge to determine the further conduct of the proceedings. The 
sanctions of dismissal, striking out, or a costs order as contained in this rule282 should 
ensure co-operation between the parties. 
6 CONCLUSION 
An order for an inquiry will not always be appropriate. As stated in the discussion on 
problems experienced with this procedure in England, it can be both expensive and 
time-consuming. Where damages are easy to quantify, the court should order a short 
postponement and then itself assess damages. However, there is no single instance 
of an award of damages for trade mark infringement in South Africa. Parliament 
presumably introduced the inquiry procedure in an attempt to make damages easier to 
obtain and it will be regrettable if this innovation is merely ignored or found to be 
unworkable. 
281 Regulation 98(2) of the patent regulations. 
282 Uniform Rule 37 A(8). 
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CHAPTER 7 
DELIVERY UP 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The South African Trade Marks Act of 1993 provides for the remedy of delivery up, but 
does not set out what this remedy entails. 
To determine this, it is necessary to refer to its equitable origins. It will be shown that 
the equitable remedy of delivery up was an ancillary to an injunction, granted by 
chancery courts to protect the plaintiff against further use of existing infringing goods. 
The meaning of the term delivery up, as developed by the English courts, 
encompassed both erasure or destruction by the defendant on oath and delivery up to 
the plaintiff for erasure or destruction. 
I will then argue that the current English Trade Marks Act 1994 alters the meaning of 
the term delivery up. What was always understood as delivery up is now known as an 
erasure order; and a statutory delivery up order bears more resemblance to the old 
remedy of conversion. 
Delivery up orders were routinely granted in South Africa before their existence was 
questioned in the Cerebos decision. Although current intellectual property statutes 
provide for such orders for the first time, it remains necessary to determine whether 
they can be justified in terms of our common law. 
I will argue that a delivery up order in South Africa can be seen as a form of mandatory 
interdict, and should not be described as merely 'procedural relief. I will also argue that 
removal of the infringing mark must be a court's first choice of order, and that delivery 
up to the plaintiff should be granted in exceptional circumstances only. No attempt 
should be made to introduce the current statutory English form of delivery up in South 
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Africa, as this has no basis in our common law and may result in the rejection of the 
remedy by our courts. 
2 ENGLAND 
2.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
2.1.1 Origin of the remedy 
Delivery up, which originated as a remedy for fraud, was a form of relief peculiar to 
equity. 1 In the nineteenth century the courts' jurisdiction to make such orders was 
described as 'founded upon the administration of a protective or preventative justice' ,2 
and, more recently, as 'founded upon the desirability of preventing the public being 
deceived by the free circulation of invalid documents'.3 Delivery up was therefore 
ordered if a document appeared valid but was actually void or voidable, as the 
existence of the document could be embarrassing, either because some claim could 
at a later stage be founded on it or because a third party could be deceived by it. 4 Story 
states that delivery up and cancellation of agreements and other instruments would be 
ordered, inter alia, where there was actual fraud by the defendants or where there was 
constructive fraud against public policy. This was so because 'a party ought not to be 
permitted to avail himself of any agreement, deed or other instrument procurred by his 
1 Story.1 (1877) 679. Another theory is that the remedy originated from the penalty created by 
section 1 of the Statute of Anne (1709), which provided that, in actions for copyright 
infringement, 'then such offender or offenders shall forfeit such book or books, and all and every 
sheet or sheets, being part of such book or books, to the proprietor or proprietors of the copy 
thereof, who shall forthwith damask, and make waste paper of them'. See in this regard Cairns 
(1988) 59. I think that his argument is questionable, as he states that delivery up is 'peculiar to 
intellectual property law'. It has always been viewed as a generally available equitable remedy. 
Although the Statute of Anne might be the origin of the remedy in respect of copyright and 
patents, which ¥Jere both viewed as proprietary rights (see Laddie (1995) 924), trade marks were 
viewed as the subject of property rights by equity courts only from 1838. 
2 Story.1 (1877) 677. 
3 Meagher (1992) 684. 
4 Snell (1973) 608; see also Halsbury Equity (1976) 856. 
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own actual or constructive fraud ... to the prejudice of an innocent party'.5 The remedy 
was therefore originally viewed as serving two purposes: to prevent the guilty party 
from further use of the fraudulent document, and to protect third parties from deception. 
Story also debated whether a permanent injunction restraining use of the document 
would not be a more appropriate remedy than a delivery up order. He concluded that 
the court's function was not solely remedial but was also aimed at preventing injustice, 
and that on this basis the order was justified.6 
2.1.2 Application to trade mark proceedings 
Although in 1877 Story referred only to title deeds, wills, contracts, and other similar 
documents in his discussion of the remedy,7 it is clear from early cases that the remedy 
was available in trade mark infringement and passing off litigation from the first half of 
the nineteenth century, not only in respect of documents and printed matter, but also 
for goods and other articles. This was presumably because equity courts originally 
granted protection to trade marks only if the action could be founded on fraud. 0 As early 
cases in equity were based on fraud, the relief afforded when fraud was proved 
remained available to a successful plaintiff, both after trade mark misuse was 
recognised as a specific type of fraud and subsequently when intellectual property 
rights were accepted as deserving of protection. 
Delivery up was requested in equity proceedings based on trade mark misuse from as 
early as 1838. In Millington, delivery up to the plaintiff for destruction of all steel bearing 
5 Story.1 (1877) 680. 
6 Idem at 682-683: 'If an instrument ought not to be used or enforced, it is against conscience for 
the party holding it to retain it; since he can only retain it for some sinister purpose'. 
7 Story.1 (1877) 677. 
8 Blanchard (1742) 485. 
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the marks complained of and all instruments used to make such marks was requested.9 
The earliest reported judgment in which delivery up in trade mark litigation was 
successfully requested was in 1855 in Farina. There a prayer for the delivery up to the 
plaintiff of the offending labels and the plates used for making such labels was 
granted.10 As neither party argued the merits of the order, it can be assumed that it was 
not uncommon at that date. 
From then on, delivery up orders were granted in intellectual property infringement 
proceedings, despite the absence of legislation authorising their use. 11 The validity of 
delivery up orders was seldom questioned. Although courts have in the past questioned 
the availability of this remedy in instances of passing off, 12 this is not the current 
position and delivery up will be granted against retailers if the goods in question are 
not sufficiently distinguished, and even against traders who do not have contact with 
the public where the goods complained of can be viewed as instruments of deception.13 
2.1.3 Nature of the equitable remedy 
2.1.3.1 Ancillary to injunction 
Historically, a plaintiff would approach a court of equity to obtain an injunction, which 
was not available from a common-law court. To prevent a 'multiplicity of suits'14 the 
equity court would then grant other relief. It is unclear why it became accepted that 
9 Millington (1838) 340. 
10 Farina (1855) 511. 
11 Dent (1861) 1007 -trade mark infringement; S/azenger(1889) 538-trade mark infringement and 
passing off; Mergentha/er(1927) 383 - patent infringement; De/ave/le (1946) 111 - passing off. 
12 In Lissen (1929) 11, the court held that a plaintiff in a passing off action was entitled to an 
injunction, but not delivery up, as the plaintiffs had no property in the goods which were the 
subject of the order. No authority was given for this view and it has not been followed. 
13 Wadlow (1995) 587. 
14 Jesus College (1745) 263. 
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delivery up in intellectual property proceedings, which in other equitable instances was 
viewed as substantive relief, 15 would be granted only as ancillary to an injunction. A 
possible reason is that the grant of an injunction was the only confirmation available 
that the items to be delivered up actually infringed the plaintiff's rights. But it was 
generally accepted from the beginning of the twentieth century that an order for 
delivery up was made 'to assist the plaintiff and as relief ancillary to an injunction'.16 
This view has been accepted by later courts and textbooks. Consequently, in a 
subsequent decision, the court described delivery up as 'collateral relief 11 to an 
injunction and it is generally accepted that a delivery up order may be granted only 
together with an injunction.10 
Although an injunction will usually be requested when a delivery up order is sought, it 
is possible to imagine instances in which a delivery up order is required but a 
prohibitory injunction is unnecessary. However, the grant of a delivery up order without 
the grant of an injunction has never been considered by an English court. 
2.1.3.2 Ownership of infringing articles 
In various intellectual property infringement decisions dealing with delivery up it has 
been clearly indicated that the goods in respect of which delivery up has been ordered 
do not become the property of the plaintiff. 
In an instance of patent infringement, it was stated that a delivery up order is not made 
to punish the infringer but to assist the plaintiff. In this way the infringer is not tempted 
to commit a breach of the injunction. While the infringing articles remain the property 
of the infringer, the court assists the plaintiff by ordering their destruction or the removal 
15 Story.1 (1877) 677. 
16 Mergenthaler(1927) 382. 
17 Killick (1958) 33. 
18 See Cornish (1996) 60; Kerly (1986) 325; Wadlow (1995) 587. 
282 Chapter 7: Delivery up 
of the offending part. 19 For this reason, in an action for passing off of bottles of 
brilliantine, delivery up for destruction was ordered only in respect of the labels, not the 
containers or their contents.20 By contrast, in an action based on breach of confidence 
where the articles of clothing themselves, not the name or get-up, offended, the 
defendants were granted the option of delivery to the plaintiff or themselves destroying 
the garments (unpicking them), as the garments contained expensive materials which 
could possibly have been salvaged.21 
These cases illustrate that British courts have always viewed delivery up as serving a 
preventative function by removing temptation from the defendant. 
2.1.3.3 Effect of the order on parties 
The plaintiff is not viewed as having any proprietary right to the items which form the 
subject of a delivery up order.22 The order is made to prevent the defendant from using 
the items concerned, not because he is viewed as having lost his proprietary rights in 
those items. 23 English courts hold the view that the order is not made to punish the 
defendant,24 and that the plaintiff should not obtain pecuniary benefit from these 
articles. The courts have therefore tried to ensure that such orders cause the minimum 
financial loss to the defendant as owner of the articles concerned.25 
Generally, therefore, they will grant the defendant the option of erasure or destruction 
under oath or delivery to the plaintiff for destruction. The term delivery up as used by 
19 Mergenthaler(1927) 382-383. 
20 De/ave/le (1946) 112. 
21 Peter Pan (1963) 409. 
22 Vavasseur ( 1878) 360; Wadlow ( 1995) 587. 
23 Vavasseur(1878) 360. 
24 Mergenthaler(1927) 382. 
25 Mergenthaler (1927) 383; De/ave/le (1946) 112; Peter Pan (1963) 409. 
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English writers and courts includes these options.26 
2.1.4 Previous trade mark legislation 
The Trade Marks Registration Act 1875, which established a register of trade marks, 
did not deal with the remedies available in infringement actions. Neither did subsequent 
Acts, including the Trade Marks Act 1938. 
2.2 CURRENT TRADE MARK LEGISLATION 
The position as regards delivery up in passing off proceedings remains is set out 
above. It is governed by equitable principles and granted as ancillary to an injunction.21 
However, as regards trade marks, the 1994 Act now contains detailed provisions on 
destruction and delivery which differ from the traditional view of delivery up. The Act 
provides for two substantive remedies: orders for erasure and orders for delivery up. 
2.2.1 Erasure orders 
Section 15 of the Act states that a court may order a person who has infringed a 
registered trade mark to erase, remove, or obliterate the offending sign from any 
infringing goods, material, or articles28 in his possession, or, if this is not practicable, 
to destroy the goods in question.29 If such an order is not complied with, or if it appears 
26 Comish (1996) 60; Halsbury Trade Marks (1995) 200; Kerly (1986) 325; Wadlow (1995) 587. 
27 Halsbury Trade Marks (1995) 200; Wadlow (1995) 587. 
28 Section 17(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK) states that goods are infringing goods if they 
bear a sign identical or similar to the registered mark; section 17(4) states that material is 
infringing material if it bears a sign similar or identical to the registered trade mark and is used 
for labelling or packing goods, as a business paper, or for advertising goods or services; while 
section 17(5) states that infringing articles mean articles which are specifically designed or 
adapted for making copies of a sign similar or identical to the registered mark. See Annand 
(1994) 181 for a discussion of these definitions. 
29 Section 15(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). 
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likely that it will not be complied with, the court may order delivery to someone for 
erasure or destruction.30 
The order can be made only against the infringer, and the remedy is in the court's 
discretion. 31 
This form of order corresponds to the traditional view of delivery up and actually 
appears to be a statutory restatement of this remedy. 
2.2.2 Delivery up orders 
Section 16 of the Act provides for delivery up. The proprietor of a registered trade mark 
may apply for delivery up of any goods, material, or articles which a person has in his 
possession, custody, or control in the course of a business. This section is wider than 
the previous one; delivery up can be ordered against anyone, not only the defendant, 
as long as the person possesses such goods in the course of a business.32 The request 
must be made by the proprietor, a requirement which does not appear in section 15. 
Provision is made in the Act for a cut-off date after which delivery up cannot be 
requested. 33 
Section 19 of the Act allows for a further order. It provides that where infringing goods, 
material, or articles have been delivered up, a further application must be made for 
30 Section 15(2). 
31 Annand (1994) 180. 
32 Section 16(1) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK) states that the proprietor 'may apply to the court 
for an order for the delivery up to him, or such other person as the court may direct. of any 
infringing goods, material or articles which a person has in his possession. custody or control 
in the course of a business' (emphasis added). This contrasts with section 15(1 ), which states 
that '[w]here a person is found to have infringed a registered trade mark, the court may make an 
order requiring hirrl (emphasis added) to erase or delete the mark. Section 99( 1 ), the equivalent 
provision in the Copyright Act 1988 has been interpreted by the court as meaning that delivery 
up can be ordered against an innocent retailer: Lagenes (1991) 493. 
33 Section 18 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). 
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their destruction or forfeiture. An application may also be made, presumably by the 
defendant or possessor of the goods, that no such order be made. Before making any 
order under this section, the court must consider whether other remedies could 
adequately compensate the proprietor and licensee and protect their interests. Anyone 
who may have an interest in the goods must be notified of such an application, may 
oppose it, and may appeal against an order made pursuant to it.34 
It is clear from sections 16 and 19 that, despite the use of the term delivery up, we are 
here not dealing with delivery up in the equitable sense, but rather with a new 
substantive remedy. 
The remedy is available against third parties and it is not directly connected to the grant 
of an injunction against the infringer. Although it grants persons with an interest in the 
goods the opportunity to be heard,35 it makes it clear that forfeiture of the goods may 
be ordered for the plaintiffs benefit, as the court is required to consider whether other 
remedies 'would be adequate to compensate the proprietor and any licensees'. 36 
Neither of these sections has been considered by the courts or by writers on the new 
Act. But it would appear that what the legislature intended was a remedy differing from 
what has previously been understood as delivery up. This contention is supported by 
the fact that the traditional form of delivery up has been retained but is now termed an 
erasure order. The assumption is strengthened if the equivalent provisions of the 
Copyright Act 1988 are considered.37 
34 Section 19(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Section 19(2). 
37 See 2.3 of this chapter. 
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2.3 DELIVERY UP IN TERMS OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT 1988 
Section 99 of the Copyright Act provides that, if a person has an infringing copy in his 
possession in the course of business, the owner of copyright in the work may apply to 
court for an order compelling that person to deliver up the infringing copy. Section 114 
then provides for a further order forfeiting the infringing copy to the copyright owner, 
or for destruction of the copy. 
Section 99(1) has been held to apply against third parties.38 laddie, relying on 
Hansard, 39 states that the intention of the legislature with these provisions was to 
compensate the copyright owner for the abolition of conversion damages.40 The 
problem foreseen by the legislature was that, with the abolition of conversion damages, 
a copyright owner could be left with inadequate relief if the infringer were unable to pay 
an award of damages.41 The new provisions allow the court, in appropriate 
circumstances, to order delivery up for the benefit of the copyright owner. As laddie 
points out, the equitable remedy of delivery up has always been available to a 
copyright owner. 42 Therefore, unless the statutory provisions have created a different 
remedy, they are tautologous.43 
2.4 OVERVIEW 
It is clear that a distinction must now be made between the traditional form of delivery 
up and that described by the two statutes above. The equitable and the statutory form 
38 Lagenes (1991) 492: 'I do not feel able to read the reference to "a person" at the beginning of 
section 99(1) as a reference to "an infringer'" (at 504). 
39 House of Lords Official Report (1987); House of Commons, Standing Committee E (1988). 
40 Laddie (1995) 934. 
41 Idem at 934-935. 
42 Idem at 924. 
43 Idem at 934. 
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of delivery up bear very little resemblance to each other, and it can be argued that the 
remedy termed delivery up contained in the Trade Marks Act 1994 is intended to serve 
the same purpose as its counterpart in the Copyright Act 1988. 
3 AUSTRALIA 
In Australia, delivery up has never been included in the statutory remedies available 
for trade mark infringement. However, obliteration or erasure of offending marks is 
described as 'part of [the] inherent equitable jurisdiction'44 of Australian courts. It is 
generally accepted by writers that erasure is the preferred relief, but that delivery up 
may be ordered if erasure is impractical.45 In one instance an Australian court refused 
to order delivery up or destruction of the goods to which the trade mark was affixed. It 
stated that although the defendant could not lawfully sell such goods with the trade 
mark affixed, if he expunged the mark from the goods, he could do what he liked with 
them.46 
Delivery up in Australia corresponds to the traditional English approach, not the 
statutory innovation. 
4 CANADA 
In Canada, section 53 of the Trade Marks Act 1953 provides that, in trade mark 
infringement proceedings, a court may give directions with regard to the disposal of 
offending wares, packages, labels, and advertising material and dies used in 
connection with them. Such disposal can include orders for erasure or destruction by 
the defendant, or delivery to the plaintiff. The form of such an order and the 
44 Ricketson (1984) 720. 
45 McKeough & Stewart (1991) 34; Ricketson (1984) 720; Shanahan (1990) 359. 
46 Co/beam Pa/mer(1968) 39. 
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circumstances in which it will be granted are still governed by English practice.47 
Canadian writers emphasise the necessity of balancing the plaintiffs right to protection 
of his mark with the defendant's property rights, and argue that the plaintiff is not 
entitled to be enriched by the order. 48 
The traditional English view of delivery up is therefore followed in Canada. 
5 SOUTH AFRICA 
5.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
5.1.1 Pre-Union decisions 
The first legislation dealing with trade marks, Act 22 of 1877 in the Cape Colony, was 
based largely on the 1875 English Act. The remedies were also similar. The Act 
provided that registration was a prerequisite to 'prevent or recover damages'49 for 
infringement. 
In the light of the English influence on trade mark litigation, and bearing in mind that 
provision was made in the Act for remedies other than pecuniary damages, it is 
remarkable that in all early Cape trade mark litigation only one request was made for 
an order for delivery up. In this decision an interdict was granted, but not the prayer for 
delivery up.50 However, the prayer was neither canvassed nor disputed by counsel or 
by the court. 
The first legislation in the Transvaal was based not on equivalent English legislation, 
47 Fox (1972) 458. 
48 Cairns (1988) 61; Fox (1972) 458. 
49 Section 1 of the Cape Colony Act 22 of 1877. 
50 Lever Bros (1900) 660. 
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but on legislation in force in the Netherlands. It provided for damages as the only 
remedy. 51 Legislation52 following annexation of the Transvaal was based on English 
legislation and was substantially similar to that in force in the Cape Colony. 
Although the English influence in the field of trade mark legislation and litigation was 
less noticeable in the Transvaal than in the Cape, delivery up orders were routinely 
granted in the Transvaal despite the lack of statutory provision for this remedy. The first 
reported trade mark infringement action in which an order for delivery up was granted, 
was in 1904.53 Here, without argument or consideration, the defendant was ordered to 
hand over under oath, to the sheriff of the Transvaal, all labels in his possession 
bearing the word 'Khedive'. Delivery up was requested in two further instances. In the 
first, a final interdict was granted but it is not stated whether the court also granted 
delivery up.54 In the second, the plaintiffs were not able to prove infringement and so 
delivery up was not ordered.55 In neither instance was the correctness of such an order 
queried. 
5.1.2 Legislation after Union 
Neither the 1916 nor the 1963 Trade Marks Act dealt specifically with delivery up as 
a form of relief. Both merely provided that proceedings could be instituted to prevent 
or recover damages for the infringement of a trade mark. 56 Despite this, a number of 
requests were made for delivery up under both Acts. 
51 Section 14 of Transvaal Act 6 of 1892. 
52 Transvaal Proc 23of1902. 
53 Le Khedive ( 1904) 65. 
54 United Tobacco (1909) 155. 
55 Distilleerderij (1913) 3. 
56 Section 124 of the Trade Marks and Copyright Act of 1916 (SA); section 43 of the Trade Marks 
Act of 1963 (SA). 
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5.1.3 Court decisions after Union 
In the first case under the 1916 Act, the court granted a delivery up order, despite the 
fact that, according to the case notes and argument, all that was sought was a final 
interdict. The court based its order on the fact that 'there is no evidence before the 
court that there may not be other labels and packets in the possession of the 
respondents'.57 Delivery up was subsequently granted in two further instances, in both 
of which trade mark infringement and passing off were found to be present.58 The 
remedy was requested in a number of other trade mark infringement and passing off 
cases, where the plaintiffs were unsuccessful for other reasons. 59 In all these 
proceedings, the correctness of a delivery up order was never queried. It is also 
possible that more such orders were granted than appears from decided cases, as very 
often all that was asked for, and granted, was an interdict and ancillary relief, which 
could have included delivery up. 
Delivery up was also granted in litigation under the 1963 Act. Despite the absence of 
legislative provision for the remedy, South African courts routinely granted such orders 
in varying forms. Before the Anton Piller type decisions which will be discussed later, 
the correctness of such an order was never doubted. 
The first order for delivery up in trade mark infringement proceedings in terms of the 
1963 Act was made in 1976. This was an action for an interdict based on infringement 
of a registered trade mark. The mark consisted of three stripes and a heel patch 
applied to shoes. An order for delivery up of the infringing shoes was requested. 
Although the correctness of such an order was not disputed in principle by the 
defendant, he asked for the order to be amended to compel the defendant to remove 
the offending marks from the shoes concerned. The eventual order was for removal of 
57 Glenton & Mitchell (1918) 267-268. 
58 Goddard (1924) 324; Peter Jackson (1938) 457. 
59 Com Products (1922) 163; Crossfield (1925) 217; Zyp Products (1926) 225; Lasar(1954) 132. 
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the offending mark from the shoes by the defendant or alternatively, at his option, 
delivery to the plaintiff.60 
The next case in which ar order for delivery up was made was based on infringement 
of a registered trade mark with an alternative claim for passing off. Infringement was 
found and an order was granted calling upon the respondent to remove the offending 
mark from all products, packaging, and printed matter; alternatively, at his option, to 
destroy all such items; or alternatively, again at his option, to deliver them to the 
applicant. Compliance with either of the first two options was to be confirmed under 
oath.61 
In a Natal decision, the defendant was ordered to deliver up to the plaintiff for 
destruction or erasure bottles of oil and various types of printed matter bearing the 
infringing trade mark. Here the defendant was granted no alternative and nothing was 
stated in the order about the subsequent fate of the bottles of oil.62 
In the only case in which delivery up was ordered where both infringement and passing 
off were found, the respondent was ordered to deliver up to the applicant for 
destruction all containers and printed matter bearing the offending mark or get-up. 
Again, the respondent was not afforded the option of himself destroying the items or 
erasing the mark or get-up.63 
Delivery up for destruction of documents was ordered in Zenith Clothing,64 while in 1983 
the Appellate Division confirmed, without discussion, a similar order granted by the trial 
60 adidas (1976) 540-541. 
61 John Craig (1977) 159. 
62 Hudson & Knight (1979) 227. 
63 Juvena (1980) 224. 
64 Zenith Clothing (1981) 68. 
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court.65 
5.1.4 Other authority 
The correctness of delivery up orders has seldom been questioned by South African 
writers on intellectual property.00 When the only South African textbook on trade marks 
first appeared in 1964 it stated that, in addition to an interdict, in both infringement and 
passing off cases the following relief could be sought: 
'(i) delivery up for destruction, or for erasure of the trade mark, name, label 
or get-up, as the case might be, of all goods bearing the trade mark, 
name, label or get-up and in the possession of or under the control of the 
defendant; 
(ii) delivery up for destruction of all boxes, cartons, wrappers or other 
containers and all advertising matter or other literature in the possession 
of or under the control of the defendant upon or in which the trade mark, 
name, label or get-up appears;' .67 
In neither this, nor the second edition of this work,68 was any South African authority 
furnished to substantiate the statement that the remedy was available in South Africa. 
Subsequent writers on trade marks and passing off also assumed the existence of such 
an order without questioning its correctness. Van Heerden and Neethling69 state that 
delivery to the plaintiff for either erasure or destruction is available to prevent continued 
65 Triang (1985) 463. 
66 But see Kelbrick (1987) 12. 
67 Chowles & Webster (1964) 285. 
68 Chowles & Webster (1972) 240. 
69 Van Heerden & Neethling (1995) 194-195. 
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infringement in passing off actions, a view shared by Naude.70 Hertzog,71 too, states that 
the remedy was available in instances of trade mark infringement. 
5.1.5 Overview 
The position as illustrated by the decisions and writers discussed above was that, 
before 1984, delivery up was accepted as a remedy by South African courts in 
intellectual property infringement proceedings. But the form of such an order, the items 
to which it related, and the circumstances in which it was granted were uncertain. This 
position was in all likelihood occasioned by the adoption, without due consideration, 
of the equivalent English remedy. 
5.2 THE EFFECT OF ANTON PILLER ORDERS ON THE REMEDY 
5.2.1 Anton Piller orders 
An Anton Piller order is an ex parte order, usually granted in camera, authorising 
search, seizure, and disclosure. 
These orders originated in England. They authorised a search of the defendant's 
premises and seizure of incriminating evidence to preserve it for use in subsequent 
proceedings.12 The first such order was an interlocutory order made during the course 
of an action for copyright infringement, in which, inter alia, delivery up of infringing 
material had been requested.73 The interlocutory order included an order entitling the 
plaintiffs solicitors to retain in their custody tapes which infringed the plaintiffs 
70 LAWSA Competition (1977) 314; LAWSA Competition (1993) 274. 
71 Hertzog (1981) 239. 
72 Bean (1994) 138-139; Cornish (1989) 47. 
73 EM/ Ltd (1975) 420. 
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copyright.74 These items were not delivered up to the plaintiff in the traditional sense 
of such orders, but were to be held in safekeeping until final determination of the 
parties' respective rights. The order was therefore not one for delivery up for erasure 
or destruction by either party, but merely for safekeeping to ensure that the items were 
not destroyed or disposed of before the determination of the main action. Subsequent 
British decisions dealing with this type of order all draw the same distinction.75 
5.2.2 South African Anton Piller orders76 
In South Africa the distinction between delivery up and interim attachment orders was 
blurred in the very first reported decision in which an Anton Piller type order was 
granted. In Roamer Watch, Anton Piller type interim relief - search, disclosure, and 
attachment - and an interim interdict were granted ex parte on an urgent basis.77 
Unfortunately the prayer and order dealing with attachment directed 'that the 
respondent deliver up to the Deputy Sheriff of this court for removal and safekeeping'78 
the watches which allegedly infringed the applicants' trade mark. The order was 
obviously not for delivery up as traditionally understood in intellectual property matters, 
but merely for interim attachment. 79 
On the return day Cilliers AJ, in deciding whether to confirm the order, considered the 
justification for the interim attachment order. He sought to distinguish between an 
attachment order in Anton Piller type proceedings and an interim order for delivery up, 
presumably because he felt that an Anton Piller order was not necessary to preserve 
74 At425. 
75 Anton Piller(1976) 783; Universal City(1976) 570; Gates (1982) 341. 
76 See Du Plessis (1984) 156, Erasmus (1984) 324, and Rutherford (1984) 149 generally for these 
orders in South African practice. See also Coetzee (1985) 634 for criticism of these orders. 
77 Roamer Watch (1980) 261. 
78 Ibid. 
79 See Shoba (1995) 19, where the court held that an Anton Piller order is not an interim interdict 
but grants instant procedural relief; see also Erasmus (1996) 4. 
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evidence, as this could be done by means of photographs and inventories of the 
infringing articles.80 I think that this approach is incorrect. The court, although itself 
distinguishing between procedural and substantive relief,81 did not appreciate that 
although the relevant prayer requested delivery up, in the present case this was not the 
substantive relief afforded as part of a permanent interdict, but merely procedural relief 
designed to preserve the relevant articles.82 An order for delivery up can never be 
granted on an interim basis, as its purpose is to dispose finally of the infringing marks 
or articles. 
The incorrect use of the term delivery up, with its specific meaning which encompasses 
erasure or destruction by the defendant or delivery to the plaintiff of the infringing items 
for destruction, was perpetuated in subsequent Anton Piller type proceedings, 
particularly those concerning intellectual property. While in certain reported decisions 
attachment and removal for safekeeping were requested,83 in others delivery up for 
safekeeping by the deputy sheriff was requested.84 
This confusion was further compounded by the fact that Anton Piller type relief was 
often coupled to an interim interdict in which it was stated that on the return day a 
permanent interdict and delivery up would be requested. 
5.2.3 The Cerebos decision 
It was presumably these considerations which led Van Dijkhorst J, in the leading 
decision on the justification or otherwise of the existence of Anton Piller type orders in 
South Africa, to include in his description of the components of such an order 
80 At284. 
81 At 268. 
82 See Erasmus (1984) 331. 
83 Wilrose Timbers (1980) 288; Petre & Madco (1984) 852. 
84 Continental Wholesalers (1983) 686; Easyfind (1983) 921; House of Jewels (1983) 825. 
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'[o]rders for the production and handing over of a thing to which no right is 
claimed, but as part of an interdict to make the interdict effective, for example by 
erasure of a trade mark from the defendant's goods. '85 
The original notice of motion in this application contained no prayer for delivery up; all 
that was requested in prayer 7 was authorisation for the deputy sheriff to remove and 
retain in his possession the documents specified in a previous prayer.86 It was not even 
specifically stated in the notice that delivery up would be requested when proceedings 
for a final interdict were instituted.87 Delivery up was also not canvassed in the heads 
of argument by either counsel for the applicant or counsel for the court. It can therefore 
only be assumed that the court viewed delivery up as one of the components of an 
Anton Piller type order by reference to previous similar decisions, specifically that given 
in Roamer Watc/788 where the term delivery up was, as illustrated above, incorrectly 
used when what was actually requested was an interim attachment order. 
5.2.4 Interpretation of Cerebos decision 
I believe that the court erred in holding that an order for delivery up is a component of 
an Anton Piller type order. The court's own description of such an order - 'as part of an 
interdict to make an interdict effective'89 - presupposes the grant of a final interdict, as 
only after final determination of the parties' respective rights may an order such as that 
mentioned by the court as an example - erasure of an offending trade mark - be 
granted. It follows that such an order can never be granted in interlocutory or 
anticipatory proceedings such as Anton Piller type orders. In no English or South 
African decision has delivery up for erasure or destruction ever been ordered except 
85 Cerebos (1984) 164. 
86 Notice of motion filed in case no 4340/84 TPD 3. 
87 Prayer 10.1.1 of case no 4340/84 TPD 4. 
88 Roamer Watch ( 1980) 284-285. 
89 Cerebos (1984) 164. 
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as part of a final, as opposed to an interlocutory, interdict. 
5.2.5 Effect of the Cerebos decision on delivery up orders 
Although the judgment was clearly obiter as regards delivery up as a final order, it 
introduced uncertainty as to whether South African courts would continue to order 
delivery up in intellectual property infringement cases. 00 
The Cerebos court used as example of delivery up the erasure of a trade mark, despite 
the fact that the issue before it was one of unlawful competition, not trade mark 
infringement. Although it held that delivery up should not be ordered as it presupposed 
that an interdict would be ignored, it appears that delivery up to a plaintiff for erasure, 
as an alternative to erasure of the offending mark by the defendant, at the defendant's 
option, was viewed as an acceptable order.91 Why such an order was not also viewed 
as presupposing that a prohibitory interdict would be disregarded,92 is unclear. 
The validity of Anton Piller orders was considered by the Appellate Division in 1986. 
The court did not consider the correctness of the Cerebos finding that a delivery up 
order formed part of an Anton Piller order.93 But in the same year, when the validity of 
a delivery up order was challenged on appeal, the Appellate Division ordered that 
infringing marks be removed by the defendant under the plaintiffs' supervision.94 
The correctness of such orders was next considered in Stauffer, an instance of patent 
infringement. Although section 65(3) of the Patents Act of 1978 makes specific 
provision for delivery up as competent relief, the court stated that such relief had been 
90 See Job (1995) 27. 
91 At 173, citing adidas (1976) and John Craig (1977) as authority. 
92 At 173. 
93 Universal City (1986) 753 and 756. 
94 Berman Bros (1986) 247. 
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granted as a matter of course prior to this enactment and held, relying on Cerebos, that 
the purpose of such an order was to make an interdict more effective.95 The court held 
that section 65(3) merely codified existing practice and that the English rules should 
be followed, which meant that a delivery up order could not be granted except as an 
adjunct to an interdict. Consequently, if an interdict could not be granted because the 
patent had expired, a delivery up order was likewise excluded.96 
In a subsequent instance of unlawful competition, where the plaintiff had requested 
delivery up or alternatively destruction on oath, the court ordered the defendant to 
destroy all advertising material.97 
Interestingly, when that part of the Cerebos decision which dealt with delivery up was 
considered in an instance of copyright infringement, the court held that this did not 
constitute authority for the submission that delivery up was no longer available, as the 
court in Cerebos was 'not concerned with the remedies of, or the relief available to, the 
holders of rights of a proprietary nature'. 98 The court held that as section 24( 1) of the 
Copyright Act of 1978 provides that delivery up is available to the plaintiff 'as [it] is 
available in any corresponding proceedings in respect of infringements of other 
proprietary rights', and as owners of other proprietary rights were entitled to delivery 
up orders, it could grant such an order. 99 No authority was given for the finding that 
delivery up is generally available to owners of proprietary rights. Most recently, delivery 
up was ordered in an instance of copyright infringement without consideration of the 
correctness of such an order. 100 
95 Stauffer(1988) 810. 
96 Ibid. 
97 William Grant (1990) 926. 
98 Ara Oy(1990) 370. 
99 At 369. 
100 Nintendo (1995) 250. 
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The most recent edition of the textbook by Webster and Page, which appeared after 
the Cerebos decision, deals with delivery up in more detail than previous editions. The 
authors view the decision in Cerebos as incorrect as regards delivery up: they argue 
that it is a procedural remedy falling within the court's inherent jurisdiction to regulate 
its procedure.101 Van Heerden and Neethling, writing on unlawful competition in 1995, 
also view the remedy as available and describe it as follows: 'the plaintiff may also ask 
for ancillary relief to prevent the possibility of the continuation of the passing off, such 
as an order for the delivery up of the goods concerned for the purpose of destruction 
thereof, or for erasure of the offending mark'. 102 
5.3 CURRENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGISLATION 
5.3.1 Trade Marks Act of 1993 
The current Trade Marks Act provides that the proprietor of a registered mark is entitled 
to an order 'for removal of the infringing mark from all material and, where the infringing 
mark is inseparable or incapable of being removed from the material, an order that all 
such material be delivered up to the proprietor'. 103 Strangely, no provision is made for 
the subsequent fate of the material if it is delivered up to the plaintiff, in contrast to the 
extensive disposal order provisions in the current English legislation.104 This provision 
has not been judicially considered. 
5.3.2 Copyright and patent legislation 
Provision is made for statutory delivery up in both current statutes. 
101 Webster & Page (1986) 325. 
102 Van Heerden & Neethling (1995) 194-195 (emphasis added). Interestingly, while all the cases 
cited above in which delivery up was granted for either trade mark infringement or passing off 
are cited as authority, the authors do not refer here to the Cerebos decision. 
103 Section 34(3)(b) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
104 Section 19 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). 
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The Patents Act of 1978 provides that 'a plaintiff in proceedings for infringement shall 
be entitled to relief by way of an interdict, delivery up of anything involving 
infringement' .105 
The Copyright Act of 1988 provides that 'in any action for such an infringement all such 
relief by way of damages, interdict, delivery of infringing copies or plates used or 
intended to be used for infringing copies or otherwise shall be available to the plaintiff 
as is available in any corresponding proceedings in respect of infringements of other 
proprietary rights'. 106 
5.3.3 Counterfeit Goods Bill 
This Bill authorises a court in civil or criminal proceedings relating to counterfeit goods 
to order delivery up in certain circumstances. If the subject matter of an intellectual 
property right has been unlawfully applied to goods, and the goods have been found 
to be counterfeit, the court may order delivery up to the owner of the right, irrespective 
of the outcome of the proceedings. 101 If delivery up has been ordered, the goods may 
not be released into the channels of commerce upon mere removal of the infringing 
mark or other subject of an intellectual property right, unless the court orders 
otherwise.108 The Bill does not clearly indicate what is to be done with the counterfeit 
goods after delivery up. The reference to removal of the infringing mark cannot be 
viewed as an erasure order, if the goods may not be released for commercial reuse. 
The memorandum on the objects of the Bill states that the court may decide what is to 
be done with the counterfeit goods and order that the alleged offender forfeit the goods 
even though a claim against him cannot be substantiated.109 
105 Section 65(3). 
106 Section 24(1). 
107 Clause 10(1)(a) of the Counterfeit Goods Bill of 1997. 
108 Clause 10(2)(a). 
109 Counterfeit Goods Bill of 1997 42. 
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'Forfeiture' has a different meaning to 'destruction', which is what would usually be 
ordered in respect of infringing goods. Forfeiture is also the word used in section 
19(1)(a) of the English Trade Marks Act 1994 and section 114(1)(a) of the English 
Copyright Act 1988. It is unclear whether Parliament intends to introduce something 
akin to the statutory delivery up of these English statutes, but I think that the Bill as 
presently drafted is too vague for our courts to make such an order. If this is the 
intention of Parliament, it is advisable specifically to provide that a court may in 
appropriate circumstances order forfeiture of counterfeit goods to the owner of the 
intellectual property right as recompense for infringement. If Parliament does not intend 
to introduce this remedy, I think that clause 10(1)(a) of the Bill should be amended to 
refer to 'delivery up for destruction'. 
5.4 CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE REMEDY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
5.4.1 Potential problems 
The provisions for erasure or delivery up in current legislation would appear to 
guarantee the availability of this remedy in South African intellectual property 
proceedings. This is not necessarily so. 
First, as regards trade mark practice, the legislative provisions apply to registered trade 
marks only, and the availability of the remedy is therefore not guaranteed in instances 
of passing off. 110 
Second, the Cerebos decision did not prohibit delivery up as remedy only in respect of 
trade mark infringement proceedings; it merely used such proceedings as an example. 
The court's objection was to the assumption that a prohibitory interdict would not be 
obeyed.111 Although the judgment was obiter as regards delivery up as final relief, the 
11 O See also Roamer Watch ( 1980) 285, where the court held that it was not necessary to decide 
whether delivery up was competent in cases of passing off. 
111 Cerebos (1984) 173. 
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court's objection can be viewed as equally relevant to statutory delivery up. 
Third, the ambit and availability of the remedy has never been thoroughly canvassed 
in intellectual property proceedings. It is possible that, if this ever occurs, delivery up 
might meet the same fate as an account of profits. 
It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether any basis for such a remedy exists in 
South African common law. 
5.4.2 South African basis for the remedy 
There is no doubt that the traditional English delivery up order was viewed as 
procedural relief and would be granted only together with a prohibitory injunction. This 
has its basis in history and can be traced to the equitable development of the remedy. 
As set out above, this equitable remedy was granted by South African courts without 
any consideration of its right to existence in this country. When considering the remedy, 
our courts and writers have, in accordance with the English approach, viewed it as a 
form of procedural relief. 112 This view was strengthened by the description of the 
traditional English form of delivery up in Roamer Watch as 'ancillary to relief granted 
by way of injunction and in order to render the injunction effective' .113 
5.4.2.1 Procedural or substantive relief 
There is no reason to regard delivery up as procedural relief in South Africa. The 
remedy will not be accepted by our courts on the basis of its equitable origin, but must 
be shown to be acceptable in terms of South African common law. If it is argued that 
it is procedural relief, the danger arises that a court will decide that the specific 
112 Cerebos (1984) 173; stauffer(1988) 810; Ara Oy (1990) 369; Webster & Page (1986) 325; Van 
Heerden & Neethling (1995) 194. 
113 Roamer Watch (1980) 284. 
Chapter 7: Delivery up 303 
circumstances do not fall within its inherent jurisdiction to grant such relief. While it is 
feasible that a court will view an order for the removal by a defendant of some labels 
from goods as within its inherent jurisdiction to regulate its procedure, it is less likely 
to grant an order for the destruction of large amounts of valuable goods as falling 
'within its inherent jurisdiction'. 
The court in Roamer made this distinction clear. Cilliers AJ described Anton Piller 
orders as 'extraordinary procedural relief when contrasting them with interim traditional 
delivery up orders as 'protection against infringement of his substantive rights' .114 He 
clearly viewed delivery up, as final relief, as a substantive remedy. 115 
When considering the distinction between substantive and procedural law, the 
Appellate Division quoted the following from Salmond: 
'Substantive law is concerned with the ends which the administation of justice 
seeks; procedural law deals with the means and instuments whereby those ends 
are to be attained'. 116 
It held that '[i]t is difficult to compose a closer definition of the distinction than this' .111 
In the light of this definition, delivery up for erasure or destruction should not be 
described as merely an order 'to make the interdict effective' .118 A plaintiff seeking an 
order for erasure or delivery up for destruction does not merely wish to ensure that the 
114 Roamer Watch (1980) 275. The court also stated that the Anton Piller order 'should go no further 
than is necessary for the preservation of the evidence . . . it should not, as far as may be 
practicable, afford an applicant the substantive relief which he may be entitled to at a later stage' 
(at 273). 
115 This interpretation is confirmed by Erasmus ( 1984) 331. 
116 Salmond (1957) 504. 
117 Universal City (1986) 755. 
118 Cerebos (1984) 173. 
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prohibitory interdict against future infringement is obeyed; he requires that existing 
infringing goods be disposed of. 
5.4.2.2 Delivery up as mandatory interdict 
There is another basis on which such orders can be justified in terms of the South 
African common law. 
Delivery up can be described as a form of mandatory final interdict which, in 
appropriate circumstances, may be granted together with or in lieu of a prohibitory final 
interdict. As regards trade mark infringement, a mandatory interdict is necessary to deal 
with acts of infringement which have already occurred, while in respect of passing off 
such an interdict is necessary to deal with articles which pose a potential threat to the 
plaintiff's goodwill. 
The standard form of interdict applied for in trade mark litigation, which orders the 
defendant to cease use of the mark, and grants a delivery up order for erasure or 
destruction of infringing articles, combines a prohibitory and a mandatory interdict. The 
prohibitory interdict relates to future injury as the defendant cannot be ordered to 
refrain from doing something which has already been done. The mandatory interdict, 
ordering him to erase or dispose of the offending mark or hand it over to the plaintiff for 
destruction, is therefore necessary to deal with acts of infringement which have already 
occurred. 119 
In the case of registered trade marks, an act of infringement occurs immediately the 
offending mark is applied without authorisation, as the proprietor of a trade mark has 
119 Jones & Buckle (1996) Act 87 states that 'an interdict is not a remedy for a past invasion of 
rights'; its authors rely on Stauffer (1988) 805. This was an instance where an interdict was 
requested in respect of an expired patent; the court proceeded to hold that an interdict 'is for the 
protection of an existing right' (at 809). The right to exclusive use of a registered trade mark, or 
to protection of goodwill, are continuing rights. 
Chapter 7: Delivery up 305 
the exclusive right to the use of his mark.120 The prejudice remains potential, not actual, 
if the infringing articles are still in the defendant's possession, but must nevertheless 
be averted by some form of court order. 
In cases of passing off, both the infringement and the prejudice are potential rather 
than actual if the articles have not yet been made available to the public, since public 
deception or confusion is an essential element of the delict. 121 However, once articles 
which will cause deception exist, the plaintiff is entitled to ask the court for an order 
dealing with such articles, as an interdict may be obtained on the basis of threatened, 
not only actual, injury. 
The view that such an order is a substantive remedy is confirmed by the current Trade 
Marks Act, which grants an order for removal or delivery up as a separate remedy, and 
does not make it conditional on the grant of a prohibitory interdict.122 
5.4.2.3 Support for argument 
Although our courts have never described a delivery up order as a form of mandatory 
interdict, support for this view is obtained from various writers on allied branches of 
law. 
Textbooks on delict state that an interdict may include an order requiring a person to 
do some positive act to remedy a wrongful state of affairs for which he was 
responsible. 123 When dealing with the right to privacy, Neethling specifically states that 
apart from a prohibitory interdict preventing disclosure of private information, a 
120 Shalom Investments (1971) 706. 
121 Van Heerden & Neethling (1995) 186. 
122 Section 24(3)(b) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 (SA). 
123 Neethling (1994) 248. Neethling uses as examples of a mandatory interdict, the command to 
destroy copies of a book that infringe copyright or labels that constitute delivery up (at 248 
footnote 20). See also Van der Merwe & Olivier (1989) 259. 
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mandatory interdict should be granted ordering destruction of the embodiments of such 
information, as without such an order the threatened or continued invasion of privacy 
cannot be effectively prevented. 124 Wiehahn, dealing with boycott as a form of delict, 125 
and Van Heerden, dealing with competition, 126 also hold the view that a mandatory 
interdict is necessary to render an existing unlawful position innocuous. As Van 
Heerden says, the function of an interdict, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is 
preventative, and the plaintiff is entitled to protection against ongoing or further injury, 
both in respect of existing and future acts. 121 
Support for this view can also be found in a textbook on copyright. Copeling, discussing 
interdicts as remedy in copyright litigation, argues that a mandatory interdict for 
destruction of infringing copies would be justified although, as he points out, in 
copyright matters the same result could be achieved through the statutory form of 
delivery up.128 
6 CONCLUSION 
Delivery up for erasure or destruction can be justified as a mandatory interdict only if 
the plaintiff obtains no benefit from the goods. Delivery up for the plaintiff himself to 
obtain financial advantage from the infringing goods has no basis in our common law. 
The form of order suggested by Webster and Page, while dealing with infringing goods 
as well as printed material, also confirms that the order is one for erasure or disposal, 
and that the goods do not become the plaintiff's property. 129 
124 Neethling (1996) 261 footnote 154. 
125 Wiehahn (1973) 207. 
126 Van Heerden (1961) 195. 
127 Idem at 196. 
128 Copeling ( 1978) 60 footnote 1 and 63. 
129 Webster & Page (1986) 325. 
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A delivery up order does on occasion cause conflict between the plaintiffs intellectual 
property rights and the defendant's property rights. I have suggested that, for this 
reason, the traditional English form of order, in which the defendant is always given the 
option of himself erasing the mark or otherwise altering or destroying the goods rather 
than delivering the items concerned to the plaintiff, should be followed in South 
Africa. 130 This is in accordance with our common law and offers the defendant the 
opportunity of minimising any financial loss he may suffer. The plaintiff is protected if 
he is afforded the opportunity of either supervising the erasure or destruction by the 
defendant, or of having these actions confirmed on oath, should the defendant elect to 
deal with the relevant items himself. 
The new copyright and trade mark legislation in England alters the concept of delivery 
up. It is clear that the statutory delivery up for which provision is made in English 
copyright and trade mark infringement proceedings is not viewed as the equitable form 
of delivery up (for erasure or destruction) but may on occasion serve as recompense 
to the plaintiff. It more closely resembles the conversion remedy than delivery up in the 
equitable sense. 
It is essential that South African courts and writers do not confuse the traditional 
English remedy with the statutory English innovation. Any attempt to introduce the 
statutory innovation in South Africa is doomed to failure, in the absence of express 
statutory provisions. It is clear that what our legislature intended by reference to 
delivery up is the traditional form of this remedy. 
The South African Trade Marks Act of 1993 fails to state what will become of goods 
which have been delivered up to a plaintiff. To ensure that delivery up orders are not 
rejected by our courts as in conflict with our common law, I believe that section 34(3)(b) 
of the Act requires amendment by the insertion of the words 'for destruction' at the end 
130 Kelbrick (1987) 22. 
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of the subsection, and that requests for such orders are phrased accordingly. I also 
think that section 34(3)(b) should be strictly applied, and that delivery up to the plaintiff, 
rather than removal by the defendant, should be granted only if the mark is truly 
incapable of removal, or if the defendant has been shown to be untrustworthy. 
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CHAPTERS 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF TRIPS 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI) was signed in April 1994. This 
agreement includes an annexure on trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
(TRIPS). The history of the inclusion of intellectual property concerns in an agreement 
on international trade policy is not relevant for purposes of this work. 1 It is sufficient to 
note that although intellectual property rights were first included in negotiations to deal 
with the problems of counterfeiting,2 the eventual agreement was expanded to create 
a minimum international standard of intellectual property protection.3 This included core 
principles governing enforcement of intellectual property rights, both internally and to 
regulate border controls.4 The enforcement of rights is viewed as one of the most 
important aspects of TRIPS, as no matter how extensive the protection of rights, if 
enforcement procedures are inadequate or ineffective, the rights are of little value. 5 
Part Ill of TRIPS deals with the enforcement of intellectual property rights. This part of 
the agreement consists of a section on general obligations, followed by sections 
dealing with particular remedies. These remedies are minimum requirements and do 
not prevent countries from making additional remedies available. 
1 See, generally, De Koning (1997) 68-69; Emmert (1990) 1319-1329; Uchtenhagen (1990) 768-
770. 
2 Emmert (1990) 1325. 
3 Cohen (1994) 33; Slaughter (1990) 419. 
4 Hill (1990) 20; Slaughter (1990) 420. 
5 Cohen (1994) 36. 
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2 TERMINOLOGY 
The language of part Ill must be noted. The word 'shall' is frequently used, and the 
word 'may' on occasion. Clearly, when provision is made that 'a member shall' ensure 
that an enforcement procedure is available, this is a command to the member to do so. 
But when it is provided that the 'judicial authorities shall have the authority to order', the 
judicial authority presumably retains the discretion to make such an order only in 
appropriate circumstances. When a member 'may authorise the judicial authorities to 
order', such remedies are optional rather than compulsory. 
3 RELEVANT TRIPS PROVISIONS 
Only those remedies for which specific provision is made in the Trade Marks Act of 
1993 will be dealt with. The relevant parts of this agreement will be considered in the 
sequence followed in the thesis. To date, very little discussion on the interpretation of 
these remedies is generally available.6 The discussion on each provision is my 
interpretation from a South African perspective. 
3.1 PREAMBLE AND GENERAL OBLIGATIONS 
The preamble to TRIPS states that the agreement has been concluded 'taking into 
account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property 
rights', and that the need for new rules and disciplines is recognised concerning 'the 
provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related 
intellectual property rights'. 
The words 'effective' and 'appropriate' are neither defined nor elaborated on in the 
agreement. Presumably, they should be interpreted in the light of the specific 
enforcement provisions contained in part Ill. 
6 When there is a dispute about the interpretation of TRIPS, it should be referred to the TRIPS 
Council, whose interpretation is binding on all members (article 68). 
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3.1.1 Functions of enforcement procedures 
Part Ill deals with the enforcement of intellectual property rights. The general 
obligations set out in article 1 include the requirement that '[m]embers shall ensure that 
enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available under their law so as to 
permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights 
covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements 
and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements'.7 
Of interest here is the requirement that remedies must serve not only to prohibit or 
prevent infringement, but also to deter. It is not clear whether this is a general 
requirement applicable to all remedies, or whether it is limited to specific remedies. 
The article dealing with criminal remedies includes the requirement that they should 
include 'imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent' .8 But 
criminal sanctions need be available only 'in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting 
or copyright piracy on a commercial scale', although members may provide for criminal 
procedures and penalties to be applied in other instances of infringement, in particular 
when committed 'wilfully and on a commercial scale'.9 Criminal remedies need not be 
available, and so are not a deterrent, in all instances of infringement. 
One civil remedy, disposal, also should 'create an effective deterrent to infringement' .10 
It is not clear whether article 41 creates a general obligation in that all remedies should 
serve a deterrent purpose, or whether the fact that the deterrent function is mentioned 
on occasion means that only these remedies must serve this purpose. One 
7 Article 41.1. 
8 Article 61. 
9 Ibid. 
1 O Article 46. 
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multinational proposal11 made during the negotiation phase, suggested that when 
dealing with civil remedies, monetary awards should be 'adequate to compensate the 
owner of the intellectual property rights fully and serve as an effective deterrent to 
infringemenr. 12 The fact that this suggestion was not included in the final agreement 
can be interpreted as limiting the deterrent function to specified remedies. 
The interpretation to be placed on the requirement that remedies must serve a 
deterrent function is unclear. But it is an important innovation as regards civil remedies. 
National trade mark legislation in England, Australia, Canada, and South Africa has 
never treated deterrence as a function of civil remedies, which, traditionally, are 
intended to serve only compensatory and preventative functions. 
3.1.2 Other requirements 
A further requirement included under this heading is that enforcement procedures 'shall 
not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or 
unwarranted delays' .13 
It is tempting to argue that the procedures for obtaining damages, in all jurisdictions, 
can be criticised as complicated and costly. But as these procedures are the same for 
all damages claims, not only those relating to intellectual property infringement, they 
are no doubt covered by the statement in article 41.5, which is discussed in the 
following paragraph. 
The general obligations also contain a statement that 
'[i]t is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place a 
11 Basic framework of GA TT provisions on intellectual property: Statement of views of the 
European, Japanese and United States Business Communities 1988. 
12 Beier (1989) 401 (emphasis added). 
13 Article 41.2. 
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judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from 
that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of 
Members to enforce their law in general' .14 
It can be argued that this statement allows members to refrain from implementing a 
specific remedy if it conflicts with their domestic law. But if the history of this provision 
is considered, this interpretation is incorrect. During the GA TT negotiations, a number 
of the less-developed countries objected to the enforcement provisions on the ground 
that compliance with them would strain already inadequate judicial and administrative 
resources. 15 The statement merely provides that intellectual property enforcement 
procedures are to be accommodated in the existing judicial system: this view is 
reinforced by the further statement that part Ill does not create 'any obligation with 
respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property 
rights and the enforcement of law in general' .16 
3.2 FINAL INTERDICTS 
The following is included under the heading 'Injunctions': 
'The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party to desist from 
an infringement. ... Members are not obliged to accord such authority in respect 
of protected subject matter acquired or ordered by a person prior to knowing or 
having reasonable grounds to know that dealing in such subject matter would 
entail the infringement of an intellectual property right.'11 
It appears that this article provides that members are not obliged to grant interdicts 
14 Article41.5. 
15 GATT Activities (1989) 65; see also De Koning (1997) 74. 
16 Article41.5. 
17 Article 44. 1. 
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against innocent infringers. But the enforcement procedures are minimum measures 
and members are free to impose more onerous procedures. 18 
3.3 INTERLOCUTORY INTERDICTS 
The following is included under the heading 'Provisional Measures': 
'The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order prompt and effective 
provisional measures: 
(a) to prevent an infringement of any intellectual property right from 
occurring' .19 
The article also states that the judicial authorities shall have the authority to adopt 
provisional measures ex parte where appropriate.20 Also, they 
'shall have the authority to require the applicant to provide any reasonably 
available evidence in order to satisfy themselves with a sufficient degree of 
certainty that the ... applicant's right is being infringed or that such infringement 
is imminent, and to order the applicant to provide a security or equivalent 
assurance sufficient to protect the defendant and to prevent abuse'. 
Provision is also made that where provisional measures were found to have been 
inappropriate,21 the applicant can be ordered 'to provide the defendant appropriate 
18 Article 1.1. 
19 Article 50.1. 
20 Article 50.2. See also article 50.4 which states that the affected parties must be given notice 
without delay after the execution of the measures at the latest. 
21 Article 50.7 refers to instances where the measures were revoked, lapsed due to an act or 
ommission by the applicant, or where it is later found that there has been no infringement or 
threat of infringement. 
Chapter 8: Compliance with the requirements of TRIPS 315 
compensation for any injury caused by these measures' .22 
This article is intended to deal with Anton Piller type relief. Whether interlocutory 
interdicts are included here or are viewed as a form of injunction, is arguable. But it 
must be noted that when a provisional remedy is sought, even ex parte, the plaintiff is 
required to satisfy the court 'with a sufficient degree of certainty' that his right has been 
infringed or that infringement is imminent. In addition, the plaintiff should provide some 
form of security or undertaking. 
3.4 DAMAGES 
The requirements as to compensatory damages against infringers are as follows: 
'The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the infringer to pay the 
right holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has 
suffered because of an infringement of that person's intellectual property right 
by an infringer who knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in 
infringing activity'.23 
The article also states that '[t]he judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the 
infringer to pay the right holder expenses, which may include appropriate attorney's 
fees'. 24 
As regards innocent infringers, provision is made that 
'[i]n appropriate cases, Members may authorise the judicial authorities to order 
recovery of profits and/or payment of pre-established damages even where the 
22 Article 50.7. 
23 Article 45.1. 
24 Article 50.2. 
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infringer did not knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engage in 
infringing activity'.25 
Damages are viewed as a compensatory remedy. But as provision is made for an 
innocent infringer to be liable for an account of profits or for statutory damages, the 
question can be raised of the intended level of compensation. 
It is generally accepted that the United States of America was the prime mover behind 
the inclusion of intellectual property rights in GATT.26 American trade mark legislation 
provides for an award of damages27 which includes actual damages and the 
defendant's profits. Actual damages may be awarded in an amount 'not exceeding 
three times such amount'. In addition, if the court finds that the amount of recovery 
based on profits is inadequate, it may enter judgment for an amount it thinks just. 
Despite this, it is stated that the sum constitutes compensation and not a penalty.28 
Is this the form of compensation intended, or the traditional English and South African 
form which merely places the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the 
defendant acted legally? 
The availability of profits or statutory damages against an innocent infringer would 
seem to indicate the former. In many instances, profits or statutory damages may 
exceed any actual damages the plaintiff can prove. It would be inconsistent if a plaintiff 
could recover a larger financial amount against an innocent infringer than against one 
who acted intentionally. It is also unclear whether a plaintiff may request an account 
or statutory damages against an intentional infringer, if available under national 
legislation, rather than compensatory damages, if the former appears more 
25 Ibid. 
26 De Koning (1997) 65-68; Hill (1990) 20; Uchtenhagen (1990) 771. 
27 Title 15 USC§ 1117(a). 
28 Ibid. 
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advantageous. 
3.5 DELIVERY UP 
This remedy is dealt with under the heading 'Other Remedies'. It is provided that 
'[i]n order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial authorities 
shall have the authority to order that goods that they have found to be infringing 
be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of outside the channels of 
commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm caused to the right holder, or, 
unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements, 
destroyed'. 29 
Materials and implements used to create infringing goods may also be disposed of 
outside the channels of commerce. The article provides that 'the need for 
proportionality between the seriousness of the infringement and the remedies ordered 
as well as the interests of third parties' must be taken into account when considering 
a request for disposal. 30 
The article concludes by stating that, in regard to counterfeit trademark goods, 'the 
simple removal of the trademark unlawfully affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in 
exceptional cases, to permit release of the goods into the channels of commerce'. 31 
The meaning of the phrase 'disposed of outside the channels of commerce'32 is unclear. 
It is clearly not destruction, as separate provision is made for that. It can be argued that 
it includes mere removal of a trade mark from the goods, as this remedy is held 
29 Article 46. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 This phrase does not appear in current trade mark legislation in England, Australia, Canada or 
the United States of America. 
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insufficient in instances of counterfeiting. However, mere removal of an infringing mark 
cannot be viewed as serving a deterrent function. 
3.6 COMPENSATION FOR ABUSE OF ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES 
Section 2, which deals with final civil remedies, also provides that the judicial 
authorities 
'shall have the authority to order a party at whose request measures were taken 
and who has abused enforcement procedures to provide to a party wrongfully 
enjoined or restrained adequate compensation for the injury suffered because 
of such abuse'. 33 
The plaintiff may also be ordered to pay the defendant expenses, which may include 
attorney's fees. 34 
I suggest that this implies that, whether or not an undertaking or other form of security 
has been given by a plaintiff, he may be ordered to pay some form of compensation to 
the defendant if a final interdict is not granted. 
4 NATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH TRIPS REQUIREMENTS 
4.1 ENGLAND 
It appears to be generally accepted by English writers that the 1994 Act complies with 
TRIPS,35 as no mention is made of any amendments to the Act which are necessary to 
33 Article 46.1. A similar provision is contained in section 3, which deals with provisional measures. 
Article 50.3 states that the applicant may be required to 'provide a security or equivalent 
assurance sufficient to protect the defendant and to prevent abuse'. 
34 Article 48.2. 
35 See Annand (1994) preface. 
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bring it into line with TRIPS. This is largely correct. But there are a few instances where 
English practice does not correspond precisely to the TRIPS requirements for civil 
remedies. 
4.1.1 Injunctions 
The requirements for final interdicts correspond to English practice, and are available 
against innocent infringers. The requirements for interlocutory interdicts as regards 
undertakings are also met. But the American Cyanamid test for interlocutory interdicts, 36 
which uses balance of convenience as the primary test for relief, would appear not to 
comply with the requirement that a plaintiff must show an infringement of his rights with 
'a sufficient degree of certainty'. 37 
4.1.2 Damages 
The provisions on damages are also met, as both compensatory damages and an 
account of profits are available when infringement is proved. But I think that the 
Edenwest decision, which held that damages are available even in instances of 
innocent infringement,38 is contrary to article 45.1, which grants compensatory damages 
only against infringers who knowingly engaged in infringing activity. 
4.1.3 Delivery up 
The disposal and delivery up provisions are in accordance with TRIPS. 
36 See chapter 4 at 2.1.2.3. 
37 Article 50.3. 
38 See chapter 5 at 3.3.1.3. 
J 
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4.2 AUSTRALIA 
The new Australian Trade Marks Act 1995 was drafted with TRIPS in mind.39 Despite 
this, the Act does not specify the civil remedies available in respect of infringement. It 
merely provides for an injunction, subject to any condition that the court thinks fit, and 
damages or an account of profits, at the plaintiffs option.40 As regards injunctive relief, 
the courts generally require an undertaking before interlocutory relief will be granted, 
and the American Cyanamid approach is not followed to the same extent as in 
England.41 The damages requirements are met, although it is debatable whether the 
availability of damages or accounts against innocent infringers conflicts with TRIPS. 
No statutory provision is made for civil delivery up or disposal, but this remedy has 
always been viewed as available. 
4.3 CANADA 
The civil remedies contained in the Canadian Trade Marks Act have not been amended 
since 1953. The Act provides for injunctions, damages, or profits, and disposal of 
offending wares.42 As other legislation has been passed to comply with various GATI 
provisions,43 it appears that the legislature considers that the TRIPS requirements on 
civil remedies have been met. The availability of injunctions, damages or profits, and 
disposal results in substantial compliance, while compliance with other details depends 
on the courts. 
39 See Recommended Changes Report (1992) 1. 
40 Section 126 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Aus). 
41 See chapter 4 at 3.2. 
42 Section 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1953 (Cn). 
43 Intellectual Property Law Improvement Act 1993; World Trade Organisation Act 1994. 
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4.4 SOUTH AFRICA 
Although South Africa was party to neither the negotiations nor the drafting process of 
GATT, the country has acceded to the agreement.44 As a member of the world Trade 
Organization, South Africa has also become party to TRIPS. TRIPS membership 
carries with it the obligation on member states to bring their municipal legislation into 
line with the requirements of the agreement.45 However, as in South African law 
international agreements find municipal application only once they have been 
incorporated into the law by legislation,46 until such time as the GATT, and with it 
TRIPS, has been incorporated, this obligation must be regarded as inchoate.47 It should 
also be borne in mind that the municipal application of an international agreement is 
further subject to the agreement not conflicting with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament. It is therefore necessary to determine whether the current South African 
trade mark legislation complies with the country's minimum international obligations in 
terms of TRIPS and, if not, whether amendments to ensure compliance will not run foul 
of the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.48 
It is generally accepted that the Trade Marks Act of 1993 complies with the minimum 
44 On 2 December 1994. 
45 Article 1.1. 
46 See Pan American (1965) 161; Tshwete (1988) 606 and section 231 (4) of the 1996 Constitution. 
The Constitution makes provision for certain exceptions. In terms of section 231(4) 'self 
executing' treaties or parts of treaties may be applied municipally without specific incorporation. 
The relevant provisions of TRIPS do not, however, fall within this category and the regular 
incorporation process must be followed. 
47 By acceding to an international treaty, the state undertakes in terms of article 18(a) of the Vienna 
Convention (1969) to refrain from any act which would defeat the object and purpose of the 
treaty. 
48 The inclusion of the phrase 'or an Act of Parliament' in section 231(4) is not without problems. 
As the incorporation is itself by Act of Parliament, the presumption that the more recent statute 
prevails in case of conflict comes into play. Furthermore, the provisions of section 233, in terms 
of which every court of law interpreting any legislation 'must prefer any reasonable interpretation 
... that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
with international law', leaves little space for municipal legislation to prevail over international 
provisions incorporated by statute. 
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TRIPS requirements.49 While this is correct in broad terms, there are areas where 
legislation or practice are not completely in line with the TRIPS requirements. 
4.4.1 Interdicts 
Final interdicts are available against intentional and innocent infringers. Interlocutory 
interdicts are also available for all infringements or threatened infringements, 
irrespective of the intention of the infringer. The South African requirement of a prima 
facie right for interlocutory interdicts accords with the TRIPS requirement that 
infringement of a right 'with a sufficient degree of certainty' must be shown for the grant 
of interlocutory relief. 
But the requirement that 'security or equivalent assurance' must be provided is not 
contained in any intellectual property legislation and is not consistently applied by our 
courts. It has been argued above that our courts should not view the offer of an 
undertaking as a safety measure which allows balance of convenience to become the 
paramount test for the grant of interlocutory relief. 50 It has also been argued that the 
American Cyanamid approach, which emphasises balance of convenience and the 
parties' ability to pay damages, conflicts with the TRIPS requirements. But it is clear 
that to comply fully with TRIPS it is necessary for an undertaking to be obtained from 
a plaintiff who seeks an interlocutory interdict. I submit that the refusal of interlocutory 
relief because a party is financially unable to furnish an undertaking is unconstitutional. 
The Bill of Rights provides that everyone is equal before the law and has the right to 
equal protection and benefit of the law.51 If a plaintiff is able to show a prima facie right 
which justifies the grant of interlocutory relief, his financial position cannot be a ground 
for the refusal of such relief. So an undertaking to pay damages cannot be an absolute 
requirement for the grant of interlocutory relief, but should be viewed as advisable if the 
49 Job (1996) 36; Rutherford (1995) 7; Standing Committee (1997) 6. 
50 See chapter 4 at 4.6.4. 
51 Section 9( 1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
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plaintiff is financially able to tender it. 
4.4.2 Damages 
The provisions of the Act regarding damages comply with the minimum TRIPS 
requirements in article 45. A successful plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages 
from a negligent or intentional infringer, while damages will not be awarded against an 
innocent infringer. The requirement that statutory damages or an account of profits be 
granted against an innocent infringer is not compulsory. But to state that our Act 
complies with the requirements for damages ignores the preamble to TRIPS and the 
general obligations imposed in respect of enforcement procedures. In both these 
clauses, remedies are required to be 'effective'. As no successful claim for damages 
for trade mark infringement has been instituted in South Africa during the century that 
such protection has been available, this remedy cannot be considered effective. It has 
been shown that the introduction of a reasonable royalty basis for quantifying damages 
holds its own problems.52 It has also been argued that, without amendment, the inquiry 
procedure will not assist a plaintiff seeking damages.53 I submit that the TRIPS 
requirements offer further support for the suggestion that statutory damages should be 
introduced in South African intellectual property legislation,54 as they can offer a plaintiff 
an effective and expeditious, although limited, form of compensation. 
4.4.3 Delivery up 
The Act makes provision for the removal of an infringing mark, or, if that is impossible, 
delivery up of infringing goods. It has been argued above55 that the Act should be 
amended to provide that, if delivery up is ordered, it is for purposes of destruction and 
52 See chapter 5 at 7.2.3. 
53 See chapter 6 at 5.8. 
54 See chapter 5 at 7.3. 
55 See chapter 7 at 6. 
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not for forfeiture to the plaintiff. TRIPS requires that infringing goods be disposed of 
outside the channels of commerce, or, unless contrary to constitutional requirements, 
destroyed, and that this procedure should create 'an effective deterrent to infringement'. 
Our Constitution provides, in the Bill of Rights, that no one may be deprived of property 
'except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property'. 56 The limitation clause provides that a fundamental right may 
be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable, taking into account factors which include the purpose and 
extent of the limitation and whether there are less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose.57 
I submit that the form of delivery up for which provision is made in our Act is not 
contrary to the Constitution. The Act is of general application and the deprivation of 
property is not arbitrary but occurs after a finding of infringement. The purpose of 
section 34(3)(b) is to prevent further infringement and for that reason the infringing 
mark is removed from goods. It is only when this cannot be done that property is 
destroyed. But amendment of our Act to comply fully with the TRIPS requirements may 
be unconstitutional. A remedy which is intended to serve a deterrent function by 
destroying goods is unlikely to be viewed as using the 'least restrictive means'. As it is 
not clear what is meant by disposal 'outside the channels of commerce', the 
constitutional acceptability of this remedy cannot be considered further. In any event, 
TRIPS provides that destruction need not be available if it is contrary to constitutional 
requirements, and South Africa can be said to comply with TRIPS if removal, or, if that 
is not possible, destruction, is available. 
56 Section 25( 1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
57 Section 36( 1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
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4.4.4 Abuse of enforcement procedures 
The requirement in article 48 of TRIPS, that a party who has abused enforcement 
procedures must pay a party who has been wrongfully 'enjoined or restrained' 
adequate compensation, is difficult to interpret. This requirement must relate only to 
final interdicts, as separate provision is made for security in respect of provisional 
proceedings. In terms of both statute and common law, a judgment or order may be set 
aside in certain circumstances,58 one of them being that the plaintiff was guilty of fraud 
which led to the grant of the judgment.59 But if an order is set aside, or if a court on 
appeal finds that the plaintiff abused an enforcement procedure, the court merely 
rescinds or amends the order. The court does not during such proceedings order that 
the defendant be compensated. A defendant will have to institute substantive new 
proceedings to recover any damages suffered as a result of the plaintiff's abuse of 
process. As the defendant is theoretically able to obtain compensation, it is difficult to 
imagine why any provision should be included, in intellectual property legislation only, 
which grants a defendant an automatic right to recover damages if a final interdict is 
overturned on appeal or set aside because of an abuse of procedure. 
5 CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that our legislation and court practice do not accord completely with 
the TRIPS requirements. The minor changes that are necessary, and constitutionally 
acceptable, will be dealt with in the chapter containing recommendations for change.00 
But our legislature should not merely look at the letter of the TRIPS requirements. 
TRIPS details three functions that intellectual property remedies must serve: 
prevention, compensation, and deterrence. 
58 Uniform Rule 42(1); Erasmus (1994) 81-306; Harms (1992) 421. 
59 Swart (1924) 189-190. 
60 Chapter 9. 
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The preventative function is well implemented in South Africa. Both final and 
interlocutory interdicts are available and frequently granted. While provision is made 
for compensation in the form of damages, no such award for trade mark infringement 
has ever been made. It is apparent that this function is not implemented effectively. No 
provision is made in our legislation or common law for a civil remedy that serves a 
deterrent function, and I think that our Constitution does not permit the remedy of 
removal or delivery up to serve this purpose. It is true that criminal remedies serve a 
deterrent function. But in the current South African situation, it is unlikely that criminal 
action against trade mark infringement will be viewed as a priority. Criminal remedies 
were available under previous legislation, but were for various reasons seldom used. 
They are even less likely to be used in the near future. The only remedy which 
currently serves a deterrent function is a costs order: this is the only way in which an 
infringer is forced to ,pay an amount greater than he would have had to pay had he 
acted legally. South Africa has rejected the remedy of accounts, which forces an 
infringer to disgorge his profits, and the old copyright remedies of conversion and 
detention were never accepted as part of our general intellectual property remedies 
and have been omitted from current legislation. 
I submit that the compensatory and deterrent functions required by TRIPS demand 
greater attention from our legislature and our courts. Trade mark infringement will 
continue as a growth industry until it is made unprofitable. Currently, reliance cannot 
be placed on criminal remedies to stop infringement. What is needed are easier 
procedures to obtain compensatory damages or reasonable royalties, the introduction 
of statutory damages which will serve as a deterrent and is an inexpensive and speedy 
alternative to compensatory damages, and the creative use of mandatory interdicts 
(which could also serve a deterrent function). 
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Trade mark infringement and passing off occur regularly in South Africa. Since 
reacceptance by the international community, the problem appears to have increased, 
despite new legislation detailing the remedies available to rightholders. 
The problems experienced under previous legislation were in a large part due to 
English influence in the intellectual property field, coupled with references to English 
remedies in our intellectual property legislation. These attempts to introduce English 
remedies, without an adequate description of the remedy concerned and a 
consideration of whether it accorded with our common law, led to a rejection by the 
courts of any assistance to trade mark owners which was not firmly based on Roman-
Dutch principles. 
To some extent, this problem has been perpetuated in current trade mark legislation. 
The Act refers to remedies such as delivery up and inquiries as to damages, which 
have specific meanings in England. In their English form, these remedies do not 
necessarily dovetail with traditional Roman-Dutch principles, and risk rejection by our 
courts if incorrectly applied. The introduction of the concept of a reasonable royalty, 
without clarifying whether it is a substantive remedy or a method of calculating 
damages, and without due consideration of the evidentiary problems it poses, will 
possibly result in the rejection of a further remedy intended to assist plaintiffs in the 
recovery of damages. 
In this thesis, the various remedies named in the 1993 Trade Marks Act have been 
placed in their historical context. Existing or future problems in their application in the 
South African legal system have been identified. Their compliance with TRIPS has also 
been considered. To conclude the thesis, some suggestions to make these remedies 
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more useful to South African litigants are made, and the introduction of a further 
remedy, which might serve the deterrent function required by TRIPS, is suggested. 
2 FINAL INTERDICTS 
Prohibitory interdicts are often granted by our courts. No particular problems regarding 
the requirements for or procedure to obtain such interdicts have been identified. 
Mandatory interdicts are seldom requested in trade mark infringement and passing off 
proceedings. The value of such interdicts is discussed in chapter 3. 1 There is nothing 
in our common law or in legislation which prevents our courts from granting such 
orders. Mandatory orders can serve a deterrent function, both because the defendant 
is forced to spend money to correct the misconceptions he created, and because 
mandatory orders, such as corrective advertising, cause him embarrassment. These 
orders can also serve a compensatory function by alleviating the expense which the 
plaintiff would have incurred to minimise the problems occasioned by a defendant's 
infringement. I suggest that practitioners include requests for corrective advertisements 
in appropriate instances of trade mark infringement and passing off. Where action is 
taken against parallel imports, requests for warning labels, similar to those in the 
Consumer Code for Electronic Advertising, should be included in the prayers for final 
relief. Other forms of mandatory orders which have been identified in America as 
appropriate in instances of trade mark infringment and passing off, are telephone 
answering messages, product recalls, customer refunds, and name changes. None of 
these orders is outside the jurisdiction of our courts and they all serve the deterrrent 
function emphasised by TRIPS. 
3 INTERLOCUTORY INTERDICTS 
The primary problem which is identified in chapter 4, is the possible introduction in 
1 See chapter 3 at 8.5. See also the same chapter at 8.3. 
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South Africa of an American Cyanamid type of test for the grant of interlocutory relief. 
I have argued that a test which primarily considers the parties' strength of case rather 
than their financial means is to be preferred and that the South African approach 
should be retained. Acceptance of the American Cyanamid approach appears to be on 
the wane in England, and it is debatable whether it is in accordance with the TRIPS 
requirement that infringement of a right must be shown 'with a sufficient degree of 
certainty'. 
The further problem identified in this chapter is the increasing reliance by the courts on 
the tender of an undertaking as to damages by the plaintiff, before they will grant 
interlocutory relief. I have argued that our courts should not view an undertaking as a 
substitute for a consideration of the merits. But TRIPS demands that the courts require 
a plaintiff to 'provide a security or equivalent assurance sufficient to protect the 
defendant'. Despite this, a court retains a discretion to impose such a requirement, and 
I have argued that to make this an absolute requirement is unconstitutional. Still, to 
comply with TRIPS, our courts may request an undertaking before granting 
interlocutory relief when a plaintiff is financially able to tender it, but they should not 
view the undertaking as making a consideration of the merits unnecessary. 
4 COMPENSATORY DAMAGES 
Some problems arising from the English influence on our intellectual property law and 
which impact on the award of compensatory damages have been identified. 
The first is the requirement of fault, in the form of intention or negligence, before 
compensatory damages will be awarded in South Africa. I have argued that, 
irrespective of English decisions, this requirement is firmly entrenched in our common 
law and must be maintained. Also, it is in accordance with TRIPS, which provides for 
awards of damages only against infringers who 'knowingly, or with reasonable grounds 
to know' engage in infringing activity. 
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The second problem is the misconception that awards of damages are made in 
England without proof of actual damages, and the suggestion that this is also the 
position in South Africa. I have shown that this is not correct, and that our law will 
award only proved loss as compensation for infringement. 
A plaintiff in South Africa has to prove both fault on the part of the defendant, and 
actual loss, before an award of compensatory damages will be made. The evidentiary 
difficulties attendant on proving loss, coupled with procedural difficulties, have resulted 
in no plaintiff ever obtaining an award of damages for trade mark infringement. 
It was to address this problem that a damages award based on the concept of a 
reasonable royalty was introduced in the 1993 Trade Marks Act. A consideration of this 
concept leads to the conclusion that our courts will probably view it as being based on 
compensatory principles. A study of its application in English and American intellectual 
property proceedings also leads to the conclusion that it is subject to the same 
evidentiary problems experienced when attempting to recover compensatory damages. 
It appears that any attempt to recover damages awarded on compensatory principles 
will be expensive and time-consuming. 
5 STATUTORY DAMAGES 
Since compensatory damages are difficult to obtain, they will not be sought unless a 
large amount is at stake and unless the defendant is in a position to pay such damages 
and the costs attendant on their proof. So compensatory damages will rarely fulfil their 
compensatory function, and will serve no deterrent function. 
I have suggested that to deal with this problem, a form of statutory damages similar to 
that in the new Canadian Copyright Act should be introduced in South Africa for all 
intellectual property legislation. This should clearly state that the purpose of the remedy 
is not compensatory. The plaintiff should have the option of using this remedy rather 
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than pursuing compensatory damages. If he elects to seek statutory damages, the court 
should be obliged, after a finding of infringement and together with the grant of a final 
interdict, to order the defendant to pay the plaintiff an amount, within set parameters, 
in lieu of damages. Although such an amount will rarely serve a compensatory function, 
it is viewed in both Canada and America as serving a deterrent function. It is a fast and 
inexpensive way of giving a plaintiff some relief, while creating a deterrent to 
infringement. 
The English concepts of nominal and punitive damages have been rejected by our 
courts. To ensure that statutory damages do not meet a similar fate, their purpose and 
ambit will have to be clearly described in legislation. Parliament will have to make it 
clear that the remedy is not Aquilian, must not be assessed on a compensatory basis, 
and does not require proof of actual damage. 
6 INQUIRIES AS TO DAMAGES 
The introduction of the inquiry procedure in South Africa is welcome. It is possible that 
the inquiry procedure will alleviate some of the procedural problems which have made 
compensatory damages so difficult to obtain. But until this procedure is detailed in 
legislation, our courts will continue to view it as merely a separation of merits and 
quantum, which will reduce its usefulness. It is essential that statutory provision be 
made that no evidence or pre-trial procedures concerning quantum need attention until 
after a determination of the merits. For the procedure to be of any value, it must be 
possible to order an inquiry when a final interdict is granted, even if this is granted on 
application, provided that fault has been proved. 
I have suggested two options for legislative amendment. The first is to amend Uniform 
Rule 33(5) to include the following sentence: 
'Where a postponement is granted for the issue of damages to be investigated 
and determined by the court, the court may order that the parties need not 
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comply further with the provisions of rules 21 (2), 35, 36 or 37 in so far as they 
pertain to this issue, and where an inquiry as to damages is requested, these 
rules and the provisions of rules 18(4) and 18(10) need not be complied with in 
so far as they relate to the issue of damages'. 
The second option is to amend section 34(4) of the Trade Marks Act of 1993 to read 
as follows: 
'Where a proprietor seeks damages or, in lieu of damages, a reasonable royalty 
and he requests an inquiry as to damages in the summons or notice of motion 
commencing proceedings for infringement, the provisions of rules 18(4), 18(10), 
21(2) 35, 36 and 37 of the Uniform Rules need not be complied with in so far as 
they relate to the amount of damages and the manner in which such damages 
are computed. The court may then, after an order on liability is made, give 
directions regarding compliance with these rules'. 
7 REMOVAL AND DELIVERY UP 
While both these orders can be viewed as being based on the assumption that a 
prohibitory interdict will not be obeyed, I have argued that they are forms of mandatory 
interdict and as such acceptable in terms of our common law. Removal orders, unlike 
orders for delivery up, were not criticised in the Cerebos decision. 
It is argued that the term delivery up, as used in our Act, does not bear the meaning 
ascribed to the term in current English intellectual property legislation, where it has 
been described as a form of forfeiture for the plaintiff's benefit. I suggest that, to avoid 
confusion, our Act should be amended to provide specifically that, if delivery to the 
plaintiff is ordered, it is for the destruction of goods from which infringing marks cannot 
be removed. 
The TRIPS requirements on this remedy are not clear. Although TRIPS states that this 
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remedy must serve a deterrent purpose, our Constitution provides that persons may not 
be deprived of property if less restrictive means are available. A removal order, when 
possible, will presumably be viewed as less restrictive. 
8 OTHER TRIPS REQUIREMENTS 
I do not think that it is feasible to include a provision only in intellectual property 
legislation indemnifying a defendant against the wrongful grant of a final interdict. Such 
interdicts are granted only after a full consideration of the facts. In the unlikely event 
of the grant of an order based on fraud or abuse of process, the defendant can apply 
to have the judgment Sf:!t aside and institute a fresh action for damages. 
9 CONCLUSION 
It is essential to have legal clarity on what trade mark rights encompass and what 
behaviour contitutes infringement or passing off. Yet a plaintiff does not institute legal 
proceedings to obtain a well-reasoned judgment on the nature of trade mark rights or 
the similarity between two marks. A plaintiff in trade mark infringement and passing off 
proceedings wants immeqiijt~ cessation of infringement or pas~in~ off, a permanent 
prohibition against such actions, and compensation for his losses. Tt)e whole body of 
law dealing with trade marl<~ ~nd passing off is intended to offer a p'aintiff with such 
{ ,. 
rights enforceable protection for these rights. Despite this, legisl~tipn, c2urts, and 
' '''· 
writers pay scant attention to the remedies which are available to prevent, compensate 
for, or deter infringement. Even the most comprehensive rights are futile if a right-
holder cannot enforce them, or cannot be told what the extent of his protection is. 
Parliament and our courts have paid too little attention to the enforcement of rights 
relating to trade marks or goodwill. The introduction in legislation of the English 
terminology used to describe remedies, and the swift rejection by the courts of such 
remedies because of their Engtish origin, have left plaintiffs with no effective remedy 
other than an interdict. White this remedy is of inestimable value in preventing 
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infringement, it neither compensates a plaintiff nor deters further infringement. 
I hope that this thesis wm, to some extent, show the way towards redressing the 
balance. 
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